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Abstract
This thesis outlines the evolution and roles of the political fronts in Northern Ireland 
and their potential for attaining political change. It will assess the impact of a number 
of selected ‘variables’, both ‘internal’ and ‘external’, on the utility (or lack of utility) 
of these fronts. The variables that have been selected for consideration are: 1) 
Ideology, structure and leadership, 2) The notion of violence as a habit, 3) Popular 
support, 4) State response and 5) Other factors and events in the External 
Environment. Alexander George’s ‘structured, focused, comparison’ methodology 
will be employed and the selected cases are the Irish Republican Army, the Ulster 
Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force. Although all of the ‘variables’ 
have had a significant impact the thesis argues that the gr eatest motivation behind the 
use of Siiui Fein has been the desire to mobilise or tap perceived existing support. In 
the case of the loyalist political fi'onts the domestic external enviromnent, specifically 
the perception that the loyalist working classes had been manipulated by ‘respectable’ 
unionist politicians, was the most important factor behind their greater use. 
Paradoxically, it is unionist culture (such as its ‘law abiding’ nature and division of 
labour ethos) that has presented the most significant obstacle to their utility.
The thesis will then assess whether or not political fr onts represent moderation 
towards the use of violence on the part of the groups. It will suggest that they have in 
the loyalist cases. Although the following argues that political fronts are very much 
part of the ‘terrorist machinery’ as the political voices and propaganda outlets for 
terrorist groups, and that it is a misconception to view them as the ‘moderate half of a 
movement, the thesis will contend that Sinn Fein has also ultimately come to 
represent moderation towards the use of violence. The conclusion will then suggest 
that the selected variables be tested in other examples and, assuming that Sinn Fein 
has come to represent moderation towards the use of violence, will then attempt to 
draw some lessons fi orn the case of the IRA and its political fr ont that might he 
considered when studying other cases.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
XeiTorism has the power to adversely affect peace processes, disrupt societies and 
hamper policy implementation. From the 1970s it has become a global phenomenon 
and, as most conflicts today take place within states rather than between them^ it is 
imperative that we should study those sub-state groups engaged in violence in order to 
understand the international system itself. The events of September if^^ 2001 has 
made such research more important than it has ever been.
For the purposes of this thesis terrorism is defined as
‘the use, or tlu'eat of use, of violence hy an individual or a group, whether 
acting for or in opposition to estahlished authority, when such action is 
designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target 
group lai'ger than the immediate victims with the piupose of coercing that 
gi'oup into acceding to the political demands of the p e r p e t r a t o r s .’2
Teirorism in general has been an understudied area of international relations and it is 
perhaps therefore not surprising that there are some areas within the topic that have 
yet to be studied in detail. While there are a number of excellent general publications 
on tenorism as well as on particular groups and their strategies, one area of study that
 ^ Jongman, A., and Sclunid, A., ‘Contemporaiy Conflicts and Human Rights Violations, 1998’, 
Tenorism and Political Violence. Autimm 1999, Vol. 11, No. 3.
has been neglected is the phenomena of teiTorist ‘political fronts’. This thesis attempts 
to tackle the question as to why it is that some terrorist organisations utilise political 
fronts, and to examine their roles and potential for attaining political change, using 
Northern Ireland examples of both republican and loyalist fronts.
There have, as far as the writer is aware, been no works published on this specific 
topic. Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank have written on a similar subject in 
reverse -  describing the evolution of teiTorist gioups from political parties. They 
suggest that in these cases ‘organizational or propaganda’ means for radicals to ai'gue 
their case either do not work or ‘at least not at the pace the radicals hope to achieve’.^  
This thesis ai'gues that political ‘fronts’ can be used when the opposite realisation 
occiu's, in other words when victoiy is not envisaged in the short tenn tlmough the use 
of violence alone (for example the IRA’s ‘Long War*’ strategy of the 1970s). Although 
Weinherg and Eubanlc address different types of linkage between terrorist 
organisations and political parties they do not set out to explain the use of ‘political 
fi'onts’.
As outlined in the methodology below this thesis is primarily concerned with cases in 
Northern Ireland -  the frish Republican Army, the Ulster Defence Association and the 
Ulster Volmiteer Force. There have been a number of works written on the evolution 
of Sinn Fein witliin the Irish republican movement but none has specifically 
scmtinised the utility of Simi Fein as a ‘front’. Less emphasis on a political strategy 
does not necessarily mean that a political fr ont loses its utility. Sum Fein, for example, 
has had fmictions that are less ‘political’ than others, such as ‘commmiity policing’
2 Wardlaw, G., Political Ten-orism, Cambridge: The University Press O f Cambridge, 1982, p. 16.
and its propaganda role. In sum, a role for the political front is not necessarily 
synonymous with more emphasis on a political strategy.
A review of the literature of the Northern freland conflict shows that, although it is 
profuse, again there is little attention given to the role of political fronts. There are a 
number of excellent books that document the histoiy of the IRA, (most notably by 
Bowyer Bell, Tim Pat Coogan, Bishop and Mallie, and M.L.R. Smith), and of the 
histoiy of the conflict generally. Conor Cruise O’Brien’s States O f Ireland and 
Richard Rose’s Government Without Consensus provide authoritative accounts of the 
decades leading up to the outbrealc of the ‘Troubles’. There has also been a 
proliferation of books that cover the period fr om tlie early 1970s, again both analysing 
the conflict and more specifically the growth of loyalist and republican paramilitaiy 
groups. None of them address in detail the role or the reasons for the existence of the 
political front -  although Hemy Patterson’s The Politics o f Illusion, A Political 
History O f The IRA does shed some light on the phenomena studied here by assessing 
the impact of the resiugence of republican socialism in the 1930s on republican 
strategy and how it generated gieater political involvement, either tlu'ough 
‘conventional’ electoral participation or giass roots agitation.
There are, however, works that describe in detail the rise of Simi Fein as a player from 
the late 1970s^ -  tliis is clearly of key interest to this thesis. It is possible that a 
political fr'ont may well be used as an avenue to a more political approach on the part
2 Weinberg, L., and Eubank W., ‘Political Parties and the Formation o f Terrorist Groups’, Tenorism  
and Political Violence. Summer 1990, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 126.
 ^By, for example, Brendan O’Brien ITlie Long War. The IRA And Sinn Fein. O’Brien Press, Dublin, 
1995), Peter Taylor (Provos. The IRA And Simi Fein. Bloomsbiuy, London, 1997), Liam Clarke 
(Broadening the Battlefield, The H Blocks and the Rise o f Sum Fein. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin 1987)
of a ‘movement’ or indeed as the ultimate means to embrace democracy and leave 
violence behind. Brendan O’Brien has paid particular attention to the growing 
prominence of Sinn Fein in The Long War. Patterson’s book also examines the 
political front’s increased role, describing republican stiategy in the late 1970s as the 
‘rediscovery of social republicanism,’ heralding an elevated role for the political 
fi'ont.5 Taylor in Provos also assesses the political front’s role from 1977. These 
authors have, however, in the main described Sinn Fern’s increased prominence 
tlu'OUgh its role in the republican movement’s evolving political strategy without 
outlining some of the other roles of Sinn Fein, such as its function as a propaganda 
tool, or in vigilante justice, or in the orchestration of street violence.
Less studied have been the loyalist groups, with the notable exception of Steve Bruce, 
who documents the origins of the UDA’s and the UVF’s political fronts and reveals 
the veiy different reasons for, and problems with, the prospects of these groups using 
such fr onts.^ Adrian Guelke and Jim Smyth have sought to explain why loyalists and 
republicans entered the electoral process in the early 1980s. Although the use of 
political fr onts by loyalists does appear to be more synonymous with engagement with 
the electoral process?, in general such endeavours form only one of the potential 
fimctions of a political fr ont.
It would be useful to draw up a model of what characterises such ‘fronts’ as distinct 
from conventional political parties. Comparisons could be made with far right
Jack Holland (Hope Against History. The Ulster Conflict! Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1999), Ed 
Moloney (A Secret History o f  the IRA. Penguin, 2002).
 ^ Patterson, H., The Politics O f Illusion. A Political History O f The IRA. Serif, London, 1997, p. 180.
 ^Bruce, S., The Red Hand. Protestant Paramilitaries In Nortliern Ireland. Oxford University Press, 
1992.
political parties such as the ‘post-fascist’ Alleanza Nationale in Italy or the Gemian 
NPD (National Democratic Party). Weinberg states that ‘some definitions of ‘political 
party’ restrict its meaning to organizations which accept the legitimacy of the 
prevailing order or ones that operate in national contexts where an atmosphere 
supportive of pluralism exists.C learly ‘parties’ like Sinn Fein would not meet these 
criteria. The literature on political parties does not locate political fronts in any model 
of political parties, though they are sometimes inaccurately described as members of 
Duverger’s ‘militia paity’ group (see chapter 3).  ^The Chambers dictionaiy describes 
the word ‘front’ as ‘the face, appeamnce; ... the side presented to view’.^ ® For the 
piu-poses of this thesis terrorist political fronts are defrned as organisations that 
provide a public face and a political voice for teiTorist groups and are characterised by 
the dual membership that exists between the two.
This project will focus on why some terrorist groups utilise political fronts and others 
do not. Thus, while it is not directly concerned with conflict resolution or peace 
processes per se (wliich others have addressed), it does set out to acliieve an improved 
understanding of the strategies of such groups. This will not only provide a useful 
conti'ihution to social scientific knowledge, with developments in causal analysis in 
particular, but it is also believed that opportunities for conflict resolution between 
governments and violent sub-state actors will ultimately be enlianced by a better 
understanding of such groups and their strategies.
? As borne out in Guelke, A., and Smyth, J-, 'The Ballot Bomb: Tenorism And The Electoral Process 
In Northern Ireland', Terrorism And Political Violence. Vol. 4, No. 2, (Summer, 1992), pp. 103-124.
® Op. cit. Weinberg and Eubank p .128.
 ^Such as in Hague R., Hanop M,, and Breslin S., Comparative Govenmient And Politics. Macmillan, 
Basingstoke and London, 1992, p. 238.
Chambers Giant Paperback Dictionary. Harrap, Edinburgh, 1998.
This is not to say, of course, that this work has no relevance to conflict resolution. For 
example, the possibility that a political front might be utilised as a sign of moderation 
towards the use of violence is also assessed, and the factors that lead to this may also 
be those tliat help facilitate resolution and a peace process. It will be argued, however, 
that there are also other potentially significant factors behind the adoption of the 
‘conventional’ political route on the part of a teiTorist group, all of which will be of 
particular interest, not just to liberal democratic governments and national policy 
makers, but to a variety of policy communities such as non-governmental 
organisations, the United Nations and the European Community.
The aim of this thesis is to make its own modest contribution to theory formulation by 
assessing the impact of a number of ‘key’ variables on a terrorist group’s decision to 
utilise a political front and/or participate (or not) in ‘conventional’ politics. It is 
tluough the assessment of these ‘variables’ that the different roles and utilities of the 
political front will he outlined. Wliilst it does not set out to construct an over-arching 
general theoiy, its conclusions can contribute to hypothesis building through 
subsequent analysis of fiuther case studies. The following will attempt to addr ess why 
some teiTorist gi'oups engage in ‘above ground’ politics more than others, or indeed 
why the same group enters the political process on some occasions but not others. The 
objective is to understand the extent to which a more ‘political route’ emerges because 
of the perceived failure of terrorism, or the belief that ten orism has served its piupose. 
Are political fronts, for example, created with the ultimate objective of abandoning 
violence? Alternatively, are they formed to launch a dual-track strategy that re­
emphasises the primary role of violence? Or do some insurgent groups resist the 
‘political route’ because of the perceived success of tenorism, where violence alone is 
viewed as having great utility? The possibility, however, that political fronts can be
utilised in other ways that do not necessarily entail engagement with ‘politics’ 
(abstentionist or not), such as vigilantism or ‘community policing’, should not be 
overlooked. Moreover, political fronts very much foim part of the terrorist machinery 
as the ‘political voice’ or the propaganda tool of teiTorist groups.
There are a variety of methodologies that could be employed to explore the above 
research questions. The statistical method entails the ‘conceptual (mathematical) 
manipulation of empirically obsei-ved data ... in order to discover controlled 
relationships among variables’12. Its advantage is that because it deals with a large 
luunher of cases it is useful as a hypothesis generating approach. However, whilst this 
thesis will focus on key variables, which the statistical method is able to do, the 
uniqueness of each case should not be compromised by what Sartori refers to as 
‘conceptual stretching’, or ‘conceptual straining ....to vague, amorphous 
conceptualizations’ so that ‘oui' gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by 
losses in comiotive p r e c i s i o n ’ ^2 pje adds that ‘...the more we climb toward liigh-flown 
imiversals’, (which the statistical method purports to be able to do), ‘the more tenuous 
the linlc with the empirical evidence.’ More significantly, the ‘contiolled variables’ 
that will be employed that make the cases worthy of compaiison will restrict the 
number of cases actually available for study, which fiuther discredits the statistical 
approach as the appropriate method for this thesis.
‘Methodology’, to use Sartori’s definition, I use to refer to ‘a concern witli the logical stmcture and 
procedure o f scientific enquiry’ (G. Sartori, ‘Concept Misfomiation In Comparative Politics’, The 
American Political Science Review. Vol. LXIV, No. 4, p. 1033.)
2^ Lipjhart, A .,‘Comparative Politics And The Comparative Metliod’, American Political Science 
Review. September 1971, Vol. 65, No. 3, p. 684.
2^ Op. cit. Sartori p. 1034.
14 Ibid. p. 1035.
The strength of the case study method is that attention can be paid to every detail in 
order to understand the use of a political front on the part of a teiTorist gi'oup, without 
any need to focus on ‘key variables’. However, by virtue of the fact that one cannot 
make any generalisations fr om just tlie one case, this, too is not the most appropriate 
methodology available for what this thesis sets out to achieve.
Some foim of comparative analysis, by natuie of the fact that it focuses on more than 
one case, contributes more to hypothesis foiinulation and theory building. Wliilst the 
smaller number of cases and potentially large number of variables (or concepts) would 
still restrict this thesis’ capacity to generate typologies it nevertheless aims to make a 
contribution to theory foiinulation that can be expanded upon by subsequent analyses 
of further cases. Two of the ways that Arend Lipjhart suggests to minimise the 
problem of too many variables and too few cases are to look at cases longitudinally, 
by, for example, focusing on, say, two different time periods of the same teiTorist 
group, thereby increasing the number of cases, and secondly by ensuring that they are 
‘comparahle’. That is ‘similar in a large number of important characteristics 
(variables) which one wants to tieat as constants, but dissimilar as far as those 
variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each other’. T h e  latter allows 
us to establish ‘relationships among a few variables while many other variables are 
controlled’, and thus alleviates the difficulty of too many variables.
As intimated above, however, and notwithstanding these suggestions, the comparative 
case study approach does restrict the scope for making general hypotheses. ‘Some loss 
of infoiination and some simplification is inherent in generalisation and in any effort
Op. cit. Lipjhart p. 687. 
Ibid.
at theoiy formulation’,i? but, as Stretton argues, ‘comparison is strongest as a 
choosing and provoking, not a proving, device: a system for questioning not 
answering.’1^  Partial generalisations based on just a couple of cases, therefore, can 
provoke and develop further theoiy formulation when tested within a wider sample. 
As Alexander George points out, although histoiy does not repeat itself, for each case 
possesses unique features, we could still classify different types of phenomena and 
come up with general laws.i^
Indeed, having smmised that a compaiative approach would most fit the research 
agenda, it is George’s ‘structuied, focused compaiison’ method that will be adopted in 
this thesis - (‘focused because it deals selectively with only certain aspects [or ‘key’ 
vaiiahles] of the historical case ... and structured because it employs general 
questions [or reseai'ch questions] to guide the data collection and analysis in that 
historical case.’^ o) Whilst a positivist, scientific approach is useful for explanation and 
policy relevance there is also a need for contextual sensitivity and cultural 
understanding, unravelling the layers of meaning that might not mean much to 
positivists but do to the indigenous population. This more hermeneutic emphasis will 
help one to understand the cases ‘inside out’. The advantage of the ‘structuied, 
focused compaiison’ is that it is a positivist method that also seeks to accommodate 
culture and ‘local’ conditions.
George, A., ‘Case Studies And Theoiy Development: The Method O f Structured Focused 
Comparison’, in Lauren, P., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History. Theory and Policy. N ew  York, 
Free Press, 1979, p. 47.
Stretton H,, quoted in Lipjhart, A., ‘The Comparable-Cases Strategy In Comparative Research’, 
Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 8, No. 2, July 1975, p. 160.
Op. cit. George p. 45.
20 Ibid. pp. 61-2
Wlien assessing the impact of each of the key variables, a clear distinction should be 
made between a political front’s political involvement that represents a more 
moderate approach on the part of the group and political engagement that does not. 
Whilst a more political route may indeed come about through a ‘softening’ of 
attitudes towards the use of violence, it might also develop as part of a sti'ategy that 
re-emphasises its utility. Thus, two veiy different strategies might emerge (as a result 
of one or more of the following variables) that both involve conventional political 
participation. The ‘key variables’ or concepts within the internal and external 
environments that will be related in each case as potential causes for the presence or 
absence of the phenomenon in question are:
The Internal Environment
1) Ideology, Stmcture, and Leadership
The ideology, structure and leadership of the groups will he assessed for their impact 
on strategy and on the utility of a political front.
2) The notion of violence as a habit.
The intention is to explore the difficulties, if any, that teiTorists have in relinquishing 
violence and how this may have impacted on the utility of the political fr ont. This will 
be viewed at both the group and individual level, where the notion of ‘no going back’ 
and the idea of a kind of family attachment with fellow insurgents will be 
investigated.
10
The External Environment
3) Popular Support
Popular support for a teiTorist gi*oup will be studied at both the structural level (where 
a state’s jurisdiction may be perceived by a ‘constituency’ as illegitimate) and ad hoc, 
where its level may vaiy due to events in the environment, for its impact on the utility 
of a political front. As stated above, whilst a high level of popular support may inhihit 
political participation as a sign of moderation, it does not preclude the possibility of 
entering the political process as part of a dual-track strategy that actually re­
emphasises the primaiy role o f violence.
4) State Response
The state’s response will he studied for its effects on the stiategies of the case studies. 
Its reaction to tenorism can militate against or result in the greater use of a political 
front. The success of security operations against teiTorists may force them to thinic 
more politically, ie. because of the perceived failure of terrorism as a tactic. 
Alternatively, if a government ‘over-reacts’ it can help a tenorist group prosper 
tlnough an increase in popular support for violence (which might be seen as legitimate 
against ‘government oppression’), and therefore lessen the chance for moderation and 
any political involvement that might represent such moderation. A group might, 
however, wish to tap the high level of popular' suppoi't politically and may therefore
11
enter the political process as part of a dual-track strategy with the political front as the 
‘junior partner’.
5) Changes In The External Environment
The effects of changes in the indigenous political conditions on the strategies of 
teiTorist groups will be assessed as will the impact of changes in the international 
strategic environment.
There is a considerable amount of overlap and interaction between these vaiiahles. 
For example, the kind of government response may determine the level of popular' 
support for a group, which in tmn may or may not prompt that group to re-evaluate its 
strategy. Thus, a combination of factors may result in str ategies that involve a gr eater 
or lesser role for the political fr ont which in tru-n may lead to engagement in (as a sign 
of moderation or otherwise), or absence fr om, the conventional political process.
Having outlined the methodology and the key variables the next step is the selection 
of case studies that fit the research ‘problem’. For the piu'poses of this thesis these will 
be the two cases of the Irish Republican Army (1956-69 and 1970 onwards), the 
Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force. As George argues, the 
cases must all be instances of the same class or universe, or in other words one ‘must 
not mix apples, oranges and pears’^ h The choice of Northern freland as the context for 
the cases provides the autlior with a number of crucial ‘conti'ols’ for comparison. The 
close geographical proximity of the cases will, it is contended, reveal a ‘cluster of
2^  Ibid. p. 55.
12
characteristics that areas tend to have in common and that can therefore be used as
controls’22.
This is not to say that there aren’t any difficulties in choosing these particular cases. It 
is, for example, questionable as to whether the ‘pro-state’ tenorist groups (the UDA 
and the UVF) can he usefully compar ed to the anti-state tenorist group of the IRA. 
After all the ‘pro-state’ imionists have been securely in power since the partition of 
the island so it would seem less likely for the loyalist groups to enter conventional 
politics and compete with the major imionist parties that already represent their 
primary interest - that of the future security of Northern Ireland’s place within the 
United Kingdorn.22 The IRA, it would appear, has had far more reason to engage in 
above ground politics since the group has set out to challenge the status quo and 
unionist dominance. Nevertheless, the contention here is that, although there are 
differences in the problems faced and strategies pursued by ‘pro-state’ groups and 
their ‘anti-state’ counterparts (and these will he outlined), it could be argued that the 
ERA, hy adopting the ‘political route’, would, like the UDA and the UVF with the 
unionist parties, be competing with the constitutional nationalist party (the Social and 
Democratic Laboiu Party) that itself advocates the main raison d’être for the IRA (a 
united Ireland). In other words both the IRA and the loyalist groups have had 
constitutional alternatives for piusuing their diametrically opposite goals without 
having to establish or utilise their own ‘political fronts’ and this enhances their 
potential for comparability.
22 Op. cit. Lipjhart, ‘Comparative Politics And The Comparative Metliod’, p. 688.
22 This thesis will argue, however, tliat it was precisely the disillusionment with unionist politicians that 
helped prompt the loyalist groups to establish political fronts.
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A second problem with this particular choice of case studies is that they are not truly 
independent because the IRA and loyalist gr oups operate within the same region of a 
‘nation-state’ and, because they are in direct opposition to one another (in a conflict 
that is often perceived as a ‘zero sum’ game), decisions taken by one side are 
inevitably going to be affected by the actions of the o t h e r . 24  Thus the three cases 
carmot be analysed in isolation from one another and this may undermine any attempt 
at generalisation. This admittedly could have heen avoided by using two completely 
‘separate’ cases.
It is true that a comparison with ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty), for example, 
and the IRA would have solved both of the above problems whilst retaining 
geographical proximity (ETA is also ‘anti-state’ and Spain is also a ‘Western 
democracy’). This, however, would reduce the number of ‘constant’ variables but 
perhaps more significantly the massive transfonnation in the political conditions that 
démocratisation in Spain brought about, which subsequently facilitated the creation of 
Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna’s ‘political fronts’ -  the EIA (the Basque Revolutionary 
Party) and HASI (The Revolutionary Socialist People’s Party) - represented a unique 
indigenous political explosion that might on its own question the comparability of 
ETA with other cases, such as the IRA. In short are any two cases truly comparahle?
Thus, to re-emphasise the advantages of using an ‘intra-unit’ rather than an ‘inter- 
imit’ compaiison ‘most of the scholars who have written about the comparative 
method insist that the study of sectors within a single nation offers the ideal setting for
24 Tliis is particularly the case with the loyalist groups whose strategies have often been regarded as a 
reaction to republican violence.
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controlled compaiisons ’25 whilst Eulau argues that ‘if ‘control’ is the sine qua non of 
all scientific procedure, it would certainly seem easier to obtain in a single culture .... 
than across c u l t u i * e s . ’ 26 Besides, whilst the cases in the Northern Ireland context may 
not he entirely independent per se, this thesis does not set out to establish theories and 
hypotheses but merely seeks to contribute to them. To reiterate Stretton’s ai’gument, 
comparison is a system for provoking, not proving.
The ‘controls’ that the selection of these case studies enable us to use can be identified 
as the following:
a) The thi'ee groups are secular, as opposed to religious or apocalyptic, and therefore 
their tactics and strategies are geared towards secular, realisable goals. Thus, the 
objectives of the groups, it is argued, in theory at least, lead to more discriminate 
violence (ie. mainly targeting security force personnel, or opposing paramilitaries), 
unlike the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by apocalyptic groups such as the 
Japanese Aum sect.2? This in turn accords secular terrorists more legitimacy and 
therefore facilitates the greater likelihood of political involvement. Thus, hoth case 
studies come from the same class of gi'oup, as opposed to, for example, the class of 
religious groups.
b) All the groups are sub-state (in other words, state tenorism is excluded fr om this 
thesis)
25 Smelser, N., cited in op. cit. Lijpliart, ‘The Comparable-Cases Strategy In Comparative Research’, 
pp. 167-8.
26 Eulau, H., quoted in op. cit. Lijphart, ‘The Comparable-Cases Strategy In Comparative Research’, 
p.l68.
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c) All the groups operate within a (Western) democratic environment.
d) All the groups operate primarily within the same geographical area (Northern 
Ireland) of the same nation-state (the United Kingdom) and therefore within a single 
culture and society.
e) All the groups have, to varying degrees and at different times, engaged in above 
ground politics.
f) All the groups are deeply involved in racketeering and organised crime as a means 
of raising hinds.
g) All the gi'oups actively engage in vigilante violence to control their ‘own’ 
communities.
Section One will begin with a brief historical narrative of events from 1956 (chapter
2) in order to provide the context for the subsequent chapters and the analysis of the 
selected variables. Chapter 3 will provide a typology of ‘the political front’ and argues 
that it represents a category of party in is own right in the hroad spectrum of political 
parties.
Section Two will hegin with an outline of the ideology, structure and leadership of the 
groups (chapter 4). The impact of these on the relationship between the groups and
2? It should be noted, however, that the gioups have also been involved in sectarian muiders and 
general attacks on civilians in public places and so they have certamly been perceived as engaging in
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their political fronts, and on the role of the latter will be assessed in chapter 5. It will 
be argued that the powerful ideology and centralised and disciplined structure of the 
IRA has facilitated tlie use of a political front whereas the less centralised and more 
fragmented natuie of the UDA, for example, has been less amenable to their use. 
Chapter 6 explores the notion that violence, both for the individual and the group, can 
become habitual and studies the degiee to which this might militate against or indeed 
facilitate the gieater use of a political front.28 It will also consider the extent to which 
the excitement, mystique and power of violence, along with its apparently addictive 
alluie to its perpetrators, as well as the idea of a close knit family of interdependent 
conspirators, has prevented a more political approach, hi general, it is argued that 
‘violence as a habit’ has undemiined the potential use or greater use of a political 
front.
Section 3 will begin by assessing the impact that popular support (or lack of it) has 
had on the utility of the political fr ont (chapter 7). hi the case of the IRA it will be 
argued that ‘popular support’ is the variable that has had the most significant impact 
in bringing about the greater utilisation of Simi Fein. Wliile there was at least a degree 
of localised support for the political finnt’s ‘community policing’ function, it was the 
desire to mobilise support that led to the gieater utility of Sinn Fein through the so 
called ‘Long War’ strategy in the 1970s and it was the desire to tap perceived existing 
support that lay behind the ‘bullet and ballot box’ strategy of tlie 1980s, when the 
political front’s role was expanded to include its electoral function. Populai' support 
has also been a significant factor behind the greater utilisation of the loyalist political
indiscriminate attacks by die victim community.
28 In the post ceasefire period, for example, some ‘Sinn Fein’ activities (such as vigilantism) may have 
increased directly as a result o f  ‘violence as a habit’ firom those ‘activists’ who want ‘action’ but are 
obliged to adliere to a ceasefii e o f  terrorist violence.
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fronts in that these fronts represented attempts to provide working class loyalists with 
political representation.
Chapter 8 will argue tliat the state’s response has also been of fundamental importance 
in bringing about gi'eater utility of the political front. Its successful response to the 
IRA by the mid 1970s prompted the group to rethink its strategy which in turn led to 
an expanded role for its political front. The British (and frish Republic’s) response to 
the conflict has also been essential in bringing about the gi'eater utility of all tliree 
groups’ political fronts through the peace process that emerged in the 1990s. Chapter 
9 will identify other important factors (in the writer’s view) that have impacted on the 
utility or othei-wise of political fronts. In the case of the IRA these include the role of 
the United States, the Libyan-IRA connection, the emergence of tlie Social and 
Democratic Party, the loyalist response (early 1970s), the hunger strikes and Sinn 
Fein’s potential electorate. In the case of the loyalist groups the most significant 
variable affecting the utility of its political fronts is the domestic external 
environment. It is argued that the Taw abiding’ nature of Northern Irish Protestantism, 
the division of laboin ethos that permeates unionism and the fact that they are pro­
state groups have all presented powerfril obstacles to the use of loyalist political 
fronts. Despite this, it was the disillusionment with ‘respectable’ unionism that led to 
the emergence of these fr onts.
In conclusion, this thesis will summarise the impact of the variables studied and then 
address the following questions: to what extent has the greater utility of a political 
fr ont come about due to the perceived failui'e of violence, and to what extent does 
greater utility represent a sign of moderation towards the use of violence? As fai* as 
Sinn Fein is concerned the jury is still out on the second question, although it will be
18
argued that the political front, for many reasons, has ultimately come to represent 
moderation on the part of the movement. Finally, political fronts are not a 
phenomenon unique to Northern Ireland. The findings of this thesis will briefly be 
compared to other cases and will then consider, if Sinn Fein has ultimately come to 
represent moderation towaids the use of violence, the lessons that can be learnt from 
the Northern freland experience.
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Section 1
Chapter 2 -  The Emergence and Evolution of the 
Modern Political Fronts
Before proceeding to assess the impact of the selected variables on terrorist group 
strategy in the Northern Ireland context it is necessary to provide a brief nairative and 
some background regarding the events that took place throughout the duration of the 
period studied (1956 -  2003) and a brief outline of what strategies vis a vis the use of a 
political front were employed by the gioups. This thesis will then focus on the reasons for 
the use of a political fr ont in the four cases and the extent to which each of the variables 
assessed brought this about. This chapter will therefore focus on what happened rather 
than why it happened, although it will of necessity provide a certain degree of explanation 
that will be developed in subsequent chapters.
The IRA 1956-69
Ever since the English confiscated and distributed Irish land to (mainly Scots 
Presbyterian) settlers ‘the root-relation between Protestant and Catholic in Ireland [has 
been that of] one between settler and native.’  ^For centuries since Irish republicans have 
revolted against the British state culminating in the Anglo-Irish war of 1919. While Irish
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republicans were determined to be rid of the British, the Protestants of Ulster were 
equally adamant (through, for example, the formation of the mass Ulster Volunteer 
Force) that they should retain their land and their link with Westminster. The peace 
agi eement that saw Home Rule for Ireland therefore excluded six of the counties of 
Ulster. The Irish, however, were split over the deal and when the ‘Anti-treatyites’ were 
defeated at the polls the latter decided to resume the war against the British. The new 
Irish Free State government realised that their foimer comrades had to be crushed if they 
themselves were to sui'vive, and so began the bitter and uncompromising civil war. The 
Anti-treatyite Irish Republican Army were eventually defeated but the group was to 
resurface as a teiTorist organisation in the decades ahead, most notably through Sean 
Russell’s bombing campaign of 1939 and the Border Campaign of 1956-62.
In 1949 the Anny Council accepted the view that one of the reasons for the failure of its 
campaign of 1939 had been ‘the failure to harness popular support’ and that the IRA had 
been ‘politically n a ï v e The upshot of this assessment was that the group needed some 
kind of political enterprise but it still did not want to have any dealings with the 
‘illegitimate’ institutions of Leinster House and Stormont. Any political involvement or 
participation in elections would have to be strictly abstentionist. This was also the 
position of Sinn Fein. Therefore in the 1949 Army Convention, a resolution was passed 
‘allowing the IRA to infiltrate and control the Sinn Fein party so that the Aimy could 
have a political wing.... Thus the Aimy Council sent volunteers off to enlist in Sinn
’ O’Brien C., States o f Ireland. Hutchinson & Co. Anchor Press, London, 1972, pp. 71-2. 
 ^Ibid. p. 247.
21
Fein’.^  The party viewed this as a natural development and accepted the election of the 
IRA’s Patrick McLogan as the new president in 1950. Henceforth the party formally 
became the political front of the IRA.
The IRA’s Border Campaign or ‘Operation HaiTest’ was launched on the 12*^  of 
December 1956. Its militaiy objectives were laid out in the following statement:
‘The mission of each force in these areas was to cut all communications, 
telephone, road and rail; destroy all petrol stations, and enemy vehicles found, his 
enemy strategic sti'ongpoints where supplies could be found, or where 
administration of enemy could be disrupted ... Our mission is to maintain and 
strengthen our resistance centres throughout the occupied areas and also to break 
down the enemy’s administration in the occupied area until he is forced to 
withdraw his forces. Our method of doing this is use of guerrilla warfare within 
the occupied area, and propaganda directed at inhabitants. In time, as we build our 
forces, we hope to be in a position to liberate large areas and tie these in with 
other liberated areas -  that is areas where the enemy’s writ no longer rims.’"^
On the night of the 12^ ’^ a series of raids against border posts and military installations 
was earned out. Ten different areas were attacked by approximately one hundred and 
fifty men.^ The authorities, aware of the internal split in the IRA that they thought had
^Ibid
4 Irish Times, January 18, 1957, quoted in Bowyer Bell, J., The Secret Army. The IRA 1916-1979. 
Poolbeg, Dublin, 1989, p. 283.
 ^See Coogan, T., The IRA. Fontana, London, 1987, pp. 384-7.
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temporarily disabled the organisation, were caught by suiprise. Nevertheless, a 
combination of internment without trial both in the North and in the South (after De 
Valera had come to power in March 1957) led to a series of arrests so that by the end of 
1957 it was clear that the campaign had passed its peak. Earlier in the year Sinn Fein, 
which had been banned by Stormont in December 1956, had managed to poll 5% of the 
vote (66,000) in the election that returned De Valera to power but by 1961 this had 
dropped to 3%. In February 1962, having sputtered on long after it had been clear that the 
campaign had been a failure the IRA formally ended its campaign while Sinn Fein, as the 
political front for a strategy of violence, ‘lay shattered on the far shore of Irish politics, 
without power or prospects, still a captive of the principle of abstentionism.’^  The 
campaign had seen a total of 605 IRA incidents since 1956, leaving six policemen and ten 
insurgents dead.^
In September 1962 Cathal Goulding took over the leadership by which time many IRA 
men had discovered alternatives to a life of insurgency.^ Under the influence of Roy 
Johnston Mar'xist ideology gradually became the new creed of the organisation. Non­
sectarianism became a crircial principle and agitation over housing and jobs was stepped 
up. Though not universally felt, antipathy towards the use of violence accompanied the 
leftward drift of the organisation. Nevertheless, although at a Special Army Convention 
meeting in 1964 the delegates endorsed social as well as political revolution, the
® Op. cit. Bowyer Bell, p. 337.
 ^Ryder, C,, The RUC. A Force Under Fire. Mandarin, London, 1982, p. 94. 
® Op. cit. Bowyer Bell, p. 339.
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leadership’s proposal to end abstention from the parliaments in Leinster House,
Westminster and Stormont was defeated.^
The debate over abstention did not end there, however. Under the continued Dublin 
leadership of Goulding the IRA pursued its leftward drift in opposition to the 
traditionalists. The group became increasingly active in agitation in the countryside at the 
same time as moving away from physical force. In an unprecedented departure the IRA 
was becoming a devoted convert to Marxism where social revolution took priority over 
Irish unification.
While all these internal debates were taking place within the IRA in March 1963 Captain 
Terence O’Neill succeeded Lord Brookeborough as Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. 
Much to the ire of hardline unionists he expressed his intention to introduce reforms to 
address sectarian tensions, thereby raising Catholic hopes at the same time as generating 
Protestant fears. In 1966 the Ulster Volunteer Force was created in response to 
‘O’Neillism’ and the suspicions he had germinated in the Protestant community.It was 
also apparently a response to the IRA^ ,^ although at this time ‘the IRA as a military force 
was virtually non-existent’*^ . Its political front was faring little better. Sinn Fein had been 
banned in 1964 followed in 1967 by the proscription of the ‘newly organised Republican 
Clubs ... on the grounds that they were front organizations for Sinn Fein and illicit
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie pp. 54-5.
Op. cit. Coogan pp. 420-21.
” See Garland, R., Seeldng a political Accommodation. The Ulster Volunteer Force: Negotiating History. 
Shankhill Community Publication, 1997, p.7.
Wichert, S., Northern Ireland Since 1945. Longman, London and New York, 1991, p. 141.
Taylor, P., Provos, The IRA and Sinn Fein. Bloomsbury, London, 1997, p. 21.
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recruiters for the IRA.’*"* Meanwhile in the South the party put up a poor showing in the 
1967 local elections.*^
Hardline unionist pressure against O’Neill’s attempts to accord Catholics equal civil 
rights meant that the minority community were to be disappointed, but the genie had been 
released. In 1967, at a time when civil rights movements were in vogue across the globe 
(particularly in the United States) the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was 
formed, initially over discrimination in housing allocation. NICRA was not a front for the 
IRA but Goulding wasted no time in infiltrating the movement, one estimate suggesting 
that thirty of the seventy delegates at the Association’s first AGM were Taiown 
republicans or IRA’.*^  The giievances highlighted by NICRA tied in with its own social 
agenda, although Goulding’s was non-sectarian whilst the civil rights movement became 
more associated with Catholic giievances. To Ian Paisley and his followers NICRA was a 
camouflage for the IRA and as such it was subjected to vitiiolic verbal abuse. Its marches 
in 1968 and ’69 were met with angiy loyalist resistance.
The environment that was to develop facilitated the ultimate reemergence of the IRA, 
albeit under a very different leadership. The in-built paranoia within the Protestant 
community from its historical ‘siege mentality’ was brought to the fore by the rantings of 
Paisley and his demonstiations against the ‘Romeward tiend’ of the Presbyterian Church. 
He more than anyone else contiibuted to the polarization of the conflict and incited
Op. cit. Bowyer Bell, p. 349. 
See ibid. p. 346.
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loyalists to take up arms to counter this ‘betrayal’. Paisley’s UCDC (Ulster Constitution 
Defence Committee) and the Ulster Protestant Volunteers were fonned to counter 
O’Neill’s ‘treachery’*^ . If Paisley was tnily unaware of some of the subversive activities 
of the UPV, he was certainly responsible for using rhetoric so forceful that it led men to 
take up arms.
In the meantime (in 1968) the IRA decided, in line with its new ideological emphasis, to 
‘undertake direct military action in support of appropriate social causes. Operations were 
to be carried out that used the Army as an instrument of social justice.’*^ Whilst 
Goulding’s ideology may not have been to the liking of some, this course of action was 
popular amongst those volunteers who wanted action and the resurgence of the physical 
force tradition. The operations, however, were limited to, for example, the desti'uction of 
a lobster boat in support of a fishing dispute and other activities associated with workers’ 
rights, rather than a full blooded assault on the constitutional status of the province.
Meanwhile, loyalists, inspired by Paisleyite rhetoric, were detemiined to continue 
resisting NICRA marches, whilst the latter was determined to keep marching. Sectarian 
hatied escalated, culminating in an attack on the left wing People’s Democracy civil 
rights march by Protestant ambushers at Bumtollet Bridge, outside Londonderry, injuring 
at least thirteen marchers while the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) allegedly stood and
Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland In 1969. Report o f Tribunal o f Inquiiy, Chaimian 
the Hon. Mr. Justice Scamian, Vol. II (Appendices), HMSO, Crad. 566, April 1972, p. 53, quoted in op. cit. 
Taylor p. 39.
Taylor, P., Loyalists. Bloomsbury, London, 1999, pp. 35-6.
Op. cit. Bowyer Bell, p. 350.
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watched.*  ^ The police force’s neutral credentials again seemed to be compromised in 
Catholic eyes when, following the Bumtollet attaclc, some policemen apparently attacked 
shoppers in (London)Deny city centre and ‘sang sectarian songs in Catholic areas into 
the early hours of the morning.’^ ** The behaviour of loyalists and the security forces 
actually began to threaten the ‘repudiation’ of the state that they so sought to defend. 
Catholic faith in the justice system also plummeted following an inconclusive inquiry 
into the death of a forty two year old Catholic taxi driver, Samuel Devenney, from 
injuries received in an encounter with police in July 1969.^ *
In the same month members of the UPV and UVF set off explosions at an electricity 
installation and at water supply lines, for which they rightly anticipated the IRA would 
get the blame. O’Neill resigned on the 28**’ April later stating that the explosions ‘literally 
blew me out of o f f i ce .T h e  loyalist strategy had worked.
On the streets defending Catholics in the North was not part of the IRA remit as far as 
Goulding and his cohorts in Dublin were concerned. The IRA’s ideology now stressed 
the need for cross religion unity of the workers against oppression. To Goulding the real 
war was between classes, not religions. There was no room for a sectarian policy that 
would scupper the very thing they were trying to achieve -  a unified working class -  and 
so protecting Catholics against Protestants did not fit in with this analysis. The Dublin 
IRA leadership, therefore, from a safe distance, refused to respond to the alleged
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos, p. 43.
Purdie, B., Politics in the Street. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland.
Blaclcstaff, Belfast, 1990, p. 215.
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victimisation of Catholics in the North, despite desperate calls from their Northern 
counterparts for aims for protection.
The marching season that approached promised fui'ther sectarian strife. Rioting did 
indeed accompany the marches but it was the Apprentice Boys parade in (London)den*y 
that marked a watershed in the conflict. Violence was sure to erupt in what was the last of 
the Summer marches. Some IRA men ignored their Dublin counterparts and set about 
establishing defensive bamcades around the Bogside. Taunts between the Protestant 
marchers and Catholic residents escalated into full blown riots and what became loiown 
as the ‘Battle of the Bogside’. After two days of mayhem the ‘Bogsiders’ stormed the 
RUC who reciprocated, followed by missile hurling Protestants.
More fuel was poured on the flames when a statement from Jack Lynch, the Taoiseach of 
the Republic in the South, made clear that the Republic could not stand idly by while 
innocent people were getting injured, and that the re-unification of Ireland was the ‘only 
permanent solution’ Such talk infuriated loyalists further and the prospect of an 
invasion from the South intensified sectarian hatred. To make matters worse the infamous 
B Specials^ "* were deployed in Derry. Many Catholics felt defenceless against the loyalist 
‘pogroms’ that burned the minority population out of their homes. Eventually, the RUC 
realised that the situation had gone beyond their contiol and asked the British government
Bew, Paul, and Gillespie, G., NoiHiem Ireland. A Chronology Of The Troubles. Gill and Macmillan, 
Dublin, 1999, p. 17.
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists, p. 61.
Lynch, J., quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos, p. 50.
The B Specials, which were part time members of the Ulster Special Constabulaiy (largely fomied from 
the original UVF after the partition settlement), were viewed by many Catholics as nothing better than
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to despatch the army. After three days of rioting, the army, in the shape of the Prince of 
Wales regiment stationed outside the city, was called in and relative order was restored.
Despite the brewing crisis in the North, Goulding believed that the time for revolution 
was not yet upon them. Whilst the issue of abstention was the main factor behind the IRA 
split in 1969 the sense of helplessness that the Northern volunteers felt after their Dublin 
leadership refused to assist with weapons was also a factor. Mai'xist ideology with its 
emphasis on mass mobilisation had generated calls for greater political involvement 
amongst the proponents of the new sUategy which in turn led to the split over abstention, 
whilst the move away fr om the use of violence until such time the country was ready for 
revolution meant that aims for the Northern IRA brigades were not forthcoming, which 
led to the first rumours of a separate Northern Command from May 1969.
After the events of August 1969 and the apparent indifference of the Dublin IRA 
leadership, the Aimy Council was accused of letting its people down and abandoning the 
constituency it claimed to represent. They had been completely unprepared, with less 
than a dozen guns available for use, thanks to the Dublin leadership’s ‘obsession’ with 
class politics.^  ^It seemed that the only hope for the afflicted minority was the Republic’s 
troops stationed on the border. The divisions within die IRA were to come to a head in its 
General Army Convention of December 1969. It was at this convention that the 
organisation eventually split over the principle of abstention. Sean MacStoifain became 
the Chief of Staff of the new ‘provisional’ IRA that broke away from the old IRA and the
Protestant vigilantes. They were disbanded in 1970 after they were found to be ‘biased and ill-disciplined’ 
(Connolly, S. (ed.). The Oxford Companion To Irish History. Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 562).
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split was miiTored in Sinn Fein with the establishment of the ‘provisional’ Sinn Fein in 
January 1970.
After The IRA Split
At the beginning of 1970 there was no apparent hostility between the British troops and 
the IRA but this was soon to change. On March 29**’ a Republican march commemorating 
the Easter Rising led to an assault on an RUC station in LondondeiTy, followed by riots. 
The following Monday loyalists attacked a republican march in Armagh. The violence 
intensified in the next few days as Catholics fiom the Ballymuiphy estate attacked 
‘Junior’ Orangemen marchers. Troops and army riot vehicles were despatched to the 
estate to restore order only to become targets themselves. The sight of loyalist rioters 
following anny incursions into their estate led many Catholics to believe that the aimy 
was not a neuti al force but another sectarian instrument of the Unionist province.
The marching season inevitably prompted further sectarian rioting and the more and more 
the Catholic minority felt vulnerable in the face of loyalist attacks with apparent security 
force acquiescence the more PIRA, who by now were better prepared, were seen by many 
Catholics as the defenders of their communities.
On 27**’ of June loyalists attacked the Short Stiand Catholic community in Belfast while 
the army chose not to get involved. Whether this was because troop levels were
Op. cit. O’Brien, p. 165.
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insufficient or that they did not want to get caught in crossfire, as Peter Taylor suggests, 
the crucial thing again was that the Catholic population’s perception was that they were 
on their own and it was only the IRA that they could look to for defence. The loyalist 
assault and army’s inaction, according to one PIRA member, ‘added to the rebirth of the 
IRA and fitted in with the emergence of the IRA as a defensive force in nationalist 
Belfast.Malachi O’Doherty agrees that ‘loyalist violence probably enhanced Catholic 
support for the IRA’ and that ‘republicans pointed to it as legitimising their need to 
defend Catholics.
The deaths of six civilians (five of them Protestant) over the weekend and the fears of a 
resurgent IRA led to another pivotal event in the conflict. The authorities sealed off the 
Lower Falls area of Belfast and placed it under military curfew while it proceeded to 
search the houses for weapons. The death of a resident after an army vehicle had 
accidentally reversed into him led to rioting and stone throwing against the army who 
responded with CS gas. Barricades were set up and the anny endeavoured to remove 
them. The whole episode served to underline much of the Catholic population’s feeling of 
alienation from the state. Kevin Kelley described what went on:
‘Troops broke down doors with pick-axes and rifle butts. They ransacked homes, 
ripping up floorboards, tearing out fireplaces and smashing holes in walls and 
ceilings. Religious statues were broken and crucifixes pulled down, causing some
Op, cit. Taylor, Provos, pp. 75-76.
Gibney, J., quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos, p. 77.
O’Doherty, M., The Trouble With Guns. Republican Strategy and the Provisional IRA. Blackstaff, 
Belfast, 1998, p. 90.
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residents to regard the British anny as no different than the sectarian gangs who 
thiew rocks through church windows. Five civilians were killed, about a dozen 
were wounded by British gunfire and more than 300 were anested during the 
course of an incident that soon became known as ‘the Rape of the Falls.
Worse still, hopelessly outdated intelligence not only led to a very small yield in terms of 
aims seizures but it also meant that a tiny proportion of those anested were actively 
involved in the perpetration of violence. Those who believed that the IRA were gone for 
good after the failed campaign of 1956-62, and this included republicans^**, could not 
have foreseen the remarkable circumstances that would facilitate, even demand, the 
revival of the organisation, not as a covert group of conspirators that lacked popular 
support, but as a group perceived by many Catholics as the genuine defenders of the 
beleaguered minority population -  and it was loyalist extremism coupled with security 
force ineptitude that had helped to bring about this resurgence.
In the Summer of 1970 the Social and Democratic Labour Party, founded by Geny Fitt, 
John Hume and Austin Currie, emerged from the Civil Rights movement. It was 
committed to the unification of Ireland by peaceful means. Predictably Provisional Sinn 
Fein called on nationalists to boycott the new party. Meanwhile, in its Ard Fheis (annual 
conference) in October, which followed the PIRA General Army Convention of the 
previous month delegates were told that aiTangements had been ‘regularised’ and that the 
‘provisional’ label was to be dropped for both ‘wings’.
^  Kelley, K., The Longest War. Northern Ireland and the IRA. Zed Press, London, 1982, p. 147. 
Such as Danny Momson (see op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p.61).
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It was the curfew of the Lower Falls in 1970 that many saw as the turning point in the 
‘Troubles’.^ * The local population, many of whom were previously unsympathetic to the 
group, were driven into the anns of the IRA and embraced its ‘vision of the British army 
as an invader’ In retaliation PIRA Idlled two RUC men in a car bomb in Crossmagi en 
in South Armagh. Such was the infancy of the revitalised movement that the command 
structure wasn’t developed enough to sanction all of PIRA’s operations as many 
‘Volunteers’ acted independently and spontaneously.
The lull in violence towards the end of 1970, however, allowed the IRA time to develop 
its structure aswell as train recruits. By the end of the year the organisation had begun 
bombing economic targets and then in 1971 began to shoot soldiers and policemen. In 
February it claimed its first army victim -  Gunner Robert Curtis, who was shot by the 
IRA’s Billy Reid in the New Lodge area of Belfast -  and set in motion a campaign that 
would increasingly challenge the ability of Stormont to control it. The ruthless 
assassination of three off duty Highland Fusiliers on 10**’ March 1971 led to demands 
from unionists for a tougher security policy and prompted the resignation of Prime 
Minister James Chichester-Clark. As the IRA mruder campaign and sectarian riots 
escalated the loyalists increasingly felt that the security forces were failing to protect their 
communities. On 15 May 1971 representatives of a number of ‘Defence Associations’ 
met to form an umbrella organisation and it was out of this that the Ulster Defence 
Association emerged.
For example ‘Jonathan’ (pseudonym), a ‘young officer’, quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos, p. 81. 
Op. cit. O’Doherty p. 86.
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On 9**’ August 1971, as the situation deteriorated, Chichester Clark’s successor, Brian 
Faulloier, introduced internment without trial. It was an unmitigated disaster. To begin 
with the IRA had been tipped off and in any case intelligence for the operation was dated. 
The army found very few of the suspects they were looking for. Significantly, unlike in 
the 1956-62 campaign, the measure was not reciprocated in the South, providing 
sanctuary for the suspects. Perhaps worst of all internment was aimed primarily at the 
Catholic population and laid the seeds for many to become involved with the IRA. By 
12**’ August twenty two people had been Idlled^ ,^ and allegations of torture by the security 
forces were rife, all helping to enhance popular support for the group. Merlyn Rees 
acloiowledged the mayhem when he announced in 1975 that 300,000 pounds 
compensation had been paid ‘for false aiTest and for assault and battery in the cases of 
473 people.’^ "*
Internment, according to Kelley, had another effect -  it led ‘to a greater politicization of 
the Provisional movement’. A s  prisoners accumulated at Long Kesh or Milligan 
political education became a priority for the internees and set in motion the internal 
process that would ultimately lead to Adams’ and Bell’s political searching, and the 
notion of the ‘Long War’.
The constitutional SDLP’s response to internment was to withdraw from Stormont, 
leaving the party out on a limb and the IRA as the sole representative of the Catholic
Op. cit. Bew and Gillespie p. 37. 
Op. cit. Kelley, p. 155.
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population, thus playing into the latter’s hands. At this time Sinn Fein was very much in 
the background as the junior partner to PIRA but during the course of the past turbulent 
months they had been busy evolving a strategy for Ireland once the British had been 
driven out. The Ard Fheis of October 1971 endorsed the Eire Nua project, which 
advocated regional parliaments for each of the four ancient provinces of the country
In the meantime, in response to internment, the IRA’s tactics became more sinister. A 
bomb ripped through the Four Step Itm on the Shankill Road, killing two Protestants and 
injuring twenty seven. Loyalists hit back in December 1971 with a devastating explosion 
that killed fifteen in the Catholic McGurk’s bar. The IRA responded a week later with 
another bomb in the Shanldll that killed four. The conflict was escalating and becoming 
more polarised with the security forces less and less in control.
Bloody Sunday, where the British parachute regiment shot dead fourteen apparently 
unarmed marchers,^^ was another pivotal event in the early days of the ‘Troubles’. It had 
a ‘profound’ effect on Catholics and confirmed to many in the minority community that 
the army as well as the RUC were merely instruments of a sectarian state.^  ^As a result 
popular support and recruits for the IRA increased dramatically as once again the 
organisation was seen as the last line of defence for besieged Catholics. Indeed, argues 
Bob Purdie, in his book outlining the origins of the civil rights movement, after Bloody 
Sunday ‘the Provisionals became the leaders of opposition on the streets as well as the
Ibid. p. 157.
Op. cit. Taylor, Proves, p .104.
”  Tlie Saville enquiry has been established to tiy and establish exactly what happened on Bloody Sunday.
Op. cit. O’Doherty p. 87.
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promoters of urban guerrilla w a r f a r e . ‘Politics was a dirty word in those days’"*** as IRA 
violence intensified and the infamous car bomb made its debut on the 20**^ of March 
1972, killing six in Donegal Street, Belfast.
On the 24**’ the deteriorating security situation prompted the British government to 
announce the suspension of Stormont and the imposition of direct rule from Westminster. 
Now that Stormont had been suspended there was a growing groundswell of Catholic 
opinion that wanted the IRA to call its campaign to a halt."** From a position of stiength 
and given the mood of the Catholic population, the IRA called a truce and a delegation 
secretly met Secretary of State William Whitelaw. The subservient role of politics in 
republican thinking was evident in that there were no Sinn Fein representatives present. It 
was also evident in the politically naive demands that the IRA leadership were making - 
that the Brits should get out, regardless of the views of the majority population of the 
province. They saw the problem as the British presence, not so much unionist 
intiansigence, and violence was the way to force a British withdrawal, and the more of it 
then the quicker Westminster’s resolve would weaken. Victory was around the comer as 
far as the group was concerned and this intensive short term strategy of violence would 
do the trick. Whitelaw described the meeting with the IRA as ‘a non-event.
In the meantime his ‘Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals’ published in March 1972 
for the first time introduced an ‘Irish dimension’, forcing a split in unionism and the
Op. cit. Purdie, p. 247.
'**’ Martin Meehan, PIRA commander in Belfast’s Ardoyne, quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos, p. 135.
Op. cit. Kelley p .l72. Goulding’s fears of an increasingly sectarian conflict led to the OIRA’s ceasefire
in May.
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creation of William Craig’s Vanguard Unionist Progiessive Party, which was fully 
supported by the UDA. It represented Craig’s efforts to unify unionists of all hues under 
one umbrella to show the IRA that it meant business. Although on the surface the 
organisation was apparently ‘respectable’ Craig’s provocative speeches, talldng of 
‘[liquidating] the e n e m y l i k e  Paisley’s rhetoric, prompted many young loyalists to 
take up arms. Whilst the abolition of Stormont was greeted with jubilation by republicans 
it was the signal for the UDA to play a more prominent role. Because they felt that the 
security forces were doing nothing about the IRA’s no-go areas they began to set up 
bamcades of their own. These were dismantled by the army but the sectarian Idlling of 
Catholics continued -  thirty six in all in the first seven months of 1972. The killings were 
also a response to the secret talks between Whitelaw and the IRA.
Indeed, fears of a secret deal between the IRA and Westminster enhanced the loyalists’ 
already traditionally entienched paranoia. It was now the turn of the Ulster Defence 
Association to attiact large numbers of recmits. More and more Catholics were 
intimidated and forced out of their homes. A stand off on Lenadoon Avenue, where the 
IRA attempted to rehouse displaced Catholics into empty homes, between the army and 
republicans eventually degenerated into rioting and gunfire - the ceasefire was over. 
Interestingly, Frank Steele, then a member of MI6, recalls that the unionists didn’t want 
the ceasefire ‘as they wanted the British anny to go on laiocking the hell out of the IRA’ 
and ‘the hard-line IRA didn’t want it’ either leading him to comment: ‘I know this sounds
Whitelaw, W., The Wliitelaw Memoirs. Aiiram Press, London, 1989, p. 100. 
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists, p.98.
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a callous thing to say, but I don’t think either community had suffered enough to want 
peace.’"*"*
And violence returned with a vengeance on ‘Bloody Friday’ 21®* July 1972 when the IRA 
planted twenty two bombs in Belfast, two of them killing nine people. According to 
Kelley, ‘the provos had done iireparable damage to their cause -  in Britain, abroad, and 
in their own commimities.’"*^ The British response was to send the army into the hitherto 
‘no go’ Catholic ghetto areas of Belfast and (London)deny in an exercise called 
‘Operation Motorman’. Whitelaw also assured unionists that the constitutional position of 
Northern Ireland could only be altered with the majority of the province’s consent. In the 
same year he introduced ‘Diplock’"*^ Courts -  juiy only tiials to counter the threats made 
to jury members by republicans.
In the meantime a power struggle had been going on in the UDA that culminated in the 
emergence of Andy Tyiie as the leader of the organisation. Interestingly Tyrie’s analysis 
wasn’t far from Adams’ ideas that he developed three years later in Long Kesh:
‘I had put suggestions forward of how the organization should develop and how 
we should look at different facets other than purely defence. I felt we should look 
at a political future, a historical future, and social issues. We should look at every 
possible aspect if it was to remain as a defence organization.’"*^
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos, p. 147. 
Op. cit. Kelley, p. 184.
Named after the judge who recommended ‘jury only’ trials. 
Tyler, A., quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 115.
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Within the UDA hardline members such as John Wliite formed the cutting edge - the 
Ulster Freedom Fighters - to streamline the military activities of an organisation that had 
already attracted over 30,000 members. The strategy of the UDA at this time was to kill 
Catholics in an endeavour to persuade the community to force the IRA to stop their 
campaign.
Between November 1972 and January 1973 the IRA was under severe pressure from the 
state’s security forces, both North and South. By Christmas 1972 two hundred IRA 
members had apparently been arrested since ‘Operation Motorman’, whilst the Irish 
Gardai had ‘[struck] at both wings of the Republican movement’, including the arrest of 
the IRA’s Chief of Staff, Sean MacStiofain."*  ^The string of arrests of key IRA figures had 
pushed the republicans into a comer and led to their decision to bomb London in March
1973. Arrests continued, however, throughout 1973 in both the Republic and Northern 
Ireland.
On the 14**’ of October 1973 the Sunday News announced the establishment of the Ulster
Loyalist Front which was to be the ‘political voice’ of the Ulster Volunteer Force. A 
forty eight day ceasefire was called by the UVF ‘to assist the Ulster Loyalist Front work 
for a political solution to the problems of Northern Ireland.’^ ** The UVF also threw itself 
behind a campaign for reducing bus fares.^* In the meantime Whitelaw managed to
49 A I
i
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 152. 
Op. cit. Garland p.23.
Ibid.
51 Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists pp. 124-5.
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persuade the UUP, the SDLP and the Alliance party to share power through what became 
Imown as the Sunningdale Agieement.^^ The Irish dimension, manifested in the Council 
of Ireland, however, was to many unionists out of the question. The February 1974 
Westminster election saw a resounding victory for the anti-Sunningdale unionists through 
the UUUC (United Ulster Unionist Coalition), seriously undemiining the new power 
sharing experiment. The UVF made their own statement against the accord -  by taking 
their campaign south of the border and killing twenty two people using three car bombs 
placed in Dublin and Monaghan.
The protest over any Dublin involvement in the province’s affairs moved on to the streets 
culminating in what was to become a hugely significant event for its impact on the utility 
of loyalist political fronts - the Ulster Workers’ Council strike. Glen BaiT, increasingly 
recognised as the political spokesman for the UDA, was chairman of the strike 
committee. The strike was supported by both the UDA and the smaller UVF and was 
fronted by Craig and Paisley. Power was cut and, largely through UDA intimidation, the 
province gradually came to an economic standstill. To loyalists and anti-Sunningdale 
unionists the government had ignored the will of the people at the February election 
while Wilson’s provocative speech labelling them as ‘people who [spent] their lives 
sponging on Westminster and British democracy’ only incensed them further.^ "* On May 
14**’ 1974 the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (1973) (Amendment) Order, 
which legalised Sinn Fein and the UVF, was passed. It was meant to encourage them to
Sunningdale was the location for the talks.
Cusack, J., and McDonald H., UVF. Poolbeg, Dublin, 1997, pp. 122-3.
Cain website, UWC Stiike - Text o f broadcast made by Harold Wilson, 25 May 1974,website: 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/uwc/docs/hw25574.htm.
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become engaged with the political process, through the constitutional Convention but the 
UWC stiike paralysed the province prompting Faulloier and the executive to resign on 
28**’ May 1974.
The apparent ‘conversion’ of Spence (the former UVF leader), the legalisation of the 
UVF just before the UWC stiike and the political vacuum left after the collapse of the 
executive, prompted the organisation to foim a new ‘political party’, the Volunteer 
Political Party. The object was to ‘get some political dialogue going’ because ‘people had 
become disenchanted with the political leadership they had been getting which was 
leading us nowhere’ and, according to Spence, working class loyalists needed to be 
politicised.^^ But the termination of the UVF ceasefire reflected the fact that a new 
hardline leadership had taken control. The resumption of violence was followed by a 
humiliating defeat for Ken Gibson of the VPP in the general election of October 1974. 
The UVF promptly stated that ‘the general public does not support the political 
involvement of the UVF’ and therefore it was ‘fr uitless to promote the Volunteer Party as 
a party political machine.
From prison, Spence was dismayed at the ending of the ceasefire and that the UVF 
outside had ignored his advice. But in Long Kesh he was to have a profound influence on 
those that would one day be instrumental in providing the political cadre that would lead 
to the creation of the Progressive Unionist Party.^  ^Without the experience in Long Kesh 
Taylor argues that it is unlikely that such a political cadre of David Ervine, Billy
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists pp.138-9. 
Ibid. p. 140.
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Hutchinson, William Smith and Gusty Spence himself, who were all to play ‘vital’ roles 
up to the Good Friday Agreement, would have emerged.^  ^ Like republicans, many 
loyalists too had received a political education of sorts in prison.
The prospect of the Convention election had aroused a debate within the IRA as to 
whether to shift towards politics or not. But violence was to continue. After the IRA 
bombed pubs in Guildford and Birmingham Idlling twenty six people Roy Jenkins, the 
Home Secretary, introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Act on the 25**’ of November
1974. The Bill allowed for the detention without charge of suspects for up to seven days, 
and, if appropriate, expulsion from the UK.
The year 1975 was to be an important one in the history of the Troubles as, according to 
republicans themselves, it nearly brought the defeat of the IRA. Following contacts via 
the secret or back channel and negotiations with Protestant clergy the IRA called a two 
week ceasefire firom the 22”^  of December which was extended to the 16**’ January 1975. 
After four bombs exploded in London and one in Manchester on January 27**’ the same 
channel of communication led to the truce from the 9**’ of February 1975. The main 
reason for the ceasefire was that the group came to believe that the British were preparing 
to withdraw fi'om Northern Ireland. Indeed, the government had apparently spoken of 
‘stmctures of disengagement’^^ , leading the IRA to assume that it was ready to abandon 
the province, when in fact it subsequently came to mean merely troop withdrawals.
See Garland, R., Gusty Spence, Blackstaff, Belfast, 2001, pp.173-4.
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 141.
^  Though the Secretary o f State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees denied any laiowledge o f the use of the 
term (Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 191). But in Bew and Gillespie’s chronology (p. 100) it is argued that Rees
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As part of the terms of the truce, Sinn Fein incident centres were established to monitor 
the ceasefire ‘and avoid the kind of confrontation that had brought the 1972 ceasefire to 
an end ... The centres were set up in Enniskillen, Armagh, Deny, Newiy, Dungannon 
and Belfast. They were a watershed in the public perception of Sinn Fein, giving it a 
political standing in the nationalist community and, more importantly, a physical 
presence.Sinn Fein, though, still had an inferior status to the IRA.
The truce raised concerns from the SDLP that Sinn Fein would reap political rewards for 
the IRA’s influence over the British government at its (the SDLP’s) expense. Perhaps 
more seriously loyalists once again feared a British sell-out and as a result intensified 
their level of violence against the Catholic community. Most notorious of the loyalist 
murder gangs was the Shankill Butchers, a UVF ‘platoon’ that sometimes attacked their 
victims so brutally that they were no longer recognisable to their own families. 
Ostensibly, the loyalist Idllings were an attempt to provoke the IRA into breaking its 
ceasefire and hence derail any ‘deal’ it may have reached with the UK, which in fact they 
managed to do by September as sectarian tit for tat bombings began again. But the IRA 
was also disappointed with the response of the government to its ceasefire.
The truce was over and the Sinn Fein incident centres were closed by Rees in November. 
By the beginning of 1976 the back channel had dried up and tit for tat killings began to 
accelerate. While the IRA had been on ceasefire many of its grass roots members 
returned to their families and dropped their guard, as the organisation was being ‘run
‘admitted afterwards in a letter to the London Times in July 1983 that the cabinet sub-committee dealing 
with Ireland had ‘seriously considered’ withdrawal. . . ’
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down’, mirroring the Anglo-Irish war truce during which the IRA had lost its operational 
capacity. The future leadership of the gi'oup in prison regarded ‘the 1975 ti'uce as the time 
when the IRA came closest to defeat and suffered irreparable damage.’^ * The legacy of 
the ceasefire confirmed republicans’ historical distrust of politicians, and most certainly 
British ones.
While republicans in jail reflected on the failure of the ceasefire it was in Long Kesh 
prison that the strategy of the ‘Long War’ was born. In early 1976 the IRA had actually 
considered calling off the campaign - ‘we were short of money, short of arms and men 
were getting anested.’^  ^As the Troubles broke out IRA strategy was very much violence 
alone with Sinn Fein acting as the propaganda tool for its use. This approach persisted 
through until 1977 when the ‘Long War’ strategy advocated the widening of the struggle. 
The main problem for Geny Adams was that ‘the struggle had been limited to armed 
struggle. Once this stopped, the struggle s topped .H is  new approach was therefore to 
expand the struggle beyond the military to the economic, social and political fronts aswell 
through a process of ‘active abstentionism’ that entailed creating and running alternative 
str uctures to those of the state. He also argued that they should piu'sue this new strategy 
on a thirty-two county basis. The political fr ont, however, was still very much the junior 
partner in the movement as a ‘Staff Report’ made clear: ‘Sinn Fein should come under 
Army organizers at all levels
Op. cit. Taylor, Proves p. 186.
Ibid. p. 197.
McKee, ‘Billy’, quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Proves, p.201. 
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At the same time as the new strategy was being developed the Northern Command was 
established to reflect the growing prominence of the Northern leaders. This wasn’t the 
only change that took place in order to sustain the ‘Long War’ strategy and to counter the 
security force successes against the republican movement. The IRA also changed its 
str ucture fr om one of large brigades to a cellular one to counter the use of informers.
Adams was released in February 1977, shortly after which it is alleged he became the 
IRA’s Chief of Staff.^  ^By this time the IRA was being put under further pressure through 
the British policy of Ulsterisation, criminalisation and normalisation -  a process 
involving the restoration of police primacy (taking the army out of the front line) and the 
removal of special category status.^  ^ Ironically, it was the dispute over the latter that 
would ultimately lead to a more political republican strategy.
In 1977 loyalists, once again fronted by Paisley and his DUP, attempted to repeat the 
workers strike of 1974 in protest at what they saw as inadequate measures against the 
IRA. This time it failed and for many loyalists it was the last time that they were willing 
to be ‘used’ by the DUP leader. Tyrie and John McMichael ‘set up a political think tank -  
the New Ulster Political Research Group -  to work out the organization’s own policy as 
its members no longer had any faith in mainstream loyalist politicians’^ .^ Glenn Ban- was 
its chairman, John McMichael its secretary and Tyrie was on the Committee. They
Quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos p.212.
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p.201, and Moloney, E., A Secret Historv o f the IRA. Penguin, 2002, p. 513. 
Special category status had been conceded by William Wliitelaw in 1972 after a hunger strike by inmate 
Billy McKee and included privileges such as prisoners wearing their own clothing and not having to do 
prison work.
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 162.
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simultaneously established the Ulster Community Action Group (UCAG) to strengthen 
its position in the community.
The outcome of the NUPRG was a paper called Beyond the Religious Divide^ ‘which 
advocated negotiated independence with a constitutional Bill of Rights as ‘the only hope 
of achieving a united Northern Ireland.’ It said there had to be a constitutional settlement 
that was ‘acceptable to both sections’ [of the community] and stressed that the idea ‘is 
not the creation of a Protestant dominated state, nor is it the stepping stone to a united 
I re lan d .T h e  notion of an Independent Ireland never caught on for economic and 
political reasons but the document ‘did mark the beginning of the UDA’s political 
development that would flourish almost two decades later through its political front, the 
Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), which was to play a vital role in the events that led up to 
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement’. I n  a local government election in January 
1981 the NUPRG managed to secure a seat through Sammy Millar.
The UDA was not the only loyalist organisation that was seelcing to make an impact in 
the political sphere. In April 1978 the Independent Unionist group, linked to the UVF, 
was established, emphasising social and economic issues. Due to the controversial 
‘Independent’ in its title its name was changed to the Progressive Unionist Party in May 
1979.
^ McAuley, J., ‘Cuchullain and an RPG7: the ideology and politics o f the Ulster Defence Association’, in 
Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland. Open University Press, Buckingham, 1991, p.54.
Beyond The Religious Divide, Linen Hall Library, Belfast. 
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The year 1981 was to have a profound effect on the course of the ‘Troubles’. Wlien 
William Whitelaw gave IRA prisoners special category status in 1972 it set in motion a 
series of events that had a profound impact on republican strategy vis a vis the role of 
Sinn Fein. The process of ‘criminalisation’ revoked this status and prisoners began to 
demonstrate through the ‘Dirty Protest’ Wlien the government refused to budge the 
prisoners raised the stakes and, after a failed hunger strike in 1980, and against the IRA’s 
wishes (the group saw such exploits as a diversion from their efforts to concentrate on the 
struggle), Bobby Sands began a second strike on 1st March 1981, followed by other 
prisoners at staggered internals.
As Sands was beginning his protest anotlier event took place that was to facilitate the 
dramatic effect that he would have on IRA strategy. On the 5^ '^  March Frank Maguire, MP 
for Fermanagh-South Tyrone, died. After much cajoling and discussion Sands’ name was 
put forward to fight the seat as an ‘H-Block/Armagh’ candidate.^^ His victory by nearly 
1500 votes seemed to be evidence that the hunger strikes had radicalised the Catholic 
population^^ and it was to have a profound effect on republican sti'ategy.
To the government it was a humanitarian vote, to the IRA it was vindication for their 
str ategy of violence. With such an emphatic political result the stage was set for the IRA 
to conduct a dual-track str*ategy with politics playing a more prominent role. The Sands 
vote had been achieved during a period of sustained IRA violence and so, rather than
When prisoners spread their excrement over their cell walls.
Negotiations were taking place that would ensure that Sands’ vote would not be diminished by a rival 
nationalist or SDLP candidate so that it was a two horse race: imionism or Sands.
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using politics as an alternative to violence or as a sign of moderation, political 
engagement was very much to be part of a dual-tiack strategy that re-emphasised the use 
of violence, as apparently condoned by the Feimanagh-South Tyrone electorate. Nine 
more prisoners were nominated as candidates in the Irish Republic general election of 
June 1 winning 40,000 votes between them and two seats in the Dail (from which 
ICieran Doherty and Paddy Agnew abstained). Thus, while the Tong war’ and the hunger 
strikes were certainly crucial factors behind the IRA’s political involvement in the 1980s 
the new strategy did not see politics as moderating the movement vis a vis the use of 
violence. After the death of Sands the party’s Owen Carron repeated Sands’ victory in 
Fermanagh and South Tyr one.
As Taylor argued:
The real historical significance [of the hunger strikes] lies in the election of 
Bobby Sands and Owen Cari'on to Westminster. Their victories laid the 
foundation for the political base that Gerry Adams loiew had to be built if the 
‘struggle’ were to progress. Sinn Fein’s electoral successes through the next two 
decades are the hunger strike’s political legacy.
Henceforth the IRA was to pursue a dual-track strategy that persisted right up to the 
ceasefires of the 1990s.
O’Connor, F., In Search Of A State. Catholics In Northern Ireland. Blackstaff Press, Belfast, 1995, p. 
264.
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During the early 1980s James Prior, who had succeeded Humphrey Atkins as Secretary 
of State in Northern Ireland in September 1981, set up elections for an assembly to take 
place on the 20^  ^October 1982 as part of a process known as ‘rolling devolution’. It was 
the first time Sinn Fein had contested elections since 1969 but they managed to win 10.1 
% of the vote and 78 seats, while the SDLP canvassed 18.8 % of the vote. On March 22"  ^
1983 Sinn Fein contested a council election in the North for the first time in fifty years 
and won a seat on the Omagh District Council by-election (through Seamus Kerr).^  ^On 
June 9‘’’ 1983 Geny Adams was elected as MP for West Belfast, though, true to 
republican tradition, he did not take up his seat. In the same election his party won 13.4% 
of the vote against 17.9% for the SDLP. On the 13*’^ November 1983 Adams succeeded 
the ‘traditionalist’ Ruairi O’Bradaigh as President of Sinn Fein -  another pivotal event as 
far as the subsequent utility of the political front was concerned. The Brighton bomb in 
October 1984, however, which nearly succeeded in wiping out the British cabinet, served 
as a powerful reminder that violence was to remain central to the struggle.
The hunger strikes also had an indirect impact on the UDA’s political thinkers. In June of 
that year it created the Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party to ‘provide Loyalist political 
expression’ but it was also ‘a reaction to Sinn Fein’s re-emergence as a political force 
during the H Block campaign and the hunger strikes.’^ *’ The creation of the ULDP also 
represented the demise of the influence of those who were associated with the NUPRG. 
John McMichael emerged as the political spokesman for the UDA, advocating a more
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos, p. 252.
See Bishop, P., ‘A Gunman Cleans Up His Act’, The Observer. April 17*^ ‘ 1983.
McMichael, G., An Ulster Voice. Robeits Rinehart, Colorado, 1999, p.32.
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limited form of independence.^^ His venture into electoral politics proved to be a disaster, 
however, gaining only 2% of the vote in the South Belfast Westminster by-election of 
Febniary 1982. Subsequent electoral forays by the ULDP suffered a similar fate.
The British government was seriously concerned at the electoral advances of the IRA’s 
political front and so sought to marginalise it by strengthening the constitutional SDLP. 
After a period of rapprochement between the London and Dublin governments^^ the 
result was the Anglo-Irish Agieement of 1985. It recognised that there were two 
tiaditions in Northern Ireland and pledged to enhance cross-border cooperation, both of 
which were intended to boost constitutional nationalism. It also promised greater security 
cooperation between the two jurisdictions (something that Thatcher was particularly 
interested in).
The AIA appeared to have the desired affect. In the 1987 election the SDLP stretched its 
lead over Sinn Fein to nearly 10%^  ^and Geny Adams lost his seat. The state’s response 
through the AIA had put pressure on Adams’ political stiategy from the militarists within 
the movement, especially when they were sitting on a stoclcpile of Libyan weapons. From 
the unionist point of view the Agreement was a disaster. To their honor the Anglo-Irish 
Conference that was part of the deal gave Southern Ministers a say in Northern affairs. A 
hundi'ed thousand unionists protested outside Belfast City Hall, while loyalists attacked 
police and burnt some of them out of their homes.
See Bruce, S., The Red Hand. Protestant Paramilitaries In Northern Ireland. Oxford University Press, 
1992,p.233.
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Paisley had already mobilised a new organisation called the ‘Third Force’ in protest at the 
government’s rapprochement with Dublin and the perceived failure to deal with the IRA 
adequately, and in 1985 the ‘Ulster Clubs’ were formed in response to IRA violence and 
Sinn Fein’s success in the district council elections when they won 59 seats.N ow  the 
response to the AIA was the formation, in the Autumn of 1986, of Ulster Resistance, a 
‘citizens army’ to defend Ulster. It was ‘in effect’, according to Taylor, a fusion of the 
Ulster Clubs and Paisley’s Third Force.^  ^ John McMichael, the reputed head of the UFF, 
sat on the Ulster Clubs’ executive and indeed attempted to procure aims from South 
Africa that were to be split between the UDA, the UVF and Ulster Resistance.
In January 1987 the UDLP published its latest political initiative. Common Sense, which 
offered proportionality at every stage of government for Catholics^  ^ but the political 
exploits of the UDA were to end with the assassination of John McMichael in December 
1987. Other serious difficulties confr onted the organisation. Many of its leading members 
were associated with extortion and racketeering, a fact exposed by The Cook Report,^ "^  
while McMichael’s killing and Davey Payne’s aiTest with the UDA’s share of Lebanese 
aims, aroused suspicion that an informer lay within their ranks. Andy Tyrie, the long time 
leader of the organisation, found that his own position had become weakened and, after
After what Garrett Fitzgerald teimed was a period where relations had been Tittle short o f disastioiis’ 
following a rift over the Falldands war (Fitzgerald, G., All in A Life. Gairett Fitzgerald. An Autobiomaphv.
Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1991, p. 462).
See op. cit. Bew and Gillespie p. 208.
See op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 179.
Ibid. p.185.
Ibid. p. 189.
Common Sense, Linen Hall library, Belfast.
The Cook Report, Cential Television, Summer 1988.
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he discovered a bomb under his car (believed to be planted by members of his own 
organisation), he resigned.
After the departure of Tyrie a collective foim of leadership took over the UDA. This 
leadership was in turn replaced by a younger collective leadership after many of the 
former were anested in relation to the Stevens enquiry into alleged collusion between the 
security forces and loyalist terrorists. The Stevens enquiries and such allegations have 
been a running sore for the secmity forces and the state. It is precisely these Idnds of 
transgressions, real^  ^and perceived, that have bolstered one of Sinn Fein’s primary roles. 
The political front’s function is to discredit the ‘illegitimate’ British state and its forces 
whenever possible and any departures fr om the use of democratic means by the state are 
sure to facilitate its propaganda function, both at home and abroad.
The new UDA leadership were graduates of the UDF (Ulster Defence Force) that Tyrie 
had set up within the organisation. They had been dissatisfied with the self-preserwation 
instincts of the old leadership that had replaced Tyrie. Tluoughout the 1980s the group 
had built up a reputation for being a bunch of gangsters that were heavily engaged in 
racketeering and ‘their political announcements were only cover for a reign of 
intimidation and t e r r o r . T h e  new leadership wanted to bring the gioup away from 
such a reputation.
A twenty page summary from the latest Stevens enquiry revealed that there was collusion in the murders 
of solicitor Patrick Finucane and a Protestant student (‘mistakenly targeted’) by the name o f Adam Lambert 
(Stevens Enquiry, Overview and Recommendations, April 17 '^ 2003, from website: 
http:/Avww .nuzhound.com )
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Wliile all this turmoil was going on within the UDA in October 1987 the Eksund vessel 
was seized with a substantial amount of arms destined for the IRA. The delivery had 
come from Libya and it transpired that several shipments of arms had already got 
through. Thus the IRA were fully equipped to carry on their terrorist campaign if they so 
chose to do.
There were, however, stiains developing within the republican movement. Adams wanted 
to bring it further down the political path, the upshot being that Sinn Fein voted to end the 
policy of abstention from the Irish parliament in 1986 (and thereby ditch one of the 
central tenets of its ideology), despite opposition from hardliners. Although this step may 
have shown an element of political realism, a serious split developed between those from 
the South (for abstention) and those from the North (voting to end abstention). Ruairi 
O’Bradaigh left the party to form Republican Sinn Fein which was committed to 
abstentionism.^^
Gerry Adams did not want to end the aimed stmggle but it had to be conducted in a way 
that would allow him to develop the political aspect of the cause. The Enniskillen 
bombing of November 1987, for example, was a huge embanassment to Sinn Fein who 
could see what effects such ‘mistakes’ would have on their electoral fortunes.
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p.207.
This appears to be a situation where a loyalist political front could be used as a tactical device.
The Continuity IRA was to become its tenorist partner.
As people gathered for the Remembrance Day ceremony in Enniskillen on the 8^ * November 1987 an 
IRA bomb exploded killing eleven and injuring sixty three, an event that lost much popular support for the 
IRA and Sinn Fein at home and abroad (see, for example, op. cit. Bew and Gillespie p. 210).
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In May 1987 Sinn Fein published a document called A Scenario For Peace. It reflected a 
giadual realisation for the first time that the unionist majority in the North had to be 
accommodated, even if it still insisted that the British government set a date for 
withdrawal from the province. Indeed, after the Enniskillen bomb Adams said ‘there is no 
military solution’ and remarked that he was prepared ‘to consider an alternative unarmed 
form of stmggle to achieve Irish independence.Indeed it was from the time of 
Ennisldllen that the Humes-Adams dialogue began in which Hume endeavoured to 
persuade Adams of the futility of the continuation of the armed str uggle.
In the meantime, in October 1988, the British government imposed a broadcasting media 
ban on Sinn Fein voices and the voices of all terrorist groups. This proved to be effective 
in limiting the party’s exposure. In the four months before the ban there were 471 
enquiries for interviews whereas in the four months after there were only 110.^ * Sinn Fein 
admitted that the ban had a detrimental effect on their ability to communicate its 
message, particularly to the British population.^^ It also reflected the hardline approach 
towards the IRA and Sinn Fein that had hitherto prevailed but was to change at the 
beginning of the following decade.
In the 1990s a number of important developments took place that were to have a 
significant impact on IRA strategy and on the role of Sinn Fein. For the first time loyalist
Quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos p.304. 
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 309.
McKittiick, D., ‘Sinn Fein concedes impact o f TV ban’, The Independent. October 19‘*', 1990.
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paramilitaries were actually killing more republicans than vice versa^  ^(in fact in 1992 the 
UDA was banned, reflecting the ‘recognition that it no longer [had] serious ambitions 
beyond its military c a m p a ig n .w h i le  security force successes reflected the British 
ascendance in the intelligence war. Taylor suggests that:
‘ [the] lethal attacks on both wings of the Republican Movement by the SAS and 
loyalist paramilitaries, as well as conventional attiition by the police and army 
through the courts, were no doubt an important contributory factor in the IRA’s 
decision to call its ceasefire in 1994. The IRA had recognized that it could not win 
a purely military victory and the British had long since realized that they could 
not inflict a military defeat on the Provisionals.’^ ^
There were other equally important developments that led to the republican and loyalist 
ceasefires of 1994, each of which were not only important in bringing about a peace 
process but also in leading to the gieater utilisation of both the loyalist and republican 
political fi'onts. For the first time the British government, rather than dismissing the 
republican movement as terrorists with little support, began to aclmowledge the electoral 
mandate of Sinn Fein and sought to include the republican movement in any settlement. 
Peter Brooke, the Northern Ireland Secretary, famously remarked in 1990 that the British 
had ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland.
See McKittricIc, D., ‘Loyalist Idllings blamed on Protestant alienation’, The Independent. April 14'*‘ 1993 
and Cusack, J., ‘New militancy evident in loyalist Idllings’, The Irish Times. September 15^^1991.
Bince, S., ‘Unionist politicians frustrated UDA political role’, The hish Times. August 15*^ *, 1992.
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 311.
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Patrick Mayhew took over from Peter Brooke in April 1992 and Tie, too, recognised that 
the only way to end the violence was to give every encouragement to those within the 
Republican Movement who wanted to lead the IRA away from ‘armed struggle’. I n  
fact, according to Taylor, by 1993 the IRA were actually looking to bring the conflict to 
an end but with honour and without surrendering.^^ The replacement of Margaret 
Thatcher with the more pragmatic John Major improved the prospects for compromise, 
although the new Prime Minister did have to rely on unionist MPs to opt out of the social 
chapter of the Mastiicht Treaty. In December 1993 the Downing Street Declaration 
reiterated Westminster’s position that the British government had ‘no selfish shategic or 
economic interest in Northern Ireland’ while it also safeguarded the rights of the 
majority population of the North.
It wasn’t just the change in the state’s approach that facilitated greater utilisation of the 
IRA’s political front. Another significant factor was the influence of the American 
administration. Its granting of a visa to Adams in 1994, much to the fury of the British 
government,was an important factor behind the IRA’s first ceasefire, and it marked 
the beginning of a massive effort by the United States under President Clinton to bring 
republicans in to a political process and convince the British government to engage with 
them. The kind of exposure that men like Adams and McGuinness received in the United 
States while the IRA was on ceasefire made it more difficult to return to ‘war’ and 
represented the culmination of Sinn Fein’s role to internationalise the conflict.
Holland, Jack, Hope Against Historv, The Ulster Conflict. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1999, p.236.
Quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos p.330
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p.330.
Op. cit. Bew and Gillespie p.282.
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The IRA’s ceasefire announcement of August 31®^ 1994 was reciprocated by the loyalist 
groups six weeks later. The organisation, however, ended it with the Docklands bomb in 
February 1996. This undermined Sinn Fein’s political efforts but Adams and McGuinness 
blamed the British government, arguing that it had deliberately stalled negotiations. 
Taylor suggests that had the IRA not bombed Canary Wliarf the organisation would 
probably have split. On 20**' July 1997, and with a Labour Prime Minister in office 
with a large majority that would not have to depend on unionist s uppor t , t he  IRA 
renewed its ceasefire.
The May 1997 general election also returned Geny Adams and Martin McGuinness to 
Westminster (although they refused to take their seats). At the same time Mitchel 
McLaughlin of Sinn Fein had apparently argued that the IRA could not overcome the 
military superiority of the British anny.***^  Thus, the state’s response and the 
aclcnowledgement that violence was not going to achieve what it set out to do forced the 
IRA to think more of politics as a sign of moderation and the means to cany on the 
struggle without violence. Public pressure too was a factor with ‘the vast majority ... 
sickened’ by the use of Patsy Gillespie as a human bomb.**^ "* The Catholic community had 
had enough. The revulsion at some of the IRA’s actions seiwed to stiengthen the support 
for those republicans seeldng a more political route. Increasing engagement with the 
peace process saw a further split away fiom the IRA with the formation of the Real IRA 
in 1997.
See Major, J., John Major. The Autobiogiaphv. Haiper Collins, London, 1999, p. 456. 
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p.352.
The Labour party has traditionally been more sympathetic to the Irish nationalist cause. 
See op. cit. Taylor, Provos, p. 314.
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In Easter 1998 the Good Friday Agi'eement was signed. At the heart of the deal was that 
so long as the majoiity of the people of Northern Ireland wanted to retain the union with 
Westminster then the constitutional status of the province would remain unchanged. This 
was reflected in the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Republic’s constitution 
that had until that time laid claim to the North. A British-Irish Council that included the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales (thus 
implying that Stormont’s bond with Westminster was on a par with those of Edinburgh 
and Cardiff) was also established. In return a power sharing executive and assembly were 
set up that would include Sinn Fein in the (mistaken) unionist belief that 
decommissioning would shortly follow. A number of North-South implementation bodies 
were also set up to enhance cooperation in areas of common interest.***^
It was vital that, if the Agreement was to survive, those groups who had used violence 
were kept on board and were involved in the new political dispensation. The political 
fronts of the IRA, the UDA and the UVF, therefore, gained in importance as channels for 
the groups to become engaged with democratic politics.
The accord, however, did not explicitly compel the IRA or the loyalist groups to disarm, 
leaving open the possibility that the political fionts could be utilised as tactical devices. 
Ever since the signing of the agreement the issue of decommissioning and alleged 
continuing IRA activity has dogged the peace process and, at the time of writing, has led 
to four suspensions of the new political dispensation. In the meantime, while the IRA
‘““ Ibid. p.317.
In areas such as agi iculture, fisheries, fianspoit, waterways and tourism.
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remains armed, it has managed to negotiate through Sinn Fein the release of its prisoners, 
executive positions in government, office space and facilities in Westminster for its four 
MPs, and is cuiTently negotiating an amnesty for ‘on the run’ prisoners and positions on 
the Disti'ict Policing Partnerships if and when Sinn Fein joins the Policing Board. At the 
same time state sponsorship of the fr ont in politics by the British, Irish and American 
governments have helped Sinn Fein poll an electoral mandate that has seen it eclipse the 
SDLP for the first time.
On the loyalist side the ceasefires and the 1998 Agreement saw the UDP and the PUP at 
their most prominent. Since the Agreement was signed, however, the loyalist groups have 
become increasingly disillusioned. The UDA dissolved its political front in November 
2001, a month after John Reid, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, declared the 
organisation’s ceasefire over. The gioup has since claimed, through the Ulster Political 
Research Group (its latest political front), that it has reinstated its ceasefire after a bitter 
feud that saw the eviction of West Belfast brigade leader Johnny Adair.
At the time of writing (June 2003) the new political dispensation is in a state of 
suspension after the Stoimont spying scandal of October 2002.**^ *’ The British and Irish 
governments continue to endeavour to reestablish the institutions but have delayed the 
Assembly elections (originally scheduled for May U*) after the IRA refused to declare 
that it would cease all paramilitary activity.
When Sinn Fein members were arrested for gathering material ‘likely to be o f use to teiToiists’
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Conclusion
There are numerous factors and events that need to be taken into account when 
explaining the emergence of the modem political fronts in Northern Ireland. In the case 
of the IRA it was the perceived failure in the use of violence following Russell’s 
unsuccessful bombing campaign in the Second World War that prompted the IRA to 
adopt Sinn Fein as its political front in order to mobilise sympathy for its cause (see 
chapter 7). The front’s electoral successes in the 1950s, however, were to be short-lived 
after the failure of the Border Campaign, largely due to an effective and simultaneous 
state response from both Westminster and Dublin (see chapter 8). The réévaluation of 
republican stiategy entailed greater identification with the working classes and Marxist 
ideology, revitalising the tradition of republican socialism. As in the 1930s this in turn 
meant more emphasis on a political strategy, although this time Goulding’s IRA argued 
against the retention of its long-held policy of abstention. This issue ultimately led to the 
1969 split between the Trovisionals’ and the ‘Officials’ and represented the most serious 
rupture to date along the tiaditional faultline between the more political ‘republican 
socialists’ and the more nationalist militarists.
Terence O’Neill’s reforms, the emergence of NIGRA, the loyalist response to it, and an 
ill-judged state response to the evolving crisis, all served to provide a polarized 
environment in the early 1970s that militated against the utility of political fr onts. The 
security force successes and the near defeat of the IRA through the 1975 truce, however.
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prompted the emerging new leadership to widen the stmggle to all fronts and so Sinn 
Fein’s role was expanded accordingly through a process of ‘active abstentionism’. 
Indeed, it was the new leadership of Adams and McGuinness that was to be insti'umental 
in providing new and innovative roles for Sinn Fein in the changing environment of the 
decades ahead.
There is no accounting for unforeseen events for their impact on strategy and Sands’ by- 
election victory certainly represented a watershed in the republican approach vis a vis the 
gieater utilisation of Sinn Fein (see chapter 9). Finally, the peace process, the ceasefires 
and the negotiations leading up to and beyond the Good Friday Agieement have accorded 
Sinn Fein an unprecedented role. Whether or not the political front has ultimately come 
to represent moderation towards the use of violence, the aspiration of the United States, 
the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom of drawing the republican movement into an 
all-inclusive peace process, even without frmi evidence that its armed stiuggle was over, 
has endowed Sinn Fein with a strong negotiating position to reap concessions for the IRA 
and the Catholic community as a whole, and this has been a fundamental factor behind 
the party’s electoral success.
Nevertheless, the new republican political strategy of the 1980s was to lead to tensions 
within the IRA. Traditionally, the fault line within republicanism had been between those 
that espoused Marxist ideology (and therefore sought to mobilise popular support through 
political endeavoui's) and those who had no time for politics but believed that the armed 
struggle was the sole means for achieving national unification. In the 1980s the new fault
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line lay between those that wanted to hold on to the sacred principle of abstention and 
those that wanted to take advantage of Sinn Fein’s electoral success by abandoning the 
principle in relation to taking up seats in the Irish Dail. This division led to the split of 
1986 and the formation of the Continuity IRA. In the 1990s unrest within grew over the 
republican movement’s increasing engagement with the peace process that led to the 
breakaway in 1997 of what was to become the Real IRA. Ever since internal tensions 
have remained over the IRA’s involvement with a process that has entailed unwelcome 
sacrifices, such as the acceptance of the principle of consent and two acts of ‘putting 
weapons beyond use’, not to mention the increasing engagement with British political 
structures.
If the hunger strikes and Sands’ victory were pivotal in enhancing Sinn Fein’s role, then 
the one event that was to provide an impetus for the creation of loyalist political fronts 
was the Ulster Workers’ Council strike of 1974. Loyalist workers had managed to bring 
the province to a standstill giving them a new found confidence that led to the perception 
of some within the loyalist groups that they could provide working class loyalism with 
better and more ‘honest’ representation than they had been getting from ‘respectable’ 
unionist politicians (see chapter 9). As with Sinn Fein, however, it was the peace process 
that was to give the loyalist political fronts (the PUP and the UDP) an unprecedented role 
as the spokespersons for the UDA and UVF, whose continued ceasefires were so vital to 
political progress.
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As important as the endogenous factors have been, the impact of exogenous factors 
should not be overlooked. The influence of the United States has been noted above while 
the growth of the European Union and supranational politics helped foster a growing 
warmth in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic, where 
tenitorial nationalism and boundaries have become less relevant. This in turn has led to 
gieater cooperation between the two states in bringing about a settlement that enhanced 
the role of the political fronts. The growth of the European Union has been just one 
aspect of the process of globalisation that has deemed frontiers and nationalism less 
relevant in the Western world. The global communications revolution and a global 
economy that have increasingly tianscended national boundaries has meant that Northern 
Ireland would miss out on the economic benefits of the new order if its two communities 
clung on to its ‘traditional’ territorial nationalism and its parochial past.
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Chapter 3 - The Political Front -  A Typology
This chapter will attempt to construct a typology of terrorist political fronts. Political 
fronts are subordinate to their terrorist organisations and dual membership between the 
two is a common feature. As most political fronts can be described as political parties in 
the broad (non-democratic) sense it sets out to place them in Maurice Duverger’s 
classification of political parties but finds that they do not adequately fit the two most 
likely models -  the ‘militia party’ and the ‘permanent minority party’. The militia party is 
a fascist creation and describes a party that is in control of its militia whereas the political 
front is subordinate to the terrorist group. The permanent minority party type describes a 
party that could resort to the use of violence rather than a terrorist group that might utilise 
a political front. It is then argued that the phenomenae of political fr onts are usually 
(though by no means always) associated with secular terrorist groups -  that is 
secessionist or nationalist - or groups that have a prominent secular component. This is 
primarily because there is a potential ethnic or ethno-religious community (such as the 
Catholics in Northern Ireland, or the Basques in Northern Spain) fr om which to mobilise 
support.
In the writer’s view the term ‘political wing’ is an unsatisfactory label for the phenomena 
in question. A political front is a ‘front’ for and under the control of the terrorist group 
and it is only when this ceases to be the case that a new label is required. The term 
‘political wing’ is often used interchangeably with political front but because it implies a
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degree of equivalence with the terrorist group (assuming that the two wings of a bird are 
the same size) in terms of decision-making and overall influence in the direction of a 
movement, it ignores the fact that political fronts are usually subordinate to the terrorist 
organisation. It is also, therefore, usually the case that they emerge from the tenorist 
group, such as the Progressive Unionist Party from the Ulster Volunteer Force or the 
Ulster Democratic Party from the Ulster Defence Association*. In Spain in 1974 the 
Basque Revolutionary Party (EIA) and the Popular Unity Party (HB) sprung from ETA 
(pm) and ETA (m) respectively.
A political front is not the same as an internal ‘political section’ of a group. Nor should it 
be confused with the plethora of other fronts, support structures and sympathetic 
‘charities’.^  While political fronts may also be engaged in similar propaganda and 
fundraising activities, the key distirrctive feature is that they are umbilically linked to the 
terrorist group. This is evident in the cross or dual membership that exists between them, 
the former being the ‘public face’ of the movement. Examples include the IRA and Sinn 
Fein, the Real IRA and the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, ETA and Batasuna^ and 
the Corsican National Liberation Front and A Cuncolta Naziunalista.
‘ Exceptions include the case o f Sinn Fein, which was taken over and adopted as the IRA’s political front in 
the late 1940s and the case o f  the Irish Republican Socialist Party which was created simultaneously with 
the Irish National Liberation Anny in 1974.
 ^Such as the Irish Northern Aid Committee and Friends o f Sinn Fein in North America. Also the Italian 
Red Brigades, for example, did not have a political fr ont but it did have a number o f other ‘fronts’, 
including a ‘mass front’ to coordinate contacts with factory workers (see, for example, Jamieson, A,,
‘Entry, Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades’, Terrorism and Political Violence. Spring 1990,
Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 5).
 ^Though ETA’s political front uses the electoral banner o f Euskal Henitarrok ( ‘ETA political wing 
revamps after Basque ballot’, Reuters. June 24*’^ 2001).
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Perhaps one of the most common misperceptions of all is that a political front represents 
the ‘moderate half of a movement. It does not follow that an active member of a political 
front has more moderate views towards the use of violence than those involved in 
peipeti'ating it (in fact they could be the same person). Nor is it necessarily the case that 
those in the front are any less radical in terms of policy than those involved in the 
peipetiation of violence. In fact the opposite may be the case. Ruairi O’ Bradaigh 
defected from Sinn Fein in 1986 in protest at the mainstream republican movement’s 
abandonment of the policy of abstention fr om the Irish Dail.
Although there are exceptions'*, most political fronts claim to be political parties. If one 
were to employ a broad definition of political parties that was to include those operating 
in non-democratic aswell as democratic societies then undoubtedly the claim is justified, 
for in the non-democratic context
‘instead of a body intended for the winning of votes, for gi'ouping the 
representatives, and for maintaining contact between them and their electors, the 
political party becomes an instiiiment of agitation, of propaganda, of discipline, 
and, if necessary, of clandestine action, for which elections and parliamentary 
debates are only one of several means of action, and a secondary means at that.’^
As most political fronts can be classified as political parties in this broader (non- 
democratic) sense it would seem worthwhile to try and place them within the different
Exceptions include Republican Sinn Fein and the 32 County Sovereignty Movement who describe 
themselves as political ‘organisations’.
 ^Duverger, M., Political Parties. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p.36.
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party types established by one of the leading authorities on the subject, Maurice 
Duverger, in his classic work Political Parties.
In another archetypal work. Democracy and the Organization o f Political Parties, M. 
Ostrogorski outlines the origin of political parties. It was, he argued, The revolution in 
the domain of ideas reinforced by the effects of the industrial transfoimation’ that led to a 
spirit of enterprise and individual effort which in turn led to the middle class demanding a 
place in society.^ Henceforth, legislation from 1826-46 in the United Kingdom, most 
notably the 1832 Reform Act, extended the franchise and so The monopoly of 
parliamentary representation was thus taken out of the hands of the aristocracy.’^  It was 
this momentum that was to ultimately facilitate greater democracy and the emergence of 
the political party. There appears to be a general consensus^ that the emergence of 
political parties was ‘bound up with that of democracy, that is to say with the extension 
of popular suffrage and parliamentary prerogatives.’^  John Lees and Richard Kimber 
agree that ‘the grrowth of a more democratic political process helped further to legitimize, 
and make necessary, political parties as electoral organizations.’***
Duverger distinguishes between two different types of origin of the political party. The 
first is the electoral and parliamentary source. As the suffrage was increased in the 
nineteenth century electoral committees were established (some evolved from the 
philosophical societies and others were set up by a few close supporters of the
® Osti'ogorsld, M., Democracy and the Organization o f Political Parties. Macmillan, London, 1902, p. ix. 
’ Ibid. p.44.
® Macridis, R., (ed.), Political Parties. Contemporary Trends and Ideas. Haiper, London, 1967, pp. 10-11, 
Neumann, S., (ed.), Modem Political Parties. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, pp. 395-6.
 ^Op. cit. Duverger p. xxiii,
Lees, J., and Kimber, R., Political Parties In Modem Britain. Routledge, London, 1992, p. 1.
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parliamentary candidate) to present the candidate to the electorate. Their role was to 
bridge the gap between the electors and the political elites that sought power. It was the 
institutionalisation of the interactions between parliamentary gioups and the electoral 
committees that was to give birth to political parties.
Where committees were created when there was no representation in parliament 
represents the second souice — the extra parliamentary origin. Trade Unions, 
philosophical societies, churches, ex-servicemen’s associations, business interests are all 
‘external’ birthplaces for the formation of political parties. Duverger then draws an 
interesting distinction in the character of the parties that have evolved from these two 
separate types of origin:
‘parties of extia-paiiiamentary oiigin show a much gieater independence of 
[elected representatives] than those born and bred in the shade of the Chamber. 
For the latter the winning of seats in political assemblies is the essence of the life 
of the party, the very reason for its existence and the supreme puipose of its life. 
On the other hand, for the former, the electoral and parliamentary stiuggle 
remains very important, but it is only one of the elements in the general activity of 
the party, one of the means, among others, that it uses to realize its political ends 
...Certainly these differences camiot be explained entirely by dissimilar origins, 
but their influence is incontestable ... The result is that parties of extia- 
parliamentary origin, even when attached by their doctrine to the parliamentary 
system never allot to it the same value as do parties of the first type. Their
Op. cit. Duverger p.xxix
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development therefore entails a certain independence in fact (often unconscious 
and repressed) with regard to parliaments and elections.’
Clearly, political fronts would logically be located in the second broad spectium -  that is 
they have an extia parliamentary origin, although the importance that teiTorist gioups 
attach to the ‘electoral and parliamentary struggle’ varies considerably, and indeed may 
be relatively unimportant.^^
Duverger goes on to identify four party types. The first is loiown as the caucusparty 
and is generally made up of a small number of influential notables that wield 
disproportionate power in relation to their numerical size. It can be a direct caucus (made 
up of ‘traditional social elites’) or an indirect caucus (consisting of ‘institutional’ elites 
composed of members selected by groups such as Trade Unions, Trades Councils and so 
on). The British Conservative party could be classed as a case of the former, whereas the 
Labour party has, traditionally at least, been more aldn to the latter.
The second party type is the branch. Unlike the caucus party its emphasis is on attiacting 
the masses and therefore it is not surprising that it is a type that has been adopted by 
socialists (although it has also been utilised by Catholic parties or parties with ‘fascist 
tendencies’), with its stress on branch meetings and political education.
Ibid. pp. xxxv-vi.
111 the 1970s the IRA was opposed to fighting elections but in the 1980s (after the hunger strikes) it 
decided to allow Sinn Fein to engage in the electoral process. Even then the party abstained from taking its 
seats at Westminster.
See op. cit. Ostrogorsld chapters 3-6 in Part II and 1-3 in Part III for a more in depth discussion o f ‘the 
caucus’.
69
The cell, the third type, is based around occupation, and might, for example, be a 
woiicforce of a factory, or ‘area’ cells might exist to unite those that do not work in such a 
large scale working environment (such as doctors and lawyers). The emphasis here is on 
worker solidarity and discipline. It is also ‘perfectly suited to clandestine action.’ A 
communist invention, it ‘provided an excellent basis for the education and enrolment of 
the masses.’ It is a type that has been most associated with the communist parties. 
Consisting of small disciplined cells it is not ideal for fighting an election but, unlike the 
caucus and the branch parties, electoral and parliamentary matters are secondary.
The fourth type that Duverger identifies is the ‘militia party’, where ‘the breach between 
political parties and parliamentary action is even more definite.’ This party is a fascist 
creation and represents a type of private aimy, with a belief in the necessity of violence:
‘Both [cell and militia parties] take part in elections, organize intense electoral 
propaganda, and weave complicated parliamentary intiigues. But that is only one 
aspect of their action, and not the essential one. The important thing is that they 
employ electoral and parliamentary machinery in order to destroy it, and not so as 
to act within its framework.’
Duverger adds that it is rare that pairies fit stiictly into any one of the above types with 
overlap possible and indeed likely. Although it would appear that, of the four, political 
fi'onts are more akin to the militia party type, and that they indeed may behave in a
Op. cit. Duverger p. 30. 
Ibid. p. 31.
Ibid. p. 36.
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similar fashion^ ,^ there are key differences between the two. In the case of militia parties 
(both fascist^  ^ and communist) the militia grows out o f the party underlined by 
Duverger’s assertion that ‘no political party has ever been exclusively formed on the
basis of the militia On the other hand almost all parties are driven to foim some kind
of militia, more or less embryonic, when they wish to maintain order at their meetings 
and protect their speakers and supporters.
In the early 1920s Italy’s fascist squads sprung from the ‘fasci di combattimento’ 
political group and in the same decade Action Française created its ‘defence wing’, the 
Camelots du Roi. In Britain the ‘flying squads’ emerged fiom Rotha Orman’s British 
Fascists while in Geimany Hitler’s Stoim Detachment (SA) grew out of the National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party.^  ^ During the Resistance in occupied Europe ‘the 
Communist parties were the only ones who managed to fomi an autonomous military 
organization during the occupation, and to make it the backbone of powerful popular 
militia forces after the Liberation.
With political fronts, however, the converse is usually the case -  they emerge from the 
teiTorist group. The Ulster Democratic Party emanated from the UDA and the PUP from
Ibid. p. 39
See ‘SF campaign mn on fascist lines’, by Ruth Dudley Edwards, Irish Times. June 11*** 2001.
For a typological description o f fascism see Who Were The Fascists? by Larsen et al.
Op. cit. Duverger p.37.
“  This doesn’t mean to say that violent fascist groups or revolutionary communist gioups do not exist 
independently o f any political party, such as the War Sport Group, the National Social Action Front and 
other neo-nazi groups that emerged in Gemrany in the 1970s and 1980s, or indeed the Red Army Faction or 
the Red Brigades, but in the case o f fascist or communist militia parties it is the militia that usually emerges 
from the party.
See Eatwell, Roger, Fascism. A  Historv. Chatto and Windus Ltd., London, 1995, Part II.
Op. cit. Duverger p.40.
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the UVF, while Sinn Fein was ‘adopted’ as the IRA’s political front in the late 1940s.^  ^In 
Spain in 1974 the Basque Revolutionary Party (EIA) and the Popular Unity Party (HB) 
sprung from ETA (pm) and ETA (m). Thus, the confrolling influence between the fascist 
party and its militia comes from the party whereas it is the teiTorist gi'oiip that contiols the 
political fr ont, hence the reason why political fronts tend not to have the charismatic and 
personal leadership styles of command found in fascist parties.
As a fascist creation there are other reasons why a political front should not be 
categorised as Duverger’s militia party type. Fascisnf^, loiown as the ‘Third Way’, like 
communism, is its own creed. It is a dogma that, though nationalistic, is international in 
scope. Fascist parties, like communist ones, are therefore concerned with how the state is 
run whereas the secular terrorist group is primarily concerned with who runs it. With 
fascism violence foims part of the creed, with secular teiTorism it is (in theory at least) 
the means to an end. The use of violence, the threat of violence and intimidation are seen 
as necessary even after the fascist state has been achieved whereas with secular terrorism 
it is seen, or so it is claimed, purely as the means to achieve secession. In this case, unlike 
the fascist militia party, political fronts foresee a time when the use of violence may no
Sinn Fein was actually formed in 1905, over a decade before the IRA, but it drifted into oblivion in the 
1930s and 1940s until the IRA took it over as its political front.
Fascism and thus fascist parties have proven notoriously difficult to define for two reasons. Firstly there 
are many different types of ‘fascisms’ (See Payne, S., ‘The Concept o f Fascism’, Who Were The Fascists. 
Larsen, S., Hagtvet, B., Myklebust, L, (eds.), Global Book Resources Ltd., Oxon, 1980, pp. 21-2 for the 
‘varieties o f fascism’) that are influenced by each countiy’s own national and cultural tiaditions. Secondly, 
the Second World War experience o f fascism that led to its discredit has prompted more contemporary 
fascist groups to distance themselves from ‘tiaditional’ fascism, hence the teims ‘neo fascism’ or ‘post 
fascism’. Roger Eatwell broadly describes fascism as ‘a serious ideology which emerged at the turn o f the 
twentieth century, and which is based on an attempt to create a holistic-national radical Third Way’ 
(Eatwell xxiii) (neither communist or capitalist). Stanley Payne in his essay ‘The Concept o f Fascism’ 
constructs a criterial definition beginning with the fascist ‘negations’ o f anti liberalism, anti communism 
and anti conservatism. Fascists aim to create a nationalist authoritarian state with the ‘attempted mass 
mobilization [along with the] militarization of political relationships and style, and with the goal of a mass 
paily militia.’ (Payne pp. 20-1.)
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longer be required. Geixy Adams, for example, often repeats his apparent desire to see the 
IRA go into retirement.
It therefore follows that, when characterising political fronts, they are ‘anti-system’ or 
‘anti-regime’ in a very different way to communist or fascist militia parties. While the 
latter are anti-democratic, ie. anti the predominant system in which they are operating, the 
former are opposed to the prevailing jurisdiction over the territory that they want ceded. 
Fascism and communism seek to overthrow democracy whereas the secular teiTorist 
group, and therefore its political front, do not necessarily aim to change the system but 
rather the territorial jurisdiction over which the state governs. It is perhaps ironic that 
contemporary fascist, or ‘post-fascist’, and communist parlies play the democratic rules 
of the game in seeking to ‘destroy the system from within’, whereas secular tenorist 
groups and their political fronts use anti-democratic practices when ideologically they 
may have no particular aversion to democracy and indeed may even claim to espouse it.^  ^
Today, European fascist movements shirk from any notions that they might have links 
with violence for fear of being banned.^^
While a constituent element of the political front is the same as many fascist or 
communist militia parties -  the justification for the use of violence or the threat of the use 
of violence - political fr onts do not, for the above reasons, fit in with Duverger’s militia 
party model. It is also worth considering, however, Duverger’s theory of minor parties. 
The two minor party types are ‘personality parties’ that are based around parliament
Sinn Fein, the UDP, the PUP all support democracy according to their websites. That is not to say, 
however, that in reality should political fronts ever attain power they will not stick to the methods that have 
brought them success and facilitated their achievement o f power.
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(resembling the caucus party) and the ‘permanent minority party’, which can be based on 
‘ethnical or geographical minorities, upon religious minorities and upon political 
minorities.The second of these categories ‘represent[s] either a race or a region which 
will not accept complete fusion with the national community. Some are separatist, others 
autonomist, others again federalist, and some simply regionalist.’^ ^
Duverger continues:
‘Expressing an opinion which is they feel not that of the nation and which has 
little support, they are led into an attitude of protestation and intransigence by the 
same psychological mechanism which leads an inferiority complex to show itself 
in aggressiveness. The absence of responsibilities for government and of a 
reasonable chance of ever assuming them removes furthermore any check to their 
opposition tendency. They are demagogic by nature, the most demagogic of all 
parties. When they are supported by a homogenous and solid fraction of the 
population -  a geographical or religious minority -  the tendency is even more 
emphasized, for outbidding and violence are ways of retaining their basic 
supporters, of maintaining their separation from the national community, of 
keeping their individuality and their heterodoxy unsullied. If a party is clearly in a 
minority in the country as a whole but in a majority in certain districts its attitude
Such as the National Democratic Party o f Germany (NPD), which has now been outlawed. 
Op. cit. Duverger p. 291.
Ibid. p. 292.
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becomes autonomist or even secessionist, which may imperil the unity of the 
country.
The problem with classifying political fronts as permanent minority parties is that the 
model describes a political party that might resort to violence rather than a tenorist group 
that might resort to using a political fr'ont. What Duverger does describe here is the 
ethnic, geographical and/or religious constituency that may potentially provide support 
for a secessionist terxorist group, which in turn may motivate it to establish a political 
front; for the assertion here is that the political front is a phenomena usually associated 
with secular/nationalist groups rather than groups pursuing communism and fascism.^^
Alexander and Pluchinsky argued that tire IRA and ETA both ‘have legitimate political 
parties to spread their propaganda. This is an immense advantage over the FCOs 
[Fighting Communist Organisations] which do not have this propaganda outle t .There  
are, it is suggested, three reasons why these FCOs did not have political fronts. Firstly, 
they saw it as impossible to achieve peaceful parliamentary transition thus leaving the 
only path of revolutionary violence. This would count oirt any prospects of using a 
political fr ont as a sign of moderation, as they are inherently hostile to compromise. Even 
so their ideology might suggest that as the ‘proletariat’ need to be mobilised that some 
kind of extra parliamentary structure be established to achieve this. This, according to
Ibid. p. 294.
Although there are numerous ‘hybrid’ gioups that merge, for example, secular ideology with communism 
or religion. The secular component, however, makes it more likely that the group will establish a political 
front than groups that have a minimal secular element to its ideology.
Alexander, Y. and Pluchinsky, D., Europe’s Red Terrorists. The Fighting Communist Organizations. 
Frank Cass, London, 1992, pp. 36-7. The groups under study here are the Red Army Faction, the 
November 17 group. First o f October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO), Direct Action, Fighting
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Alexander and Pluchinsky, would involve reaching the ‘fighting communist party’, or 
civil war, stage. The authors argue, however, that none of the FCOs had reached this 
phase (as at 1992) nor indeed have they since as such terrorist groups have been defeated 
or have ceased operations since the end of the Cold War.^ "^  The Red Brigades wrote of:
‘... the still embryonic development of the objective and subjective conditions of 
the revolutionary process that do not permit the ‘upgrade’ from a political- 
military vanguard, which essentially establishes a ‘propaganda’ relationship with 
the masses, to an organic political-military vanguard, which directs and organizes 
the political and military struggle of class layers.
The second reason why revolutionary communist gioups did not generally employ 
political fronts is that they were engaged in an international struggle against imperialism 
and ‘Americanism’. Therefore, their preoccupation with an international conflict against 
capitalism also limits the potential value that any domestic political front might have. 
This overlaps with the third and most significant factor of all -  there is no domestic 
ethnic or nationalist community to potentially provide a natural constituency of support 
for the groups, though there may be ideologically sympathetic or supportive individuals 
or groups (such as Autonomia or Organised Autonomy in Italy^ *^ ).
Communist Cells (CCC), the Red Brigades and the Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol). The main propaganda 
outlets for drese groups are their own communiques and left wing journals (some o f their own).
Although one report suggested that the Red Aimy Faction had come out o f retirement, after anti­
globalisation protests (‘Red Anny Faction Back’, The Times. May 22*^ 2001).
Red Brigades, ‘Twenty Final Theses’, quoted in op. cit. Alexander and Puchinsky, p. 27.
See ‘Italy: Behind the Mask’, website: httn://www.nvbooks.com/articIes/7727 .
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This is not to argue that there are no revolutionary groups that also have an ethnic or 
religious dimension or that there can’t be a merging of secular with a form of communist 
or religious ideology. Even in these ‘hybrid’ cases, however, the secular dimension has 
rendered it more likely that they would use a political front compared to those groups that 
are purely revolutionary or religious. The Irish National Liberation Anny, for example, 
which struggles for social revolution as well as Irish unification, has the Irish Republican 
Socialist Party as its political front. In practice both Hezbollah and Hamas have a secular 
element to their outlooks and this is why these religious groups have found it necessary to 
engage in the conventional political process.^  ^ So too has the radical Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan which recently created a political front to take part in elections.^^
There is little doubt that, using the broad definition above, political fronts can be 
classified as political parties but it is mostly democracies that they operate in and it is 
clear that they do not play to the rules of the democratic game^ .^ David Held focuses on 
the obligations of citizens that enjoy democratic rights: ‘Individuals should be free and 
equal in the deteimination of the conditions of their own lives; that is they enjoy equal 
rights {and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the fr amework which
See Klein, M., ‘Competing Brothers; The Web of Hamas-PLO Relations’, and Zisser, E., ‘Hizballah in 
Lebanon -  At the Crossroads’, Tenorism and Political Violence. Summer 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2.
News Analysis, ‘The PR Minefield in Central Asia’, website: http://www.ianaradionet.com , August 6^ ' 
2001.
Democracy is a fluid concept. Its meaning has changed through history and there are very different 
contemporary examples o f it. Robert Dahl argued that a liberal democracy is a system of government that 
needs : ‘the freedom to form and join organisations; freedom of expression; the right to vote; eligibility for 
public office; the right to compete for support and votes; alternative sources o f information; free and fair 
elections; institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions o f  
preference.’ R. Dahl, quoted in: Z. Gitelman, ‘Tire Démocratisation Of Russia In Comparative 
Perspective’, S. White, A. Pravda, Z. Gitelman, Developments In Russian Politics 4. London 1990, p.267.
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generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this 
framework to negate the rights o f others. ’ "^ (^italics added)
Paul Wilkinson stresses aspects in the tiaditions of liberal political theory that he felt had 
been neglected -  ‘obligations, duties, law, authority and order’, for ‘liberal democratic 
rights all ultimately depend upon the viability of the liberal s ta te .Thus ,  he emphasises 
three key pillars of the liberal state -  the political obligation and support willed by its 
citizens, the supremacy of its rule of law and ‘the right use of the state’s monopoly of 
legitimate force in order to preserve internal peace and order, to enforce the law, and to 
defend the community against external enemiesCrucially the monopoly on the use of 
force by the liberal democratic state is ‘legitimate and legally authorised’.A n o th e r  
feature of democracy is the subordination of the military to the civil power. It is against 
these elements of democracy that political fronts fall down as democratic political parties. 
First and foremost they are part and parcel of, and fully justify, the existence of an illegal 
and alternative secret army dedicated to undermining the legitimate state. It is true that a 
group of citizens may withhold support from the state but the democratic principle of 
consent does not allow a minority to impose its will on the majority. They also justify the 
use of teiTorism and are subordinated to their tenorist bosses, flying in the face of the 
democratic assumption that the military is controlled by the civilian power. They may 
also employ undemocratic electoral practices such as intimidation and poll ffaud.'^ '^
Held, D., quoted in Sorensen, G., Democracy and Democratization. Westview Press, Oxford, p. 10. 
Wilkinson, P., Tenorism And The Liberal Democratic State. Macmillan, London, 1977, pp. 4-5. 
“"Ibid. pp. 12-18.
Ibid. p. 19.
Throughout its histoiy Sinn Fein has been widely suspected o f engaging in electoral fraud, such as the 
use of multiple voting, aswell as intimidatoiy tactics (see part II).
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Notwithstanding these clear affronts to a functioning democracy it is also interesting to 
see how political fronts square up to democratic parties in terms of their functions. 
Definitions of political parties vary considerably, between ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ 
inteipretations. Rose states that ‘the only attiibutes necessary by definition are that a 
party nominates candidates and contests elections ... A general election can be reduced to 
a popularity contest between competing political personalities, or a vote of confidence (or 
no confidence) in the relative competence of alternative teams of politicians.’'^  ^ This 
could easily include those political fronts that engage in the electoral process, though 
Rose argues that it is American writers that often use this minimalist definition of party 
politics, whereas ‘European writers normally assume that parties have larger political 
puiposes.’'*^^
If one was to use a more ‘European’ inteipretation (as the cases in this thesis are in 
Europe) the functions of democratic parties then are: to provide a channel of expression 
between the rulers and the ruled, to serve as agents of interest aggregation, to hold office, 
to implement collective goals when in office, [and] to recruit candidates for office.'^  ^This 
is not adequate, however, in explaining the functions of minor pairies in democracies. As 
Lees and Kimber argue they have a different role to that of major parties: ‘the role of 
minor parties, such as the nationalists, is often much more aldn to a pressure group.’'^  ^
These smaller parties do, nevertheless, have a political progiamme and produce 
manifestos to the electorate in the distant hope that they may be elected or indeed that 
they may (more realistically) hold the balance of power or foim part of a coalition
Rose, R., Do Parties Make A Difference?. Macmillan, London, 1980, p. 10. 
Ibid.
79
government. Apart from adherence to assumptions that a commitment to democracy 
entails, political fronts may also then differ from democratic parties by, for example, 
refusing to ‘legitimise’ the parliament of the state by not taking up its seats, thereby 
effectively denying parliamentary representation to their supporters and usurping the role 
of parties as channels for developing participation and as crucial linkages between state 
and society.'^  ^ This would also preclude the party from political debate and decision­
making in parliament.
This is not to say that ‘democracies’ do not have undemocratic features or indeed that 
democratic parties do not have undemocratic practices. In fact, as Duverger notes, no true 
democracy has ever existed, and Alan Ware emphasises the undemocratic nature of 
parties.B ut it is the work of Robert Michels that is most noted for its elucidation of the 
‘strong centralizing and oligarchical tendencies’ of political par t ies .Only a small 
number of people actually make the decisions, partly because it would simply take too 
long to consult everybody. Democracy is therefore ‘utterly incompatible with strategic 
promptness’ and is ‘not for home consumption, but is rather an article made for export.
What is of particular interest for this thesis is that Michels refers us to a resemblance 
between democratic political parties and military organisations.^^ It would therefore seem
See Hague R., Hanop, M., and Breslin, S., Comparaitive Government and Politics. An Intioduction. 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1992, pp. 235-6.
Op. cit. Lees and Kimber p. 13.
Pridham, G., Securing Democracv. Political Paities and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe. 
Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p.2.
Ware, A., ‘Mechanisms for democracy’. Held, D., and Pollitt, C., New Forms O f Democracv. Sage, 
1986, pp. 131-2.
Michels, R., Political Pairies. Dover, New York, 1959, p.43.
Ibid. p. 42.
Ibid. p. 43.
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logical to suggest, given the true centralised and oligarchic nature of political parties, 
that, internally at least, political fronts are not that dissimilar to ‘democratic’ parties. If 
‘oligarchy ... is inherent in all party organisation’^ '^ , and political fronts emanate from the 
terrorist organisation, then the ‘military’ structure of the terrorist group conditions the 
political front (which it controls) to be oligarchic. In other words the oligarchic tendency 
that has developed in ‘conventional’ political parties is also an inherent and indeed 
necessary characteristic of political fronts if they are to be utilised to greatest effect, and 
in this respect, therefore, they are similar to what we usually consider to be democratic 
parties.
It is in the ‘extenral’ that political fronts differ from ‘democratic’ political parties where 
they clearly breach some of the central tenets of democracy that the latter adhere to -  the 
rule of law, acceptance of the state as the sole legitimate holder of the monopoly of the 
means of force and the pursuance of political goals by exclusively peaceful means.
Conclusion
In summary, political fronts are characterised by dual membership with the terxorist 
gr oup and their subordinate status to it. Representing the public face of a movement, they 
are usually, but not invariably, associated with secular terxorist groups or organisations 
that have a secular cornponerrt to their ideology. This is because the secular terxorist 
gr oup has an ethnic or geographical constituency of potential support. Though there may 
be overlap in terms of fundraising and propaganda activities they are not the same as
Ibid. p. 11.
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other types of fronts or ‘charities’ that are used to sustain different types of terxorist 
group. While it is not always the case, most political fronts can be classified as political 
parties, although they are not democratic political parties. Despite this they primarily 
operate within democracies while justifying anti-democratic practice -  the use of 
violence or the threat of violence to attain political goals. Due to the difficulties of 
matching political fronts with Duverger’s militia party and permanent minority party 
models it would seem reasonable to suggest that they represent a category of party in 
their own right. The ‘political front’, therefore, merits its own unique location in the wide 
spectrum of political parties.
82
Section 2 - The Internal Environment
This section will assess the extent to which the ‘intemaT environment has determined the 
sti'ategy of the IRA, the UDA and the UVF vis a vis the use of a political front. The first 
chapter (chapter 4) outlines the ideology, organisational stmcture and leadership of the 
three groups. Chapter 5 assesses how these have impacted on the nature of the 
relationship between the tenorist organisation and the political front, and on the role of 
the political front. Chapter 6 will assess the impact that the notion of ‘violence as a habit’ 
has had on a gioup’s strategy, both at the organisational and individual level. Section 3 
will then assess the effect that the ‘external environment’, including the impact of popular 
support, state response, and other factors in the domestic and international environment, 
has had on tenorist group strategy vis a vis the use of a political front.
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Chapter 4 - Ideology, Organisational Structure
and Leadership
The IRA
Ideology
The IRA’s ideology emanates from the 1916 Easter proclamation of an Irish Republic 
and the establishment of the 1919 Dail (not recognised by the British government) when 
Sinn Fein won seventy-three from one hundred and five seats. The IRA and Sinn Fein 
were bitterly opposed to the 1922 treaty that brought about the partition of the island. It 
has therefore viewed Westminster rule, any Northern Ireland assembly and the Dublin 
administration as illegitimate -  evident in the Anny Council order of 1927 that prevented 
IRA members from voting in elections.^ The Council is still seen as the legitimate 
government of the whole of a united freland, inheriting the legacy of the 1919 Dail. Its 
primary objective, therefore, is to end partition and rid the British from the island. There 
is no room for compromise on complete independence, with the use of ‘physical force’ 
seen as the means to achieve its political objectives.
The physical force tmdition -  the belief that it was only thiough aimed struggle that the 
British would eventually leave Ireland - has peimeated republican strategy ever since 
Wolfe Tone’s rebellion of 1798. This heritage has been undeipinned by another stiand in 
republican ideology, as espoused by its chief proponent Patiick Pearse, - the cathartic
‘ Although, as noted above, this mle was subsequently broken in the 1930s,
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value of violence and its use as an end in itself. He saw the Easter Rising as a sacrificial 
act and ‘believed in the rejuvenating power of blood’^ . Indeed, such acts and the creation 
of martyi's should persevere through generations, he argued, via a process of what he 
termed ‘apostolic succession’ - the idea that uprisings could act as nationalist statements 
to keep the republican ideal alive .^ Physical force, embodied in the IRA, has therefore 
been the driving force in the republican movement, violence as the sole means to achieve 
its objectives. Even military setbacks or failed campaigns were seen as virtuous because 
they represented the glory of failure and oppression, and helped to sustain the notion of 
victimhood that accompanies republican tiadition. As Smith maintains ‘the self-sacrificial 
image is a compelling symbol of republican ideology and something from which the 
movement continues to draw much of its inner stiength ... [sustaining] the movement’s 
puipose and cohesion.’'^
Set against the purity of the gunman and the martyi' in the history of Irish republican 
ideology is the belief that politics is the ‘domain of the unprincipled where the purity of 
the ideology could be entrapped and undeimined in the murky world of compromise, 
careerism and expediency’.^  No more was this evident than in those that negotiated the 
‘ti'eachery’ of partition; and in the 1950s, while men like Sean South'" were sanctified in 
song, ‘nationalist politicians were a curious mixture of pathetic ineffectuality cum petty
" Bishop P. and Mallie E., The Provisional IRA. Corgi, London, 1992, p.24.
" Smith M., Fighting For Ireland. The Militarv Stiateev Of The Irish Republican Movement. Routledge, 
London and New York, 1995, p .l 1.
“ Ibid. p. 13.
 ^Ibid. p. 20.
® Sean South was an IRA ‘volunteer’ who was killed in the 1956-62 Border Campaign.
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corruption.’^  There has therefore been a long held and deep suspicion of any political 
involvement by republican purists.^
IRA dogma has also maintained that its minority status does not mean to say that it is in 
the wrong. In fact, on the contrary -  the Irish public is seen as having strayed from what 
should have been its true destiny. This means that, ideologically at least, popular support 
has not been a ‘requirement ... as an aid to revolt. Historically, the absence of the desire 
to cultivate a political constituency has meant that the movement has seen little need to 
produce social, political and economic policies which would encourage a wide 
following.’^  As one republican stated in the 1920s ‘The people of a nation may not 
voluntarily suixender their independence ... if a majority is found that would vote such a 
surrender, the vote is invalid legally and morally and a minority is justified in upholding 
the independence of their country .The  Provisional IRA also followed the old IRA ‘in 
not accepting that the majority will should prevail if it is incoixect.’ ^  ^
The above combination of an uncompromising political ideology, the tradition of 
physical force and the legacy of Pearse suggests an unbridgeable and watertight 
intransigence. In practice, however, republican ideology has in fact been diluted by a 
pragmatism designed to advance the organisation’s influence without threatening its 
credibility in the eyes of its constituency - evident in the fact that abstention has 
subsequently come to represent merely the refusal to take up seats if elected. While
" Caralier, B., (fonner vice-chaimiaii o f the SDLP), quoted in: O’ Connor, F., In Search Of A State. 
Catholics In Northern Ireland. Blackstaff, Belfast, 1993, p. 106.
® Op. cit. Smith p. 20.
® Ibid. p. 22.
Drake, C, ‘The Provisional IRA: A Case Study’, Tenorism and Political Violence. Summer 1991, 
Volume 3, No.2, p. 44, quoted from H. Patterson, The Politics o f Illusion. London, Hutchinson, 1989, p. 
23.
86
feigning ideological purity and a principled approach in refusing to sit in these 
institutions, participation in the electoral process itself smacks of a pragmatic approach. 
For through Sinn Fein (and Saor Eire and Fianna Fail before it) it has become involved 
with the ‘illegitimate’ political process. Popular support has, in fact, been a telling factor 
behind IRA strategy and the perceived failure of violence has led to the search for 
alternative strategies.
One of the reasons for this pragmatism has been the group’s varying adherence over time 
to its remaining ideological component -  republican socialism. The legacies of Finton 
Lalor and James Connolly have helped to foster this tradition, which has underpinned the 
movement’s overall political objective of a united socialist republic. It has also meant 
that, historically, the main fault line within the group was characterised by the division 
between militarists that sought unity purely through armed stiuggle, and the proponents 
of socialism that wanted to pursue a more political path. The prominence of Marxist 
protagonists on occasion pushed the organisation in a leftward direction with a greater 
emphasis on workers’ rights and mass mobilisation. This in turn promoted political 
development (in the face of deep suspicions from the military ‘purists’), usually when 
violence alone as a sfrategy was perceived to have faltered and when left wing adherents 
managed to sway the ‘organisation men’ against the wishes of the ‘militarists’.
The contiudictions between these components of IRA ideology are glaring. Given that the 
IRA is totally committed to the national cause how can it genuinely espouse Marxist 
ideology that envisages the ‘withering away’ of the state? Secondly, ‘atheistic’ 
communism is completely anathema to the community (Northern Catholics) that the IRA
" Op. cit. Drake p. 44. 87
has claimed to represent. Finally, republican socialism hardly sits comfortably with the 
notion of courting Washington and Irish-American opinion.
The 1969 Split
In December 1969 a General Army Convention was held to determine the future 
ideological and strategic path of the IRA. Two proposals put forward by the Chief of 
Staff, Cathal Goulding, were to be ratified -  the first was to establish a ‘National 
Liberation Front between Sinn Fein, the Irish Communist Paify and other left-wing 
gioups. The other was to drop the traditional Republican policy of abstention so that Sinn 
Fein representatives, if elected, could take their seats in either the Dail, Stormont or 
Westminster.’^^  It seemed that the IRA was taking on an increasingly socialist agenda, 
wliich in turn meant greater involvement in ‘conventional’ politics. This direction, and 
the two proposals, were anathema to the traditional hardliners who, under the leadership 
of Sean MacStiofain, were bitterly opposed to the dismantling of the key tenet of 
abstention from the Dail and Westminster, and the legitimisation that such a policy would 
accord to the two ‘unlawful’ states in Ireland.
Goulding saw the IRA’s role as preparing the masses for a socialist revolution but only 
when the conditions were right, which was apparently not the case in the late 1960s when 
he refused to allow the organisation to take firll advantage of the civil rights movement. It 
was this policy, according to the traditionalists, that had left the Catholics in the Norih
Coogan, T., quoted in, ‘Proceedings o f the Irish Republican Anny General Amiy Convention, December 
1969’, by Morgan J. and Taylor, M., Tenorism And Political Violence. Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 1997), p. 151.
defenceless against Protestant extremists and had led to the embaixassing jibe that the 
IRA stood for T Ran Away’.
The main factor behind the split, however, was the prospect that that sacred tenet of 
republican ideology -  abstention - was to be ditched. Those that remained with Goulding 
became known as the Official IRA while those that departed were referred to as the 
Provisional IRA. The 1969 split was miiTored in Sinn Fein, with the foirnation of 
Provisional Sinn Fein a month later. Henceforth, it was the ‘Provisionals’ that adopted 
the mantle of traditional republicanism -  that is, its ideology was still based on the 1916 
Proclamation, aiming for ‘a democratic, socialist Republic, consisting of a 32-county 
Ireland divided into four regions, Ulster, Connaught, Munster and Leinster.’ The 
socialist stiand, however, perhaps predictably, was to take a back seat after the split.
The adoption of Marxist doctrine on the part of the IRA has therefore increased the 
likelihood of engagement in the conventional political process as a means of giving 
political representation to the masses of the ‘oppressed’ it has sought to mobilise (see 
chapter 7). It was this objective that lay behind the OIRA’s rejection of the policy of 
abstention from the political process. However, ironically, as Connor Cruise O’Brien 
argues, the new PIRA ‘had better chances of winning both influential and popular 
support’ than the OIRA both in the North and in the Republic. In the North ‘the 
formidable thing about the new IRA’, he states, ‘was its simple relevance to the situation’ 
where afflicted Catholics could identify with the Provisionals, and where there was no 
theoretical communist jargon or fanciful notion of some alliance between Protestant and
Appendix, Conflict Studies. Ulster: Consensus And Coercion. No. 50, October 1974, p. 22. 
O’Brien, C., States Of Ireland. Anchor Press, London, 1972, pp. 205-8.
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Catholic workers/^ The ‘Officials” analysis seemed to be equally dubious in the South 
‘as very few people ... had any desire for a revolution [and] this cut [the movement] off 
from popular support.’ Nevertheless, whilst the PIRA may have been more relevant as 
the defender of the Catholics, its ultimate objective of the return of the Six Counties to 
the rest of the island also seemed unrealistic for as long as they discounted the views of 
the majority of the population in the North (see chapter 7).
The pragmatism that emerged with the new leadership in the 1970s and that was to lead 
to the end of the long held policy of abstention fr om the Dail in 1986 had very little to do 
with republican socialism. The new fault line in the movement emanated from the 
glowing prominence of Sinn Fein within the movement and the increasing engagement in 
the conventional electoral process on the part of mainstieam republicanism. Many were 
suspicious of the new path, even though Sinn Fein was used as a tactical device to further 
the overall stiuggle against the British state. Thus, the traditional fault line between 
republican socialists and militarists has been replaced by the rift between those that have 
supported the leadership’s ‘struggle on all fronts’ and those who are opposed to the 
increasing engagement with British stiuctures. Both the socialist influence and more 
lately the Adams/McGuinness sti'ategy have entailed compromising tiaditional republican 
ideology.
For the purposes of this particular chapter the potency and strength of the IRA’s 
nationalist ideology has helped to sustain the organisation’s rigid and centralised 
structure, which in turn has ensured that Sinn Fein has, until very recently at least, been
Ibid. p. 205. 
Ibid. p. 208.
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under the direct control of the Army Council. As such, unlike the political forays of the 
1930s that represented socialist leanings, the modem Sinn Fein has in the main been 
utilised as a tactical tool by the republican leadership in its armed struggle for Irish 
unification.
Structure
As far as the current structure of the organisation is concerned the hierarchy resembles 
the functional organisational chart of a large business. At the top of the tree is the 
General Anny Convention which is an organised meeting of around 100-200 selected 
delegates from different commands around Ireland^®and, according to its constitution, it 
is supposed to meet every two years (but is subject to postponements) in order to select 
the twelve member Army Executive, It is believed, however, that the GAC has met far 
more infr equently than this.^^
The Army Executive meets every 6 months^° although again the fr equency of these 
meetings is subject to change. Its role includes monitoring the Aimy Council’s activities 
‘on behalf of all GAC representatives’ but its most important function is the 
appointment of members of the Council. The IRA is run by the seven member Council 
including the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General. It is the 
‘Supreme Authority when the General Army Convention is not in session’ and is ‘the
Horgan, J., and Taylor, M., ‘The Provisional Irish Republican Army; Command And Functional 
Stiucture’, TeiTorism And Political Violence. Vol. 9, Autumn 1997, No. 3, p. 4.
Ibid. p. 4.
It is believed that after meeting in 1969 it did not reconvene until 1986.
Boyne, S., ‘Uncovering The Irish Republican Army’, from Frontline: The IRA And Sinn Fein, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review. August 1996, website: 
http://www.Dbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/org.html.
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overall PIRA leadership, responsible for the execution of all military policies in line with 
overall strategies.’ It meets at least once a month. Although it sees itself as the true 
government of a united Irish Republic its role is very much that of coordinating the 
sti'ategy and tactics of the IRA against the British. The planning and implementation of 
Army Council decisions are undertaken by the General Headquarters Staff (GHQ) which 
acts as a link between the Council and the Northern and Southern commands. GHQ, 
which is based in Dublin, is seen as the ‘governing body’ in between Aimy Council 
meetings and refers decisions back to the Council.
The Northern Command covers Northern Ireland as well the Republic’s border counties, 
Donegal, Leitrim, Cavan, Monaghan and Louth,’ and consists of ‘at least’ five brigades -  
those of Belfast, Derry, Donegal, Armagh and Tyione-Monaghan.^'^ These brigades 
consist of three or four Active Service Units, each of which has an Officer Commanding 
(DC) who reports to the Brigade Commander. The Southern Command covers the other 
counties of the Republic of Ireland and has less members than the Northern Command, 
with a Dublin brigade and ‘a number of smaller units in the p rov inces . I t  also consists 
of Brigadiers, OCs and ASUs. According to Horgan and Taylor (1997) Southern 
Command very much acts as the ‘logistic support’ or the ‘Quartermaster’ for Northern 
Command '^". As it is not on the front line of the conflict it plays less of a role in taking 
major decisions. It primarily engages itself in the training of ‘Volunteers’, the provision
Op. cit. Horgan and Taylor, ‘The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command And Functional 
Structure’, p. 5.
PIRA’s Constitution, quoted in op. cit. Horgan, and Taylor, ‘The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 
Command And Functional Stmcture’, p. 5.
Op. cit. Horgan, J, and Taylor, M., ‘The Provisional Irish Republican Anny: Command And Functional 
Stmcture’, p. 7.
Op. cit. Boyne.
Ibid.
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of funding and safehouses, and the storage and movement of weapons. For example, A 
Limerick ASU of the IRA apparently transports weapons to a Longford-Wetmeath ASU 
which in turn delivers them across the border to the Northern Command.^^
The active membership of the IRA consists of no more than a few hundred at any one 
time although there is also a Targe support network consisting of thousands’. ‘Non 
operational members’, as Morgan and Taylor call them, engage in hiding, moving and 
storing weapons, providing safe houses and perhaps financial provision. Sean Boyne 
suggests that the str ength of the IRA in 1996 amounted to around 400 hard-core activists 
(including ‘about 40 middle-ranking members of the IRA who make operational 
decisions’), ‘with perhaps a similar number [400] of ‘auxiliary’ or ‘second-line’ activists 
who can be called on in a c r i s i s I n  March 2002 a PSNI Special Branch source verified 
that IRA membership stood at around 400-500.^^ As far as the group’s weaponry is 
concerned it is larown to have an armoury roughly the size of that of a regular army 
infantry battalion, consisting of 600 rifles or more, a variety of small arms and medium to 
heavy weapons, and as much as two tonnes of plastic explosive.
Leadership
Following the second world war an increasing amount of ‘Northerners’ held senior 
positions in the IRA^  ^ and ‘after 1948 when the Free State declared itself a republic, the
Op. cit. Morgan and Taylor, ‘The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command And Functional 
Structure’, p. 8.
Ibid. pp. 8-9.
Ibid. p. 3.
Op. cit. Boyne.
Special Branch source, interview.
O’Ballance, ‘IRA Leadership Problems’, Wilkinson, P. (ed.), British Perspectives On Tenorism. Allen 
and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 78.
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IRA largely confined its military actions to Northern Ireland whilst maintaining its 
headquarters in D u b l i n .A s  Northern Ireland was regarded as ‘occupied’ tenitory it 
was natural that the Northern IRA wanted to see more ‘action’ against the British there. 
Indeed, it was the ‘Southerners’ that had become associated with the more ‘political’ left 
wing tide of the IRA in the late 1960s, and it was the ‘Noilhemers’ who became 
frustiated with the lack of action or military ‘defence’. As such the Southern IRA was 
linked more with the Officials whilst the Northern IRA were associated with the 
Provisionals and so from 1970 ‘Northern leaders were elected to the Provisional 
Executive Committee and the Aimy Council.
The role of prisoners should not be overlooked as a further significant ‘internal’ factor 
behind IRA strategy as it was the arena where the future Northern leadership discussed 
the way forward. While the security forces appeared to be getting the upper hand against 
the IRA in the mid 1970s, republican prisoners, including Geixy Adams, were reassessing 
its strategy. The prisons were vital in the politicisation of republican inmates and clearly 
their reading and discussion seminars had an impact on subsequent strategy. Indeed, it is 
where the idea of the ‘Long War’ was bom. It was also the arena where the 1981 hunger 
strikes took place -  an episode that fundamentally changed the course of republican 
strategy.
The IRA had always been controlled by the Southern leadership but a new younger 
leadership had begun to emerge in the North by the mid 1970s. They argued that ‘to 
improve effectiveness the North should have its own administrative structure and more
Op. cit. Drake p. 43.
Op. cit. O’Ballance p. 79.
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autonomy over its ac t ions .The  Dublin leadership obliged and by the end of 1976 the 
Northern Command came into being. It was the emergence of this new Northern 
leadership that was instrumental in bringing about the Long War strategy. David 
McKitti’ick states that the old guard of Daithi O’Connell and Ruairi O’Bradaigh had been 
taken in by the British pretence of withdrawal from the province, nearly leading to the 
defeat of the IRA.^  ^ Henceforth they were gradually marginalised along with their Eire 
Nua policy in favour of a unitary Irish state -  ‘ a far more uncompromising Republican 
pos i t ion .As  far as other republican principles were concerned the new leadership was 
more pragmatic believing that it shouldn’t stick to old rules that damaged them. Crucially 
it was this change at the top that was to lead to new and unprecedented ways as to how a 
political front could be utilised.
Asked what the single most important factor was that brought about the greater utilisation 
of Sinn Fein, the party’s Belfast Councillor Michael Browne stated that it was the change 
in leadership. The real turning point, he argues, came later in 1983 when Adams became 
President of the party and was someone who ‘was capable of dealing with the evolving 
s i tua t ion .I f  the old guard had not been swept away by this new leadership, he argues, 
the subsequent changes that took place would not have happened.Greater utilisation of 
Sinn Fein in this new approach, however, did not represent moderation in the gi'oup’s 
attitude towards the use of violence. In fact the opposite was the case as Adams and 
others restructured the IRA to combat the use of infomiers.
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 311.
McKittiick, D., interview.
Eire Nua proposed a federal Ireland that would give unionists a regional power base. 
Op. cit. O’Brien, States Of Ireland, p. 111.
38 Browne, M., interview. 
Ibid.
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According to Drake the reorganisation was the result of the recognition by PIRA that they 
were indeed engaged in a Tong war’. Previous PIRA predictions of military victory in the 
short tenn had meant that Tong term security and the need to build up a durable political 
base were not thought to be important’ Until 1977 PIRA was organised into 
companies, battalions, and brigades, some of which contained as many as 50 men’."^  ^
However, the security forces had considerable success in penetrating these divisions both 
because of their size and their ‘multi-channel’ command sti'ucture."^  ^Informers meant that 
many of the IRA leaders and their recruits were rounded up leading to a downturn in 
military activity. The Provisionals’ response was to change the basic structure of the 
organisation from large brigades to small secret cells in which the members of the Active 
Service Unit (consisting of four to six ‘volunteers’'^ )^ only knew each other. The cell 
leader alone knew the identity of his immediate superior to eliminate the danger of 
informers.'^ '* Thus the organisation became far more difficult to penetiate, evident in the 
increased number of attacks in 1979.'^ ^
Under the new approach the struggle was also to be expanded beyond the military role. 
IRA sti'ategy had been very much one of violence alone with the role of Sinn Fein (which 
was illegal until 1974) limited to being the propaganda mouthpiece for the aimed struggle 
and ‘community policing’ (see chapter 6). In 1977, however, the ‘Long War’ strategy 
advocated the widening of the stiuggle. The main problem for Geny Adams was that ‘the
Op. cit. Drake p. 47.
Ibid. p. 45.
TRA -  Tough nut to crack’. The Economist. July 1979, p. 19.
Estimates vary as to the size o f these cells. The Economist, for example, suggests that the cells contained 
five to eight men or women (The Economist, op. cit., p. 20) and Drake indicates that as many as twelve 
members could have been in one Active Service Unit (op. cit. Drake p. 47).
^  Op. cit. O’ Balance p. 80.
See Connell, J., ‘Soldiers take back seat in ‘Ulsterisation’ moves’, The Sundav Times. January 17^ 1982.
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sti'uggle had been limited to aimed stiuggle. Once this stopped, the stiuggle stopped.
The new approach emphasised that there should be increased activity on the economic, 
political and cultural fronts aswell as the military. Adams stressed the importance of 
building a strong political alternative to constitutional politics, through a process of 
‘active abstentionism’.'^  ^He also argued that the political struggle had hitherto been too 
restricted to the North and should be expanded on a thirty-two county basis.'^  ^The new 
strategy meant that Sinn Fein would no longer just be the mouthpiece for IRA violence 
but would be instrumental in establishing a popular infrastructure of ‘very necessary 
things like housing committees, defence groups, advice centres, local policing, people’s 
taxis etc’^ *, albeit outside the system. Developing alternative economic and social 
sti'uctures to those of the state, then, was to be one of Sinn Fein’s most important 
functions.
At the beginning of the 1980s ‘although Dublin was the seat of the GHQ, and Provisional 
Sinn Fein HQ, at Kevin Street, Dublin, was still the mouthpiece, the conti'ol of the 
Provisional IRA was firmly in Northern hands.Meanwhile, hundreds of republican 
prisoners who were being released after doing time for teiTorist offences in the 1970s, 
and who did not want to go back inside or pick up a gun again, but were still committed 
to the cause, provided a dedicated pool of activists for the party.^  ^ The Hunger Strikes 
provided a second boost to this activist base for die political front. A large army of
Adams G., Before the dawn. Mandarin, London 1997, p. 250,
Op, cit. Provos p. 200.
Patterson H., The Politics O f Illusion. A Political History O f The IRA. Serif, London 1997, p. 185. 
“^ Mbid. p. 191.
Op. cit. O’Balance p. 79.
McKittiick, D., inteiview.
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auxiliaries after these two waves of politicisation, along with excellent organisational 
sldlls, were, according to McKittrick, the genesis of today’s Sinn Fein/^
It was the new leadership in the North that was also behind the ‘bullet and ballot box’ 
strategy in 1981 as Adams saw opportunities in a more political (though no less 
militaristic) strategy. Patterson notes, however, that ‘1983 had seen the first string of 
‘fraternal’ calls from the expanding Sinn Fein political organisation for a ‘refinement’ of 
IRA activity to minimise adverse electoral repurcussions.’^  ^ Wliile Adams preached 
‘refinement’ a member of the IRA Army Council called for escalation. '^* Finally, the 
‘showdown’ between the Southern leadership and that of the North over the issue of 
abstention in 1986 confiimed the ascendancy of the Northern Command. The decision to 
take seats in the Irish parliament was too much for some of the traditional hardliners who 
split from the movement.^^ Nevertheless, the strains between the more traditional 
militarists who remained and the proponents of the political strategy were to continue so 
that it often looked as if two separate and contradictory stiutegies were being pursued.
There is no doubt that the change in leadership in the republican movement was a key 
factor behind the greater utilisation of Sinn Fein, initially through the so called Long War 
strategy. Adams was a crucial factor in this but the support of Martin McGuinness was 
also important as he had the military pedigree^^ to cany hardliners with him. It is a 
leadership that still remains intact today despite a further split in 1997 when some of its
Ibid.52
Op. cit. Patterson p. 196. 
Ibid. p. 222 (footnote 60).
To form Republican Sinn Fein, later to be the political front o f the Continuity IRA.
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See op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 319.
members, disillusioned with the IRA ceasefires and the peace process, broke away to 
fonn the Real IRA with the 32 County Sovereignty Movement as its political front.
More than one source suggests that a further important change in the balance of the 
leadership took place in the Autumn of 2001 after the Colombian episode^  ^ and the 
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11*’^ 2001.^  ^It has been claimed that at 
this time the ‘Sinn Fein’ element took the opportunity to take control of the Army 
Council:
‘...Adams and his supporters on the IRA’s Army Council, who had never 
sanctioned the Colombian adventure, saw their chance to seize control. On 27 
September at a safe house in Dundalk ... the Provisionals’ leadership held an 
historic meeting. Pat Doherty, a Sinn Fein MP, proposed that, for the coming few 
months, Martin McGuinness should become the IRA’s chief-of-staff, putting the 
pro-decommissioning wing in the driving seat. [According to one senior police 
officer] ‘Colombia had been a monstrous cock up and now no one was going to 
oppose McGuinness and what he was going to do. The IRA had been led down a 
potentially dangerous path in Colombia, one which threatened to cut off money 
and influence in America’.... With the balance of forces now finnly in favour of
In 2001three IRA members were airested by the Colombian authorities at Bogota airport with false 
passports and for allegedly training members o f the FARC guemlla group in the use o f mortars. It was seen 
as a propaganda disaster for the IRA as America was finious that, while it had been hosting Sinn Fein 
members at the Wlnte House, the IRA was apparently assisting a group that Washington vehemently 
opposed. At the time o f writing the three are standing trial in Colombia.
Such as Cowen, R. and Boycott, O., in ‘Sinn Fein offers hope on IRA arms stoclqpile’. The Guardian. 
October 8* 2001, and Ruddock, A., (Ruddock, A., ‘How America held the IRA over a barrel’. Guardian 
newsunlimited, website: http:/Avww.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland . October 28**' 2001).
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those who wanted an IRA gesture on anns, the stage was set for an historic move,
which up until 18 months ago the Provos vowed would never happen. ,59
This was disputed, however, by a Special Branch source, who claims that the Colombian 
episode was officially sanctioned by the Army Council.^® Whether or not there was a 
change in the balance of the Army Council at this time, and so whether or not Sinn Fein 
has after all come to represent moderation towards the use of violence on the part of the 
movement, the implications of both assessments will be considered in the conclusion.
In general, the IRA’s powerful ideology and tightly conti'olled, disciplined and 
centralised organisational structure has certainly been a factor that has facilitated the use 
of a political front, especially when that political front has been used as a tactical device 
when sti'ict control and coordination from the centre is an imperative. The change in the 
leadership in the 1970s and its suivival since has also ensured that Sinn Fein has 
continued to be used as a political front in new and innovative ways.
The Loyalists
Ideology
Loyalist ideology has also been able to draw on centuries-old traditions. Roy Garland 
notes that ‘the communal banding together in military-style organisations, whether for 
defence or attack, had a long history in Ireland going back to the 18*'’ century agrarian
Ruddock, A., ‘How America held the IRA over a baiTel’, Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
http://www.newsuiili mited.co.ulc/iiireland . October 28**' 2001.
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gl'oups such as the Whiteboys, Steel Boys, Hearts of Oak, Peep o’ Day Boys, Orange 
Boys and Defenders.’ *^ Boulton, too, recalls a long tiudition of Protestant paramilitarism 
that has sought to keep the minority population in line in the name of Protestant law and 
order, from the days of the ‘Volunteers of the 1780s and the Yeomen to the USC [Ulster 
Special Constabulary] of the last fifty years [1922-72].’*’^
As far as the loyalist teiTorist groups are concerned, however, ideology has been a far less 
potent force than it has been for their republican opponents. The IRA has been able to 
draw on the legacy of the 1919 Dail, the physical force tiadition of republicanism and 
centuries of revolt. As pro-state groups (see chapter 9), the loyalists have been members 
of the dominant majority community, so they could not draw on any legacy, real or 
imagined, of victimhood, state oppression, discrimination in the worlcplace and in 
housing allocation. Nor could they get around the contiadiction that they were breaking 
the laws of a system and jurisdiction that they were trying to protect. In addition to these 
factors, or maybe because of them, they have in general shown little interest in reading 
history books or developing a coherent historical ideology from which to draw an 
appropriate strategy. They have been more interested in ‘action’ rather than political 
seminars. One UDA spokesperson said:
‘The more we talked to people and asked ‘what’s it all about?’ the more we got 
the same answers, ‘no suiTender’, ‘remember 1690’, ‘fuck the Pope’.... We did a 
suiwey asking people when Protestants came to Ulster. When was the Plantation?
Special Branch source, interview.
Garland R., Seelcing a oolitical Accommodation. The Ulster Volunteer Force: Negotiating History. 
Shankhill Community Publication, 1997, p. 10.
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And a lot of other things. A lot of people thought we came here just before World 
War One, because the only thing they loiew was that their Grandfathers were in 
the war, at the Somme ... nothing before that, absolutely nothing.
Perhaps more significantly the fact that the IRA’s cause is one of an aspiration yet to be, 
but that could be realised, has more potency and romance than an ideology that simply 
seeks to preserve the status quo and therefore entails fighting for something that already 
exists.^ '* Moreover, the UDA and UVF are but two of a number of organisations that 
pursue the same aim, including Ian Paisley’s hardline Democratic Unionist Party and Bob 
McCartney’s UK Unionist Party, whereas the IRA has been the sole inheritor of a long 
established ti adition of militant republicanism.
The one consistent theme in loyalist (and unionist) ideology is the maintenance of the 
border with the Irish Republic, whether Northern Ireland remained as part of the United 
Kingdom or became an independent state in its own right. Around this core theme 
ideologies have come and gone, fiiom associations with left wing dogma to the secular 
aspiration of an independent Northern Ireland, which, of course, totally undeimines the 
concept of loyalism to the British state. Although the activities of the gioups are illegal, 
they are justified on the grounds that they are defending tlieir state. As Boulton states.
Boulton, D., The UVF 1966-73. An Anatomy O f Loyalist Rebellion. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1973
p. 22.
‘UDA HQ’, quoted in McAuley, J., ‘Cuchullain and an RPG-7: the ideology and politics o f the Ulster 
Defence Association’, in Hughes, E., Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland. Open University Press, 
Buckingham, 1991, p. 56.
This is not to say that the loyalists groups might not be suspicious o f particular British governments. 
‘Pro-state’ in this thesis refers to being pro the constitutional (ie. through the crown and its symbols) status 
of the province, and not to governments that it has periodaically suspected o f wanting to sell them out.
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‘the men of the UVF, new and old, loiew that their actions were ‘illegal’, but they would 
have vehemently denied that they were ‘unconstitutional’.’^ ^
There has also been and still is a much uglier element of loyalist dogma - one that 
amounts to a form of ‘sectarian ideology’. One can’t really separate this from the fact that 
the unionist statelet had sectarianism built into it from its inception and that bigoted 
attitudes are still rife in general in the province (‘large numbers of Protestants vote for the 
Rev. Ian Paisley, who has always trumpeted his anti-Catholicism’).^ *^  But loyalist 
sectarianism is represented by the most overt and extreme form of bigotry. McKittiick 
notes that ‘loyalists held in the Maze prison decorated their wing with the slogan, ‘Kill 
‘em all. Let God sort ‘em out.’ Murals in loyalist areas of Belfast proclaim, ‘KAT -  kill 
allTaigs.” ”
The UDA
Ideology
Unlike the IRA, the UDA has suffered from a lack of organisation as well as a generally 
weak and decentralised leadership that has often been unable to impose its will and 
discipline on the rest of the organisation, which at times has meant that whole brigades 
have acted independently of the leadership. Thus, a single coherent, consistent and 
unified ideology has been difficult to achieve.
Op. cit. Boulton p. 59.
McKittiick, D., ‘From football stadiums to hospitals, daily life in Ulster remains blighted by historic
hatred’. Independent. 23 August 2002.
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As violence empted in Belfast in 1970, including rioting, pub bombs and car bombs, 
vigilante groups, known as Defence Associations,^® were formed ‘to block out their small 
clusters of sti'eets and keep out the enemy’ The leaders of these Associations began to 
meet and agreed on the foimation of the Ulster Defence Association. Thus, ‘the original 
purpose of the UDA was defence’, though there were also those ‘who wanted to take the 
fight to the e n e m y . I t  initially emerged as a response to the IRA, but it was also 
established ‘to impress upon Westminster the holocaust which would follow [any] British 
withdrawal’.^ * Thus, the first ideological thrust of the UDA was the maintenance of the 
status quo and the preservation of the linlc with the United Kingdom. From its inception, 
however, the organisation also had a component that was interested in improving the lot 
of the loyalist working class. Bruce notes that:
‘As well as those attracted by the excitement or by the need to defend their areas 
against republicans, there were a large number of trade unionists and community 
leaders, often older men, who wanted to see the movement develop some sort of 
‘forward direction’. While their initial reasons for involvement may have been 
defensive and infoiined by little other than a wish to maintain the status quo, they
Ibid. This is not to say that sectarianism has only existed one side (see, for example O’Callaghan, The 
Informer. Corgi, London, 1998, p. 83 and 136 for sectarian attitudes within the IRA) but it has been more 
overt and durable on the loyalist side.
According to Boulton these were set up in Shankhill, Woodvale, Oimeau, Camck, Donegall Pass, 
Hammer, Newtownabbey, Abbots Cross, Woodbum, Lisburn Road, Seymour Hill, Suffolk, Castlereagh, 
Beersbridge, Upper Woodstock and Dundonald (op. cit. p. 145).
Bruce, S., ‘The Problems Of ‘Pro-State’ Tenorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries In Northem Ireland’, 
Terrorism And Political Violence. Vol. 4, Spring 1992, No. 1, p. 69.
™ Ibid.
Aughey, A,, and Mcllheney, C., ‘The Ulster Defence Association: Paramilitaries and Politics’, 
Tenorism: British Perspectives, from Conflict Quarterly, 2, Paul Willdnson (ed.), Dartmouth Publishing, 
Aldershot, 1993, p. 190.
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quickly came to see the possibility and importance of improving the position of 
working-class loyalists.
In fact, because of the difficulties in developing a coherent ideological path to which the 
organisation as a whole could become committed, its identification with loyalist workers 
provided it with a doctrine and the means to mobilise mass support. Cusack and Taylor 
note that ‘in its early days the UDA initially had considerable political success, in temis 
of mass mobilisation, and through the loyalist workers’ strikes’.^ ®
This did not, however, resolve the internal strains in the organisation. In fact there were 
‘major tensions between the military and political sides, between those who saw their role 
as counter tenor and those who saw their role as providing social and political leadership 
to the loyalist w/class.’^ '* There was also rivalry between competing branches and very 
different views on any prospect of political engagement. For example the Woodvale 
company supported William Craig’s Ulster Vanguard, whereas others (such as Sammy 
Smyth, editor of Ulster Militant) argued that ‘the Ulster Defence Association owes its 
birth and sti*ength to the promise given that there would be no political involvement of 
any kind. While it adheres to that promise, it will remain strong and viable; once it enters 
the political arena then it will start to disintegiate.’^  ^ Thus, some UDA men were 
sceptical of any political involvement, mirroring the hardline component of 
republicanism.^^
Bmce, S., The Red Hand. Protestant Paramilitaries In Northem Ireland. Oxford University Press, 1992,
p. 226.
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Neveitheless the overlap that existed between the UDA and trade unions gave it a strong 
grounding of support in its early days. As Bruce states ‘the loose network of shop 
stewards and union activists was the framework for both the Derry UDA and the area’s 
section of the UWC [Ulster Workers’ Council].
After the successful association with the loyalist worldng classes in the early 1970s, 
culminating in the 1974 UWC strike, Cusack and Taylor argue that in the years 1977-87 
‘the organisation was generally viewed as lacking the psychological and organisational 
base of a strong ideological commitment.’^ ® The establishment of the New Ulster 
Political Research Group represented the UDA’s attempt ‘to shift the influence of 
Protestant militancy from the streets to the conference room.’^  ^ It was this group that 
proposed a third way between union with the UK and a united Ireland -  an independent 
Northern Ireland.
It wasn’t the first time that loyalists had mooted the idea of independence. Addressing 
50,000 Orangemen in 1912, Carson stated that ‘We must be prepared [for], ...the 
morning home rule passes, ourselves to become responsible for the government of the 
protestant province of Ulster’,®** and in the early 1970s William Craig threatened a 
loyalist drive for independence to counter Harold Wilson’s ‘threat of interference’ ftom 
Westminster.®*
Ibid. p. 226.
Op. cit. Cusack and Taylor p. 3.
Op. cit. Aughey and Mcllheney p. 193. 
“  Op. cit. Boulton p. 18.
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The group published a document entitled Beyond The Religious Divide which advocated 
negotiated independence for the province with a new constitution and Bill of Rights. The 
reasoning behind this initiative appeared to be a genuine attempt to bring the conflict to a 
close:
‘Without the evolution of proper politics the people of Northern Ireland will 
continue to be manipulated by sectarian politicians who make no contribution to 
the social and economic well-being of the people or the country, but only continue 
to fan the flames of religious bigotry for self-gain and preservation.’®^
Bruce argues that the UDA promoted a ‘mostly true’ new history for loyalists to underpin 
the group’s new policy®®, which goes as follows:
‘The Gaels were not the first inhabitants of Ireland. They displaced the pictish 
‘Cruithin’, who moved to what is now Argyll. The Cruithin gradually became the 
Scots, and some of them returned during the Plantation to settle in Ulster. So the 
present-day Ulster Protestants are not late colonists but the original inhabitants, 
returning to regain their land from the invading Celts.’®'*
The theme of independence was taken further with the 1987 publication of Common 
Sense, which argued that there would be no majority rule but proportionality at all levels 
of government.®  ^ Neither of these two initiatives were taken very seriously and were
Beyond the Religious Divide, Linen Hall Library, Belfast. 
Op. cit. Bruce, The Red Hand p. 234.
Ibid.
Common Sense, Linen Hall Library, Belfast.
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largely ignored by the major parties. Bruce points out that working class Protestants who 
are not evangelicals grow up in a world of late 17**’ century symbols, such as the Orange 
Order, the Apprentice Boys of Deny and the Battle of the Boyne, stating that ‘ideas and 
images that do not draw on that tradition will have an uphill struggle to acceptance.’®^ 
Arthur Aughey questioned how negotiated independence could be equated with loyalty. 
The logical response of an exit strategy, he stated, was the classic illusion of the ‘third 
way’ “ it didn’t make sense because it was not part of the endgame for opponents. 
Aughey continued:
‘[the proposal] was a triumph of logic over practicality. ‘Why don’t people accept 
such rationality?’ But practicality was the problem. People didn’t necessarily see 
the world their way. So then they’d say politics doesn’t work! It would reconfirm 
their position as a frustrated, misunderstood elite.’®^
The Common Sense document represented the culmination of the rise of the ‘political’ 
element, under John McMichael, in the movement.
Thus, the UDA has had associations with socialism and was the only serious proponent 
of an independent Northem Ireland. Ultimately, however, its only core and consistent 
ideological component was the maintenance of the border with the Irish Republic. As one 
‘senior loyalist’ summed up ‘...the UDA was always the last line of defence between us 
and an enforced United Ireland.... We can’t trust the British Government and we can’t
Op. cit. Bruce, The Red Hand p. 235.
Aughey, A., interview.
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tmst anyone else... Without us being here, it would be so much easier for our country, 
and our way of life to be taken from us.’®®
Structure
Initially the UDA was nothing more than a rather disorganised amalgam of vigilante 
groups that claimed to be defending their areas fr om IRA violence. Peter Taylor sums up 
its structure:
‘The organization was structured along British army lines, as were both the IRA 
and the UVF in a compliment to their opponents. The country was divided up into 
seven ‘brigade’ areas: North Belfast, East Belfast, South Belfast and West Belfast, 
South-East Anti'im, Londonderry and the Border Counties. They were then 
organized into battalions, companies, platoons and sections. A steering committee 
was set up at the top known as the ‘Inner Council’, consisting of the ‘brigadiers’ 
from each of the areas and their ‘staffs’.’®^
As stated above, the very composition of the UDA may have facilitated a more political 
route through the possibility of representing the loyalist workers and indeed the 
framework of the different associations of the UDA was often based on the sections of 
the UWC. McAuley also argues that:
Quoted in op. cit. Cusack and Taylor, p. 24.
^  Taylor, P., Loyalists. Bloomsbury, London, 1999, p. 83.
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Tt is important to note that the paramilitary groups, and the subsequent 
community groups, developed from the same base. Often they relied upon the 
same people and drew upon the same physical structure.’^ **
Thus, it seems that, notwithstanding major obstacles, like the division of labour ethos that 
predominated in unionism as a whole (see chapter 9), there would appear to have been 
potential for a political front to represent the worldng class or indeed to tap the potential 
popular support base (see chapter 7). According to Boyne ‘in its early days the UDA 
developed into a mass movement with the capability to bring many thousands of 
supporters onto the streets.’^ * It is perhaps, therefore, not surprising that there were 
‘social’ and ‘political’ sides of the UDA. Brace states that:
‘the UDA’s development from vigilante groups (and its legality) meant that it 
drew in a different sort of figure, the trade unionist activist with a broader vision 
of what the loyalist working class could be doing, [and a] number of men were 
pushed by their own communities into the role of local representatives and 
became prominent in the ‘social’ or ‘political’ (as distinct from the military) side 
oftheUDA.’’^
Indeed, the loyalist strike of 1974 was a reflection of the cross-over with working class 
politics in the organisation’s earlier days. The creation of the NUPRG, too, represented 
the continuing influence of those who had been ‘politically’ engaged on behalf of the 
UDA in the early 1970s. The identification with working class solidarity, however, was
^  Op. cit. McAuley p. 52.
Boyne, S., ‘Loyalists: Nemesis From The North’, Jane’s Intelligence Review. November f  * 1997, p. 32.
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not allowed to go unchecked and the swift retribution in 1972 against such leanings 
seiwed as a reminder of the rift in the organisation between these people and the 
militarists. If anybody in the organisation exhibited too much ‘class consciousness’ (as a 
natural response to feelings of manipulation by constitutional politicians) that risked in 
any way the charge of being ‘republican-like socialists’ then the UDA took action. As 
McAuley states:
‘Reaction to this developing ‘class-conscious’ line of argument was rapid, 
dramatic and bloody. In an intense campaign within the UDA, those in any way 
associated with this radical line were assassinated or forced to flee the country. 
The more ‘military’- orientated members of the UDA took control.’**®
And in June 1973 the Ulster Freedom Fighters, ‘a more secretive grouping under the 
umbrella of the UDA’, emerged**'*, apparently in response to the SDLP’s participation in 
the new Assembly, some of whom were on the UFF’s ‘death list’. **^ By claiming that the 
UFF was a separate organisation from the UDA the latter managed to escape proscription 
until 1992.
Thus, it would be true to say that the UDA was a mass organisation with at times 
different and contradictory agendas and, because of the ideological divisions and the
Op. cit. Bruce, The Red Hand pp. 71-2.
Op. cit. McAuley p. 50.
McMichael, G., An Ulster Voice. Roberts Rinehart, Colorado, 1999, p. 6.
Daily Telegraph. 9“' July 1973, cited in Conflict Studies. Ulster: Consensus And Coercion. No. 50,
October 1974, p. 11.
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decentralised stiuctiire of the organisation, it was often characterised by factional 
disputes.**** As McAuley states;
‘fiom its inception the UDA contained a number of different ideological 
positions. The organisation’s history reveals almost continuous factional disputes. 
Some of this merely reflects the organisation’s involvement in ‘protection’ and 
the setting-up and management of ‘drinking clubs’. But it also reflects the fact 
that as an organisation with a mass base it contained a criminal element. Other 
disputes involved individuals and ‘power-struggles’ aimed at demarcating control 
in localised areas. Serious disagieements have also arisen from differences over 
the direction of both military and ideological straggles.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the UDA developed a more secretive cell structure for
greater security. McAuley describes how the UDA was reorganised again in 1983:
‘[It] marked a more formal separation of the political and military roles. It has 
been suggested that the organisation was restructured into two major components. 
Firstly, ‘Promotion’, which can be sub-divided into ‘Education’, ‘Politics’ and 
‘Public Relations’, and secondly ‘Protection’, which revolves mainly around the 
activities of the UDF [Ulster Defence Force] and the UFF. The reason for this was 
not simply an attempt to increase formal bureaucracy. It was, rather, an attempt by
See op. cit. Boulton pp. 153 and 182, for example. 
Op. cit. Me Auley p. 49.
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the UDA Council to come to temis with various factions within the 
organisation.’**®
From a membership that peaked at around 30 -  40,000 it is believed that the UDA’s 
numerical stiength at the end of the 1970s was around 10,000. The figure is now believed 
to be in the high hundreds**^  whilst it is thought that by 1997 its ‘hard core of activists 
could [have numbered] 200-300’.***** The group recruited a number of fonner servicemen 
but have been less keen to do so after Brian Nelson, a British military intelligence officer 
who managed to penetrate the organisation (actually becoming the UDA’s senior 
intelligence officer), was exposed as a mole.
During the 1980s the UDA ‘became largely associated with corraption and extortion for 
the personal gain of the leadership.’**** Indeed, argue Cusack and Taylor, ‘it is of some 
significance that the decline of the UDA in this period was associated both with 
increasing racketeering and extensive penetration of the UDA by a security force double 
agent [Nelson] and other agents.’***^ The Cook Report of 1988 exposed the activities of 
leaders like Eddie Sayers and Jimmy Craig. The fact that ‘gangsterism’ for personal gain 
was allowed to develop seemed to be symptomatic of an organisation that was bereft of 
an alluring political ideology and endowed with a loose decentralised sti'ucture.
Ibid. p. 64.
Special Branch source, interview.
Op. cit. Boyne, ‘Loyalists: nemesis fiom the North’. 
Op. cit. Cusack and Taylor p. 4 
Ibid. p. 5.
113
After leadership changes, however, the new UDA of 1992 was a far more militant, better 
organised and ‘a highly effective terrorist group.’***® Yet the group is still widely believed 
to be heavily engaged in illegal activities, including racketeering, drug dealing, extortion, 
and club and pub running operations,***'* that appear to be more to do with maintaining 
individual prestige and fiefdoms than securing political goals. The organisation withdrew 
support from the peace process in 2001 and its ceasefire was declared at an end by the 
then Northem Ireland Secretary of State, John Reid, along with that of the LVF, which, in 
August 2002 was said to be expanding and going through a major reorganisation.***® The 
UDA and the LVF are said to have had close links dating back to the friendship between 
Billy Wright****’, the former leader of the LVF, and Johnny Adair, who emerged as the 
most well Icnown and formidable UDA leader since his release fiom prison in the Spring 
of 2002. After an internal feud, however, Adair and his ally John White were expelled 
fr om the organisation. The former was re-imprisoned after breaking the terms of his early 
release license granted through the Good Friday Agreement. While in jail his Shanlchill 
stronghold was overrun by the rest of the UDA leadership and their supporters in 2003. 
The cuiTent feud is the latest of a number of factional disputes that have characterised the 
organisation.
Leadership
The first ‘chairman’ of the UDA was Charles Harding Smith but when he was arrested in 
a security force sting operation he was replaced by Jim Anderson ‘who took the rank of
Ibid.
See, for example, Murray, A., ‘UDA’s rackets bring in over £5m’, Sundav Life, July V'*' 2002. 
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‘Major-General’ as the movement reorganised itself on straight military lines.’***^ 
However, it was Andy Tyiie that became the most well loiown leader when he took over 
in 1974 because he remained at the helm until 1988. Once he had established himself, he 
increasingly tried to centralise the organisation, and ‘in later years he took to appointing 
the brigadiers’***®, when these had tiaditionally been chosen by their own areas. He was 
unsuccessful, however, in replacing the brigade structure with a central command in 
1985.***^  The organisation was unable, therefore, to bring about the strict, disciplined 
stiTicture that the IRA had achieved.
At the beginning of the 1980s, although Tyrie remained in position, there were some 
leadership changes. Barr and Chicken withdiew from the NUPRG to be replaced by John 
McMichael (who had criticised their policy), as the political spokesman for the UDA. 
The change was reflected in the formation of the new ULDP in 1981, McMichael’s 
investigations into racketeering in the organisation ended abruptly when he was blown up 
by a car bomb in December 1987. Although he was killed by the IRA it is believed that 
he may have been set up by members of his own organisation. After the depaiture of 
Tyrie not only did the personnel change but so did the structure of the leadership. Instead 
of having a chaimian in overall charge of the organisation there was to be a collective 
leadership. This ‘Inner Council’, however, soon gained a reputation for corraption and 
resting on its laurels. Cusack and Taylor describe its inadequacies:
‘During 1980-89 the old ‘Inner Council’ leadership appears to have been very
suspect in teims of political motivation, and some of the individuals in power
Op. cit. Boulton p. 161.
Hand p. 252.
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Op. cit. Bruce, The Red 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s significantly directed the organisation away 
from its original ideological and political objectives. Either by accident or by 
design, a situation emerged where the non-political activities continued, were 
condoned by the leadership and assumed exaggerated importance and influence. 
In this context, gangsterism and coiTuption flourished under the guidance and 
direction of UDA leaders such as Craig, Payne and their allies.’****
By the end of the decade, however, this leadership was displaced by a new hardline 
one.*** The allegations of the Cook Report had been extremely embanussing for the 
UDA.**® So too was the whole Nelson affair**® and it prompted the so-called ‘Outer 
Council’ to take over the organisation. These new leaders originated from the Ulster 
Defence Force:
‘the UDA almost incidentally developed a co-ordinated second tier of 
management. At the start of the 1980s the UDA Chairman, Andy Tyiie, and John 
McMichael, who was the South Belfast brigadier and overall military commander, 
had set up a recruitment and training programme, which included some 
ideological instruction, as well as survival and combat training in isolated rural 
areas in Ulster. As well as providing a well-trained element and directing and 
sustaining the motivation of younger members, the UDF initiative was also the
Ibid.
Op. cit. Cusack and Taylor p. 25.
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first time that the previously separate members of the UDA’s six self-styled 
brigades met regularly.’**'*
McAuley also refers to the foiination of the UDF which ‘came into existence as a 
‘reserve army’ to be used in a ‘domesday (sic) situation” .**® It is through participation in 
the UDF, argue Cusack and Taylor, that many members of the UDA’s ‘Outer Council’ 
came together and it was this ‘second tier leadership’, with ‘around 30 members, about 
five fiom each of the UDA’s six brigade areas’, that came to the fore as the new 
leadership at the end of the 1980s, after the old one had been discredited. Following 
Adair’s failed attempt at taking over the organisation in 2002, the UDA continues to be 
run by a collective leadership that sits on the Inner Council.
The UVF
Ideology
Unlike the UDA, the UVF does have a more tangible history to draw upon. Not only does 
it proudly remember Carson’s 1912 UVF force (with 200,000 members**^) that was 
foimed in response to the Home Rule Movement but it has also drawn much legitimacy 
from Ulster’s contiibution to the British war effort and the sacrifices of the 36**’ (Ulster) 
division at the Somme in 1916. The First World War put an end to the thr eat of loyalist 
rebellion and after partition was conceded the UVF units became ‘a peace-keeping
Op. cit. Cusack and Taylor p. 9. 
Op. cit. McAuley p. 64.
Op. cit. Bruce, ‘The Problems o f  Pro State Ten orism’, p. 67.
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vigilante movement’ and were later incorporated into the B Special Constabulaiy.^*^ The 
modem UVF, a very different type of organisation, came about because of the perceived 
threat from an apparently resurfacing IRA in 1966 -  the 50**' anniversary of the Easter 
Rising. The Belfast Newsletter reported that ‘the Northern Ireland government is 
enquiring into reports that the UVF is being re-formed in county Tyrone to oppose IRA 
and Republican plans to hold parades at Easter.’**^
The UVF was also formed to oppose O’Neill’s reforms that its members believed 
threatened the constitutional status of the province, and it put itself on standby in case of 
an ‘imposed solution’ from Westminster, especially after the secret talks between the 
government and the IRA in 1972. But generally, the UVF’s ideology indicates furlher 
how bereft loyalists were of a coherent dogma. Bruce argues that beyond the maintenance 
of the Border the group didn’t really have one, summed up by this passage from a ‘senior 
activist’:
‘We never had an overall goal. I never really loiew what I was fighting for. If you 
was a journalist or that I might come out with some wee thing but I never really 
knew. A journalist would phone up and ask what we were thinking. We’d take 
down some book and take a few sentences out and jumble them up and give it to 
him as our policy.’ *
As Bruce states it wasn’t that UVF members were less bright than their republican 
counterparts but there was little scope for the development of political policy ‘because
Op. cit. Boulton p. 33.
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there were already better-established political gi'oups that represented many of the views 
held by UVF members.’*^** Moreover, the division of labour* ethos (see chapter 9) meant 
that paramilitaries should stick to violence and politicians to politics. The UVF’s raison 
d’etre can be summed up, then, as a response to the IRA*^ *, to protect the constitutional 
position of the province and to fight against any attempts at an imposed solution.
Beyond this there were other ideological strands that were more about individual leanings 
than policy and reflected the multifarious nature of the organisation. Bruce states that 
when the only thing that UVF members had in common was that they had joined the 
UVF there was bound to be a plethora of different views and this was perhaps inevitable 
when one considers that the group sought to formulate policy after it was formed rather 
than beforehand. There wasn’t even a unified approach on relations with Westminster:
‘John McKeague, the founder and leader of the RHC [Red Hand Commando] 
(soon to be fully merged with the UVF), was in favour of a sovereign Ulster 
government in a federal United Kingdom but his second-in-command shared 
Gibson’s dislike for any form of independence. Beyond the constitutional issues 
there was even less agreement. At times, the UVF of Spence sounded socialist, 
and in another country many of its members would have been Labour men. At 
others, especially if accused of communism, it sounded rabidly right wing. But 
none of this should be surprising when one remembers that what UVF members 
had in common was that they had joined the UVF. Although they were recruited
Op. cit. Bruce, The Red Hand p. 123.
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from a fairly nanow class background, some were rural and some were urban. 
Although few were committed evangelicals, some were more religious than 
others. Some were skilled well-paid workers and others were long-teim 
unemployed. Some were thoughtful planners and others were hoodlums. Why 
should such a variety of people agr ee on policies beyond the simple constitutional 
issue?’’”
Nevertheless, Henry Patterson argues that, in comparison to the UDA, the UVF were 
more likely to have a tendency for political pretensions because they were in a better 
position to develop a political party. Part of the explanation, he argues, was that, 
because of the violence after 1969, some of the old labour supporters found themselves in 
the UVF -  and it is through this that some of the origins of PUP ideology can be found, 
along with the belief that mainstr eam unionism had let down working class unionism.
As with republicans it was the prisons that were to provide an extra dimension to the 
UVF’s political thought. Billy Mitchell, a UVF member noted,
‘Unfortunately in 1974 we didn’t have a strategy and we didn’t have a political 
philosophy .,, We had a gut feeling that the politicians weren’t going to resolve it, 
that only the paramilitaries could stop the violence and that there had to be some 
form of compromise where we could accommodate each other’s aspirations. We
Ibid. p.124.
Patterson, H., inteiview.
Ibid.
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didn’t have a strategy for doing it then. Perhaps we had to go to gaol to find 
,126one.
Indeed, Garland in his article on the UVF devotes a whole section to the influence of 
prison life on UVF prisoners, under the heading ‘Prison becomes a university’.P r is o n s  
for both the republican and loyalist groups were periods of analysing the self and the 
environment and plotting a course thereafter. With republicans it was what is known as 
the Long War, with loyalists it was their awareness of worldng class status and unionist 
‘exploitation’ -  and it was the changing relationship with constitutional unionism that lay 
at tire heart of the use of the loyalist political fronts. Spence stated that ‘the men were 
ready, not for indoctiination, but to be set in pursuit not only of truth but of some form of 
political ideology.’
It wasn’t just the realisation that working class loyalists had been used by ‘respectable’ 
politicians when it suited them and ditched when it didn’t that the tedium of prison life 
had facilitated. It was also the environment where men like Gusty Spence were exposed 
to republican prisoners and indeed cooperated with them. Spence had even developed a 
friendship with an Official IRA member. With time to reflect and through such 
associations he was to take an increasingly socialist line and his influence was borne out 
in a UVF statement that claimed that ‘the w/class people of whatever creed are the real 
inheritors of peace and prosperity’.
Mitchell, ‘Billy’, quoted in op. c it  Taylor, Loyalists, p. 123. 
Op. cit. Garland p. 17.
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Spence’s political ideology had also led to a more conciliatory approach as far as 
violence was concerned. His reaction, he says, to the Dublin and Monaghan bombs, 
which effectively ended the UVF ceasefire, was ‘one of shock and honor’. H i s  
influence fiom prison could not prevent the emergence of the new hardline UVF 
leadership at this time. Nevertheless, states Taylor, Spence more than anybody sowed the 
seeds that were to lead to the creation of the Progressive Unionist Pai*ty and without the 
experience in Long Kesh it is unlikely that such a political cadre of David Ervine, Billy 
Hutchinson, William Smith and Gusty Spence himself, who were all to play ‘vital’roles 
up to the Good Friday Agreement, would have emerged.*^*
Structure
In comparison to the UDA the UVF is a highly secretive organisation and details of its 
structure and leadership are hard to come by. The grorrp was formed in early 1966 on the 
lower Shanklrill.*^  ^ In its early days it wasn’t a clear-cut organisation with confusion at 
times between it and Noel Doherty’s Ulster Protestant Volunteer Divi s ionsand overlap 
with the Shanlchill Defence Association.* '^* The UVF also had links with another 
Protestant paramilitary organisation called Tara, led by evangelical Christians, which was 
under the leadership of William McGrath. The association came to an end, however, 
when apparently ‘evidence was received in 1971 of McGrath’s homosexual abuse of 
young men.
Spence quoted in op. cit, Taylor, Loyalists p. 139. 
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With its leader in prison by 1971 the UVF organisation:
‘had almost ceased to exist as a co-ordinated force. Occasional acts of violence by 
ad hoc gr oups of militants were done in its name, and hr the bars of the Shanldiill 
men made brave plans over beer. But in July 1971 there was probably no more 
than a score of active UVF men, most of them long-time associates of Gusty 
Spence.
The republican response to internment soon changed the situation and when Spence was 
‘kidnapped’ by his former colleagues in 1972 ‘it was soon clear that, back in action, he 
was presiding over a substantial UVF revival. The force’s structure of ‘divisioirs’, 
‘companies’ and ‘battalions’ was formalised for the first time.’*^  ^Bruce states that, unlike 
the UDA, and ‘with one or two exceptions, the UVF was thoroughly ‘military’ and its 
Volunteers shared only a desire to save Ulster from republicans and a liking for action. 
Boyne outlines its str ucture:
‘The controlling body of the UVF is the Military Command, which is assisted by 
a headquarters staff including an internal security unit. Unlike the UDA’s Inner 
Council, the UVF Military Command is not composed of representatives of the 
brigades below. Although highly secretive, the UVF is regarded by some analysts
Ibid. p. 11.
Op. cit. Boulton p. 144.
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as having a loose structure: a type of federal system comprising a collection of 
semi-autonomous gangs, or cells.’*'***
There doesn’t appear to be much consensus as to how centralised the UVF has been. A 
Toose structure’ with a ‘federal system’ of ‘semi-autonomous gangs’ implies that it is not 
that centralised and Bruce argues below that, like the UDA, the UVF has never managed 
to centralise its organisation. Yet, arrother commentator suggests ‘the UVF has 
traditionally had a tightly centralised command structure’.*'** David Erwine stated that 
whereas the UDA’s brigades are virtually autonomous the UVF is more tied together 
although that has meant that there are more internal stresses.*'*^  Thus, it would appear that 
the UVF is at least more centralised than the UDA. Certainly the fact that the UVF has 
been a more disciplined and controlled organisation would suggest this. Like the UDA, 
the UVF also decided to reorganise in 1979, devising ‘a cell system where smaller units 
were engaged in specific roles and operations. The theory was that members of one cell 
would rrot be privy to what another cell was doing and so would be unable to tell the 
police.’*'*^
Leadership
Gusty Spence was widely thought to be the leader and mentor for the early UVF although 
he used the ‘official’ pseudonym of Colonel William Johnston. His increasing socialist 
and anti-sectarian stance was not to the liking of some within, however, and the end of
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Op. cit. Boyne, ‘Loyalists: nemesis fiom the North’.
O’Fan ell, J., ‘Loyalists rearnhng for battle to come’, Scotland on Sunday. 12“’ May 2002. 
David Eivine, interview.
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the UVF’s ceasefire in 1974 represented the take over of a hardline leadership. Although 
the success of the UWC strike led to the forination of the VPP, when this failed a ‘policy 
re-think’ (in December 1974) emphasised a commitment to ‘military policies’ and ‘the 
UVF would ‘seek to expose the errors of doctrinaire Socialism and to expose the myth of 
the supposed class struggle.’*'*'* The Sunday News commented: ‘Political observers see 
this attitude as being the result of a take-over of the leadership by right-wing members of 
the UVF.’*'*^
A coup was said to have taken place in the organisation in 1975 when “ a moderate’ 
leadership managed to take over, which ‘unreservedly condemned sectarian murders on 
the grounds that the war was not being conducted against people because of their 
religious beliefs.’*'*^ Bruce confirms that ‘the brigade staff who had been in contr'ol for a 
year was replaced by a group of more experienced, older men who were a little more 
political.’*'*^
In general, the identity of the UVF leadership has remained secret. When the Combined 
Loyalist Military Command announced its ceasefires irr 1994, while PUP members sat 
alongside Gusty Spence, ‘the military commanders who had engaged in the critical 
dialogue with Archbishop Fames, and had made the ceasefire possible, chose not to stand 
in the spotlight.’*'*^
Cusack, J., and McDonald, H., UVF. Poolbeg, Dublin, 1997, pp. 193-4. 
Sunday News. December F* 1974, quoted in op. cit. Garland p. 35.
Ibid.
Quoted in op. cit. Garland p. 35.
Op. cit. Bruce, The Red Hand p. 175. 
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 233.
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To sum up it would appear that the UDA, unlike the IRA, has not been able to centralise 
its organisation. It would seem that the UVF is centralised to a degree but certainly not as 
much as the IRA, given that Bruce argues that, like the UDA, the UVF has been unable to 
do this:
‘it is hard not to be struck by the weak and often irrational internal discipline of 
the loyalist paramilitaries. Disagr eements might lead to someone being shot in the 
head, but, as often as not, serious breaches of discipline would go unpunished. In 
the 1970s UDA brigadiers went accompanied by bodyguards to protect them, not
fi'om the IRA but from other brigadiers It seems no accident that the UDA and
UVF have never managed to centralize their organizations. They remain local 
area groups only loosely affiliated to a central structure. Although it has now been 
a company of the UDA for twenty years, the WDA still uses its owrr name first 
and UDA second on floral tributes.’*'*^
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the ideologies, traditions, str uctures and leaderships of the case 
studies. The IRA has had a powerful nationalist dogma that has been accompanied by an 
uncompromising physical force tradition, a belief that politics was the ‘domain of the 
unprincipled’ and, at different times, an adherence to republican socialism. As it has seen
Op. cit. Bruce, The Red Hand, pp. 285-6.
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the administrations of Leinster House, Stormont (when it has existed) and Westminster as 
illegitimate on the island it has also held to a deeply embedded tradition of abstention 
from these institutions. It has also traditionally declared an indifference to its minority 
status and public opinion.
This chapter has argued, however, that the IRA has in fact been more pragmatic than the 
intransigence of its ideology might suggest for historically the group has been involved 
with the ‘illegitimate’ political domain and popular support has been important to the 
Irish republican struggle. Traditionally, as noted earlier, the fault line within the IRA has 
been between those who have wanted to associate themselves with left wing politics and 
who wished to revitalise the tradition of republican socialism, and those who saw any 
activity that did not entail the use of physical force for the national cause as an 
unnecessary diversion. More latterly the desire to mobilise popular support and to 
become further engaged in politics has not emanated from Marxist dogma but from the 
republican leadership’s aim of increasing Sinn Fein’s mandate both in the Irish 
Republic*^ ** and Northerir Ireland in an effort to achieve Irish unification by more 
political m e a n s . T h i s  more ‘political’ approach that emerged in the 1980s, and the 
dropping of abstention from the Irish Dail in 1986, and from Stormorrt through the new 
political dispensation after 1998, has been fundamental in bringing about the greater 
utility of Simi Fein as the group’s political fr'ont.
While certain aspects of IRA ideology may have been watered down to facilitate political 
involvement, most notably through the ending of the policy of abstention fr om the Irish
And thereby end its policy o f abstention fiom the Irish Dail in 1986. 
Although at the time o f writing the threat of violence remains.
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Dail and Sinn Fein’s full participation in the Stoimont executive and assembly that were 
created by the Good Friday Agreement, the group’s powerful anti-state ideology has 
facilitated a disciplined and highly centralised structure which has increased the 
likelihood that a political front could be used effectively under the tight control of the 
IRA leadership, whether as a tactical or propaganda device, or as an electoral tool. It is 
logical that the disciplined and tight hierarchical lines of control from the Army Council 
to the General Headquarters, to the two commands (Southerir and Northern), to the 
Brigades, and then to the Active Serwice Units has been replicated in the Army Council’s 
relationship with the political front, which has therefore been used more effectively as a 
result (in comparison to the loyalist political fronts). The next chapter will assess more 
closely the impact that the ideology and organisational structure of the gr oup has had on 
the nature of the relationship between it and its political front, and on the role of the fr ont.
Perhaps the most significant ‘internal’ factor vis a vis the greater utility of Sinn Fein has
been the change in leadership that took place within the IRA during the 1970s and 80s. It
was Gerry Adams and the Northern leadership that recognised the limitations of a purely
militaristic approach and this in turn led to the use of the political front in new and
innovative ways. As Sinn Fein councillor Michael Browne put it the new leadership was
able to deal with the evolving situation. It was Adams that recognised that a short war
was no longer a realistic aspiration and so the struggle was widened to all fronts while the
‘army’ was reorganised into a cell structure to combat the use of informers. Since the
electoral success of Sands it has been Adams that has developed the IRA’s electoral
strategy both North and South. The survival of this leadership to this day has been
fundamental in ensuring that the political front has continued to play a prominent role in
mainstream republican strategy, and indeed it may even have eclipsed the IRA itself
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through the current peace process, although at the time of writing the process remains 
stalled.
Despite the physical force and abstentionist traditions of Irish republicanism that, it could 
be argued, have limited the role of the political front as an electoral tool, the IRA’s 
ideology, structure and especially its leadership are all internal factors that have helped to 
facilitate the effective and greater utilisation of Sinn Fein. This has been important in 
enabling the group to use its political front when the external environment may have 
demanded it -  such as popular support (chapter 7), the type of state response (chapter 8) 
and other factors in the external environment (such as the hunger strikes or United States 
influence [chapter 9]).
As far as the two loyalist case studies are concerned they do not have such a potent 
ideology. That is because they are pro-state groups and have, ostensibly at least, been 
fighting for something that already exists. Being pro-state has also increased the 
likelihood that those who wanted ‘action’ or a military career would join the British army 
or the police force and that those with political talent would realise their potential in one 
of the unionist parties, leaving only the remnants for the loyalist paramilitaries. The 
contiadiction of breaking the law of the state that one is trying to uphold in the midst of a 
‘law abiding’ community (see chapter 9) that also seeks to maintain the status quo 
underlines the frailty of the loyalist groups’ dogma. With an ideology represented by 
other hardline unionist entities it has been that much easier for the loyalist groups to 
degenerate into organised criminal empires. The lack of an alluring ideology, it is argued, 
has therefore had a direct bearing on the stiuctures of the two groups which are not as
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centralised or as disciplined as the IRA, particularly in the case of the Ulster Defence 
Association.
Moreover, the range of state alternatives, both in security and politics, has meant that the 
loyalist groups have been less likely to develop a leadership that could tightly centi'alise 
and conti'ol their organisations, let alone one with the ability to develop an effective 
political strategy. Chapter 5 will outline the impact of the two groups’ ideology and 
structures on the nature of the relationship between the groups and their political fronts, 
and on the roles of the latter. As with the case of the IRA it is important to aclmowledge 
these internal impediments on the loyalist side when considering the impact of the 
external environment on the utility of the two gr oups’ political fronts.
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Chapter 5 - The Impact Of Ideology And 
Structure On The Relationship Between Terrorist 
Organisations And Their Political Fronts, And On 
Their Role
Them A
The IRA’s uncomplicated and powerful ideology has underpinned its rigid, well 
organised and centralised structure. Discipline, unity and undivided loyalty to the 
leadership are characteristics that have helped to give the organisation its longevity. 
There have been splits (in 1986 and 1997) but, in general, so tightly controlled has the 
group been, that the republican movement has usually been able to present a united 
front.* These characteristics are bound to have had an impact on the nature of the 
relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein and therefore on the role of the political 
front.
Although the political front does not foim part of the formal str ucture of the organisation, 
it has nevertheless been under the direct contr ol of the Army Council. Thus, the discipline 
and centralised nature of the IRA is replicated in the strict control that the IRA leadership 
has exerted over its political front. This has been managed by the dual membership that 
has existed between the organisation and its political front at leadership level.
* This is not to say that Irish republican ten orism in general has not been fractious, most notably in the 
1970s and 80s through the emergence o f splinter groups such as the Irish People’s Liberation Organisation 
and the Irish National Liberation Army.
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From 1949, when Sinn Fein was ‘infilfrated’ and the IRA ‘[took] control’ of the 
organisation, ‘electing a member of the Army Council, Patrick McLogan, as their new 
President’^ , Sinn Fein has indeed been inextricably linlced to the IRA. Examples of this 
dual membership are hard to come by but not, argues Peter Taylor, because they do not 
exist but because they are seldom brought to light.  ^ It is not difficult to find cases where 
‘former terrorists’ are members of Sinn Fein but it is less easy to find evidence of 
simultaneous membership irr both organisations. Andrew Silke, though, in his arficle on 
paramilitary vigilantism, explains how the Sinn Fein ‘advice centres’ of the 1970s 
became known as ‘Provo Police Stations’ rirn by Sinn Fein ‘Civil Administration 
Officers’.'* The CAO was:
‘habitually also a member of the IRA, and indeed was often a relatively senior 
figure in the local chain of command. The dual membership, an officer of an 
executive branch of Sinn Fein, as well as a member of the IRA, was -  and is -  
reflected in the dual responsibilities for the post of Civil Administration Officer.’^
Taylor argues that the case of Martin McCaughey illustrates the interchangeability 
between the IRA and Sinn Fein in a way that few cases do. McCaughey became a Sinn 
Fein councillor despite the fact that ‘his activities were more IRA than Sinn Fein.’^  Ken 
Fitzgerald, who played a leading role in the IRA’s anti-drugs campaigns in Dublin in the
 ^Bishop, P., and Mallie, E., The Provisional IRA. London: Corgi, 1992, p. 39. After spending the 1930s 
and 40s in the wilderness the link between the IRA and Sinn Fein was reestablished in the late 1940s.
 ^Taylor, P., Provos. The IRA And Sinn Fein. Bloomsbury, London, 1997, p. 278.
Silke, A., ‘Rebel’s Dilemma: The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Fein and Paramilitary 
Vigilantism in Northern Ireland’, Tenorism and Political Violence. Vol. 11, N o .l, pp. 72-3.
 ^Ibid. pp 72-3. The CAO was responsible for sanctioning vigilante activity as well as ‘frequently being the 
Officer Commanding (OC) for the IRA’s Intenial Security for the local units.’
 ^Op. cit. Taylor p. 278.
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1990s, was a Sinn Fein candidate in the last local elections, but after he was convicted he 
claimed membership of the IRA and secured a prison transfer/ After the 2001 
Westminster elections Sinn Fein councillor Martin O’Muilleoir let slip that ‘the IRA 
came out of this election stronger’/  Conor Claxton, one of the guilty men in the Florida 
gun running trial admitted in court that he was an international representative for both the 
IRA and Sinn Fein/
In May 2001 Michael Noonan, the foimer leader of the Irish Fine Gael party, said of the 
IRA and Sinn Fein that ‘dual membership [has been] the norm rather than the exception, 
particularly at the highest level.’*** A leaked document made available to the Sunday 
Times in March 2001, which was apparently ‘verified by senior sources in the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary and the Irish police’, claimed to loiow the identities of the Army 
Council members, three of which were McGuinness, Adams and Martin Feii'is, all key 
Sinn Fein figures.** In fact it has been rumoured that McGuinness took over the 
leadership of the Army Council in September 2001.*  ^When one also considers that one 
hardline member, Brian Keenan, is apparently seriously ill, then it would appear that Sinn 
Fein is fast becoming the Aimy Council.*  ^Thus, in the unlikely event that the party were 
to become the largest all-Ireland party in a united Ireland then it is possible that, through 
Sinn Fein, the Army Council could indeed fonn the government of a united Republic, and
 ^Hennessey, M., ‘SF aims for breakthrough after years o f preparing’, Irish Times. July 30* 2001.
 ^Moriaity, G., ‘New electoral map displays a stark contrast’, Irish Times. June 11* 2001.
 ^Carroll, J., ‘I was in IRA, gun accused tells court’, Irish Times. F‘ June 2000.
Noonan, M., quoted in ‘Ahem says his view of Sinn Fein remains the same’, Irish Times. May 3''“ 2001. 
Clarke, L., ‘Leaked list names the men who run the IRA’, Sundav Times. March 25* 2001.
See, for example, Cowan R., and Boycott, O., ‘Sinn Fein offers hope on IRA arms stoclcpile’. The 
Guardian. October 8* 2001.
News reports state that Keenan is suffering ftom cancer (such as Clarke, L, ‘Cancer may force Keenan to 
quit top IRA post’. The Sundav Times. September F‘ 2002).
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inherit the legacy of the 1919 Dail, thereby fulfilling a part of its ideology that many have 
assumed the organisation has lost sight of for practical reasons.
However much one speculates as to who is and who isn’t on the IRA Aimy Council the 
evidence of cross membership between the two organisations is compelling -  and this 
was brought home when Cuba’s ‘Sinn Fein representative’, Niall Connolly, was one of 
three IRA men caught training the Marxist revolutionary group FARC in August 2001.*'* 
Connolly was also believed to be part of a team helping to organise Gerry Adams’ trip to 
Cuba.*^
Wliat is equally clear is that, at least until the recent apparent change in the internal 
dynamics of the Army Council, the IRA was the senior partner in the relationship — 
evident in the fact that Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein’s two leading 
members, are said to have fenied messages back to the IRA leaders during the [July 
2001] talks. And this was not the first time that Army Council members had been 
present in make or break negotiations.*^ The very fact that the British and Irish 
governments and the Northern Irish political parties all waited neiwously for the terrorist 
group’s response to the governments’ blueprint for the future of the province showed 
clearly that the real power within the republican movement was in the organisation’s 
Aimy Council.
Ford R., and Evans, M., ‘Arrested IRA man ‘is Sinn Fein Cuba link” . The Times. August 16* 2001.
Ibid.
Watt, N., ‘Optimism grows over Ulster deal’, Guardian newsunlimited, website; 
http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nirehmd , July 2F* 2001.
See Irish Independent quote in Brown, D., ‘What the Irish papers say’, Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland , July 9* 2001.
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If one refers to the diagram of the IRA’s Command and Functional Sti'ucture in Horgan 
and Taylor’s article*  ^ it might therefore be appropriate to include Sinn Fein as a direct 
link under the Army Council to which it has reported through the dual membership of 
both leaderships.*^ This would make clear that rather than the ‘moderate half of the 
movement, or a separate political party, Sinn Fein has in fact been for most of its life a 
tactical device under the direct control of the IRA Army Council. This has meant that at 
least until the Autumn of 2001 Sinn Fein has been a tightly controlled instr ument of the 
IRA leadership and its role as a political front has therefore been decided and delegated 
according to the tactical demands of the movement at the time. The IRA’s powerful 
ideology and tight organisational structure has instilled loyalty and discipline in the ranks 
and the same has gone for Sinn Fein in its deference and loyalty to the group’s 
leadership.
Thus, it would be a mistake to view Sinn Fein as an alternative to the armed struggle. It 
has very much been part of the strategy of ridding the province of the British through the 
use of violence or the threat of violence. Once it is understood that Sinn Fein has, at least 
until very recently, been a tactical device controlled by the Army Council rather than the 
‘moderate half of the movement, it is then possible to fully appreciate the role of the 
IRA’s political front.
Horgan, J., and Taylor, M., ‘The Provisional Irish Republican Anny: Command And Functional 
Structure’, Tenorism And Political Violence. Vol. 9, Autumn 1997, No. 3., p. 26.
Of course the IRA would not place Sinn Fein in any such stmcture as it would give the lie to their claims 
that the IRA and Sinn Fein are completely separate organisations.
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The Loyalist Groups
There are many obstacles to the establishment of a loyalist political front that the anti- 
state IRA does not face. While the more significant of these are to be found in chapter 9, 
the type of ideology and structur e of the two groups and the nature of the relationship 
between the paramilitary organisations and their political fronts have also affected the 
utility of the latter. In the case of the IRA and Sinn Fein it is clear that its more potent 
ideology, strict discipline and centralised structure has ensured that Sinn Fein, until 2001 
at least, was directly under the contr ol of the Army Council. With a somewhat weaker 
ideology by comparison and less centralised structures, it has been less likely that the 
UDA and the UVF would establish a political front that could be centrally controlled as a 
tactical device.
There is another key organisational difference between the loyalist groups and the IRA 
vis a vis their political fronts that might be important in explaining the different roles of 
the UDP and the PUP on the one hand, and Sinn Fein on the other. Andrew White noted 
that, aside from the division of labour ethos that has existed in unionism between the 
politicians and the paramilitaries, that this same ethos has been replicated between the 
loyalist paramilitary groups and the UDP and the PUP. In other words, unlike the 
interconnecting role of Sinn Fein with the IRA in overall republican str*ategy, the political 
fr onts of the loyalist groups were more akin to separate layers. Thus, it would appear that 
the political fronts on the loyalist side are more detached from their paramilitary groups. 
White states that ‘the paramilitaries have been almost wholly intent with concentrating on
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the ‘military’ part of the campaign, whilst letting the PUP and UDP set their political 
agenda. Any political pronouncements by the paramilitaries have been mere repetitions of 
the policies of those parties.’^ **
There are varying accounts as to the true nature of the relationship between the loyalist 
groups and their political fronts. Some argue that, in comparison to the IRA and Sinn 
Fein, and in keeping with the ‘division of labour’, there is more detachment from the 
loyalist groups and their political fronts, in which case the term ‘front’ may not always be 
appropriate. Gary McMichael, for example, states in Ulster Voice, that it was not 
factually correct to label the UDP as the UDA’s political ‘wing’.^ * Yet Arthur Aitghey 
asserted that there is definitely dual membership at leadership level between the loyalist 
groups and their political parties. He also stated that loyalism is personal and fr agmented, 
that they were ‘a bunch of individuals’ at leadership level and that organisation hasn’t 
really existed.^^
The UDA/Political Front Relationship
The UDA’s mass membership in the early 1970s, its associations with working class 
organisations, its internal divisions between those that wanted to develop ‘class 
conscious’ political activity and the militarists, and its decentralised structure were all to 
have an impact on the nature of the relationship between the group and its first political 
front, the NUPRG. Initially none of its members were active on the military side of the
White A., ‘The Development o f Working Class Loyalist Conflict (1985-95) and the Rise o f the PUP and 
the UDP’, MA Dissertation, Queen’s University, Belfast, August 1995, p. 58.
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organisation with men like Barr and Chicken representing the old affiliations with 
working class organisations. This meant that, although the NUPRG was an offshoot of 
the UDA and its members were also UDA members, there was no direct involvement or 
dual membership with the Inner Council of the group or the UFF. The front, therefore, 
while an offshoot of the organisation which was there to give Andy Tyrie political 
guidance, was separate from the ‘fighting machine’. The political front did not resemble a 
political party because it did not set out to create a political platform, but it was more of a 
think tank, fr om which the first ideas of negotiated independence evolved.
The composition and the character of the political front was to change, however, when 
John McMichael, who was ‘responsible for planning and approving many of the UFF’s 
assassinations’, became the secretary of the NUPRG. What is interesting is that, 
according to Bruce, he appears to have been something of a ‘minder’ This would 
appear to represent an attempt by the military side of the organisation to exercise control 
over the think tank and to make sure that no political initiatives were embarked upon that 
would be detrimental to the overall aims of tlie organisation. It seems that this view was 
confirmed by the marginalisation of Barr and Chicken and the elevation of McMichael as 
the UDA’s ‘chief political spokesman’.^ '*
A new political front emerged in 1981 that represented the change of personnel called the 
Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party (ULDP). Thus, a political party was formed that had at
McMichael, G., An Ulster Voice. Roberts Rinehart, Colorado, 1999, p. 35,
Aughey, A., interview.
Bruce, S., The Red Hand. Protestant Paramilitaries In Northern Ireland. Oxford University Press, 1992, 
p. 232.
2** Ibid. p. 233.
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its apex dual membership with the military leadership of the UDA. Gary McMichael 
confii'ms this (as well as the subordinate status the party had in relation to the ten'orist 
organisation) stating that ‘the UDA had created the ULDP merely as an extension of 
i t se l f .Hi s  father, who was reputed to be the leader of the UFF, was at the same time 
leader of the new party.
Due to the fragmented nature of the organisation, however, the party did not command 
widespread support within the UDA. Indeed, while McMichael sought to give the 
organisation a political direction others in the organisation were busy lining their own 
pockets and gaining the group the reputation as a bunch of corrupt racketeers. Meanwhile 
Ban* and Chicken ‘laiew that the unpopularity of the UDA would prevent those 
associated with it winning elections; their ideas could only succeed if taken up by another 
p a r t y . T h i s  seemed to be borne out by Bruce’s assertion that the ULDP’s political 
fortunes and the UDA’s claims to be taken seriously as a constitutional political force 
were undeimined by its members’ perpetiation of violence in protests against the Anglo- 
Irish accord.^^
McMichael’s assassination abruptly ended the UDA’s political initiatives. Although he 
was murdered by the IRA he was apparently set up by members of his own organisation, 
who feared that his political ambitions and attempts to ‘clean up’ the organisation’s 
image would impact on their illegal sources of income. Not long afteiwards in 1988 his 
son, Gary McMichael, and his colleagues:
^  Op. cit. McMichael p. 32. 
Op. cit. Bioice p. 233. 
Ibid. p. 242.
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‘refonned the ULDP as an independent political party. Naturally, some of the 
activists were former or cuiTent members of the UDA, but the objective was to 
create a political movement that was open and attractive to any person who 
supported our policies and aims.’^ ^
Peter Taylor argues that:
‘the UDP’s^  ^relationship with the UDA ‘was not umbilical like that of Sinn Fein 
to the IRA or the PUP’s to the UVF^ **, as [Davey] Adams^* explained. ‘The 
relationship is very much a voluntary one in terms of when the UDA leadership 
want political analysis from us. When they ask for our view on any given 
situation, then we will provide it, but we don’t have a direct input as such in 
determining UDA and UFF policy. Wliat we do is if we are invited, we go and 
make arguments fr om our position. But at the end of the day it’s for the leadership 
of that organization to decide whether they accept our position or whether they 
don’t.’^ ^
As noted above, Gary McMichael concurs, stating that the labelling of the re-formed 
ULDP and then the UDP as the UDA’s ‘political wing’ by the media was ‘factually 
untme’. This viewpoint would imply that the UDP was more autonomous from the 
terrorist organisation than its predecessors. Nevertheless, the fact that the UDP was to
Op. cit. McMichael p. 33.
The Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party’s name was changed to the Ulster Democratic Party. 
The nature o f the relationship between the UVF and the PUP will be discussed below.
A former leader o f the UDP.
Taylor, P., Loyalists. Bloomsbury, London, 1999, p. 215.
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dissolve because Gary McMichael felt that he ‘could no longer represent the UDA on 
matters relating to the Good Friday Agreement’ suggests that the party’s whole raison 
d’etre was to speak for the paramilitary organisation, and that it was therefore indeed the 
UDA’s political front/^ This subordinate status of the party seems to be confinned when 
leading members of the UDP ‘were bluntly told to ‘cool it” over the fast pace of the 
peace process/'* To recall Aughey’s view that loyalism has been about ‘a bunch of 
individuals’, often fragmented with little organisation, perhaps suggests that, while it 
seems that McMichael had no formal position on the Inner Council of the UDA or in the 
UFF, he was nevertheless informally involved and positioned as the group’s political 
representative.
After support for the UDP peaked in the negotiations that followed the announcement of 
the CLMC ceasefire, it  performed disappointingly in the Assembly elections following 
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Then the cracks inherent in the various 
elements of the UDA and its decentralised structure spelt the end for the party:
‘Electoral failure strengthened those forces within the UDA who were unhappy 
with the political direction the peace process was taking. The UDA, never as well 
organized as the Ulster Volunteer Force, began to fragment. A faction under 
Johnny Adair wanted to resume violence while using the UDA’s resources to run 
a profitable dmg-smuggling operation. Several ‘brigades’ threatened to go 
independent ... In spite of the fact that the UDA pioneered the political route for
BBC News, ‘Loyalist party ‘left with little option” , website: littp;//www.bbc.co.uk/news , 28* November
2001 .
Campbell, J., ‘Loyalist Bosses Warn On Fast Paced Peace Process’, Sunday World. January 8* 1995.
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loyalist paramilitaries, the old sectarian and criminal element within its ranks 
proved too strong ... In the end, the UDP manifested all the contradictions that 
were inherent within the UDA from the start -  a populism that attempted to reach 
out to Catholics coexisted with a bitter sectarianism, and men who aspired to real 
politics stood alongside pure criminals.
In 2002 a new political front, the Ulster Political Research Group, was formed under the 
leadership of John Wliite, apparently ‘to give political analysis to the ... Ulster Defence 
Association’.^  ^ Given White’s close association with Adair it might be reasonable to 
assume that the front represented just the latter’s West Belfast C Company Brigade and 
not the UDA as a whole. The subsequent fallout within the group has meant that the 
political fr ont has changed hands and is now being controlled by the mainstream of the 
UDA which, through the UPRG, announced a twelve month ceasefire in March 2003.
The Impact of Ideology and Structure on the Role of the UDA^s Political 
Fronts
This chapter argues that the lack of an alluring ideology and the type of organisational 
structure of the UDA has impacted on the nature of the relationship between the group 
and its political fr onts. This in turn has had an effect on the type of role that these fronts 
have had. While the UDA’s pro-state nature and the ‘division of labour’ ethos within 
unionism (see chapter 9) represent more significant obstacles to their utility, it is argued
McMichael won 16,715 votes during the forum elections.
Holland, J., ‘Dark side’s ascendance seals fate o f the UDP’, Irish Echo Online, website: 
http://www.irishecho.com , 12* -  18* December 2001.
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that the fragmented and decenti'alised nature of the group (partly because of its weak 
ideology) has also had a negative impact in this regard. One manifestation of the structure 
of the UDA has been the space it has given for racketeering and corruption to flourish 
which has had a detrimental effect on the utility of the group’s political fronts, especially 
when they have been used as a conduit for political initiatives or as political paities 
fighting elections (see chapter 6).
The point has been argued above that the looser sti'ucture of the UDA has facilitated more 
illicit activity for personal gain. Therefore it would appear in this case that the political 
goal is diluted and that any use of a political front would be less likely for two reasons. 
Firstly personal gain has become more important than the political goal with some 
leaders and secondly the continuing political conflict has served as a cover for criminal 
enterprises. In this case such profiteers would see the establishment of a political front 
that represented a sign of moderation as a threat to their illegal empires. The peace 
process (that the UDA was involved with through the UDP until 2001), for example, has 
meant that paramilitary organised crime has increasingly come under the spotlight as the 
political conflict recedes.Moreover, if the UDA has had the image of a bunch of 
coiTUpt gangsters (and they appeared to be seen as such in the 1980s) then what chance 
for a political front at the ballot box? As Cusack and Taylor argue ‘the loyalist teiTorist, if 
recognised at all, is seen as being synonymous with a gangster, and is rarely given the 
political ‘legitimacy’ and ‘status’ his republican counteipart attracts.
BBC News, ‘Government meets loyalist gi'oup’, website: http://www.bbc.co.iilc/news , 14“' August 2002. 
A recent Northern Ireland Select Committee report on organised crime (2002) stated that Northern 
Ireland paramilitaries were raking in eighteen million pounds a year.
Cusack, J., and Taylor, M., ‘Resurgence O f A TeiTorist Organisation -  Part 1 : The UDA, A Case Study’, 
Terrorism And Political Violence. Vol. 5, Autumn 1993, No. 3, p. 2.
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The divisions in the organisation were also bound to affect the prospects for a UDA 
political front. A divided UDA could quite likely lead to a divided political front and 
therefore undermine its effectiveness in whatever it tried to achieve. This appeared to be 
the case in January 2001 when an ‘anti-agreement faction’, amounting to about a third of 
the UDP, split from the party."^  ^ If the front wasn’t divided then it couldn’t be 
representative of the whole organisation leaving scope for brigades that weren’t involved 
in its creation to engage in activity that would undennine what the political front was 
tiying to accomplish.
Thus, the relatively weak ideology and decentialised nature of the group has meant that 
the role of the UDA’s political fronts was severely restricted whether as tactical devices, 
as electoral tools, or as the means of intioducing political initiatives.
The UVF-PUP Relationship
The UVF appears to be more centialised, united and disciplined than the UDA. In theory 
this might impact on the nature of the relationship between the UVF and the PUP. The 
political front is more likely to be supported by the whole of the UVF and not by one 
section of it, nor would the activities that the front was set up to engage in likely to be 
undemiined by the racketeering and corruption that have been so obvious in the UDA. 
Thus, it would appear that, notwithstanding other factors (such as being pro-state and the 
unionist division of labour ethos -  see chapter 9), the more centralised structure (than the
Murphy, C., ‘Anti-agieement faction splits from UDP’, Irish Times. January 24“' 2001.
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UDA), and greater discipline and unity, would lend itself to the more effective use of a 
political front.
There seems to be a divergence in views, however, as to the true nature of the 
relationship between the UVF and the PUP. Peter Taylor, for example, describes the UVF 
and PUP as one."^  ^McAuley and Hislop, though, state that;
‘There is little doubt that the PUP and the UVF liaise on issues that effect (sic) 
them both and that the UVF exert a significant influence on PUP policy making. 
The relationship is not a direct one, however. Firstly, the UVF’s fomial rules state 
that when a member is convicted for life or seiwed ‘substantial’ sentences, he or 
she, is not allowed to re-join the organisation. So although the likes of Spence, 
Hutchinson and Ervine may have been involved in the UVF, we can reasonably 
assume that they are no longer active members.
Thus, UVF rules at least would suggest that, unlike the republican case, the leadership of 
the cuiTent PUP are not members of the UVF. Whether this was to deter harassment from 
the security forces or whether it represented a security risk to the organisation because of 
police attention to ex-prisoners, it would appear that former prisoners could join the PUP 
but could not rejoin the UVF. That would mean that the current leadership of the PUP 
could not be members of the UVF Military Council, in contiast to their republican 
counteiparts where it is widely believed that Adams, McGuiness, and Ferns sit on the
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists, p. 215.
42 McAuley, J., and Hislop, S., ‘ ‘Many roads forward’: Politics and Ideology within the Progiessive 
Unionist Party’, Etudes Irlandaises. Spring 2000, p. 191.
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IRA’s Army Council. This is corroborated by the view of Hugh Smyth, a leading light in 
the old VPP and now the PUP, when he states that: ‘there may well be ex-members of 
paramilitary groups in the PUP but there is no ‘dual membership” '*^
David Eiwine has stressed that the relationship between the UVF and the PUP is not the 
same as that of the IRA and Sinn Fein. You ‘can’t hold ‘serious office’ if you’re a UVF 
member’.'*'* The PUP, he said in 1998, ‘are not fiont men and give no political direction’ 
to the UVF but the party does provide ‘political analysis concerning the constitutional 
situation in Northern Ireland and it is up to them [the UVF] what they do with that 
analysis.’'*^ Billy Hutchinson described the PUP as ‘political confidants of the illegal 
UVF’.'*^
The UVF magazine, Combat, also claims to shed light on the true nature of the 
relationship between the UVF and the PUP:
‘While the leaderships of both the Ulster Volunteer Force and Red Hand 
Commando engage in dialogue with the Progiessive Unionist Party with a view to 
jointly analysing political issues, no member of either organisation is required to 
support the Progressive Unionist Party either by becoming a member, canvassing 
for candidates or voting for those candidates. The special relationship between the 
UVF/RHC and the PUP is based partly on former associations and partly on the
Smyth, H., quoted in: Sean McKee ‘The Real Voice o f Ulster Loyalism? The Progiessive Unionist 
Party’, M Litt Dissertation, University o f Ulster, 1995, p. 11.
Ervine, D., interview.
Ervine, D., speech, Progressive Unionist Party website: www.pup.org. 10“‘ December 1998. 
Ervine, D., quoted in McKittiick, D., The Neiwous Peace. Blackstaff, Belfast, 1996, p. 151.
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trust and respect that has been generated through dialogue. The leadership’s 
respect for the political analysis of the PUP has not diminished over the years. 
This does not mean that the UVF/RHC will always accept the analysis given or 
that the PUP will always endorse or speak favourably about UVF/RHC 
activities.’'*^
And in answer to the question: Does the PUP have any control of the military decisions
reached by the UVF leadership?:
‘The leadership engages with the Progiessive Unionist Party only on the issue of 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional position and cuiTent political developments 
which affect the rights of Northern Irelands citizens to freely express their 
democratic will on this issue. The UVF is very much a broad church; within our 
structures exist political and social opinions which amass the political spectmm, 
left to right wing, secular to religious. Our Volunteers are united by the 
fundamental desire to protect Northern Ireland’s unity with Great Britain within 
the confines of a pluralist, democratic United Kingdom, any debate with the 
Progressive Unionist Party is geared towards that end. Neither the Progressive 
Unionist Party, nor any other outside body possess any semblance of control over 
the military decisions of the Ulster Volunteer Force. Those decisions are taken at 
Brigade level and tliroughout the various levels of leadership within our
47 tUlster Volunteer Force Speaks Out’, Combat. Linen Hall Library, Belfast, (undated).
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organisation, based upon our founding principles and the policies formulated by 
the highest councils of our organisation/'*^
It is interesting to note that there is very little mention of socialism or worldng class 
issues, which have provided much of the raison d’etre for the PUP. Perhaps one of the 
reasons for this is that, in comparison with the Sinn Fein and IRA case, it appears that the 
PUP have enjoyed relatively more autonomy from the UVF. One ‘senior member’ of the 
UVF stated that:
‘The governments assume that when they talk to the Progiessive Unionist Party 
they are also talking to the UVF. They think it’s like talking to Sinn Fein. When 
they talk to Sinn Fein leaders, they are really talking to the IRA. But it’s not the 
same with the PUP, they don’t necessarily represent the views of the UVF.’'*^
Alternatively, when General John de Chastelain recalled his meeting with PUP 
spokesman Billy Hutchison, who filled the role of interlocutor to the decommissioning 
body on behalf of the UVF, he recalled that ‘when Hutchison spoke to us, we loiew he 
was speaking to us on behalf of the UVF, when we put questions to him for the UVF, the 
answers, we knew were fr om the UVF.’ ®^ Perhaps the most logical conclusion to draw is 
that, as Aughey states, the relationships are more to do with interactions between 
personalities at leadership levels rather than formalised dual membership as is the case
Ibid.
® McDonald, H., ‘Finucane murder suspect may turn Queen’s evidence’. Guardian newsuiilimited, 
website: httD://www.newsiinliniited.co.u1c/nireland , December 23'^ “ 2001.
Sengupta, K., ‘General handled a tiicky task with patience and calmness’. The Independent. October 3 F*
2002.
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with the IRA and Sinn Fein. It would, though, appear that the PUP has enjoyed more 
autonomy from the UVF than Sinn Fein has from the IRA.
The Impact on the Role of the UVF’s Political Fronts
Like the UDA, the pro-state nature of the UVF’s ideology has limited the utility of its 
political fr onts (see chapter 9). Moreover, the greater degiee of detachment in comparison 
to Sinn Fein and the IRA might lessen the chance of the UVF’s political fr onts being used 
as tactical devices. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the gioup also (like the UDA) 
has a relatively weak ideology, it has been more centralised and disciplined than the 
UDA. This has enabled its political front to be used more effectively, as it appears that it 
speaks for the whole organisation, whereas the UDP clearly did not.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the IRA’s powerful ideology has facilitated its disciplined 
hierarchical stmcture and this in turn has helped it to contiol its political front through 
dual membership, particularly at leadership level. Thus, the organisational stmcture of the 
movement has helped to determine the nature of the relationship between the IRA and 
Sinn Fein, which has been one of loyalty and deference to the Army Council. This in turn 
has helped to affect the type of role the political front has had. Rather than as an 
alternative to the aimed stiTiggle the political front has for most of its life been a sub-unit
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of the organisation, designed to undertake activities that enhance the overall object of 
driving the British from the province.
As far as the loyalist groups are concerned the main thrust of this thesis is that their 
political fronts were utilised because of disillusionment with ‘respectable’ politicians and 
the belief that the loyalist working class needed political representation. It will also argue 
(in chapter 9) that the main obstacle to the use of loyalist political fronts has been the 
division of labour ethos that exists within unionism as a whole. Even members of the 
UDA and UVF vote for the mainstieam unionist parties. This chapter argues that while 
these ‘external’ factors were more significant as far as limiting the potential for loyalist 
political fronts has been concerned, in the case of the UDA its decentralised structure 
would also have had a limiting effect on their potential use. Perhaps partly because of 
weak ideology it is an organisation that has not been able to establish a cential command 
stmcture that imposes discipline from all its members. It is clear that the political projects 
aligned to the group have not been subjected to the same discipline and control as their 
republican countei-parts. This has meant that their utility as tactical devices would have 
been limited. With the UDA’s image of gangsterism, their utility as the means through 
which to communicate political initiatives and/or to stand at elections has also been 
resti'icted. The more centralised UVF’s greater discipline has meant that its political front 
has been utilised more effectively.
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Chapter 6 = Violence as a Habit
This chapter aims to assess the impact that ‘violence as a habit’ has had on the utility of 
the political fronts. It will firstly assess the extent to which violence can become habitual 
both at the individual and organisational level, drawing on some aspects of psychological 
and organisational theory respectively. It will then study the post-ceasefire period (when 
the groups are supposed to have been on ceasefire) and establish that the use of violence 
has continued. Although this could be for a number of reasons it is argued that the use of 
violence has to some degree become habitual, both at the individual and organisational 
level. Finally, the chapter will argue that ‘violence as a habit’ has generally had a 
detrimental impact on the utility of the political front, especially where its role is that of 
an electoral tool. In the case of the IRA continuing violence fr om those wanting ‘action’ 
to satisfy personal needs and the organisational imperatives that sustain the IRA for its 
own sake (two of the constituent elements of ‘violence as habit’), it is argued, have had 
negative repercussions on Sinn Fein’s attempts to develop itself as an all-Ireland party 
and on any prospect that it might share power in a coalition government in the Irish 
Republic.*
Sinn Fein has had other functions, however, and these have included ‘community 
policing’ and vigilantism, as well as creating instability, through riots and street violence, 
in order to tiy and prove that the Northern Ireland statelet is inherently unsustainable. 
Paradoxically, therefore, while violence as a habit may have been detiimental to Sinn
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Fein’s electoral ambitions, the fact that the IRA is on ceasefire may have increased the 
utility of the fiont in other ways. As violence has become habitual to some, and if an 
organisation needs to undertake a certain level of activity to sustain itself, then both needs 
could be satisfied if those wanting ‘action’ are employed in Sinn Fein activities -  
vigilantism and orchestrated street violence. On the loyalist side violence as a habit has 
also had a negative effect on the utility of the two groups’ political fr onts. That is because 
they have generally been used as electoral tools to court the vote of a ‘law abiding’ 
community and have also in the main represented a sign of moderation towards the use of 
violence.
In the first instance it is important to acknowledge that it would be extremely difficult, 
and indeed highly speculative, to attempt to assess the extent to which violence has 
become a habit, independent of any other variables. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain 
the degree to which this particular ‘variable’ has affected group stiategy vis a vis the use 
of a political fr ont. This is particularly the case when, for example, at the individual level, 
‘faced with similar threats, conditions, circumstances, or pressures, some individuals 
react violently when others do not’, and that ‘when we recognize wide differences in 
individual capacities for patience and tolerance, we are admitting the empirical variability 
of individual thresholds for aggressive responses.’^  Notwithstanding the above 
limitations, it is nevertheless important to aclmowledge that the use of violence can build 
up a momentum of its own. TeiTorist groups can often persist with their strategies of
* Both the major parties have expressed their unequivocal opposition to sharing power with Sinn Fein 
unless the party ‘resolved its relationship with the IRA.’
 ^Wilkinson, P., ‘Social Scientific Theory and Civil Violence’, in Alexander, Y., Carlton, D., and 
Willcinson, P. (eds.), Tenorism: Theoiv and Practice. Westview. Colorado 1979, p. 57.
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violence even when other factors might indicate that it is not rational for them to do so, 
and this might have a bearing on whether or not to use or to what extent they might utilise 
a political front.
The Individual
To explain why individuals can become ‘hooked’ on violence, while it is not the intention 
to engage in a detailed assessment as to why men and women become violent^, it is 
useful to at least be aware of some of the psychological and theoretical explanations that 
might help to account for violence in general and more specifically the political violence 
in Northern Ireland. The reason for this is that if violence has been perpetrated through 
personal needs, for example, then this could have an impact on the utility of a political 
front. The explanations for violence seem to rest between two propositions -  the first 
fr om ‘instinctivists’, who see aggression as a natural instinct of human behaviour, and the 
second from ‘environmentalists’, who view such behaviour as a product of the 
environment (see Section 3). This chapter is concerned with the notion of violence as a 
habit notwithstanding the impact of environmental or external factors. It will therefore 
briefly focus on the instinctivist psychological reasons for individuals becoming involved 
in the first place as some of these reasons may persist and thus help to bring about the 
persistence of violence from an individual perspective, which in turn may militate against 
the potential for the greater utility of a political front.
See, for example, Gurr, T., Wliv Men Rebel. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971.
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An individual’s own personal experiences might help to account for people joining 
terrorist organisations in the first place. These might in many cases relate to encounters 
with the state security forces, through, for example, the so-called ‘Rape of the Falls’, or 
the imposition of internment or Bloody Sunday.'* Eamonn Collins, in his autobiography, 
wrote of his feelings after apparently being wrongly arrested and assaulted by the British 
Anny:
‘Sometimes, as I remembered that night, I would feel the soldiers had merely 
made an understandable mistake in a conflict which was not of their making. 
Other times I would feel a surge of rage whose power would unbalance me: I 
would sit alone in my room and think with pleasure of blowing off the heads of 
those para scum.’^
One element of the notion of violence as a habit is the idea that individuals in Northern 
Ireland have joined terrorist gioups as the means of attaining adventure and excitement, 
as a way of enhancing self-esteem amongst peers and within communities, and as the 
means of boosting their ego. Eric Fromm’s work in The Anatomy o f Human 
Destructiveness gives a useful insight into the various explanations for the origins of 
violence from human beings. He notes that for man the satisfying of his organic needs 
alone does not make him happy. His passions move him and excite him*" - ‘in his attempt
 ^These events will be looked at in more detail for their impact in the state response chapter. 
 ^Collins, E., Killing Rage. Granta, London, 1997, p. 53
“ Fromm, E., The Anatomv o f Human Desti uctiveness. Cape, London, 1974, p. 265.
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to transcend the triviality of his life man is diiven to seek adventure, to look beyond and 
even to cross the limiting frontier of human existence.’^
If terrorist activity partly reflects the individual’s need for ‘adventure’ then this might be 
an inhibiting factor against the use of a political front,^ especially where this represented 
moderation towards the use of violence. Crenshaw writes:
‘The incentives for joining a teirorist organization, especially one that is already 
established and of loiown character, include a variety of individual needs: to 
belong to a group, to acquire social status and reputation, to find comradeship or 
excitement, or to gain material benefits. The popular image of the terrorist as an 
individual motivated exclusively by deep and intransigent political commitment 
obscures a more complex reality. Under certain conditions, membership in an 
underground organization is a valued social relationship, winning the militant the 
respect and admiration of peers and family. Joining an organization in order to 
enhance one’s appearance in the eyes of others is characteristic of nationalist and 
separatist gioups.... Since many tenorists are adolescents, joining may be a sign 
of personal daring or social rebellion more than political belief. Other incentives 
are those intangible benefits of association in a group: a feeling of belonging, 
acceptance, and solidarity.’^
’ Ibid. p. 267.
® Unless, o f course, some o f  the functions/activity o f a political front includes the use o f violence, for 
example through vigilantism, stieet riots, or intimidation.
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There is no doubt that paramilitary groups have become a source of prestige for many 
youngsters in Northern Irish schools and something to aspire to become part of. The 
establishment of the youth wings of the groups, such as the Young Volunteer Force and 
the Ulster Young Militants (the UVF and UDA youth wings), is testament to this. The 
leader of the UDA’s South Brigade said in 2001 that ‘in the past, it was the done thing in 
many loyalist areas to join the paramilitaries, and a lot of kids still want to get 
involved.’*** One Belfast IRA man stated in 1993 that ‘still the organisation [the IRA] has 
the luxiny of more people than it needs ... there’s young blood coming up all the 
time...’.** Reports have suggested that violence in schools in the province have shown a 
marked increase amongst teenagers since the ceasefires.*^ It seems that the endurance of 
the Troubles and the entrenchment of paramilitary culture has led to a higher degree of 
propensity towards violence among youngsters than would otheiwise have been the case.
Bishop and Mallie have described how many ‘volunteers’ ‘found the experience of ‘war’ 
exhilarating, especially those who took part in rural operations:
‘One spoke of ‘being so excited after a job that we shot the wee birds in the wires 
as we drove back from it.’ Another , after a shooting, of ‘feeling like eating a big 
dinner you felt so excited afterwards.’ Eyewitnesses to the assassination of a 
school bus driver and part-time UDR man in 1984 described how his two killers
® Crenshaw, M., ‘Theories o f  Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches’, in Rapoport, D., 
(ed.). Inside TeiTorist Organizations. Frank Cass, London, 2001, pp. 19-20.
Rosie Cowan, ‘Loyalists recruit the next generation’, Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
httn://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland, April 3,2001.
O’Connor, F., In Search Of A State. Catholics In Northern Ireland. Blackstaff Press, Belfast, 1995, p.
104.
See, for example, ‘Union says schools may need guards’. The Examiner. February 26“' 2000.
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whooped with joy as they escaped on a motorcycle. Some found the excitement 
addictive.’
Violence was alluring for other reasons too. The IRA, UDA and UVF have all essentially 
been working class organisations and the prestige of becoming a ‘volunteer’ has offered 
the working class a chance for esteem and a position of status within their communities 
and amongst their peers. Fromm argues that:
‘among the working class boredom is much more conscious than among the 
middle and upper classes ... they lack the genuine satisfaction experienced by 
many persons on a higher social level whose work allows them, at least to some 
extent, to be involved in creative planning, exercising their imaginative, 
intellectual, and organizational faculties.’*'*
Thus, the escape from nomial mundane life is a natural impulse and in fact not one only 
pursued by illegal combatants. Fromm states that the fact that war has the positive 
features of adventurousness, solidarity, equality, and idealism is a sad comment on our 
civilization which entails injustice, inequality and boredom governing social life in 
peacetime.*  ^ Thus, belonging to a teiTorist gioup can fulfil some of the same personal 
needs that a state’s soldiers might seek to satisfy.
Bishop, P., and Mallie, E., The Provisional IRA. London: Corgi, 1992, p, 195. 
Op. cit. Fromm p. 244.
Ibid. pp. 214-15.
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In summary, as Crenshaw notes above, the appeal of sticldng with a gi'oup can be as 
much to do with personal needs as ideological orientation and this can help to peipetuate 
the use of violence and a group’s existence beyond what may seem politically rational. 
This in turn may have a negative impact on the utility of a political front, particularly if it 
represents a sign of moderation. Moreover, each act of violence can reinforce the self­
esteem of ‘volunteers’, Collins described how the further he got steeped in violence the 
more he needed further ‘fixes’ or operations.*^ Having established that violence can 
become habitual at the individual level the impact of this variable on the utility of the 
political front will be assessed later in the chapter.
The Organisation 
Ideology
Before going on to outline some aspects of organisational theory it is first of all necessary 
to stiess that the use of violence by the IRA, the UDA and the UVF in Northern Ireland 
has been part and parcel of the traditions and ideologies of republicanism and loyalism 
that stretch back hundreds of years and it is these legacies that, to varying degrees, can 
provide a powerful allure to its inheritors, especially republicans, and have therefore 
helped to underpin the notion of ‘violence as a habit’. As Bowyer Bell pointed out of the 
IRA in the early 1960s, for example, the ‘dead weight of tradition ... made it difficult for 
the young men to chart an alternative course once the military option had aborted’*^ , 
while men like MacStoifain ‘had [a] ...fanatical belief in the ‘traditional’ virtues of
Op. cit. Collins p. 158.
Bowyer Bell, J., The Secret Armv. The IRA. 1916-1979. Poolbeg, Dublin, 1997, p. 340.
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...Republicanism.’*^  Indeed, so potent have the traditions and ideology of the IRA, in 
particular, been that should its followers wane in one generation there is still the potential 
for a resurgence in the next one.
Remaining with the case of the IRA, it is also important to remember the commemorative 
culture that permeates everything the republican movement does.*  ^The annual gatherings 
that were held in memory of Sean South^ **, the Wolfe Tone gathering at Bodenstown 
every June, and the yearly Hunger strike commemorations are just a few examples. 
Conor Cruise O’Brien notes the impact of the ‘cult’ of the 1916 Rising as a factor behind 
the durability of IRA violence^*, while Ben Caraher, a former SDLP member, remarks 
that Irish literature that disparages politicians ‘works on you. It’s how a political tradition 
is passed on, almost unconsciously.’^  ^ Certainly republican ideology and its traditions 
have given subsequent generations of ‘volunteers’ the feeling that they were ‘[sharing a] 
sense of being heir to a long history of violent republicanism’.^  ^Violence to some in the 
republican movement, therefore, has become a transgenerational habit and it is the 
powerful cuiTents in republican tradition that have served to undermine the greater 
utilisation of a political front. That is because these cunents have militated against any 
moderation towards the use of physical force and therefore any use of the political front 
that may represent such moderation, and also against any strategy that might entail 
greater engagement with British structures, even if this was tactical.
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie, p. 135.
See O’Brien, C., States Of Ireland. Anchor Press, London, 1972, p. 270.
Op. cit. Bowyer Bell p. 308.
O’Brien, C., ‘Terrorism Under Democratic Conditions: The Case o f the IRA’, Crenshaw, M. (ed.), 
Tenorism. Legitimacy and Power. Wesleyan University Press, Connecticut, 1983, p. 101.
Op. cit. O’Connor p. 363.
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The loyalists’ ideology is far less alluring, largely due to the problems associated with 
being pro-state groups, as outlined in chapter 9. But this hasn’t stopped them drawing on 
a long tiadition of sectarian violence against the Catholic population.
Organisational Theory
Martha Crenshaw wi'ote:
‘Organizational analysis explains ... why tenorism continues regardless of 
political results. ... Organizations are much more responsive to the environment 
during their inception than in the course of subsequent operations. The older the 
organization, the more its behavior is explained by organizational imperatives.’^ '*
This section is concerned with the internal processes of a terrorist organisation that 
peipetuate its existence. If a teiTorist organisation exists to carry out teiTorist acts then in 
order to exist it needs to cany out such acts. Otheiwise, its puipose and reason for being 
become redundant and logically the gioup should disband. The problem is that, even if 
the logical course of action is to disband (through sufficient state concessions or changes 
in the environment), there are internal processes that can take place that serve to 
peipetuate the existence of a group when it may not otheiwise be rational or serve its 
original puipose. If this is the case then clearly this might militate against the utilitisation
Urban, M., Big Bovs’ Rules. The Secret Stmggle Against The IRA. Faber and Faber, London, 1992, p. 
32.
Op. cit. Crenshaw, ‘Theories o f TeiTorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches’ p. 21.
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of a political front as a sign of moderation, or indeed any political engagement.^^ The 
internal processes include an enhanced sense of group loyalty through personal needs, 
and thus a devotion to a group’s maintenance as the primary goal (ahead of political 
objectives), and leadership status that would not easily be relinquished from those in 
senior positions. ‘Organizational process theory’, cited by Crenshaw, suggests that:
‘teiTorism can become self-sustaining regardless of its political consequences,’ 
and it assumes ‘that the fundamental puipose of any political organization is to 
maintain itself. Terrorist behavior represents the outcome of the internal dynamics 
of the organization rather than strategic action. The minimal goal of any 
organization is survival, but the goals of the people occupying roles in an 
organization ti'anscend mere survival. Leaders, in particular, wish to enhance and 
promote the organization. Their personal ambitions are tied to the organization’s 
viability and political position.
The theory therefore suggests that even if a group’s political demands were met the 
organisation would still persist as a natural outcome of internal dynamics and personal 
ambitions. The question would arise as to the extent that teiTorist leaders, so used to 
positions of power and subservience from their subordinates within an undemocratic 
environment, have the ability to adapt to an open democratic political setting, where 
disagreements are resolved through debate and dialogue. If a teiTorist gioup’s main 
preoccupation is to exist regardless of other factors then this would militate against the
^^Altliough the utility o f the political front might be enhanced if  its vole is vigilantism and this is used to 
‘sustain’ the group.
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use of a political front as a sign of moderation, where such use might be perceived as ‘the 
beginning of the end’ of the gi’oup.
A gi'oup’s isolation from mainstieam society can enhance loyalty to the gioup and its 
leadership and can therefore also perpetuate an organisation’s existence beyond what 
may seem rational. Wilson states that:
‘Progi essive isolation from the environment reduces the amount and quality of the 
information members receive about external events. They become less concerned 
with the achievement of political goals and more concerned with maintaining the 
group.
It could therefore be argued that by isolating itself from mainstream society the political 
(or otherwise) assessment of the teiTorist gioup, composed of like-minded individuals and 
therefore reinforcing opinions, often bears no relation to reality. As Fromm states 
consensus can succeed in transfoiming fantasy into reality, ‘since for most people reality 
is constituted by general consensus and not based on reason or critical examination’^ *, 
and ‘sometimes the consensus even of a small group suffices to create real i ty.This  is 
one of the reasons why Crenshaw suggests that terrorists may not recognise failure.^ ** 
Again this may defer or even indefinitely postpone greater utilisation of a political front,
Op. cit. Crenshaw, ‘Theories o f Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches’ p. 19. 
Wilson, J., cited in op. cit. Crenshaw ‘Theories o f Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational 
Approaches’, p. 21.
Op. cit. Fromm p. 203.
Ibid. p. 203.
Crenshaw, M., ‘How Tenorism Declines’, Tenorism And Political Violence. Vol. 3, No. 1, (Spring, 
1991), p. 87.
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where recognition of the failure in the use of violence might otherwise have prompted a 
réévaluation of strategy that could have given a political front a role or a larger role.
Writing on the IRA, Bishop and Mallie stated that:
‘Once you are in, friendships with those outside the ranlcs become awkward, 
circumscribed by the need for secrecy. In the bleak, barn-like social clubs of West 
Belfast, the IRA men drink with each other, while their wives and girlfriends form 
a separate, exclusive huddle. This rock-pool atmosphere is addictive. Many of 
those who have left the movement or been forced out miss its conspiratorial 
closeness; they find the open water cold and daunting.’^ *
According to one IRA commander: ‘People became very close. Eating and sleeping 
together, fighting and dying together.
Indeed the whole notion of self exclusion ‘from genuine dialogue’ with others, argued 
Bishop Daly when speaking of the IRA in the early 1990s, ‘generates a sort of 
desperation’. ‘I wonder’, he said, ‘if it’s because their ingenuity and intelligence have 
been too concentrated on their military survival -  that they haven’t really done enough 
deep, informed political thinking to see if theirs are realistic and feasible political 
objectives.’^  ^ One observer questioned whether the IRA leaders wanted a solution: 
‘would it not put them out of a job? Would they be willing to give up the role of ‘heroic
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie, p. 12. 
Ibid. p. 196.
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patriot’ they once had if they got what they wanted?’^ '* After all the raison d’etie of 
members, their positions as glorified ‘freedom fighters’, and the high profile of respected 
and revered leaders all depend upon the continued existence of the organisation.
The IRA
In order to assess how violence can become habitual even when other factors would 
appear to deem its use as detrimental to the group’s political goals it would be useful to 
focus on the gioups after their official ceasefires, and why in the post-ceasefire period 
violence has continued. This is because, notwithstanding stiategic motives, where 
violence has become habitual it is more likely to be exposed when a group is supposed to 
be on ceasefire. Then can one more accurately assess the impact of this particular 
variable on the utility of a political front. Any assessment of the reasons for the 
persistence of violence, however, is bound to some degree to be speculative when one is 
not privy to the inner workings of these secret organisations.
The first point to establish is that IRA violence has continued since the Good Friday 
Agieement was signed. As at August 2001 the group had killed eleven people in 
Northern Ireland and was suspected of Idlling between 6 and 10 people in the Republic in 
its campaign against drugs^ .^ It has also continued to carry out punishment beatings on
Daly, E., quoted in op. cit. O’Connor p. 287.
Blythe, G., ‘Talk to the IRA’, The Independent. January 1992.
Cusack, J., ‘Tenorists still killing despite agreement’, Irish Times. F ‘ August 2001.
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so-called ‘undesirables’ and expulsions ‘to control worldng class communities’. The 
group has also murdered opponents (Real IRA member Joe O’Connor was murdered by 
the IRA in November 2000). The Colombian episode, where three IRA men were 
apparently not only training FARC rebels in explosives technology but were also 
allegedly testing out weapons for themselves, has provided further suspicion of 
continuing IRA activity as does the theft of highly sensitive documents from Special 
Branch offices in the Castlereagh complex^*. So too does the recovery by police of an 
IRA targeting list that was updated as recently as 2001. The PSNI believe that nationalist 
riots in Belfast have also been orchestrated by mainstream republicans while it was an 
alleged IRA spy ring operating at the heart of Stoimont that led to the suspension of the 
new political dispensation in October 2002.
The IRA’s organised criminal activity has also continued. It is apparently heavily 
engaged in smuggling fuel while the organisation dominates the illegal tiade in 
cigarettes.^^ This kind of activity has continued unabated with the recent four million 
pound theft of cigarettes in the Republic.'*** It has also continued to be involved in the 
extortion of money.'**
It is important to aclmowledge that there could be any number of reasons for the 
persistence of IRA violence and activity that bear no relation to the notion that violence
See McDonald, H., ‘Sick mother speaks out over IRA beating o f teenage son’, Guardian newsunlimited, 
website: http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland, January 2001.
Barnes, H., and Kent, G., ‘An end to exile’, htto://www.newsiinlimited.co.uk/nireland . F‘ August 2001. 
At the time o f writing the PSNI have made it clear that the main line o f enquiry involves the IRA. 
‘Shadowy figures who lie behind Border smuggling’, The Irish Times. March 3^ 2001.
McDonald, H., ‘Trimble quits with call to suspend Assembly, Guardian newsunlimited, 
http://www.newsunlimited.co.ul</nireland . July F ‘ 2001.
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has become a habit. The fact that the group has remained intact could be for strategic 
reasons. It could be that it is preparing for a return to war if need be. Or, as this thesis 
argues, it could be to avoid the accusation that the organisation was surrendering at the 
same time as enabling the republican leadership to continue to use the threat of violence 
to gain further concessions. Continuing activity might also be a strategic choice such as 
the orchestiation of violence in Belfast to discredit the new PSNI. Or it could simply be a 
manifestation of the different stiands of opinion in the movement, including varying 
levels of commitment to republican tiaditions and ideology, and therefore such activity 
might be necessary to hold the organization together.'*  ^Changes in the environment, such 
as an increase in loyalist sti'eet violence, might also help to account for continuing IRA 
activity.
It would seem unsatisfactory, however, to exclude the notion that violence may also have 
persisted due to pressures for organisational survival and, at the individual level, from 
those who want action, or as Collins put it, more ‘fixes’. Much depends on the intentions 
of the IRA. If it is sincere about a commitment to democracy, come what may, then it 
might suggest that at least some of its ongoing activity might be related to factors to do 
with ‘personal needs’ or organisational sustenance. The difficulty lies in separating the 
potential motivations above fr om the possibility that the peipetiation of violence has also 
become habitual, and, to reiterate, when one is not privy to the ongoings within the 
organisation the conclusions are bound to some degree to be speculative.
Cusack, J,, ‘Main teiTorist gioups still recruit and tiain’, Irish Times. July 3*“ 2001.
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One way of attempting to do this is to tty and identify those types of activity that do not 
appear to bear any relation to political goals. It seems that, although political violence has 
receded, the illegal fundraising sttuctures that have helped to support and sustain the 
armed struggle remain in place. If anything they have expanded during the peace 
process.'*  ^ Wliile the cutting edge of violence may have been reduced all the structures 
that undeipinned it are still there. In the case of the IRA the group may have used these 
activities and indeed increased them in order to maintain organisational cohesion. 
Crenshaw states:
‘The operational inteipretation of ideology will vary according to the need to 
ensure organizational survival. The chance for action, no matter what it 
accomplishes, may be a dominant incentive ... Circumstances may alter incentive 
structures. If an organization is forced into inactivity, substitute incentives must 
be found. Some might shift to dealing in drugs, for example.’'*'*
If violence for the original political objectives is no longer appropriate organisational 
suiwival dictates that alternative avenues through which to channel violent activities are 
needed and it is the increase in the illegal activities that keeps the organisation united and 
operational. It will be argued in the conclusion to this thesis that the IRA has kept itself 
intact mainly because it is now ttying to ‘win the argument’.'*^ It can’t therefore take any 
action that could be construed as sunender or that would lead to mass defections to RIRA
Brian Keenan, for example is said to believe that IRA violence stopped too soon (Henry Patterson, 
interview).
Northern Ireland Select Committee report on organised crime (2002).
Op. cit. Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power, p. 20.
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or CIRA. Therefore it seems that the group has continued its organised criminal activity 
to keep the organisation intact, in keeping with the Crenshaw’s scenario above, rather 
than the other way round -  ie. keeping it intact to profit from such crime. The IRA is, 
after all, a military organisation and therefore one assumes that in order to suiwive it 
needs to undertake a certain level of activity. Part of this activity may include the need to 
use violence to keep these illegal empires intact from predators
Not only has organised crime helped the IRA to sustain itself at the organisational level 
but it seems that it has also been in the interests of certain individuals to keep this kind of 
activity going and even increase it, regardless of the ceasefire and the peace process. 
Although it appears that illegal activity has been geared towards, ostensibly at least, the 
political goals of the organisation, the tme picture may be different. Jim Cusack stated in 
June 2001:
‘With the continuation of the peace process in Northern Ireland, it appears that an 
unusual number of former IRA figures have acquired wealth. Gardai suspect that 
some have done so illegally ... One former leading IRA figure is also recently 
reputed to have bought a home in the Caribbean.
To coin Arthur Aughey’s phrase (interview).
Real IRA member Joe O ’Connor was said to have been murdered by the IRA for ‘moving in’ on the 
IRA’s cigarette smuggling racket (See Cusack, J., ‘New ferocity to gang ‘wars’ outside Dublin’, The Irish 
Times. June 11**‘ 2001).
Cusack, J., ‘New ferocity to gang ‘wars’ outside Dublin’, The Irish Times. June 11* 2001.
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Another fomier IRA leader is said to have become a millionaire through smuggling 
fuel/^ Thus, although it is widely believed that it is the loyalists that are often engaged in 
organised crime for personal gain, the same could be said of some republican figures, and 
thus individual self-interest might be another factor that has accounted for the persistence 
of such IRA activity.
The desire to maintain the organisation might also account for the dramatic increase in 
the number of punishment beatings in the post-ceasefire period. This is coiToborated by 
Liam Kennedy’s research on vigilantism when he argues that:
Tt is hardly coincidental that 1975 was the worst year for republican ‘punishment’ 
activity and that it was also a year in which a ceasefire existed for much of that 
time. This kind of substitutionism may also explain, in part, the persistence of 
‘punishment’ beatings in nationalist and loyalist areas, and especially in West and 
North Belfast, during the months following the IRA’s ‘total cessation’ of violence 
in August 1994 and the loyalist ceasefire soon afterwards.
Silke also argues that there were organisational imperatives in maintaining a certain level 
of violence:
‘Shadowy figures who lie behind Border smuggling’, The Irish Times. March 3*^  2001.
Kennedy Liam, ‘Nightmares within Nightmares: Paramilitary Repression within Worldng-Class 
Communities’, in Crime and Punishment in West Belfast, by Liam Kennedy (ed.). The Summer School, 
West Belfast, 1995, p. 78.
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‘With the current set of cease-fires, the ASU members were again essentially left 
idle. Training and intelligence gathering continued but this required considerably 
less activity than the organization had previously been expending. As a result, 
members were transfeired into vigilante activities to keep them occupied while 
still providing a ‘useful community service’. Added to this, vigilantism provides 
the IRA with a low risk opportunity to ‘blood’ new recruits and to test potential 
members. Recruitment continued for all paramilitaries during the cease-fires and 
the punishment attacks provided a ready activity to blood these new members.
In some cases a beating had a dual purpose. Some of the victims were those that were 
considering joining dissident gi'oups but the main motivation behind the increase, 
whoever was ‘beaten’, was to keep those ‘volunteers’ who were keen for action on board. 
Thus, the rise in punishment beatings has not only been a manifestation of the continued 
desire for action on the part of ‘volunteers’ but also a way of sustaining the teiTorist 
organisation. By keeping these members occupied the IRA has managed to maintain 
unity and cohesion at the same time as sustaining the power and prestige of the 
leadership. While there are IRA Aimy Council members in the leadership of Sinn Fein, 
their power and authority is derived from being at the apex of the IRA and not as leaders 
of the party. A PSNI Special Branch source stated that:
‘if IRA leaders gave up their positions on the Aimy Council they’d lose control. 
They might also lose control if there wasn’t a continuing level of violence. It also
Silke, A., ‘Rebel’s Dilemma: The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Fein and Paramilitary 
Vigilantism in Northern Ireland’, Tenorism and Political Violence. Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 1999), p. 88.
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may have been useful to keep non Sinn Fein members on the Council so that the 
grass roots don’t feel neglected.
The notion that the grass roots of the IRA has to be placated is taken further by O’Connor 
when she stated, from her survey in 1993, that ‘the assessment that leading republicans 
are afraid of those in their own movement has become commonplace among many 
Northern Catholics, like the clear-eyed summary of grassroots motivation as ‘simply 
frustration and revenge’. O n e  former supporter highlights another problem:
‘[The IRA] is a military organisation. Even the most political of them have a 
different concept of politics from people involved in conventional, electoral 
lobbying, where you’re conditioned to accept that you may be beaten at times and 
you then reorganise and come back. Their attitude to politics has been very much 
-  if you don’t win, there’s no point.
In summary, the IRA has continued with its organised criminal activity as well as a 
certain level of violence through punishment beatings in order to sustain the organisation. 
The steep increase in such beatings and expulsions in 2001-2 (see PSNI table below) 
gives one of the clearest indications that the perpetration of violence has become habitual 
at the ‘individual’ level. This activity has been permitted in order to satisfy the demand 
for ‘action’ and to sustain the organisation. A PSNI Special Branch source has verified
Special Branch source, interview. 
Op. cit. O’Connor p. 370.
Quoted in op. cit. O’Connor p. 369.
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that it is one of the ways that the leadership has held the organisation together, along with 
‘rearming, training, targeting and criminality’/'*
Casualties as a Result of Paramilitary-Style Attacks 1990/91-2003/04^^
■H
1990/91 112 61 51 53 18 35 1651991/92 64 44 20 79 27 52 1431992/93 139 69 70 56 33 23 1951993/94 83 59 24 42 37 5 1251994/95 98 55 43 105 46 59 2031995/96 6 6 0 246 90 156 2521996/97 41 37 4 291 125 166 3321997/98 73 33 40 125 70 55 1981998/99 73 40 33 172 112 60 2451999/00 75 53 22 103 70 33 1782000/01 162 99 63 161 89 72 3232001/02 190 124 66 112 76 36 3022002/03 165 110 55 140 92 48 305
2002/03 
(to 25/05/02) 13 8 5 21 16 5 34
2003/04 
Ito 25/05/03) 22 16 6 15 10 5 37
The next step is to assess how these ‘violence as a habit’ activities have impacted on the 
utility of the IRA’s political front.
Special Branch source, interview.
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The Impact of ‘Violence as a Habit^
By assessing the post-ceasefire period it should in theory make it easier to identify 
activity that represents some form of violence having become habitual. It would then be 
reasonable to assume that this habitual element was present in the years of the Troubles 
but was more disguised because of the strategic decision to pursue a violent political 
campaign anyway. It is possible to discern, however, that the level of indiscriminate 
violence that persisted in the 1980s did not seem to be conducive to the overall strategy 
of the republican leadership. The Enniskillen bomb, for example, with the murder of 
innocent civilians (rather than ‘combatants’) did not tie in with the electoral part of the 
republican approach. This was evident in the fact that Adams felt the need to call for 
refinement on a number of occasions. Clearly, it was his view that ‘violence as a habit’ in 
this instance, through continuing indiscriminate violence when ‘refinement’ was called 
for, was detrimental to Sinn Fein’s electoral progress and therefore to its utility as an 
electoral tool at this time.
Of course, the impact of ‘violence as a habit’ on the utility of a political fiont depends on 
what the role of that political front is. In the post-ceasefire period, for example, if one of 
Sinn Fein’s roles has been ‘community policing’ or punishment beatings (such as that 
carried out by the ‘Concerned Parents Against Drugs’ in North Kerry) then ‘violence as a 
habit’ may well have actually increased the utility of the political front by providing the
From the Police Sem ce o f Northern Ireland website at: litto://www.psni.police.iilc/stats/punbeat2.shtTiii
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means for IRA members to cany out these more ‘Sinn Fein activities’ instead of 
exploding bombs or shooting security force personnel. Silke argues that:
‘Sinn Fein is intimately involved in every aspect of the vigilantism. Indeed, a case 
can be argued that the political inffastnicture from which contemporary Sinn Fein 
emerged ultimately had its origins in the efforts of republicanism to establish 
formal structures to facilitate organized vigilantism’.^ ^
In fact ‘co-ordinating vigilarrtism was one of the most important functions of the political 
p a r t y I n  the case of the IRA, therefore, the political front, in times of ceasefire, may 
provide the means for some of the substitute activities for those volunteers who want 
‘action’. In times of ‘war’ this fimction would of course be unnecessary, where IRA men 
were presumably otherwise employed and so did not need to engage themselves with 
Sinn Fein activities of this sort. Nevertheless, the fact that punishment beatings increased 
in times of ceasefire suggest a certain level of addiction to the perpetration of violence, an 
addiction which can affect the utility of a political fr ont in a detrimental way even in 
times of ‘war’, such as in the 1980s.
When one considers that Sinn Fein has also been an electoral tool then the IRA’s 
continuing activity could be seen as something of a double-edged sword. The political 
front might be popular at the local level by getting rid of social nuisances and drug 
dealers through beatings and expulsions. Indeed Monisey and Pease argue that:
‘^ Op. cit. Silke p. 71. 
"rW d.p. 75.
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‘within Belfast, a strong measure of support is expressed for the LR.A. in its 
punishment role. The support is variable, and particular incidents provoke more 
general condemnation, but the belief that ‘somebody has to do something’ is 
fairly widespread.
The fact that Martin Fenis was elected to the Irish Dail shortly after being aiTested for 
allegedly administering a beating also suggests that there is a localised demand for Sinn 
Fein vigilante activities.
At the regional and national level, and in the Msh Republic, however, the picture is very 
different. Most people clearly cannot bring themselves to vote for a party that still 
engages in such activity and is still linked to an intact and indeed active IRA. This is 
reflected in the relatively few second preference votes that Sinn Fein manages to poll.^  ^
This is because not only are electors asked to choose which manifesto they prefer but 
also, perhaps more fundamentally, as democrats, whether or not they want to vote for a 
perceived anti-democratic party. In the North, too, vigilantism has not helped the party’s 
appeal in the eyes of middle class Catholics. The problem has not gone unnoticed 
amongst some republicans;
‘[Some] Sinn Fein members dislike it [vigilantism] ... because of the issues of 
disrepute that the practice raises and the subsequent impact this can have on
Moitissey, M., and Pease, K., ‘The Black Criminal Justice System in West Belfast’, The Howard Journal. 
Vol. XXI, 1982, p. 165.
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political support. Rough and ready vigilantism may be popular with many people 
at a local level, but it reflects poorly on a political party with serious national 
ambitions. Sinn Fein has always depended on the nationalist working-class for its 
core support, but it is not likely to gain wider acceptance among the North’s 
growing nationalist middle-class so long as it is clear that the party is deeply 
involved in the violent activities of a paramilitary organization.’^ ®
The difficulty for republicans is that since the 1970s they had actively encouraged local 
communities to use them as an alternative law enforcement system with its own summary 
justice -  to such a degroe that many in these communities have come to depend on Sinn 
Fein to address social problems such as drug dealers and joyriders. If the IRA and Sinn 
Fein stopped these activities then they risked losing this localised support at the ballot 
box. Not only that, these people might start to use the ‘illegitimate’ state police force as 
the means to deal with social nuisances, and this would caiTy the risk of increasing the 
number of informers. Or indeed people might look elsewhere for ‘protection’. For 
example, during the recent riots in Belfast the INLA has challenged this traditional role 
of the IRA.^* Silke remarks that despite attempts to stop it (in 1983 and 1993) ‘public 
pressure forced them to return to the old levels of violence, even though senior 
republicans lorew the policy was not effective and was ultimately hurting the movement 
in the wider political arena.
See ARK Northern Ireland elections website: http:/Avww.ark.ac.iilc/elections/fa98.htm . 
“  Op. cit. Silke p. 81.
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This ti-aditional role of the front that it took upon itself, therefore, would be difficult to 
shrug off, even if it wanted to (as stated above keeping IRA members occupied with 
‘Sinn Fein activities’ has actually been one of the ways to keep the IRA intact). But this 
aspect of violence as a habit has without doubt hampered the party’s prospects at the 
national level and also therefore its utility as an electoral tool. At least, while Sinn Fein 
refuses to endorse the new Police Seiwice of Northern Ireland, republicans can make a 
prima facie case for the perpetuation of the alternative justice system. If the party were to 
join the Policing Board, however, then one might assume that Sinn Fein’s tiaditional 
‘community policing’ role would be curtailed as it could not presumably justify two 
separate and rival law enforcement systems.
The very fact that the IRA remains intact has also had a detrimental effect on Sinn Fein’s 
prospects as a political force. Irish premier Bertie Aheme has stated on many occasions 
that Sinn Fein must ‘resolve its relationship with the IRA before going into coalition with 
his party, Fianna Fail’®^. Former Fine Gael leader Michael Noonan also made it clear that 
his party would not form a government with Sinn Fein in it.^ '* Clearly violence as a habit 
at the organisational level, through the continued existence of the IRA and its attendant 
illegal stmctures, has also limited the political scope of its political fr ont in its electoral 
role.
See ‘Is The Peace Process Working?’, Irish Herald. Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
http://www.newsimlimited.co.uk/nireland , September 9* 2002, where one resident criticises the IRA for 
not protecting them.
Op. cit. Silke p. 83.
For example in McDonald, H., ‘Irish army can’t police Armagh’, Guardian newsunlimited, 
http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland  ^January 14th 2001.
^  Fahy, D., ‘Sinn Fein ‘militaiy wing’ obstacle to talks’, Irish Times. February 10* 2001.
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Perhaps strangely, the organised crime element in itself does not appear to have been 
flagged up as an electoral weakness as it is with the loyalist groups. This is because the 
IRA is not, ostensibly at least, using it for personal gain but for the ‘noble’ political 
cause. Moreover, there appears to be some sympathy with the view that this kind of 
activity has an air of legitimacy because it is undermining the ‘illegitimate’ British 
economic system. As one republican proclaimed:
‘The emotional attachment of the men and women of West Belfast to this state is 
as it was at the time of partition -  non-existent and growing cooler by the day. 
Generally speaking, they will lose little sleep over the news that a huge black 
economy is sucldng the lifeblood out of the north because they don’t see 
themselves as having a stake in a political anangement which is so manifestly 
unsustainable.’^ ^
Therefore organised crime in the IRA case is cloaked with political legitimacy and has 
not, it seems, undeimined the gioup in the same way that such affiliations have 
undermined the UDA.
The ‘unsustainability’, refeiTed to above, of Northern Ireland as part of the United 
Kingdom is related to another important role for Sinn Fein -  the orchestration of street 
violence. In the Summer of 2002, for example, it was said to be organising riots in North 
and East Belfast. There are a number of reasons behind this foim of activity. Firstly, the 
political front has wanted to illusti'ate the republican argument that the statelet is
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inherently unsustainable and so it has been the business of Sinn Fein to create instability 
and confrontation by stoking up sectarian tension in interface areas. The political front 
has also tried to manipulate sectarian tensions surrounding the marching season, once 
again to try to undermine the viability of the Northern Ireland statelet.^^ Secondly, the 
aim is to provoke the police into an overreaction, perhaps video the ‘evidence’, and then 
show it to the domestic and international audience, not only for propaganda purposes, but 
also specifically to justify the party’s decision not to sit on the Policing Board of a police 
force that they could argue was no different from the ‘oppressive’ RUG. Thirdly, 
provoking ‘state repression’ would enhance their message that they were ‘defenders of 
the Catholic community’ The more hatred and tension, then the less sustainable the 
province would be.
The use of street violence is another example where the notion of ‘violence as a habit’ in 
the post-ceasefires period may have actually increased the utility of Sinn Fein in this 
respect because, as with punishment beatings, it provides a substitute activity for those 
who might normally have been engaged in tenorism. As Dingley noted ‘street politics 
kept a lot of activists employed at a time when the peace process would have made them 
redundant.ShaiTock and Devenport concur that Adams the tactician ‘could 
contemplate the mayhem, tragedy and disruption which Drumcree 1996 brought into
Livingstone, R., Irelandclick.com, website: http://www.nuzhound.com. July 4* 2002.
^  For an excellent analysis on how Sinn Fein stokes up tensions in the marching season see Dingley J., 
‘Marching Down the Gaivagliy Road: Republican Tactics and State Response to the Orangemen’s Claim to 
March their Traditional Route after the Drumcree Church Service’, Tenorism and Political Violence. 
Autumn 2002, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 42-79.
Clarke, L., Broadening the Battlefield. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1987, p. 221.
Op cit. Dingley p. 69. See also Harding, T., ‘Sinn Fein accused of parade riot plot’, news.telegraph.co.uk, 
website: http://www.telegraph.co.uk , July 12* 2002.
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ordinary people’s lives as an opportunity to be ‘developed and exploited” /^ Once again, 
however, this type of activity may be detrimental to that other fundamental role of the 
IRA’s political front -  its development as a political force on an all-Ireland basis.
In summary, the notion of violence as a habit was largely hidden in the turmoil of the 
early 1970s when Sinn Fein sat comfortably as the propaganda tool for a campaign of 
violence, however indiscriminate. In the 1980s it was clear that such violence restricted 
the utility of Sinn Fein, even when the party was being used as a tactical device. The 
dramatic increase in punishment beatings in recent years has arguably also not been 
conducive to the utility of the political front whose role has increasingly been one of 
securing votes at the ballot box. Alex Maskey for one has acloiowledged this detrimental 
impact: ‘I don’t want it to happen at all. It offends, it hurts, and it is politically 
disastrous’.^ ® This aspect of violence as a habit may have brought limited community 
support from people who condone vigilantism against drug dealers, for example, (after all 
this has been one of Sinn Fein’s traditional roles) but it has hindered the paity’s efforts to 
gain a wider following at the ballot box. It has also limited its political options vis a vis 
any potential sharing of power in a coalition government in the Irish Republic, as indeed 
has the fact that the IRA has remained intact. It is clearly difficult to quantify the extent 
to which violence has become habitual, and also how much of an impact it has actually 
had vis a vis the utility of a political fr ont. In general, however, the notion of violence as
ShaiTock, D., and Devenport, M., Man of War. Man of Peace. The Unauthorised Biographv of Gen v 
Adams. Macmillan, 1998, p. 477.
Quoted in Human Rights Watch/Helsinld, To Sei~ve Without Favor: Policing. Human Rights, and 
Accountability in Northern Ireland (London: Human Rights Watch 1997) p. 106, cited in Silke TPV article 
note 81, pp. 92-3.
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a habit has had a negative, if not decisive, impact on the utility of Simi Fein whose role 
has changed as mainstieam republicanism has modernised itself.
The Loyalist Groups
As stated above probably the best way to ascertain whether or not violence has become a 
habit both at the individual and organisational level is to identify activity that seems to 
have very little relation to political goals. In the cases of the loyalist groups, and 
especially the UDA, this activity is far more transparent than is the case with the IRA. It 
has been argued earlier that, at least to some degree, this is due to a weaker ideology and 
less disciplined and less centmlised organisational stmctures.
As with the IRA, it is important to establish that loyalist violence and illegal activity has 
continued in the post-ceasefire period. The UDA has continued to be engaged in street 
disturbances as well as widespread attacks on Catholic homes,^* and has continued to 
murder innocent Catholics purely on the basis of their religion.^  ^The group has also been 
heavily engaged in punishment beatings.^^ Perhaps the most bitter episode of violence 
since 1998 has been the feud between the UDA and the UVF which left seven men dead 
and led to the reimprisonment of Johnny Adair for breaching the terms of his release 
license. The UDA’s ceasefire was declared over by John Reid, the Secretary of State for
See OTan-ell, J., ‘Loyalists reanning for battle to come’, Scotland on Sunday. May 12* 2002.
Such as that o f the Catholic postal worker, Daniel McColgan on 26* Febiaiary 2002 and Gerard Lawlor 
on 22nd July 2002.
See Bradley, M., ‘Punishment attacks on youths almost doubled’. The Irish Times. August 23^ ** 2001 and 
Murphy, C., “ Punishment’ shootings, beatings rise sharply’. The Irish Times. May 23”^* 2001.
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Northern Ireland, in 2001/'* The UVF ceasefire officially remains intact (as at June 2003) 
but it was suspected of planting a fireball bomb that failed to detonate in Ballycastle, 
County Antrim in August 20017^ According to the PSNI, it has also been involved in 
orchestrating str eet violence and it too has engaged in punishment beatings/^
It is possible to relate some of this activity to political goals. For example, it could be 
argued that loyalists have become increasingly disillusioned with the peace process that 
they supported in 1998 - reflected in the ongoing sectarian murders and street violence 
(which is also linked to strengthening Protestant communities at the expense of Catholic 
ones). Sectarian activity, especially in the case of the UDA, is linked in a spurious way to 
the political goal of maintaiiring the union with the UK, and preventing unification with 
the Catholic South. However, there is much activity that does not appear to have any 
connection with the political goals of the organisations.
A Northern Ireland Special Branch source stated that loyalists have been tempted towards 
criminal activity as an end in itself The UDA, for example, has been involved in ‘drug 
dealing, racketeering, the sale of illegal tobacco and stolen a lc o h o l . I t  has also recently 
been reported that loyalists have been involved in a sixty million pound drugs haul that
Although the organisation has claimed to be back on ceasefire (fiom March 2003).
BBC News, ‘UVF members linked to bomb’, website: 
http://news.bbc.co.ul</l/hi/northern ireland/1520556.stm , September 1st 2001.
See BBC News, ‘Paramilitaries blamed for violence’, website: httD://www.bbc.co.ulc/news , August 29* 
2002 and Murphy, C., ‘ ‘Punishment’ shootings, beatings rise sharply’, The Irish Times. May 23*^ *^ 2001.
Special Branch source, intemew.
McDonald, H., ‘UDA gang sends bomb ‘message’ to campaigner’. Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
httT)://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland, September 8* 2002. See also, for example, BBC News, ‘UDA 
ceasefire: 1994-2001 website: http://news.bbc.co.ulc/l/hi/northern ireland/1569237.stm , October 12th 
2001 .
182
was exposed by an international police effort in September 2002/^ It is perhaps 
siiiprising that the loyalists have also carried out punishment beatings and have engaged 
in ‘community policing’ of its own, given that, as pro-state groups, one would assume 
that they would support the state police in dealing with crime. Silke, though, outlines the 
recent history of how the relationship between the loyalists groups and the police has 
deteriorated ever since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, when the violent 
backlash brought loyalists into conflict with their own police force.^ ® This, along with a 
greater RUG emphasis on counter terrorism in loyalist areas, led to a failure on the part of 
loyalist communities to cooperate with a police force that they no longer trusted.®* In fact 
loyalists have attacked the homes of policemen and women.
There is, however, another reason why loyalists are opposed to having the police around 
and why they mete out their own form of justice. They do not want their criminal empires 
exposed or interfered with by the lawful authorities. The UDA recently placed a pipe 
bomb under the car of a man who was trying to set up a police clinic in the Rathcoole 
Estate of North Belfast.®  ^ The group saw this as a direct threat to their drug dealing 
operations. Thus, it is far more convenient for the loyalist gi'oups, at a time when they 
have increased their criminal activities, and when these activities have become more 
exposed as the political violence has receded, to deal with miscreants themselves, rather 
than have the state’s police force, who might ask too many awkward questions, involved.
O’Kelly, B,, ‘Loyalists and Dublin criminals behind 80m dnigs haul’, Sunday Business Post online, 
website: http://www.thepost.ie/web/I-Iome/index.asp , September 8* 2002.
Silke, A., ‘Ragged Justice: Loyalist Vigilantism in Northern Ireland’, Tenorism and Political Violence. 
Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 4-5.
Ibid. p. 5.
McDonald, H., ‘UDA gang sends bomb ‘message’ to campaigner’, Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
httn://www.newsiinliinited.co.uIc/nireland, September 8* 2002.
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With the loyalist groups there appears to be more evidence (than in the IRA case) to 
suggest that there are reasons for the maintenance of the organisation and peipetration of 
violence other than ideological motivations. It is probably no exaggeration to suggest that 
they represent illegal fiefdoms that have hitherto used the political conflict to hide illicit 
activities. During the Troubles they have established a warlord type prestige amongst 
their leaders as well as acquiring sizeable and personal financial gains. This is 
particularly the case with the UDA. One drugs squad officer stated in 2002 that ‘the UDA 
is now a major criminal empire’.®^ There is no reason why activity that is not linked to 
the political objectives of the organisation, and that may be more to do with sustaining 
such fiefdoms or with personal gain, should not continue during a peace process that is 
after all primarily concerned with a political settlement. Thus, an organisation may 
remain in existence to cany on with activities that had hitherto been given cover by the 
political conflict. As with the IRA’s illegal supporting stmctures, the loyalist groups may 
also need to use violence to keep empires intact fr om predators.
Thus, this criminal activity that has become part and parcel of the loyalist paramilitary 
world, and that has little to do with political goals, has perpetuated the use of violence 
and the organisations’ survival regardless of political objectives. In September 2002 the 
new PSNI Chief Constable Hugh Orde said ‘there are a number of major players who
Op. cit. O’FaiTell.
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have no visible means of support, who seem to go on some very nice holidays and who 
seem to have a terrifying grip on some of their communities.’®'*
This ‘terrifying grip’ is often manifested in vigilante activity that is undertaken to 
preserve the organisation. Silke states that:
‘While the loyalist vigilante priority is to first and foremost maintain operational 
control over members as well as those on the periphery of the organisation, a 
significant amount of effort is also devoted to protecting the authority and prestige 
of the organisation within loyalist areas. In practical teims this ultimately involves 
‘punishing’ anyone who defies commands issued by the organisation, who comes 
into conflict with members of the group, or who hinders -  intentionally or 
accidentally -  any of the group’s activities ... The strong reaction is not because 
the group has especially strong feelings about a given individual, but because the 
group is responding to a perceived thr eat to the status of the entire organisation’®^
Clearly this suggests that organisational survival seems to be more important than 
political goals.
Wlrile loyalist group activity has persisted largely to maintain illegal fiefdoms, and 
therefore to perpetuate organisations whose maintenance has become more important for 
organised crime pmposes than the realisation of political goals, there is also a strong
Quoted in McKittrick,D., ‘Hugh Orde: Belfast's new man fiom the Met doesn't expect to be popular’. 
The Independent. 2"*^  September 2002.
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individual adherence to violence in the loyalist groups. With a weak ideological 
underpinning, the use of violence has become a particular source of prestige at the 
individual level for working class loyalists. Silke argues that:
‘The standing individuals gain within their communities once they become 
paramilitary members is arguably the most tangible reward they will ever receive 
for membership. Certainly, this status is one of the most powerful attractions for 
potential recraits and it provides a powerful incentive to remain involved in the 
movement once an individual has joined. The status is not necessarily one of 
popularity. It is not about being admired or liked within the community. It is 
about being respected (author’s italics) and about being taken very seriously by 
those around you.’®*’
One former loyalist, Dave Fogel, stated that ‘I was walldng around the streets with the 
power of life and death over people ...I must at times have been drunk with it. It wasn’t 
the power that people have given you by votes but the power given you by violence.’®^ 
Certainly, without the powerful ideology associated with being an anti-state group, the 
loyalist groups and their members have been more prone to the charge of using violence 
for other pmposes, such as personal prestige and the sustenance of illegal empires. Like 
republicans they have mainly been working class and so the UDA and the UVF have 
provided a chance for working class loyalists to escape from their social status, as 
Fromm’s theory above suggests. The paramilitaiy culture that exists in many
Op. cit. Silke, ‘Ragged Justice: Loyalist Vigilantism in Northern Ireland’ pp. 14-5,
Ibid. p. 15.
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communities has also led to teenagers aspiring to be members of the two groups. 
O’FaiTell noted in May 2002 that:
‘Both the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF) are ‘swamped’ by young recruits, according to one former UVF prisoner. 
This is backed up by police sources.’®®
As far as the individual adherence to the perpetration of violence is concerned one 
shouldn’t forget that it is sometimes not through choice that young men join the UDA. 
Silke quotes one local source:
‘The UDA press gangs seventeen-year-olds into their organization. If you get in 
trouble, they tell you to join the UDA. Last year one of my son’s mates, who was 
seventeen, joined. Now he can’t get out. He daren’t speak about it.’®^
This would appear to be another factor that accounts for the persistence of violence and 
organisational survival, though in the long term it is questionable as to whether such 
intimidatoiy tactics help preseiwe the group. In short, the less an organisation has existed 
to fulfil political goals the more its survival is likely to become an end in itself.
In summary, there has been much loyalist activity that bears little relation to political 
goals but has been more to do with sustaining ‘mafia organisations’®® and all the personal
Fogel, D., quoted in Taylor, P., Loyalists. Bloomsbury, London, 1999, p. 101.
Op. cit. O’Fanell.
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power, prestige and wealth that goes with them. This has entailed controlling loyalist 
communities and carrying out numerous punishment beatings. Clearly, when contiolling 
their ‘patches’ (for extortion and racketeering purposes) is paramount organisational 
suiwival is imperative, regardless of the political environment. As this type of activity 
bears little relation to the political conflict and has little political orientation then it seems 
that there is no reason why it should have stopped during the peace process. In fact it has 
increased as the gioups have found new ways to utilise their manpower.
The Impact on the Loyalist Political Fronts
Before assessing the impact that these violence as a habit factors (adherence to organised 
crime and punishment beatings) have had on the utility of the loyalist political fronts, as 
with the republican case, it is worth reiterating what the role of these fronts has been. It 
has been argued elsewhere (chapter 9) that the main motivations for the use of loyalist 
political fronts has been to give working class loyalism representation and to explore 
ways that could result in a greater degree of accommodation between the two 
communities. With the former this would mean that loyalist workers would need to 
support the political fronts at the ballot box. With the latter the political fronts’ proposals 
would have to be taken seriously by the main unionist parties to succeed. The two aspects 
of violence as a habit assessed here, punishment beatings and organised crime, have 
lessened the chances of the loyalist political fronts succeeding in either of these 
objectives, largely due to the ‘law abiding’ nature of Protestants. This particular
Op. cit. Silke, ‘Ragged Justice: Loyalist Vigilantism in Noitliem Ireland’ p. 10.
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‘variable’ has therefore reduced the utility of the loyalist political fronts. This has 
especially been the case when loyalist involvement with organised crime has had little to 
do with the realisation of political goals.
It is well known that these aspects of loyalist activity existed in the years before the 
ceasefires. During the peace process, however, they have become more exposed, whereas 
during the Troubles they were to some extent hidden by the political conflict. Thus it 
would also appear that these violence as a habit factors would have impacted on the 
groups’ strategy vis a vis the use of a political fr ont in the same way as they have done in 
the post-ceasefrre period.
This is probably best exemplified by the case of the UDA in the 1980s. The organisation 
had become so heavily involved in racketeering that the UDA leadership was largely 
viewed as a coiTUpt bunch of gangsters, hardly an impression that facilitated the use of a 
political front in the face of a generally ‘law abiding’ Protestant population. Thus not 
only did the division of labour ethos (see chapter 9) militate against the use of a political 
front, but so too did the fact that the organisation was heavily engaged in organised 
crime. Unlike republicans, who have had no problem in undeimining the ‘illegitimate’ 
economic system, there was no such questioning of the legitimacy of the status quo 
amongst the unionist population. Thus, whether the UDA’s political fronts were 
established to give a voice to working class loyalism or to present innovative ideas, their 
utility was and has been restricted by its attachment to corruption and racketeering. Fewer
As Assistant Chief Constable Alan McQuillan labelled them (quoted in ‘Leading loyalist shot in face’, 
BBC news, website: htti3://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northem ireland/2262658.stm , September 17* 2002.
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‘law abiding’ Protestants, working class or not, would vote for such political fronts, and 
as a source of ideas they have not been taken seriously.®*
The loyalist groups, however, weren’t totally oblivious to the effect that continuing 
violence was having on the fortunes and therefore the utility of their political fronts. One 
of the reasons, argues Silke, that the groups introduced a system of fines against criminals 
in the Shankhill area rather than using physical violence was that it ‘would take the 
pressure off the loyalist political parties ... who were coming under pressure because of 
punishment beatings and shootings carried out by the loyalists.’®^
Nevertheless, violence as a habit has persisted more in the loyalist gioups because less of 
their activity revolved around its political ideology. As Silke has argued:
‘Over the course of the cease-fires the loyalist politicians have ridden the waves 
caused by the continuing illegal activities of the paramilitary groups they 
represent (e.g. extortion, racketeering, vigilantism, etc.) .... If they are to develop 
support among the wider Protestant population, the groups need to distance 
themselves from all the activities associated with paramilitarism, including 
vigilantism’.®®
As Bmce argued o f the UDA in Bruce, S., The Red Hand. Protestant Paramilitaries In Northern Ireland. 
Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 236.
Op. cit. Silke, ‘Ragged Justice: Loyalist Vigilantism in Northern Ireland’ p. 16.
Ibid. pp. 24-5.
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Conclusion
This chapter has endeavoured to assess the impact that the notion of ‘violence as a habit’ 
has had on the utility of the political fronts. Such violence includes ongoing teixorist 
activity, punishment beatings and shootings, and organised crime. The above has argued 
that violence has indeed become habitual at the individual level, evident in the shaip rise 
in punishment beatings in the post-ceasefire period. This to some extent, and particularly 
with the loyalist groups, is due to the personal prestige and power that individuals have 
been used to enjoying in the paramilitary world. At the organisational level organisational 
theory suggests that terrorist groups may continue to exist even when it might not be 
rational®'* for them to do so and that therefore a certain level of activity or substitute 
activity is necessary to sustain them. This is especially the case if leadership ambitions 
are tied in with the continued viability of the group. The extent to which violence has 
become habitual at the organisational level, however, is difficult to gauge in the case of 
the IRA because there may be strong strategic motives for the group to remain in 
existence. These include continuing to use the threat of violence for political leverage, 
and to continue to wield influence, and therefore remain relevant, ‘on the ground’. Nor 
should one overlook the impact of the strong commemorative culture and 
transgenerational inheritance of the mantle of armed stmggle that exists in the republican 
movement.
^^* Meaning that, all things considered (ie. military failure, sufficient concessions), it would not be logical to 
continue with ten orism were it not for such organisational processes. For further typologies of group 
behaviour see Post, J., Ruby, K., and Shaw, E., ‘The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated
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Thus, there could be any number of strategic or ideological reasons why violence may 
have continued in the post-ceasefire period, but the notion that violence has also become 
habitual should not be overlooked. In order to assess the impact of this variable on the 
utility of the IRA’s political front it is important to be clear about what Sinn Fein’s role 
has been. Its functions have included ‘community policing’ and the use of street violence 
to stoke up tensions in the ‘inherently unsustainable statelet’. This chapter has argued that 
since the ceasefires the notion of violence as a habit has actually increased the utility of 
the political front with regard to these particular roles.
In general, however, ‘violence as a habit’ has inhibited the utility of Sinn Fein. While 
punishment beatings and shootings may have brought localised support to the party they 
have hindered its attempts to establish itself as a significant all-Ireland organisation. 
Secondly, the fact that the IRA has remained intact has limited Sinn Fein’s negotiating 
position vis a vis forming part of any potential coalition government in the South. The 
increase in beatings in the post-ceasefire period suggests that violence had to some 
degree become habitual and this might help account for the level of indiscriminate 
violence in the 1980s that compromised the utility of Sinn Fein as an electoral force. 
Organised crime has not been viewed by republicans as detiimental to its cause as, 
ostensibly at least, it has been geared towards the political goal. They do not have any 
moral qualms about participating in a black market that undermines the ‘illegitimate’ 
economic system. Broadly, however, violence as a habit, exemplified through the
Framework for the Analysis o f Group Risk for Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Tenorism. Vol. 25, 
No.2, March-April 2002.
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increase in punishment beatings and shootings and through the continued existence of the 
IRA, has undemiined the utility of the group’s political fi'ont.
The Loyalist Groups
As noted above organisational theory suggests that teiTorist organisations may continue 
to exist even when it is not rational for them to do so. Assuming that ‘rationality’ here 
refers to the political conditions or concessions that might warrant the disbandment of a 
gi'oup, then clearly whether or not it ceases to exist depends on the degree to which these 
gi'oups are ‘political’ or on how much importance is attached to the political goal. This 
chapter has argued that the loyalist groups, and particularly the UDA, partly because of a 
weaker ideology as pro-state groups, are less political than the IRA and have been more 
inclined to establishing organised criminal empires as ends in themselves, using the 
political conflict as a cover. Therefore, any political settlement would not logically lead 
to an end to such activity nor the disbandment of the loyalist groups.
The ‘law abiding’ nature of the Protestant population, and its loyalty to the state, has 
meant that it has been more offended by loyalist organised crime. Clearly, this activity, 
the increase in punishment beatings, and the murders of innocent Catholics, has 
undeimined the utility of the loyalist groups’ political fronts when this utility has largely 
depended on the support of the wider unionist population.
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This section has argued that ideology, sti'ucture, leadership and the notion of ‘violence as 
a habit’ have all had an impact on the utility of the political fronts studied in this thesis. 
The IRA’s potent ideology has facilitated a very centralised and hierarchical stiucture 
which in turn has, particularly through dual membership at leadership level, ensured that 
the political front has been tightly controlled by the Army Council. As an anti-state group 
this has enabled the organisation to utilise the fr ont as a tactical tool to greater effect in its 
struggle against the British in Northern Ireland. Another crucial development behind the 
gi'eater utilisation of the IRA’s political fr ont was the emergence of the new leadership in 
the Northern Command, and particularly Gerry Adams who ‘was able to deal with the 
evolving situation’ The survival of this leadership has enabled the political fr ont to be 
further developed and utilised in new and innovative ways. This chapter has argued that 
the notion of violence as a habit has in general, however, been detiimental to the progress 
of Sinn Fein, whose role has increasingly become an electoral one. While it may have led 
to the greater utilisation of Sinn Fein’s more traditional roles of ‘community policing’ 
and street violence it has hampered the party’s efforts to broaden its electoral support 
North and South, and the potential it may have had or have in forming part of a coalition 
government in Dublin.
The loyalist groups have had a less alluring ideology, largely because they are pro-state. 
There have been a number of pro-union parties that represent similar political views and 
those with military or political talent would inevitably find themselves in the state’s
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security forces or one of these parties. For this reason the emergence of a gifted and 
innovative leadership that might use political fronts more effectively has been less likely. 
The weaker ideological commitment of the UDA has been a factor behind its fragmented 
and decentralised structure and it has been argued that this has militated against the utility 
of a political front. Although the UVF is more centralised both groups have suffered ftom 
a relatively weak dogma and a lack of ideological conviction that has allowed the 
development of organised criminal empires as ends in themselves. In the face of a Taw 
abiding’ unionist population this ‘violence as a habit’ factor has militated against the 
utility of loyalist political fronts, particularly when this utility has been bound up with 
winning votes at the ballot box or as the means to present new ideas for ultimately ending 
the conflict. The next section will assess the impact of popular support, state response and 
other factors in the external environment on the utility of political fr onts.
95 As Sinn Fein councillor Michael Browne stated, interview.
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Section 3 - The External Environment
In Chapter 6 the degree to which the notion of ‘violence as a habit’ has impacted on the 
use or not of a political front was assessed. This of course largely depends on how much 
weight one accords to the ‘instinctivist’ origins of human aggression or organisational 
imperatives as potential reasons for the persistence of violence (therefore lessening the 
chances of a political front as a sign of moderation or even as a tactic). Likewise any 
assessment of the impact of the external environment on teiTorist group str ategy vis a vis 
the greater or lesser utilisation of a political front depends on how much one holds to the 
‘environmentalist’ school of thought as an explanation for terrorist gr oup behaviour. One 
might assume, for example, that if the conditions that led to the outbreak of violence in 
the first place persist then this may also lead to the inhibition of the use of a political front 
as a sign of moderation. Despite the role of internal factors, and most particularly the 
leadership in the case of the IRA, this thesis will argue that changes in the environment 
have been more fundamental in bringing about not only the greater utilisation of, but also 
new roles for, the ‘political front’. As Crenshaw explains, terxorist groups are constrained 
by the ‘social, economic and political givens of the situation’, over which they may have 
no control. ^
' Crenshaw, M. (ed.), TeiTorism, Legitimacy and Power. Wesleyan University Press, Connecticut, 1983, p. 
31.
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Chapters 7, 8 and 9 assess the impact of ‘popular support’, ‘state response’ and ‘other 
factors in the environment’ on the strategies of the IRA, UDA and UVF vis a vis their use 
of political fronts.
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Chapter 7 - Popular Support
This chapter will focus on the effect that the level of domestic popular support has had on 
the three groups’ strategy vis a vis the use of a political front (the effect of international 
support will be assessed in Chapter 9). It will not primarily be concerned with those 
factors that in turn affect popular support, such as state response or other conditions in the 
external environment. These will be explored in later chapters for their impact on the 
level of support for the gr oups and thus their indirect effect on gr oup strategy vis a vis the 
use of political fronts. It is argued that in the case of the IRA the desire to mobilise or tap 
perceived existing popular support has been the most significant of the variables behind 
the greater utility of its political front. Despite apparent ideological indifference to the 
level of support and the view that the ‘only mandate republicans needed was the illegal 
British presence in ‘our’ country’, the group has in fact been concerned with attracting a 
wider following within the Catholic community. On the loyalist side popular support has 
also been an important factor behind the emergence and utility of their political fronts in 
the sense that they sought to give representation to a potential support base that, it was 
perceived, had been disillusioned with its traditional political representatives (unionist 
politicians).
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The IRA
Despite its apparent (ideological) indifference to public support it will be argued that the 
IRA has always been concerned with attracting a wider following. One of the means it 
has used to achieve this is the adoption of left wing ideology which emphasises the 
‘mobilisation of the masses’. While the organisation has had genuine left wing adherents 
within its ranks, Mamsm has also been used to generate popular support for the national 
object. This aspiration of mobilising support through left wing ideology, usually after the 
perceived failure in the use of violence, has necessarily led to greater ‘political’ 
involvement. Mar*xist dogma, however, despite the IRA’s stated aim of achieving a 
socialist united republic, has not always so obviously been to the fore. The contradictions 
of a gr oup that has courted the support of both the Catholic minority and the anti­
communist United States for support, at the same time as espousing an atheist communist 
ideology has often obliged the IRA to play down its socialist credentials.
Wliereas the desire to mobilise support has affected strategy so too has perceived existing 
support. It will be argued that the perception amongst Catholics, after loyalist attacks and 
perceived state acquiescence, of the IRA as the last line of defence led to Catholic ghetto 
support for a strategy of violence alone. Genuine fear of expulsion firom their homes or 
worse meant that there was little time or room for politics. The type of government and 
security force response in the early seventies helped lead to popular support for the IRA’s 
initial ‘defence’^  of the Catholic community.
 ^It is debatable as to how preoccupied with ‘defence’ the IRA was and how much it was rather more 
concerned with propaganda victories (ie. ‘presenting an image o f exacerbated crisis to disgr ace the 
government’ (O’Doherty, M. The Trouble With Guns, Republican Strategy and the Provisional IRA.
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The perceived existing support for the IRA after the Bobby Sands by-election victory of 
1981 had a very different effect (when there was no fear of impending pogroms) 
prompting the organisation to engage in electoral politics. IRA proclamations that it 
represented the Catholic community meant that it had hitherto been very wary about 
pursuing an electoral strategy that could disprove these claims. The wave of sentiment 
that elected Sands as a member of parliament, however, dispelled these fears and 
prompted the IRA to tap this perceived support by going to the polls, albeit on an 
abstentionist basis. Thus, perceived popular support for the organisation can have 
different effects on IRA strategy under different circumstances.
The roots of the IRA’s popular support go back centuries thi'ough many generations of 
republican revolt against the British establishment. The response of Westminster to the 
Easter Rising of 1916, the behaviour of the infamous Black and Tans and the prospect of 
conscription were all significant factors behind the ballooning of Irish public support for 
the IRA’s aim of ridding the island of the British. As such ‘during the Anglo-Irish war, 
the IRA’s gi'eatest asset was the solid baclcing, or at least toleration, it received ftom the 
majority of the Irish people.’^  After the partitionist settlement, however, the organisation 
found it difficult to sustain a level of popular support. Nevertheless, ever since the 
Government of Ireland Act was imposed there remained within Northern Ireland a 
minority that sought union with the South. Brian Lennon wrote that ‘Noiihem
Blackstaff, Belfast, 1998, p. 81). O’Doherty’s book challenges the notion o f the IRA as ‘community 
protectors’.
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nationalists ... saw themselves as having been cut off from their fellow country men and 
women in 1920’."^ Thus, although the IRA was never likely to appeal to the majority 
unionist population, it has always had a degr ee of ‘fixed’ support from a constituency that 
still sees the British presence in the ‘Six Counties’ as illegitimate, and the IRA’s 
campaign of violence as justified.
Beyond this ‘core constituency’ were Catholics who were to ‘[inherit] sentimentality and 
tolerance towards the organisation, expressed in rebel songs and stories.’  ^ Indeed, there 
are even suggestions of implicit support from the bulk of Northern Catholics from the 
belief that at best ‘while they cany on’ nothing will be imposed, like an internal 
settlement.^
It wasn’t just sentimentality that contributed to the view of many Catholics that the 
British state was something alien to them. They had been excluded from exercising 
political power within Northern Ireland for all but the four months of Sunningdale in 
1974 and the hitherto brief period in the cunent peace process. As Richard Rose argues, 
the unionists fr om the foundation of the regime did not seek to make it fully legitimate by 
attracting support from Catholics.^ He also notes that subsequently ‘at the most elemental 
level of equal protection of life, person and property, substantial departures from justice
 ^Smith, M., Fighting For Ireland? The Military Strategy O f The Irish Republican Movement. Routledge, 
London and New York, 1995, p. 52.
Lennon, B., After the Ceasefires. Catholics and the Future o f Northern Ireland. Colombia press, Dublin, 
1995, p. 20.
 ^Bishop, P., and Mallie, E., The Provisional IRA. London: Corgi, 1992, p. 151.
® See, for example, O’Connor, F., In Search Of A State. Catholics In Northern Ireland. Blackstaff Press, 
Belfast, 1995, p. 96.
 ^Rose, R., Governing Without Consensus. An Irish Perspective. Faber and Faber, London, 1971, p. 93.
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have existed for decades in Northern Ireland.’ His survey of Catholic attitudes (before 
the ‘Troubles’ began in 1969) revealed that three quarters of the minority population 
believed that they were discriminated against/ an observation that was reinforced by 
Fionnuala O’Connor’s study in the early 1990s:
‘Discrimination, fear of physical attack and conviction that the state was ‘alien, 
not ours’ are the themes that surface repeatedly when people talk about how they 
first became aware of being ‘Northern Catholics’... ‘For many older people, 
awareness of geiTymandering^° and discrimination in housing and employment 
coincided with the realisation that employment in the public seivice would be on 
terms designed to remind them that they were powerless.’
All this amounts to what Rose refeiTed to as a ‘fundamental antagonism’ towards the 
state. Not only was there a natural constituency that felt ‘cut off from the ‘South’ in the 
first place but unionist discrimination and the perception that the British government 
ignored the plight of the powerless community did nothing to alleviate the situation and 
meant that the regime in Stoimont was never going to be fully legitimate as long as the 
situation remained unchanged. As Rose concludes ‘the relatively high vote in Northern 
Ireland [as compared with England] for anti-regime parties indicates that support [for the 
state] [was] less than unanimous there.
 ^Ibid. p. 438.
 ^Ibid. p. 271.
Genymanderiiig is the tenu given to the manipulation o f the borders o f electoral constituencies to 
achieve a disproportionately gr eater number o f seats.
Op. cit. O’Connor p. 151.
Op. cit. Rose p. 28,
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Despite the opportunities that this gave the IRA to reap additional support, in the context 
of Northern Ireland, where unionists have formed the majority of the population and the 
SDLP was the majority Catholic political party until 2001,^  ^ the level of popular support 
for Sinn Fein and the IRA, even at its height, has not been substantial (Sinn Fein’s vote 
never exceeding 20% until the 2001 Westminster election). The IRA was ‘not going to 
swim in a sea of gx*een support but would be forced to avoid contact with the angiy 
Orange populace. Many areas were Nationalist but not necessarily sympathetic; without 
the support or toleration of a majority of the people, the IRA faced an almost 
insuimountable obstacle in Northern Ireland as a whole.’
The lack of substantial or at least majority support did not dissuade the ‘purists’ after 
their defeat in the civil war. Unused to being in the minority they declared their 
indifference to the fact:
‘The people of a nation may not voluntarily suiTender their independence, they 
may not vote it away in the ballot box even under duress and if some, even a 
majority be found, who through force or cupidity, would vote for such a 
sunender, the vote is invalid legally and morally and a minority is justified in 
upholding the independence of their country.’
It was they who were in the right and who or how many chose to follow them was 
immaterial. From these early days, therefore popular support has not been an ideological
Sinn Fein eclipsed the SDLP in the 2001 Westminster election with 22% of the vote. 
Bowyer Bell, J., The Secret Aimv. The IRA. 1916-1979. Poolbeg, Dublin, 1997, pp. 284-5.
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requirement. Henceforth many ‘volunteers’ believed that they needed no other 
justification for their actions other than the courage of their own convictions. The Irish 
public, misled by the pro-treatyite ‘traitors’, had strayed from the island’s true destiny of 
a united republic. Yet, despite this apparent dogmatic indifference to popular feeling, and 
although the organisation has always been imbued with those militarists that see the level 
of popular support as immaterial, it will be argued that the str ategy of the organisation 
as a whole has in fact been affected by its level of support. Moreover, it is asserted that 
the organisation has made conscious attempts to mobilise support for its cause. Not only 
has the group been concerned with generating a popular following but it has also utilised 
the ballot box to tap perceived elevation in support. This chapter will examine the effect 
that the level of popular support, both fr om its core constituency and from the public at 
large, and the changes in these levels, has had on IRA strategy and more particularly on 
its attitude to engagement with the conventional electoral system.
Above all the IRA has been concerned with maintaining the support of its ‘core 
constituency’ -  that is it’s regular passive and active supporters. It has at different times 
also, as the self-appointed defenders of the Catholic population, been engaged in courting 
the sympathy of the whole minority population in Northern Ireland. Crenshaw has noted 
the need for terTorists’ means to be appropriate for their ends.^  ^The IRA, as a ‘secular’
MacSwiiiey, M., quoted in The Politics O f Illusion. A Political History O f The IRA, by Patterson, H., 
Serif Publishers, London, 1997, p. 29.
For example, see op. cit. Bowyer Bell, J., p. 277. IRA men Cronin and Murphy were unimpressed by 
Sinn Fein’s success in the 1955 election, ‘needing no further evidence than the courage o f their 
convictions’ for the justification o f the cause. Also ‘for [Marion] Price (cited in Cowan, R., ‘I have no 
regrets’. Guardian newsunlimited, website http://\wvw.newsunlimited.co.itlc/nireland. March 13^ ' 2003), 
popularity is no measure o f the legitimacy o f a cause. ‘The majority o f Irish people have never supported 
the republican cause,’ she admits. ‘Most are not willing to make the sacrifices it requires. But as long as 
there is a British presence in Ireland there will always be justification.”
Op. cit. Crenshaw p. 28.
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gl'oup, will therefore by definition try not to alienate the Catholic public, evident by its 
target selection of security forces along with British symbols and figures, and its 
admission of ‘mistakes’. Price, writing in the Conflict Studies }own\Si\ of 1974, stated that 
‘Public revulsion at indiscriminate killings has often compelled the Provisionals to re­
think their tactics and the most consistent targets over the past two years have been the 
SF [security forces] and the British public’*^ , and more subsequently Eamon Collins 
wrote that:
‘The IRA -  regardless of their public utterances dismissing the condemnations of 
their behaviour fiom church and community leaders -  tried to act in a way that would 
avoid censure from within the nationalist community; they loiew they were operating 
within a sophisticated set of informal instructions on their behaviour, no less powerful 
for being largely unspoken.’
By attempting not to alienate the Catholic public in this way (or at least by limiting its 
admonishment through apparently tiying to limit civilian casualties) this has potentially 
facilitated a more political route.^^
According to Coogan, the IRA was in fact concerned with attracting ‘a sympathetic 
civilian population’ as early as 1924, though the 1920s largely saw the disgruntled group
Price, P., ‘Ulster: Consensus and Coercion, S.F. Attrition Tactics’, Conflict Studies. No. 50, 1974, p. 15.
Collins, E., Killing Rage. Granta, London, 1997, p. 295.
As compared with a ‘religious’ or ‘apocalyptic’ tenorist group, where the notion that ‘if  you’re not with 
us you’re against us’ prevails. Because the objectives o f these groups are beyond what governments or 
states can gi ant the level o f popular support outside the gr oup is iiTelevant. They are not looking for any 
material or secular gain that could be achieved with a degree o f popular support. Indiscriminate violence, 
therefore, would not be an inappropriate means to the ends that such groups are seeking, whereas it would 
be for the IRA.
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divorced from conventional politics through disillusionment with politicians and their 
‘betrayals’. Indeed, it was the continuing ‘depletion of popular support’ (thiough the 
policy of abstentionism) that prompted de Valera to break away from Sinn Fein and foim 
Fianna Fail^\ By the 1930s the IRA had revived an ideological stiand -  republican 
socialism - to also address the problem of dropping support. It was the reemergence of 
this ti'adition that, to the suspicions of the militarists in the movement, became 
synonymous with a more conventional political strategy. While embracing left wing 
dogma was tantamount to engaging in politics the underlying reason for political 
involvement was the desire to generate a wider public following for the national object 
through a political ideology that the IRA had hitherto been lacking. The new architect, 
Peader O’Donnell, a genuine proponent of socialism, was aware of the dangers of the 
creed being hijacked for pragmatic reasons: ‘For O’Donnell, social discontent was not 
something that an existing republican leadership could use for its own purposes. 
Nevertheless, according to one assessment this is precisely what was happening:
‘It was fairly clear that the IRA could not continue to live on its original base. The 
number of people who are prepared to imperil their lives and fortunes for the 
difference between the existing state ... and a Republic ... is negligible ... The 
men who wished to keep the IRA alive had therefore to look around for support 
springing from some other motives than the traditions of Irish independence and 
they found support in the widespread movement against the system of private 
property and enterprise.
Op. cit. Patterson p. 34.
Ibid. pp. 36-7.
22 Ibid. p. 54.
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Patterson argues that "'for the mainstream o f the IRA leadership ... O’Donnell’s re-coding 
of republicanism in the language of class struggle held out the possibility of enlisting new 
masses for traditional objectives.’^ '* (italics added) The organisation as a whole, with the 
exception of the 1960s, has not fully embraced Marxist ideology beyond the stated aim of 
a ‘united socialist republic’. It did, however, see the potential in left wing dogma for the 
mobilisation of support for a united Ireland.
The depression of the 1930s enhanced this opportunity. ‘The predominant tendency in the 
IRA’, argues Patterson, ‘looked to the annuities movement and to the intensification of 
problems of unemployment and agiicultural depression as the material from which ‘a 
second round’ could be engineered. ... It was in many ways a land war disguised as a 
national s t ru g g le .T h e  new direction met with some success according to an IRA 
document which described ‘an amazing resurgence’ with ‘several companies and 
battalions [having] doubled and tiebled their stiength.’^  ^ The desire to court popular 
support, as with future IRA generations, had led the IRA to emphasise the ‘socialism’ 
aspect of its ideology, which in turn was synonymous with engagement in politics 
(O’Donnell’s influence had led to the foimation of Saor Eire in 1931 and the Republican 
Congress in 1934 [though the latter without the Army Council’s blessing], Cuman 
Poblachta na h-Eirean was established by the IRA as a response to the Congiess).
Marxism in the IRA, however, was always a risky venture. To many ‘militarists’ in the 
movement (the IRA has rarely been a monolithic organisation in its strategic outlook)
2^  Ibid. p. 56. 
22 Ibid. p. 54. 
2® Ibid. p. 55.
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politics has been seen as anathema. More significantly, however, and as noted earlier, the 
new ideology was flawed by a number of contradictions. Firstly, ‘atheist’ communism 
was anathema to the Catholic community that it was part of and claimed to protect. In 
fact, under IRA regulations members could not be communists.^^ Secondly, it ignored the 
fact that, as Rose points out, the sources of tension in ‘Northern’ society (evident in the 
sectarian riots of the 1930s) emanate from religious divisions and not class ones.^  ^
Thirdly, and this was to become increasingly relevant in subsequent generations, socialist 
credentials were hardly an asset when drumming up support for the republican movement 
in the United States, particularly after the Second World War and the emergence of the 
Cold War with communist Russia.
In the 1930s it was the first of these contradictions that led to attacks from the Catholic 
Church and community for espousing an anti-Catholic ideology.^^ This, along with De 
Valera’s victory limited the appeal of republican socialism (Soar Eire had largely been a 
response to Cosgrave’s ‘repressive regime’). Fianna Fail’s rise to power promised the 
realisation of many of the IRA’s objectives but the latter was concerned that much of its 
support was sapped by the new ‘republican’ administiation. The desire to retain it was 
temporarily satisfied through the emergence of Eoin O’Duffy’s ‘Blueshirts’ and so ‘Irish 
fascism represented the issue that would allow the IRA to take the initiative against de 
Valera’s increasingly successful incoiporation of its constituency.
22 Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie, p.58. 
2® Op. cit. Rose p. 285.
2® See op. cit. Patterson pp. 59-60. 
2° Ibid. pp. 63-4.
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Despite the failure of the 1930s political projects, even if the IRA wanted to distance 
itself from ‘lefties’, it nevertheless aclaiowledged that the main reason behind the failure 
of Sean Russell’s bombing campaign of 1939 was its inability to harness popular support, 
and it was the desire to remedy this that was the major factor behind the adoption of Sinn 
Fein as its political front. This step did not in any way represent moderation on the part of 
the IRA, for the group had decided in 1948 to prepare for another military campaign.^* 
Neither was it another attempt to rejuvenate republican socialism. Sinn Fein was adopted 
as a front for a stiategy of violence, seiving as a mouthpiece for the aimed struggle. 
Patterson notes that ‘most IRA members were, of course, little interested in social 
philosophy, Maixist, Catholic or otherwise. Most would have been practising Catholics 
with no time for politics, particularly if they were tainted by ‘communism’ (a ‘capacious 
teim’ in post-war Ireland)’. They were dedicated to ‘reunification by physical force’.
The impressive showing at the polls in 1955 provided the IRA with the popular support 
that they had sought to generate and was seen as giving them the popular mandate and 
moral authority for the use of force.^  ^But ‘as the futile campaign sputtered on, producing 
only internment ... and a massive mobilisation of the police and 13,000 B Specials, 
interest and sympathy evaporated.’^ '* By 1959 the Sinn Fein vote had slumped. As a front 
for the IRA and as the voice for a stiategy of violence, its electoral fortunes suffered a 
substantial drop. As part and parcel of the shategy of violence the political front sank 
with the failed Border campaign. The main reason for this failure in the aimed struggle,
2' Ibid. p. 86.
22 Ibid. p. 87.
22 Op. cit. Bowyer Bell p. 269.
2“* Op. cit. Patterson, p. 92.
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as the IRA itself admitted, was ‘the attitude of the general public’/^ If the stiaiggle were 
to continue a reassessment of republican strategy was needed and it was to be driven by 
the need to recoup lost support.
Cathal Goulding, under the influence of the left wing intellectual Roy Johnston, felt that 
the grievances of workers were being ignored and sought to revive the tradition of 
republican socialism. This would ultimately lead to a more political strategy once more 
but Sinn Fein would no longer be used as a propaganda tool that mobilised popular 
support for the armed struggle and the national object. Nor would there be a repeat of the 
1930s where left wing ideology was utilised by a pragmatic leadership to generate a 
wider following for national unification. The failure of the Border Campaign led to a 
reassessment that would ultimately attempt to lead the republican movement down the 
leftward path, away from Irish unification as the primary objective and eventually away 
fr om the aimed stmggle.
The new route became synonymous with a more political strategy much to the annoyance 
of the more tiaditional hardliners in the North. This approach, however, did not just entail 
‘developing Sinn Fein, involving members in social, economic and civil rights 
campaigns’^ ® but also led to the whole movement becoming politicised. According to 
Patterson by May 1966 ‘little progress had been made in developing Sinn Fein as a 
relatively independent political organisation and most educational work was being canied 
out inside the IRA.’^  ^This meant that the nature of the relationship between Sinn Fein
22 op. cit. Bowyer Bell p. 334. 
2® Op, cit. Patterson p. 151.
22 Ibid. p. 106.
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and the IRA had changed and was very different to that of the subsequent PSF and PIRA. 
At this time Sinn Fein was no longer the propaganda tool for a strategy of violence, but 
was swept along behind the IRA leadership’s preoccupation with Mai-xism and the 
ultimate recession of the use of violence. Its utility was restr icted by the fact that the 
whole movement was becoming more political. The divisions between Dublin and the 
Northern brigades of the IRA culminated in a split over the decision by the Special IRA 
Convention in December 1969 to end abstention and send elected Sinn Fein candidates to 
the parliaments in Dublin, Belfast and London. Edgar O’Ballance wrote that since the 
1930s there were two distinct pressure groups within the IRA, one for military action and 
the other ‘that somehow wants to associate itself with the people in a communist 
m anner .The  1969 split represented the largest rupture to date between the two.
Left wing ideology had taken hold in what was to become the ‘Official’ movement and 
this was synonymous with a greater political strategy through Sinn Fein but not this time 
as the means to mobilise support for the national cause but with genuine conviction for a 
communist triumph prior to unification. Sinn Fein’s role was transformed into mobilising 
support to that end:
‘Thus the 1967 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, in line with a previous decision by the August 
IRA gathering, amended the party’s constitution to define its aim as the establishment 
of a Socialist Republic. That year would also see the organisation establish a number 
of citizens’ advice bureaux and, most importantly, the Dublin Housing Action 
Committee, which quickly mobilised a considerable popular constituency through a
O’Ballance, ‘IRA Leadership Problems’, Willcinson, P. (ed.), British Perspectives On Terrorism. Allen
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campaign which focused on the contrast between the housing crisis and the 
unprecedented level of office building in the city.’^ ^
The new ‘Provisional’ movement, however, continued to use Sinn Fein as the propaganda 
tool for violence. Developments from 1969 onwards created an environment that ensured 
that the role of the political ‘front’ in the early 1970s was restricted to that of 
spokesperson for the continuing aimed struggle.
The Provisionals set about transforming a conflict that revolved around the demand for 
civil rights within the United Kingdom into a call for the end of any connection with 
Westminster - for the ‘Troubles’ did not evolve from the British presence in Northern 
Ireland but from the denial of Catholic civil rights by a sectarian unionist regime. As 
Kelley states ‘hardly anyone in heland was then [August 1969] conducting a serious anti­
partition campaign’.'*® This is crucial to explaining the fall in popular support for the IRA 
and its strategy of violence in the 1970s as reforms increasingly addressed Catholic 
grievances. Economic and civil rights remedies that addressed the true nature of the 
discontent in Northern Ireland undermined the appeal of unification, echoing times past 
when John Dillon (a dominant anti-Pamellite of the 1890s) feared settlement of the land 
question would reduce support the Irish peasants would give to nationalism.'** Fearing the 
Land Act, he believed ‘.. .that the land trouble is a weapon in nationalist hands and that to 
settle it finally would be to risk Home Rule, which otherwise must come.’'*^ Likewise 
once unionist prejudice in housing, jobs and political representation dissipated the IRA’s
and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 77.
2^  Op. cit. Patterson p. 113.
Kelley, K., The Longest War. Northern Ireland and the IRA. Zed Press, London, 1982, p. 122.
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support dropped. The vast majority of Catholics had wanted a say in Northern Ireland, 
they didn’t want to destroy it.'*^
At the beginning of the 1970s, however, popular support for the Provisional IRA did not 
derive from any left wing sympathies but from the nature of the loyalist, unionist and 
state response to the civil rights marches in the province (see chapters 8 and 9). This 
increased level of support for the organisation did not, however, lead to the greater 
utilisation of its political front. Provisional Sinn Fein. This was because the perceived 
impendirrg physical threat to the Catholic population did not require politics or diplomacy 
but physical protection and the Provisionals were there to provide it.'*'* It was the 
wholehearted backing of the Catholic ‘ghettos’ in the early days of the conflict that was a 
key ingredient for a successful strategy of violence alone, with the Provisional Sinn 
Fein’s role restricted to ‘performing propaganda work on behalf of the IRA.’'*^ This high 
level of popular support and the surge in recruits and resources that it brought about 
helped the organisation to believe that victory was ‘just around the comer’'*® and that they 
were engaged in a short war.
Popular suppori, then, evident through both increased recruitment and resources, did 
indeed lead to the perceived success in the use of violence and dictated that the IRA
Bew, P., Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland. Clarendon, Oxford, 1987, p. 16.
2^ Ibid. p. 102.
'*2 This is notwithstanding groups like People’s Democracy and figures like Michael Fanell who sought 
revolution rather than reform (see op, cit. Rose p. 159).
There was a genuine belief that the Catholic area o f Short Stiand ‘would have been razed that night’ were 
it not for the IRA along with ‘Citizens’ Defence Associations’ (see Taylor, P., Provos. The IRA And Sinn 
Fein. Bloomsbury, London, 1997, p. 77). Nevertheless, the idea that the IRA were ‘community protectors’ 
in general is questionable (see note 2).
“^2 Op. cit. Kelly p. 127,
Meehan M. (IRA commander in 1975), quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 135
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should continue with its violence alone strategy. Patterson argues that the post 1969 
influx of recruits ‘soon ensured the Provisionals an easy numerical predominance’.'*^  The 
Lower Falls curfew, the imposition of internment without trial and Bloody Sunday (see 
chapter 8) all enhanced Catholic support for the gi’oup. With the establishment of the 
ghettos the ‘volunteers’ did not even have to stay in hiding or conceal their identity. As 
Kelley remarks:
‘The guerrillas made no pretence of being an elitist avant-garde. In those early 
days, practically everyone in a Catholic neighbourhood loiew who was involved 
with the ‘ra’ .. .Very few people would even consider informing on these children, 
uncles, fathers, wives, sisters, cousins, brothers-in-law, friends, comrades. IRA 
volunteers were widely respected for their courage and patriotism, and they were 
not looked upon as any kind of alien or menacing force that had been imposed on 
the community ...the guerillas were well protected by their communities and 
could not be readily identified by any outsider.’'*^
The IRA, it seemed was emerging ‘as the anny of the Catholic people.’'*^
It was the high level of popular support for the IRA in the early 1970s, therefore, that led 
to the emergence of the Catholic ghettos which in turn led to what was one of Sinn Fein’s 
earliest roles -  that of vigilantism or what has been termed as ‘community policing’. As 
the security forces of the state were increasingly seen as unacceptable, untiustworthy and
‘'2 Op. cit. Patterson p. 145. 
Op. cit. Kelley p. 141.
O’Brien, C., States Of Ireland. Anchor Press, London, 1972, p. 280.
214
unwelcome by republican communities it was the IRA that willingly®® and increasingly 
implemented an alternative law and justice system, that involved punishment beatings 
and shootings as the means to deal with not just social nuisances but those who would 
dare to stand up to the gioup. As Silke maintains (in chapter 6) the coordination of 
vigilante activity has been one of Sinn Fein’s most important roles. The political front 
was very much the first point of contact for those who had a giievance, whether it be for 
burglary, joy riding or any other ‘social’ nuisance that the state’s police force would 
noimally deal with.
Not everyone agi'eed that the ‘volunteers’ were regarded with such esteem by Catholics. 
Connor Cruise O’Brien argued that ‘most people, while resentful of the British Army 
[before Bloody Sunday] seemed still to shiinlc from the ferocity of the IRA and were 
shocked by certain actions.’®* In the Republic, he suggests, anti-IRA feeling hardened 
quickly, even after Deny [Bloody Sunday], and on the lO**’ March the IRA announced a 3 
day ‘truce’ apparently ‘conscious of the trend of public opinion.’ ®^ Bishop and Mallie 
also state that by the Spring of 1972 Catholic attitudes to the IRA began to change with 
‘the sympathy [it] had gained after internment... wearing off .®^
Sean MacStiofain, however, recollects that in the Spring of 1972 the IRA was ‘in the best 
state it had been for fifty years in terms of men, ammunition, equipment and morale ... 
we were winning’®'*. This may have been more a reflection of the previous couple of
2*^ Republican ‘community policing’ has also been ideologically compatible and useful for the IRA as it 
sustains its view that the state’s junsdiction in Northern Ireland is illegitimate (see state response chapter). 
2’ Op. cit. O’Brien p. 279.
22 Ibid. pp. 285-6.
22 Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 221.
2‘* Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 135.
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years support that had paid dividends in terms of recruits and resources, rather than 
Catholic opinion at the time. Nevertheless, the perception was that the IRA had the 
support of the Catholic community in what they did. In summary, Sinn Fein’s role was 
therefore restricted for two reasons. Initially, the Catholic population, rightly or wrongly, 
feared for their immediate safety and so turned to the ‘ra’ for ‘defence’, and secondly the 
resources and recruits that emanated from this support were key factors in a successful 
strategy of violence alone with no need for réévaluation (as in the 1930s or 1960s) that 
might involve greater utilisation of ‘politics’. A ‘short war’ would mean that politics was 
for the time being unnecessary and iiTelevant, though, as noted above, this did not mean 
that the political front did not have other important functions.®®
As the conflict continued PIRA continued to be aware of public opinion. As Price argued 
above the ‘public revulsion at indiscriminate killings has often compelled the 
Provisionals to re-think their tactics and the most consistent targets (over the past two 
years [ie. up to 1974]) have been the SF [security forces] and the British public.’®® 
However discriminate the apparent target selection was supposed to be by the end of 
1974 the organisation was getting increasingly unpopular, even in the ghettos.®  ^Certainly 
the removal of the perceived threat of imminent loyalist pogroms and a more successful 
state response in dealing with the IRA led to a decline in the support base of the gioup, 
evident in the shortage of recruits by 1976.®®
22 Its propaganda and ‘community policing’ roles, for example. As noted above little emphasis on a 
political stiategy did not necessarily mean a redundant political front.
2® Op. cit. Price p. 15.
22 Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 269.
2^  See op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 213.
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It was the drop in popular support that was to be a crucial factor behind the Long War 
stiategy. Indeed, Patterson agrees that ‘one of Adams’ major concerns about the situation 
of the Provisionals ... was their growing isolation from the majority of people in the 
Catholic ghettos.’®^ Adams was worried that ‘the rate of attrition is increasing in 
Republican areas and the Brit news media is spreading stories to increase the confusion 
within the ghettos ... The Brit intends to isolate us from the people’ ®®. The ‘war 
machine’, therefore, needed to be suiTOunded by a ‘popular infrastructure’®*.
Wliereas the substantial degree of popular support had facilitated the IRA’s strategy in 
the early 1970s, the fall in this following also had repercussions. Once more it was the 
failure to sustain its level of support that had contiibuted to the perceived failure of a 
sti'ategy of violence alone. This led to a réévaluation that emphasised the need to mobilise 
a wider following for the IRA’s struggle. Once more, despite the recent memories of the 
Goulding ‘beti'ayal’, the Long War stiategy appeared to be an attempt to rejuvenate 
Marxism. In a speech written by Geny Adams and Danny Monison, Jimmy Dmmm, a 
senior republican, stated at the 1977 Wolfe Tone commemoration that the working class;
‘in the 26 counties’ needed to be mobilised and that ‘we need a positive tie-in 
with the mass of the Irish people ... We need to make a stand on economic issues 
and on the everyday stmggles of people. The forging of the strong links between 
the Republican movement and the workers of freland and radical trade unionists
2^  Op. cit. Patterson p. 190.
Adams G., quoted in Patterson op. cit. p. 191. 
®' Op. cit. Patterson p. 191.
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will create an iiTepressible mass movement and will ensure mass support for the 
continuing armed struggle in the North.
Whilst no doubt designed to stave off dropping support these left wing sentiments did not 
endure for long. If the organisation was to make progress in drumming up support in 
America and in the Catholic South overt socialism was out of the question. In 1984 
Adams stiessed the importance of American support ‘in the future when we will want 
international recognition for a new government of a new Irish s t a t e . I n  1986 he 
admitted ‘I don’t think socialism is on the agenda at all at this stage except for political 
activists of the left. What’s on the agenda now is an end to partition. You don’t even get 
near socialism until you have national independence.’^ '^
By the time that the hunger striker Bobby Sands was fighting the Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone by-election the IRA had failed to generate the popular support they had hoped to 
achieve through the Long War strategy. One supporter remarked that ‘the limitations of 
the Provisionals’ campaign had become evident. It was now seen by larger and larger 
sections of the ghetto population as getting nowhere, more and more out of conti'ol and a 
source of unnecessary hardship .Sands’ victory, however, was seen by the IRA as 
evidence of substantial support for the republican movement and the aimed struggle, 
although the truth is many voters may have had other motives. Sands’ canvassers had 
campaigned on the basis that a vote for him was a humanitarian one, not a vote for the
Drumm, J., quoted in op. cit. Patterson p. 180.
Adams G., quoted in ‘W e’ve Got the Spectators Involved’, Newsweek. January 16^, 1984. 
^  Op. cit. Patterson p. 205.
Foley G (IRA supporter in the mid 1970s), quoted in Patterson op. cit. p. 192.
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Moreover, he was nominated as an H Block candidate, not as a Sinn Fein one and, 
with no SDLP candidate to vote for, some Catholics simply wanted to register a vote 
against the unionists. O’Brien wrote in The Observer newspaper the following June:
‘People didn’t vote for the IRA: they voted for a humanitarian resolution of the H 
Block situation. They voted for Sands, not in his aspect as an officer in an 
organisation which had been systematically murdering their Protestant neighbours, 
but in his aspect as a suffering victim, in order to save his life. Also they didn’t vote 
for Sands; they voted against Hany West. They voted according to their tradition, for 
the Catholic candidate to keep the Protestant out.’^^  (writer’s italics)
The important thing as far as IRA strategy was concerned was that, despite these caveats, 
the group, with some justification, perceived the vote as a moral mandate for the use of 
violence. The prospect of tapping and even developing this support was the key factor 
behind the ‘bullet and ballot box’ strategy of the early 1980s and the subsequent removal 
of abstentionism from the Dublin parliament in 1986. The 1980s saw an unprecedented 
role for Sinn Fein as the political fiont for the republican movement, primarily because 
the republican leadership saw the opportunity of mobilising support for the national cause 
both North and South of the border. The desire to utilise and mobilise further popular 
support was key to the gi'eater utilisation of the political front as an electoral tool.
The IRA has long claimed to represent the Catholic population, especially after their 
‘defensive’ role in the early 1970s. This has meant that they had everything to lose by
“  Op. cit. Proves p. 241.
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putting this assertion to the test, paiticularly when the reality was that it would be 
disproved by the SDLP, and not much to gain because they had in any case already 
claimed to represent the minority commimity. A longstanding reason, therefore, for the 
IRA’s refusal to adopt an electoral strategy has been fear of failure.*"^  The ‘risk of 
humiliation’ was too great to take part in the district council Assembly elections of 1973 
despite resentment that the SDLP was talcing all of the nationalist vote.^  ^In the late 1970s 
‘even the most militant supporters of ‘active’ republicanism shrank from the possibility 
of electoral rejection’ while Sinn Fein were concerned about the repurcussions of a 
Sands defeat in the Femianagh and South Tyrone by election/^ The ti'uth was that up to 
1981 most republicans knew that their proclamations, claiming to receive public support 
from the Catholic population, bore no relation to reality.
That is until Sands’ victoiy. In the end ‘it took the unwelcome initiative of the prisoners 
in starting a hunger stiike for political status to force a reluctant leadership into electoral 
pol it ics.Sands’ success conquered the IRA’s fear of losing at the ballot box and the 
organisation now believed that it could credibly claim to represent a substantial 
constituency, a claim that they would have found difficult to substantiate in the past. 
Adams aclmowledged that ‘the political campaign is important ... because it shows the 
size of Sinn Fein’s and the IRA’s support. Before that, the IRA was dismissed as a ‘tiny 
group of criminals,
O’Brien, C.C., ‘A choice o f  risks in Ulster’, The Obseiver. June 7th 1981.
This was confiimed by Belfast Sinn Fein councillor Michael Browne (interview).
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 265.
™ Op. cit. Patterson p. 193.
See Bew, P., and Gillespie, G., Northern Ireland. A Chronologv Of The Troubles. Gill and Macmillan, 
Dublin, 1999, p. 147.
Op. cit. Patterson p. 193.
Adams, G., quoted in Clifton, T., ‘We’ve Got the Spectators Involved’, Newsweek. January 16th 1984,
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The problem, however, for Sinn Fein was that this level of support had to be sustained. 
Any fall in the republican vote would undermine the (in any case spurious) claim that the 
IRA represented the Catholic population. Electoral success, therefore, had to be sustained 
if there was not to be a further réévaluation of republican strategy. Failures at the ballot 
box would serve to strengthen the hand of those within the movement who disapproved 
of any kind of ‘politics’ and would thus undeimine the political front. Danny Morrison’s 
defeat in the European election was just such a setback '^  ^ and one report suggested that 
the IRA was ‘riddled with dissent since the elections to the European Parliament... when 
their vote collapsed’ Whereas popular support for the republican movement generated 
by the hunger strikes had prompted it to adopt the electoral route, any decline in 
following would also have had ramifications on stiategy and put pressure on this more 
‘political’ path.^ *)
John Hume’s New Ireland Forum and the Anglo-Irish agreement that it spawned (see 
chapter 8) did hamper Sinn Fein’s electoral performance leading some in the movement 
to further question the efficacy of ‘politics’. Y e t  ultimately the political experiment was 
always thieatened by the contradictions of the dual-track strategy. The support that Sinn 
Fein hoped to sustain and develop was increasingly undermined by IRA violence and 
especially by its ‘mistakes’. Atrocities such as those of HaiTods, Enniskillen and 
Wanington caused public outrage that inevitably cost Sinn Fein votes. It was a no win 
situation for the party. ‘Mistakes’ and civilian casualties would cost votes, electoral
See op. cit. Bew and Gillespie p. 181.
Ryder, C., ‘The hawks win internal IRA power struggle’, Sunday Times. September 9*** 1984. 
5*^1990.
See McKittiick, D., ‘Poll defeats push republicans towards greater violence’, The Independent. February
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decline would strengthen the hand of the traditional ‘militarists’ to pursue further 
violence, and this would put yet more pressure on the political stiategy.
The contradictions between the two tracks of republican strategy were to become evident 
to Adams himself and it was this realisation that led to strains within the movement and 
was ultimately to see moderation in the movement’s attitude towards the use of violence. 
The tensions were manifest in Adams’ repeated warnings to his fellow republicans that 
civilian deaths at the hands of the IRA threatened the electoral fortunes of Sinn Fein^ ,^ 
which had declined by 1989, and thwarted his objective of broadening the support base of 
the movement. To some though, wrote Mary Holland at the time, IRA bombs and its 
‘mistakes’, such as the killing of sixteen year old Charles Love in January 1990, were a 
reminder that the military ‘wing’ would not be dictated to by Adams and his ‘political’ 
cohorts, and that Sinn Fein very much remained the junior ‘wing’ of the movement.^^ 
While the desire to tap and mobilise popular support had brought the political dimension 
to fruition, and was certainly fundamental in the movement’s gi'eater use of Sinn Fein, it 
was not going to be allowed to have the type of impact that would have permitted the 
political front to eclipse the ‘army’.
The movement has never seen, and possibly still doesn’t see, democratic politics as the 
way to do business. Certainly, in the 1980s it did not have enough faith in politics as the 
means to achieve its goals. It therefore did not gamble on giving Sinn Fein anything but a 
subordinate role in case the movement became victim to electoral defeat or ‘broken
Such as Adams’ fomier prison ally Ivor Bell, and Ruaivi O Bradaigh, who evenhially left the mainstream 
movement (over its decision to abandon its policy o f abstention from the Irish Dail) to fonn Republican
Sinn Fein.
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promises’ from ‘deceitful politicians’. The Army Council therefore ensured that the 
military machine remained intact and veiy much the ascendant partner. As John Hume 
noted ‘the real power in the republican movement lay with the IRA’s Aimy Council. This 
position was maintained for as long as it seemed possible that the Hillsborough 
Agieement (the Anglo-Irish Agreement) would seriously erode Sinn Fein’s support 
base.’ ®^
Sinn Fein’s conference of 1991 was ‘subdued’ through its loss of support^  ^ -  the very 
support that had given the party its elevated role. Such was the frustration with the effect 
of IRA actions on electoral performance that ‘a certain distancing’ from ‘some types of 
IRA violence ... [was] thought helpful. After the IRA’s attack on Musgrave Park 
Hospital in November 1991, David McKittrick wrote:
‘The attack within a hospital is also further confirmation that the IRA has become 
increasingly heedless to public opinion and is prepared to contemplate actions that 
some years ago its leaders would have rejected as politically counter-productive.’^ ^
Such attacks could not continue if Adams’ ‘political’ ambitions were to be realised. The 
IRA militarists may have been uncomfortable with the growing influence of the 
‘politicos’ but it seemed that they had a choice -  to become increasingly isolated fr om the 
Catholic population whom they puiported to defend and who they had relied on for 
support in the past, or to give Adams’ stiategy a chance.
See ‘Killing of civilians alienates voters, Adams warns IRA’, Independent. 30* January 1989.
Holland, M., ‘Act o f heartbreaking folly in Derry’, The Irish Times. January 3 1990.
Op. cit. Patterson p. 200.
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It soon became clear that if the group wanted to bring Irish unification any nearer then it 
could not simply brush aside adverse Catholic reaction - not only to its ‘mistakes’, but 
also to its hoirific new tactic. Peter Taylor argues that the use of the ‘human bomb’ by the 
IRA in 1990:
‘increased a groundswell for peace that the IRA could not ignore. After twenty years 
of ‘war’, it was becoming increasingly clear that a considerable section of the 
community on which the Provisionals relied for their support, and whom they had 
originally come into existence to defend, had had enough. By actions such as this and 
the revulsion they provoked within the community, the IRA inadvertently 
strengthened the hand of those within the Republican Movement who argued that an 
alternative route to ‘armed struggle’ had to be found ... [Martin McGuinness 
believed] that the ‘war’ had to be just and supported by the people on whose behalf it 
was being fought.
Thus, popular support or lack of it, real or perceived, had helped lead to a réévaluation of 
strategy in the 1960s, had helped to detemiine a strategy of violence alone in the early 
seventies, had contiibuted to the notion of a ‘Long War’ in the mid seventies, had led to a 
more political strategy in the early 1980s and had increasingly pressurised the IRA to end 
their campaign of violence by the 1990s.
McKittiick, D., ‘Sinn Fein faces future beseiged by self-doubt’, The Independent. 4* February 1991. 
McKittrick, D., ‘IRA turns its back on public opinion’. The Independent. 4* November 1991.
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 317.
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The failed campaign of 1956-62 led to a reappraisal of IRA stiategy that sought to recoup 
popular support, although this was ultimately not to be for national unification as the 
main priority. Although the polarization of the conflict in the early 1970s militated 
against ‘politics’ the political front’s ‘community policing’ role did (and continues to), 
represent, at least to some degree, the desire of republican communities to have an 
alternative law and order or vigilante system, primarily to deal with ‘social nuisances’. It 
was the fear of being isolated from the community that prompted Gerry Adams to launch 
the so-called ‘Long War’ strategy that was to entail a much more substantial role for the 
IRA’s political front and it was the desire to tap perceived existing support after the 
Sands by-election victory that prompted an even greater role for Sinn Fein, this time as an 
electoral tool.
At the same time Sinn Fein failures such as losing West Belfast in the 1992 election, 
according to Rick Wilford, meant that there was no doubt ‘that the politicos in the 
movement will cede to those more intent on the continuing or indeed the escalating use of 
violence.Popular support that had prompted the movement to use the electoral route 
was followed by a decline in support that, conversely, led some republicans to question 
the political project. In the end Adams’ stiategy survived, though not without the splits of 
1986 and 1997.
To this day Sinn Fein has been utilised to generate greater popular support through the 
ballot box, not only in Northern fteland but also in the Irish Republic. Wliile it managed 
to eclipse the SDLP for the first time in the Westminster election of 2001, it also
Wilford, R., quoted in op. cit. Patterson p. 238.
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campaigned energetically in the South in 2002 to secure five seats in the Irish Dail. There 
are a number of reasons for this electoral success. Although Sinn Fein has gained the 
reputation for being the hardest working party on the ground, mobilising support and 
dealing with local issues, it has been the legitimacy accorded to the republican movement 
through the peace process (see chapter 8) that has been fundamental in bringing about 
gi'eater support for the party. The sponsorship of Sinn Fein by the British, Irish and 
American governments (see chapter 9) has had a telling effect. Westminster’s desire to 
keep republicans on board the peace process has given the party the mantle of being the 
‘tough lawyer’ for the Catholic community (as opposed to the ‘weaker’ SDLP) while the 
highly prestigious tiips to the White House by Sinn Fein leaders have shown the 
electorate where the real influence lies in teims of reaping benefits for the minority 
population (see chapter 9).
This thesis argues that popular support, despite ideological claims, has been the most 
significant of the variables behind the use of the IRA’s political front, whether or not this 
gi'eater utility has represented a sign of moderation towards the use of violence. Indeed, 
the adoption itself of Sinn Fein in 1948 by the IRA was to generate a wider following. 
Popular support continues to be of key importance to the group and this is evident in Sinn 
Fein’s continuing role in vigorously mobilising support in both the Irish Republic and 
Northern Ireland.
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The Loyalist Groups
This thesis argues that one of the main motivations for the use of loyalist political fronts 
has been to give worlcing class loyalism representation, especially after it had been 
‘manipulated’ by ‘respectable’ politicians. It is in this respect that one could argue that 
these political fronts were established to tap perceived existing support or at least a 
potential constituency of support, although, of course, the electoral forays of these fronts 
failed miserably. Through the desire to represent working class loyalists perhaps it should 
come as no surprise that some of these fronts exhibited socialist credentials as against the 
‘right wing’ unionism that had ‘let loyalists down’.
Indeed, in the case of the UDA it was so interwoven in teims of structure and 
membership with the Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW) that one might have 
expected that any electoral engagement by the former would have automatically supplied 
it with a ready made electoral base. This wasn’t to be the case for the many reasons 
outlined in chapter 9. The UVF’s Progiessive Unionist Party also saw itself as 
representing the working class. The whole problem with socialism was the perception 
within unionism as a whole (see chapter 9) that it was something that Catholics did -  
through the Social and Democratic Labour Party and the ‘communist’ IRA and this is one 
of the reasons, in a religiously divided society, that attempts to utilise their working class 
credentials at the ballot box met with little success. Nevertheless, the desire to tap 
perceived popular support or to give the loyalist worldng class political representation 
was a fundamental reason for the emergence of the loyalist political fronts.
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The UDA
There is no doubt that from its creation the Ulster Defence Association had close links 
with the Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW). Indeed, Boulton went as far as to 
suggest that LAW was, in effect, the UDA’s political wing.^  ^The latter was a working 
class body that took on the structure of the local union. As McAuley stated in chapter 4 
‘it is important to note that the paramilitary groups, and the subsequent community 
gi'oups developed from the same base. Often they relied upon the same people and drew 
upon the same physical sti'ucture.’*^  Thus the popular support base, and potential 
electoral base, of the UDA stemmed fr om these links as well as from, to a lesser extent, 
those that they had ‘defended’ in the early days of the Troubles.
Nevertheless, the UDA did not take on the hue of a revolutionary vanguard movement 
that sought to overthrow their unionist establishment. Nor was it one that sought to 
challenge the political status quo. That is because the allegiance of working class loyalists 
was still to the Protestant government, such was the sectarian nature of the division in 
Northern Ireland (see chapter 9). As such there was initially no desire to seek political 
representation other than that that constitutional unionism provided.
Despite this the signs that the UDA were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the 
tiaditional arrangement between worlcing class loyalists and constitutional unionism were 
there. As early as 1972 the UDA chaimian, ‘as if to underline the UDA’s continuing class
Boulton, D., The UVF 1966-73. An Anatomy O f Loyalist Rebellion, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1973, 
p. 176.
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independence’, warned that ‘people are beginning to ‘catch on’ about the Unionist 
government. The ordinary man is starting to think for himself about the fifty years of
mismle that he did have’.^ ^
There is little doubt that the class factor played a role in the ultimate utilisation of 
political fronts by the UDA. If its membership was going to be used and abused then it 
had to find its own political representation. But not only was there opposition from 
outside the UDA to its left of centre leanings but any radical, left wing sentiments were 
too much for many of those within the UDA. As McAuley noted above, the ‘reaction to 
this developing ‘class-conscious’ line of argument was rapid, dramatic and bloody’.®^ 
Therefore, anything that sounded remotely like revolutionary left wing politics was 
stamped out. Boulton states that;
‘1972 ended with a new flare-up of ideological warfare within the UDA. Early in 
October an army patrol had stopped a car containing ‘Duke’ Ernie Elliot, 
‘Lieutenant-Colonel’ of Woodvale. Searching the car, they found manuals on 
urban guerilla warfare and literature on Trotsky, Franz Fanon and Che Guevera. 
On 7 December, Elliot was found shot dead not far from his home, and the RUG 
made it known that they did not suspect the IRA. It was widely concluded, though 
without firm evidence, that Elliot, having identified himself with a left faction 
within the UDA, had been killed by a faction of the right.
^  McAuley, 1 , ‘Cuchullain and an RPG-7: the ideology and politics o f the Ulster Defence Association’, in 
Hughes, E., Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland. Open University Press, Bucldngham, 1991, p. 52.
Op. cit. Boulton p. 177.
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Nevertheless, there was frustration that the UDA, ‘which was largely responsible for the 
stoppage [of 1974], was unable to gain any political advantage from the street power that 
it had displayed. It watched as people like the Reverend Ian Paisley and William Craig 
pocketed the political g a i n s . A s  disillusionment with unionist politicians hit a peak 
after the failed strike of 1977 the UDA set up two organisations that were to try and 
address the problem of worldng class representation. The New Ulster Political Research 
Group fulfilled the realisation that any support would only be forthcoming if there was a 
fr esh approach to the problems of Northern Ireland and the Ulster Community Action 
Group was to represent grass roots loyalists by ‘[stiengthening] its position at the 
community level’.T heN U PR G ’s ‘Chairperson’ stated that:
‘The problem to date has been that the UDA has always relied on the established 
politicians to represent them politically. But we believe that over the last few 
years that representation hasn’t been reflecting the true feelings of grass-root 
people
John McMichael’s poor showing in a South Belfast by-election (where he secured just 
1.3% of the vote) illustrated that while the UDA may have been a mass organisation this 
was not reflected in the polls, and it was failures at the ballot box that undermined any 
subsequent ventures into politics.
Op. cit. McAuley p. 50.
Op. cit. Boulton p. 182.
Holland, J., ‘Dark side’s ascendance seals fate o f the UDP’, Irish Echo. December 12-18. 
Op. cit. McAuley p. 54.
Ibid.
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The roots of the establishment of the UDA’s political fronts, therefore, ‘lay in an intense 
feeling of frustr ation born of the realization that a section of the loyalist worldng class 
had no significant political role.’^  ^ This was equally true of Gary McMichaeTs Ulster 
Democratic Parly. While the state was paramount in giving the loyalist political fronts 
greater utility tlirough the ceasefires and the period leading up to the Good Friday 
Agreement,i t  was again the theme of loyalist representation that was the prime 
motivation in their use. Gary McMichael stated in the UDP’s Conference in 1997:
‘The UDP was created because the gr*assroots worldng class loyalist community 
had no voice and no honest representation. The major unionist parties were 
detached from the community and did little to project the interests of the loyalist 
people. They demanded its support and unquestioning loyalty but gave nothing in 
return. ... You see, we have a curious philosophy and that is that a political party 
is there to serwe the people -  not the other way around.
In summary, although the UDA had mass membership and was a working class body this 
did not guarantee electoral success if it chose to utilise a political front as an electoral 
tool. The division of labour ethos, traditional loyalties and the law abiding nature of 
unionism in general (see Chapter 9) meant that the perceived popular support generated 
by the UDA could never be transformed into political support and influence. The 
disorganised nature of the gi'oup and its primary preoccupation with organised crime and 
with maintaining individual fiefdoms also continually undermined the political front’s
Holland, J., ‘Dark side’s ascendance seals fate o f the UDP’, Irish Echo. December 12-18.
McMichael managed to win a seat on the Lisbuni district council in 1993 and the UDF polled 2.2% of 
the vote in the 1996 forum elections, but this success proved to be shortlived.
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efforts (see chapters 5 and 6). Despite these fundamental obstacles, the ‘popular support’ 
variable has been an important factor behind the foimation of the UDA’s political fronts. 
However, rather than representing a burning desire to mobilise support for its political 
objectives, the converse was the case. The motivation behind these fronts was to give 
political representation to the loyalist working classes, who were, so it was perceived, in 
need of it and who had been ‘let down’ by unionist politicians. While this aspiration 
prompted the use of these fronts as electoral bodies it has been the lack of electoral 
support that has militated against their use.
The UVF
The Progiessive Unionist Party was also borne of the disillusionment with unionist 
politicians following the 1974 strike and therefore it also sought to give political 
representation to the loyalist working classes. The PUP was, if anything, more socialist in 
orientation than the UDA’s political fronts. Such leanings were evident early on in the 
Troubles with a number of UVF men having been in the Northern Ireland Labour Party. 
Gusty Spence, who had reputedly been the leader of the group and who was in prison for 
the 1966 murder of Peter Ward, went through an apparent conversion to socialism in 
prison through his friendship with a member of the Official IRA.^  ^In 1972 he stated that 
‘our social conscience has to take as primacy the needs of the working class people’.
McMichael, G., Leader’s Address, UDP Conference, February 22“^  1997, Linen Hall Library, Belfast.
Patterson, H., inteiview.
See op. cit. Boulton p. 167.
Garland, R., Gusty Spence. Blackstaff, Belfast, 2001, p. 146. Spence later recalled tliat he had 
deliberately omitted to say loyalist working class people (p. 146).
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But Spence argued that his type of socialism wasn’t Marxist, Che Guevera or Trotskyite 
but more like ‘Democratic socialism’ modelled on the UK Labour P a r t y . I t  was 
‘motivated by the desire to build a ‘caring society
Although Spence had very tenuous links with the UVF leadership outside prison it was 
his ‘education seminars’ within that led the likes of David Eiwine and Billy Hutchison to 
thinlc more politically and become aware of ‘class politics’ and so it was these early 
roots that were to provide the political thinking behind the PUP.
The foimation of the PUP’s first forerunner, the Ulster Loyalist Front, in 1973 also 
reflected a left of centre political approach. Its declared aim was to:
‘express the views and opinions of giassroots Loyalists ... Its policies included a 
‘return to democracy’ and increased use of referenda, workers’ partnership 
schemes, and although in favour of private enteiprise it wanted to curb 
‘international monopoly capitalism’. Better seiwices for the old, the very young, 
the sick and disabled were called for, as well as changes in housing allocation and 
in educational structures.
As noted above the UVF was disillusioned with mainstream politicians who had 
‘misrepresented’ the loyalist working class and this was the main motivation behind the 
utilisation of their political fronts (see chapter 9). It was perhaps inevitable that the
Garland, R., Seeldng a political Accommodation. The Ulster Volunteer Force: Negotiating History, 
Shankhill Community Publication, 1997, p. 31.
Ibid.
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emerging class consciousness of loyalists should lead to a socialist analysis that sought to 
provide this hitherto ‘manipulated’ constituency with a political voice. The Volunteer 
Party, for example, intended to:
‘Concentrate its energies and resources in the pursuance of a constiuctive social 
and economic programme designed to bring about a better standard of living for 
the people of Northern Ireland ... to champion the cause of the ill-housed, the 
unemployed, the oppressed and the deprived. ’
The creation of the Independent Unionist gi'oiip in April 1978 was once again the 
‘manifestation of the desire of many working-class loyalists to create their own effective 
political representation’ and was again to focus on ‘social and economic issues’, a n d  
these have been recumng themes of the renamed PUP.^ ®^
Thus, in this sense, like those of the UDA, the UVF’s political fronts represented the 
desire to tap perceived existing support. Again like the UDA, however, these fronts have 
not been able to tiansform this perceived support into electoral success. While the 
Progiessive Unionist Party does have two MLAs in the Northern freland Assembly, 
David Ervine and Billy Hutchison, it has never managed to generate a wide following for 
the reasons outlined in chapter 9.
See op. cit. Garland, Gusty Spence pp. 174-5.
Op. cit. Garland, ‘Seeking a Political Accommodation’, p. 23.
McKee, S., ‘The Real Voice o f Ulster Loyalism? The Progiessive Unionist Party’, M Litt Dissertation, 
University o f Ulster, 1995, p. 7.
Ibid. p. 9.
McAuley, J., ‘Many Roads Forward: Politics and Ideology Within the PUP’, Etudes Irlandaises. Spring 
2000, p. 178.
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Conclusion
Despite claims from the 1920s that the IRA was indifferent to popular support the group 
has in fact been concerned with mobilising a wider following. Part of the reason for this 
is related to its republican socialist legacy that has formed part of its ideological make up. 
After the failure of the militarists in the 1920s Peader O’Donnell’s attempts to take the 
IRA down a more leftward path were manifested in Saor Eire and the Republican 
Congiess. After the failed Border Campaign of 1956-62, Marxist dogma once more came 
to the fore with the subsequent attempt to end the policy of abstention. The traditional 
fault line between those of a left wing disposition and those that concentrated on the 
national object through purely military means, culminating in the 1969 split, however, 
was to be replaced by new sources of friction over Adams’ political strategy.
This chapter has outlined the potential sources of support for the IRA should it have 
sought to mobilise it. First and foremost there has been a structural or fixed support for 
the IRA fi’om those that have seen partition as an illegitimate settlement and who have 
condoned the ‘armed struggle’. Beyond this has been a form of what might be termed 
latent sympathy from a broader group of Catholics for the tradition of revolt against the 
British that led to the birth of the Irish Free State (and then the Republic) in the first 
place. This sympathy was perpetuated by the real and perceived discriminatory practice 
of the Stormont regime since its inception in 1922. Thus, although the IRA was never 
likely to achieve a majority following (given that unionists and Protestants formed the 
majority of the populatiorr) there was a significant pool of potential support.
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This thesis argues that the IRA has indeed been concerned with attracting a wider 
following and that this has been the most significant variable behind the greater 
utilisation of the group’s political front. This was evident in the group’s decision to adopt 
Sinn Fein as its political front in the first place after Russell’s failed bombing campaign. 
The IRA also aclmowledged that it was the lack of support that had led to the failure of 
the Border Campaign and that therefore a réévaluation of strategy was again necessary to 
address this.
Conversely, gr-eater public support in the early 1970s, generated in large part by the 
loyalist reaction to the civil rights marches and the state’s response to the evolving crisis, 
enabled the IRA to conduct a terrorist campaign endowed with resources and recruits. 
The group had long learnt that to run a successful insurgency campaign the support of the 
population that it claimed to represent was crucial. The belief that the minority population 
was in imminent danger and the view that the gr oup was engaged in a short war meant 
that there was no time or inclination for an expanded role for Sinn Fein beyond its 
propaganda and ‘policing’ functions. When support began to fall away by the mid 1970s, 
however, and when it was clear that the British government was not going to withdraw 
from the province after the 1975 truce, Adams devised what was subsequently to be 
called the ‘Long War’ strategy. The main impetus behind this strategy was to mobilise 
popular support, both North and South, and this was to be part of Sinn Fein’s expanded 
remit.
By 1981 the Long War strategy had failed to generate the support that Adams had hoped
for. Sands’ by-election victory, however, prompted the IRA to expand Sinn Fein’s role
further through engagement with the electoral process that this time was to tap perceived
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existing support as well as mobilising further support. Adams reiterated the importance of 
expanding the struggle to the Irish Republic and this entailed dropping the long held 
policy of abstention from the Dail in 1986. The desire to generate support both North and 
South, therefore, was the main driving force behind the gr eater utilisation of Sinn Fein. 
Conversely, the internal frictions over the increasing engagement with the conventional 
political system meant that should there have been a drop in the level of popular support 
at the ballot box then the perceived utility of Sinn Fein in its electoral role would have 
been reduced.
With loyalist frustration at ‘right wing’ unionism and with the subsequent desire to give 
the loyalist working classes adequate representation it is no surprise that the loyalist 
political fronts were socialist in orientation. Indeed , the UDA’s structure was actually 
interwoven with the Loyalist Association of Workers. It therefore appeared that the UDA 
and the loyalist political fronts in general would have a natural constituency of support. 
While they were created to provide a political voice to those they felt needed 
representation (especially after the successftrl Ulster Workers’ Strike of 1974) the irony is 
that they have by and large failed to convert this perceived ‘demand’ into electoral 
sitccess, largely because of the reasons outlined in chapter 9. Wliile the ‘popular support’ 
variable was therefore important in bringing about the perceived utility of the loyalist 
political fronts the evident lack of support at the ballot box militated against their gi’eater 
use.
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Chapter 8 - State Response
This chapter is concerned with how state response has facilitated or militated against the 
use of a terrorist group political front and how it has changed its role. In the case of the 
IRA from 1956-69 it is argued that the type of state response to the Border Campaign was 
fundamental in the failure of the IRA’s stiategy of violence and this led to a reappraisal 
of the group’s approach that transformed Sinn Fein’s role from being a tactical device, 
both as an electoral tool and a propaganda mouthpiece for the armed struggle, to 
representing moderation on the part of the movement. This was exemplified in 
Goulding’s desire to abandon the long held republican tradition of abstention and his 
advocation of the gradual winding down of the armed struggle.
State response in the early 1970s from Stormont, Dublin and Westminster, however, all 
helped to polarize the brewing conflict. In the case of the IRA the perceived imminence 
of the crisis militated against the use of a political front, either as a tactical device or as a 
sign of moderation. Sinn Fein was in any case illegal until 1974. On the loyalist side, as 
this thesis argues that their political fronts represented a sign of moderation, polarization 
also meant that their utility was extremely limited (notwithstanding the other factors 
outlined in chapter 9 that militated against their use).
The legalisation of Sinn Fein represented the beginning of what is a cential component of 
this thesis, specifically how the state has facilitated the use of a terrorist political fr ont as 
a tactical device, even though the intention of Westminster was to strengthen the hand of
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the so called ‘doves’ or ‘politicians’ in the movement and to get the IRA to politicize 
their giievances rather than continue with its military strategy. It could be argued that the 
sti'ategy of using a political front in this way has been facilitated by the British, Irish and 
American governments right up to the present day, notwithstanding Tony Blair’s Belfast 
speech of October 2002, which stated that a ‘half in, half out’ approach from republicans 
could no longer be tolerated. At the time of writing, however, it remains to be seen 
whether or not ‘acts of completion’ will become the new bargaining tools to take the 
place of decommissioning, and hence leave open the notion that Sinn Fein continues to 
be used as a tactical device, possibly, if unlikely, for an ultimate return to ‘war’, should a 
united Ireland not come about.
In the case of Northern Ireland the state’s response to terrorism has been a significant 
factor behind changes in the strategies of the IRA, the UDA and the UVF, Martha 
Crenshaw wrote;
‘As in our analysis of the choices of the terrorist organisations, we are dealing 
here with the political decisions of government elites. These decisions are 
consfrained, by the teiTorist’s initiatives and by the social, economic and political 
givens of the situation, which neither of the major actors -  terrorist or government 
-  conti’ols. Yet governments have choices in how to combat teiTorism -  choices 
that can be key deteiminants of the outcome’.^
‘ Crenshaw, M. (ed.), Terrorism. Legitimacy and Power. Wesleyan University Press, Connecticut, 1983, p. 
31.
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Tliis chapter will assess the effect that state response has had on teiTorist group strategy 
vis a vis their use of political fronts, both directly and indirectly (such as the effect that it 
has had on the level of popular support for the groups that in turn may affect their 
strategies). The ‘state’ will include the Stormont administration (when it has existed), the 
United Kingdom and the Irish Republic, and therefore covers Anglo-Irish cooperation (or 
lack of). This is because, in the case of the IRA, membership has existed on both sides of 
the border.
Crenshaw warned of the potential for broadening the popular base of participation in 
violence by government over-reaction.^ It is indeed an important test for any democratic 
state to get the balance right between dealing with tenorism in a robust and efficient way 
at the same time as not appearing to be oppressive. The Easter Rising seives as a 
reminder of the dangers of over-reaction. As an event it did not capture the public’s 
imagination but the British state’s response to it, executing its leaders, not only brought 
the insurgents sympathy from the populace at large but it also catapulted the event to the 
forefront of republican mythology, feeding the notion of the ‘purity’ of martyrs against an 
‘oppressive’ state.
From its early days unionists did not, argued Rose, seek to make the state fully legitimate 
by attiacting support from Catholics.^ Unionists were a permanent majority in control of 
the state, nationalists were a pennanent minority. The proportional representation 
electoral system that was included in the Government of Ireland Act was dropped in the 
province by 1929, through fear of the 33% Catholic minority. According to O’Connor
 ^ Ibid. p. 34.
 ^Rose, R., Governing Without Consensus. An Irish Perspective. Faber and Faber, London, 1971, p. 93.
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‘this was a suppressed community for half a century: ignored by Britain, abandoned in all 
but rhetoric by their supposed kith and kin in the Republic, accustomed to the idea that 
they could achieve nothing politically for themselves/'^
In his discussion on state legitimacy Rose noted the failure of the boundaries of the state 
to match the political system.^ There were specifically two political systems within the 
UK -  one in Northern Ireland and one on the mainland. If this, along with the hardcore of 
the minority Catholics that were still bitter over the partition settlement, undermined the 
‘Britishness’ of the province then the Irish state’s constitutional claim to the North was 
bound to destabilise it further. The result was two different states laying claim to the 
same tenitory (one of which controlled that temtory) and this provided would-be 
terrorists with the constitutional ‘justification’ to their claims as legitimate freedom 
fighters. When assessing the impact of state response in Northern Ireland, therefore, it is 
important to understand the inherent constitutional instability that derived from the 
‘state’, and particularly the non-occupying Irish state that laid claim to the province in 
1937, and how this gave a prima facie justification for nationalists of either hue (Irish and 
British) to resort to violence.
Nevertheless, Wichert argues that the welfare state that was introduced in Northern 
Ireland after 1945 pushed Northern Ireland’s fortunes ahead of the South, loosening ties 
of allegiance by which the minority felt bound to Dublin.*" Coogan concurs stating that 
‘the welfare state having been introduced to the North many former Nationalists were
O’Connor, F., In Search Of A State. Catholics In Nortliem Ireland. Blackstaff Press, Belfast, 1995, p. 377. 
 ^Op. cit. Rose p. 27.
 ^See chapters 3 and 4 in Wichert, S., Northern Ireland Since 1945. Longman, London and New York,
1991.
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secretly disposed to support the British link [sic].’^  This did not alleviate what Wichert 
called a ‘cold war’ between the two communities in the 1950s, but the population at 
large, including the minority, was ‘kept content’.^  Wliile unionism was enjoying a period 
of ‘unprecedented strength’, Catholics felt better off than their counterparts in the 
Republic, socially and economically.^ There was little desire at this time for political 
teiTorism -  which in turn implied de facto acceptance of the status quo and partition.
Yet this did not prevent Sinn Fein from achieving a sizeable vote in the Northern 
elections of May 1955, polling 152,310 votes (23.5%), ‘almost the entire nationalist 
vote’, and winning two seats.'® This was at least to some degree because the Nationalist 
party of Northern Ireland did not participate apparently for fear of being embarrassed by 
their nationalist rivals." Another factor, according to Smith, was the ‘large measure of 
popular steam behind the nationalist cause, which had arisen as a result of the Free 
State’s declaration of a republic in 1948’.'^
Sinn Fein’s electoral role was part of a dual-track stiategy that was similar to that of the 
1980s. The difference was that, although the IRA earned out the occasional amis raid,'^ 
the Border Campaign had not yet got under way. Nevertheless, the group was in the final 
stages of preparation for a military assault and the party was very much under the confrol 
of the Army Council. The IRA saw the electoral success of its political fr ont as a direct 
mandate for the use of force against the British state. It must have been further
’ Coogan, T., The IRA. Fontana, London, 1987, p. 335.
® Op. cit. Wichert p. 71.
 ^Ibid. p. 75.
Smith, M., Fighting For Ireland? The Militai-y Strategy Of The Irish Republican Movement. Routledge, 
London and New York, 1995, p. 67.
" See Bowyer Bell, J., The Secret Armv. The IRA. 1916-1979. Poolbeg, Dublin, 1997, p. 269.
Op. cit. Smith p. 67.
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encouraged by the fact that the Irish government ‘took no steps to stop [the illegal 
drilling]’ that took place in the newly established tiaining camps in the Republic*'  ^ as it 
prepared for its next campaign.
Thus, prior to the Border Campaign and the subsequent banning of Sinn Fein in 1964 
Sinn Fein’s role clearly went beyond simply being the propaganda mouthpiece for the 
IRA. It was also used as an effective electoral tool to illustrate the stxength of feeling 
behind the nationalist cause (see chapter 7) in a dual-tmck strategy, although the party’s 
support was to evaporate during the failed Border Campaign.
The IRA 1956-62
State response was a crucial factor behind the failure of the Border Campaign and thus in 
the loss of popular support for the IRA and Sinn Fein. It led directly to the perception 
within the IRA that the use of violence as a stiategy (with Sinn Fein serving as the 
electoral tool and propaganda mouthpiece for that violence) had failed and this led to a 
réévaluation of the republican approach in the 1960s. This in turn meant a very different 
role for Sinn Fein -  instead of being the electoral tool and propaganda mouthpiece for 
aimed republicanism it was to become part of Goulding’s project of identifying with the 
working classes with an emphasis on mass mobilisation. Thus combined state response
See op. cit. Coogan p. 335.
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from the Irish Republic and the UK forced a reappraisal of IRA strategy that in turn led to 
a very different role for Sinn Fein.
Because of the internal split in the IRA the two governments were smprised by the 
launch of the Border Campaign or Operation Harvest. Their response to it was to a large 
extent determined by the realities of indigenous circumstances. Costello’s ‘fragile’ 
coalition, ‘supported by the remaining three members of Claim na Poblachta, had to tread 
warily, fearful that the campaign might set off a patiiotic orgy in the Republic’ whilst 
conversely the value of the unionists to the British government meant that there was 
pressure for a harsh reaction against the insurgents. On the 15‘*^ December the Special 
Powers Act in the North enabled the Royal Ulster Constabulary to airest and intern 
without trial. They were also able to respond through the ‘Reserve Force’ that had been 
established in 1950 and which had been ‘progressively strengthened and equipped since 
then’.^ *^ Henceforth ‘hundreds’ of republicans were airested, including thirty on 
December the and 22"^ .^  ^ In the same month Stonnont banned Sinn Fein, while the 
Dublin government reassured the British by doubling the number of border guards.
Following die mass frmerals of South and O’Hanlon, however, the Dublin government 
also arrested a number of republican figures - ‘relative tolerance of the campaign during 
December had brought three deaths and dragged the country to the edge of a 
confrontation with Great Britain.’ By the end of January ‘almost the entire Army
Ibid. p. 366.
Op. cit. Bowyer Bell, p. 293,
Ryder, C., The RUG. A Force Under Fire. Mandarin, London, 1982, p. 91. 
Bishop, P. and Mallie, E., The Provisional IRA. Corgi, London, 1992, p. 44. 
Op. cit. Coogan, p. 388.
Op. cit. Bowyer Bell, p. 300.
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Council and GHQ staff ended up in prison, forcing the IRA to form a temporary Army 
Council.^  ^ A combination of legislation and security force detennination undertaken 
simultaneously by both the Southern and Northern administrations had routed the 
organisation. Internment on both sides of the border had meant that most ‘volunteers’ 
were behind bars during the campaign.
The 1957 election in the South brought De Valera back to power once more. Historically, 
argues Peter Taylor, ‘republicans have tended to deal more harshly with their own than 
the British ever did.’^  ^ In July 1957, after the death of an RUC constable at an IRA 
ambush, he ordered wholesale internment as he had done in the war. This included the 
arrest of ‘most of the Sinn Fein executive, Aimy Council and GHQ staff Thus, ‘at one 
go, for the second time in six months, the top had been clipped off the IRA and many of 
the activists swept from the scene.Meanwhile the British aimy was well armed enough 
to ensure that ‘increasingly, the IRA had to confine itself to sabotage operations, often on 
a low level.
Because of continuing pressure from the security forces, both North and South, the 
insurgents were also confronted with a ‘lack of sanctuary, ... [and] lack of space for 
manouevre.’^  ^ In the Republic in the early autumn a number of key IRA figures were 
aiTested so that ‘control from the top had been lost and with it direction of the 1958-59 
s e a s o n I n  November 1961 the Irish Republic took steps to crush the campaign once
Ibid. p. 301.
Taylor, P., Proves. The IRA And Sinn Fein. Bloomsbury, London, 1997, p. 21.
^  Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 43. 
^ Op. cit. Bowyer Bell p. 306.
Ibid. p. 312.
Ibid. p. 330.
26 Ibid. p. 323.
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and for all by reinti-odiicing the Military tiibunals that had been used in the 1940s.^  ^The 
optimistic hope that the insurgents might attract some sympathy from the Southern 
government was a serious miscalculation and there were no contingency plans to deal 
with its unexpected response.
The IRA clearly believed that the Border Campaign had been a failure. The republican 
perception was therefore that the strategy of violence had failed^  ^ and this prompted the 
gi'oup to reevaluate its approach. There was henceforth to be an emphasis on left wing 
ideology and greater identification with the plight of the workers. In the South this 
entailed “ anti-imperialist’ housing, fishing rights and land ownership campaigns’, issues 
that could be pursued openly ‘through their political wing, Sinn Fein’.^  ^Thus, like Saor 
Eire in the 1930s, Sinn Fein was being used to generate a wider following by identifying 
itself with social and worker related issues. The difference, however, was that Goulding’s 
IRA sought to mobilise support for social revolution as the priority over national 
unification, whereas in the 1930s the ‘organisation men’ of the IRA used left wing 
ideology to mobilise support for the national cause.
State response in the North prevented the use of a political front as an electoral tool 
because the party was outlawed under the Special Powers Act;
See ibid. p.333.
Notwithstanding those who believed that any rebellious act, whether it succeeded or not, was beneficial 
to the cause as a nationalist statement that continued the legacy o f past 'martyis'.
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p.73.
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‘The Government had banned Sinn Fein in 1964 along with its newspaper, the 
United Irishman. The movement had briefly circumvented the ban by setting up 
Republican Clubs instead, but they were outlawed in 1967.’^ °
This meant that it was no longer possible for the IRA to pursue its dual-track strategy of 
violence and the ballot box that was to be reinvigorated in the 1980s.
State response along with the drop in popular support were key factors in the failure of 
the use of violence as a strategy and this prompted a réévaluation of the IRA’s approach 
in the 1960s, which in turn transformed the role of the political front fr om being the 
propaganda mouthpiece and electoral tool for a terrorist organisation to being the device 
through which popular support could be mobilised for the socialist cause. It should be 
noted, however, that, as the 1960s passed, the rift within the IRA became more 
pronounced and one of its manifestations was two very different roles for Sinn Fein (or 
what became the Republican Clubs in the North). Although Sinn Fein was banned until 
1974 the emergence of Provisional Sinn Fein saw the political front’s role revert to its 
traditional one (since the late 1940s) -  that of the propaganda mouthpiece for armed 
republicanism.
The IRA 1969 - 2002
There is no doubt that the state responses, from Dublin, Stormont and Westminster, have 
all had a significant impact on IRA strategy vis a vis its use of a political front. All their
Ibid. p.74.
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responses in the early 1970s combined to contiibute to the republican perception that 
politics was a waste of time and therefore militated against the greater utility of the 
political front (beyond its use as a propaganda mouthpiece), either as a tactic or a sign of 
moderation. Government policy and security force successes by the mid 1970s, however, 
forced a rethink within the emerging leadership in the Northern IRA that did entail a 
larger role for Sinn Fein (but outside existing state structures). Crucially Sinn Fein had 
been legalised in 1974 with the objective of encouraging the ‘politicians’ or ‘moderates’ 
within the republican movement.
The policy of Ulsterization, criminalisation, and nonnalisation helped to limit the appeal 
of the IRA and Sinn Fein in the late 1970s. But Thatcher’s refusal to give in to the hunger 
stiikers ironically instigated a series of events that were to catapult Sinn Fein into 
electoral politics, not as a sign of moderation but as part of a dual-track strategy that re­
emphasised the use of violence. The state’s response to Sinn Fein’s success at the ballot 
box, through the Anglo-Irish agreement, failed to have a lasting impact on the party’s 
electoral fortunes and so, despite internal IRA frictions, did not force the gioup to 
reconsider the use of the political project. The alternative to marginalising the republican 
movement was to bring it into an all-inclusive peace process that ensured that the 
political front was to have even gi'eater utility. It has, for example, enabled the 
mainstream republican movement to negotiate the release of its prisoners, to gain two 
executive positions in the new executive, to claim approximately £100,000 office 
expenses for each of its MPs, to achieve British demilitarisation in the province, and to 
negotiate for the release of the so-called on the runs - and all while the IRA remains 
armed and its activity allegedly continues. At the time of writing it is not clear whether
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the cuiTent peace process has been and continues to be the means by which the IRA reaps 
tactical advantage, or whether the party does now genuinely represent a sign of 
moderation towards the use of violence. The process which, through the sponsorship of 
the UK, the Irish Republic and the United States, has brought republicans into the 
conventional political system has seen Sinn Fein apparently represent this new relative 
moderation on the part of the republican movement. Alternatively, if Sinn Fein has been 
used as a tactical device to gain concessions then we have witnessed the tactical use of a 
political front to an unprecedented level, enough to provide a lesson for any group 
wanting to abuse a peace process while harbouring intentions of a return to war when 
conditions suited. It is a state gamble -  the state has either provided the structures and 
assurances through which Sinn Fein can operate as evidence of moderation on the part of 
the republican movement or it has facilitated the devious use of a political front as a 
tactical device.
In order to assess the impact of the ‘state response’ factor in the second case study it is 
first necessary to recall March 1963 when Captain Terence O’Neill succeeded Lord 
Brookeborough as Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. The new premier was determined 
to ease sectarian animosity in the Province but his policy that was intended to lead to ‘the 
full legitimation [of Stonnont] in the end threatened its repudiation.’^ ' His good 
intentions raised Catholic expectations but also managed to generate Protestant fears. 
Hardline unionists saw O’Neill’s meetings with the Republic’s Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, 
in 1965 as a sell out and, in the face of unionist opposition to reforms, nationalists were
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repeatedly disappointed and came to see his efforts as ‘window dressing to fool 
Westminster critics of the unsavoury Unionist machine.
Henry Patterson concludes his article on British government policy from 1969-74 with:
‘Instead of making it clear that what was at stake was a process of reconstitution 
of the Northern Ireland state along more democratic and equitable lines, the desire 
to return as quickly as possible to a situation where British involvement was 
minimised, led to an attempt to create a nonsectarian coalition. This meant, at the 
very least, appearing to take nationalist aspirations seriously. The result was 
predictably disastrous. For while it might have been possible to at least secure 
Protestant acquiescence to a more substantial programmes (sic) of internal 
(writer’s italics) reform, refoims, which appeared to be linked to a process of 
gi'adual British disengagement were quite a different matter.
This desire to continue its tradition of detachment from the province^'' on the part of 
Westminster created a situation that would encourage nationalists at the same time as 
reinforcing the insecurity of unionists. From the loyalist point of view it was an attitude 
that provided the backdrop to the notion of an Independent Ulster. As far as republicans 
were concerned it confirmed their belief that it would not take much to force the British 
into complete withdrawal. The British state’s detachment from Northern Ireland,
Op. cit. Rose, p. 100.
Op. cit. Bowyer Bell, p. 347.
Patterson, H., ‘British Governments and the ‘Protestant Backlash’ 1969-74’, p. 247.
This was confimied by Edward Heath’s apparent desperation to avoid the imposition o f direct rule 
because ‘it would lead to Westminster becoming irrevocably involved in a conflict that one set o f minutes 
said ‘could be the United Kingdom’s Vietnam’ (From cabinet papers in Cobain, 1., ‘Heath in firing line 
over his role in Bloody Sunday’, The Times. December 2'“* 2002.)
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therefore, simply exacerbated the problems caused by the dual constitutional claim on the 
province.
This destabilising mix of insecurity on the unionist side and aspiration on the Catholic 
side meant that the situation that was brewing up in Northern Ireland at the end of the 
1960s was to present a far more formidable problem for the British government than any 
other in the province since partition. Westminster had hitherto taken an amis length 
approach to the internal affairs of the province but the civil rights marches and the 
loyalist response threatened to spiral out of contiol. The apparent indifference of the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary to the attacks by loyalists on People’s Democracy marchers at 
Bumtollet Bridge in January 1969 marked the beginning of the loss of confidence in the 
security forces of Northern Ireland within the Catholic community. The following night 
the police entered the Bogside area of Londondeny and behaved in such a way as to 
prompt the establishment of a Commission of enquiry (the Cameron Commission) which 
concluded that:
‘We have to record with regret that our investigations have led us to the
unhesitating conclusion that on the night of 4tli/5th January a number of
policemen were guilty of misconduct which involved assault and battery,
malicious damage to property in stieets in the predominantly Catholic Bogside
area giving reasonable cause for apprehension of personal injury among other
innocent inhabitants, and the use of provocative sectarian and political slogans.
Wliile we fully realize that the police had been working without adequate relief or
rest for long hours, and were under gi'eat sti'ess, we are afraid that not only do we
find these allegations of misconduct are substantiated, but that for such conduct
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among members of a disciplined and well - led force there can be no acceptable 
justification or excuse.
The imminence of the perceived loyalist threat and an apparently disinterested security 
force prompted some Catholics to seek defence fr om the IRA, and this was an important 
origin of Sinn Fein’s ‘community policing’ role. Moreover, it was the perceived lack of 
legitimacy of the state and its police force that made this function for the front 
ideologically desirable for the group. The aimy too, originally sent in to defend Catholics, 
soon became the enemy to many of them. After its so-called ‘rape of the falls’, where 
homes were ransacked in the search for weapons and which affected 20,000 Catholics^ ,^ 
its role was seen as an oppressive insti’ument of unionist rule. Internment without trial 
and the disaster of Bloody Sunday further alienated the minority population from the 
state. In all, the response of the Stormont regime and the security forces had made a 
significant contiibution to the surge in popular support for the IRA and therefore helped 
to sustain its strategy of violence alone with the (still illegal) Sinn Fein’s role restricted to 
being the mouthpiece for such a strategy.
The Irish state’s response made its own contribution to the escalating crisis. Up until the 
1970s the British government’s reaction to the IRA was restricted by the fact that the 
organisation was based in Dublin and so its success in dealing with the group has largely 
depended on cooperation with the Republic. Swift action from the two governments 
(under the Prevention of Violence Bill in Britain) had ensured that Russell’s exploits had
The Cameron Report: ‘Disturbances in Noithem Ireland, Report of the Commission appointed by the 
Governor of Northern Ireland’, Cmnd. 532, published in Belfast by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
September 1969, Cain website; http://cain .ulst.ac.uk/.
Jeffrey K., ‘Security Policy In Northern Ireland: Some Reflections On The Management Of Violent 
Conflict’, Terrorism and Political Violence. Volume 2, Spring 1990, No. 1, p. 27.
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corne to ‘a dead end by the autumn of 1939’^ ,^ while internment on both sides of the 
border was key to defeating the campaign of 1956-62.
Notwithstanding these achievements in countering the IRA, the Irish Republic’s response 
has often been viewed by the United Kingdom as somewhat ambivalent, mainly because 
of Fianna Fail’s historic attachment with the cause of Irish republicanism. Certainly its 
response to the emerging crisis in the late 1960s did not help as far as Westminster was 
concerned. The Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, controversially and publicly stated that ‘it is clear 
that the Irish Government can no longer stand idly by and see innocent people injured 
and perhaps w orse .F ie ld  hospitals were set up along the border in County Donegal to 
treat some of the injured. O’Brien claims that ‘the undercurrent of sympathy’ from the 
Southern administration encouraged the IRA to proceed with its plans, ‘emerging ever 
more clearly as the army of the Catholic people’, operating from a safe base in Catholic 
tenitory (the Republic).A wife of an IRA prisoner recalls:
‘People’s expectations were really raised at that time. They felt our saviours were 
coming: to the rescue! ... People felt brilliant, gieat, this is the rest of our nation 
looking after us at last, after all this suffering.
The issue of Southern support came to a head when two senior cabinet ministers were 
dismissed on suspicion of illegally importing amis for use in Northern Ireland. A 
combination of the existence of key ministers in the South that had republican credentials
Kelley, K., The Longest War. Northern Ireland and the IRA. Zed Press, London, 1982, p. 67. 
Op. cit. Taylor, Proves p. 50.
O’Brien, C., States Of Ireland. Anchor Press, London, 1972, p. 280. 
Op. cit. O’Connor p. 252.
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and the widespread turmoil in the North that threatened the Catholic population led to a 
very different attitude towards the IRA compared to its response in 1939 or 1956-62.
Peter Taylor wrote that:
‘The assistance that the Dublin Government was to lend to its beleaguered fellow 
nationalists in the North was strictly covert. Government money was channelled 
through various bank accounts and ended up largely, but not exclusively, in the 
hands of the IRA in Belfast. Most of the recipients were members of the newly 
emergent Provisional IRA. This was no accident as the Dublin Government was 
thought to favour the more tiaditional ‘nationalist’ IRA, the Provisional, over the 
Officials, whom ministers regarded as dangerous Mai%ists who would be as eager 
to overthrow the Southern state as they were in Northern Ireland.’
According to Kelly, ‘the Southern pay-off was also made conditional upon the 
Northerners’ agreement not to engage in any political activities in Eire’.'" This on its own 
would have militated against the use of a political front in the South. Taylor’s interview 
with Blaney revealed a plan that could only have stiengthened and revitalised the IRA, 
both materially and in terms of morale:
‘I asked Neil Blaney whether he accepted that by his actions he had helped create 
the Provisional IRA. He sucked on his pipe, then went through the ritual of 
stoking it and prodding it with a match before he answered. ‘We didn’t help to 
create them [because that was the result of the IRA’s own internal dynamics], but
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we certainly would have accelerated, by what assistance we could have given, 
their emergence as a force.’
Charles Haughey, Neil Blaney and Kevin Boland were all charged with the illegal 
importation of amis. They were found not guilty, though apparently ‘not because they 
were innocent of importing amis but because the Minister of Defence had authorised the 
operation; hence the importation was not ‘illegal’.’''^
To give some indication as to how perceptions are what counts in Northem Ireland and 
how these contiibuted to the polarization of attitudes in the early 1970s, responding to 
Taylor’s question as to whether he was smprised by the whole affair, John Taylor (now 
Lord Kilcooney) said:
‘Well, it wasn’t a major suiprise. The average unionist in Northem Ireland would 
have expected nothing less, you laiow. They don’t tmst Dublin Cabinet ministers 
and they kind of assume that people who are in the Cabinet in Dublin would be 
involved in some way with republican terrorism. So when this actually came out 
to be a reality, people weren’t as shocked as you would imagine.
The confimiation of unionist and loyalist suspicions helped to polarize the crisis in the 
North which in turn meant that the use of the IRA’s political front was going to be 
restricted to ‘community policing’ and being the group’s propaganda tool. The more 
substantive point to be made here, however, is that because the IRA received money that
Op. cit. Kelley p. 125 
'*■ Taylor, P., Loyalists. Bloomsbury, Loudon, 1999, p. 76.
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was allegedly signed off by Irish ministers, and as Lynch’s words implied that the 
Republic would become physically involved if the situation north of the border 
deteriorated, the IRA felt vindicated in pursuing its strategy of violence alone. Thus, a 
sense of impending crisis and the perception of imminent action from the South certainly 
contiibuted to the IRA’s approach, one that saw no need for greater utilisation of its 
political front (which was in any case banned until 1974) beyond its traditional role as a 
mouthpiece for violence.
As early as June 1970, however, according to O’Brien, the North was not such a topic in 
the Republic’s government anymore.'*'' Certainly it soon became apparent that Dublin was 
not going to live up to its earlier posturing much to the disappointment of republicans in 
the province:
‘They seemed to totally just want to ignore it. They just didn’t want anything to 
do with it. I don’t laiow how they would see it, but that’s how we feel -  a total let­
down.’'*^
Once it was clear that tangible support fr*om the South was not going to be forthcoming it 
was inevitable that this would in the long run make its own contribution to undermining 
the IRA’s military capacity - materially, in terms of morale and in terms of moral 
justification and support for the struggle. Despite the money that was apparently procured 
through these men for the IRA, the expectation of intervention and further, more 
substantial assistance fr om the Lynch government was not met. In fact by 1972 the Irish
Ibid.
Op. cit. O’Brien p. 218.
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administration introduced the Offences against the State Act, ‘a draconian new bill which 
allowed the authorities to jail anyone as a member of an illegal organization simply on 
the word of a policeman’'*^ , after which the Irish Gardai launched a series of raids on IRA 
suspects The receding interest in the problems of the North took much of the morale 
out of the republican movement in the early 1970s.
The state response that was to provide the main impetus behind the IRA’s strategy in the 
early 1970s, however, was that from the unionist administration and the security forces at 
its disposal. Internment gave the IRA the excuse to indulge in what they saw as an all out 
war reducing any chance that the political front could have played a more prominent role. 
An editorial in the Republican News concuiTed that ‘the Republican Movement must be 
assured of the willing co-operation of all our people. Political strife is meaningless now. 
The nation must take precedence over the party. The die is already cast. ‘This is war” .'*^ 
The selective nature of internment'*  ^ and the Bloody Sunday tragedy seiwed only to 
increase support and recruits to the IRA as well as reinforce the group’s strategy of 
violence. The British government realised that a fresh state response was required and 
duly suspended Stormont in April 1972 and imposed Direct Rule.
An MI6 official who had been sent to the province, Frank Steele, summed up the 
ineffectiveness and counteiproductive nature of the state’s response prior to the 
imposition of Direct Rule;
Op. cit. O’Connor p. 252.
Holland J., Hope Against History. The Ulster Conflict. Hodder and Stoughton, London 1999, p. 95. 
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 243.
Republican News quoted in op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 190.
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‘There was very little co-ordination of whatever intelligence was being produced 
by the RUC, the army and MI5. Internment had been a disaster. It barely damaged 
the IRA’s command structure and led to a flood of recruits, money and weapons. 
It was a farce. And as for the special interrogation techniques, they were damned 
stupid as well as morally wrong. Such methods are counter-productive and do you 
enoiinous damage when they get out, as they inevitably do. And in practical 
teiiiis, the additional usable intelligence they produced was, I understand, 
minimal.’ '^*
Peter Taylor concluded that by the beginning of 1972:
‘the powerful base established by the IRA in the nationalist community was the 
result not of intimidation but of a series of mistakes and miscalculations made by 
the unionist government and the British over the previous two years, of which 
‘Bloody Sunday’ was the latest and most catastrophic.’ '^
Direct Rule was seen by republicans as a defeat for unionism that had been forced on the 
British by the IRA. Now it was just a matter of time before the ‘imperialists’ would be 
driven out of the North. Victory was around the corner as Tommy Goiman, an IRA 
member, explained:
See op, cit. O’Brien p. 274.
Steele, F., quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 130.
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 130.
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‘Everyone felt we were very close to victory ... Most people on the gionnd felt 
that it was only a matter of time before the British were going to finally admit
defeat.
It was for this reason that any change in stiategy was unlikely, unless the British 
withdrew from the province, and so any expanded role for the political fi'ont at this time 
would have served no purpose. An IRA commander, Martin Meehan, claimed that:
‘Politics was a dirty word in those days. We actually believed we could drive the 
British army into the sea. It was raw determination, a gut feeling that if we could 
keep up the pressure we could do it. As young men, that was the thing that 
motivated us. We really thought that victory was just around the comer and that 
with one more push we could do it. All the signs were there that we were on the 
road and we had moved mountains.
As a result the republican group’s meeting with Willie Wliitelaw in 1972 was not 
conducted via a political front but took place with the IRA itself. The fact that the 
meeting took place at all was an indication of how successful IRA strategy had been. But 
something did happen at the meeting which would indirectly have ramifications for 
republican strategy vis a vis the use of a political front. As a condition for the ti'uce talks 
Wliitelaw, home secretary at the time, gianted special category status to IRA prisoners -  
an issue that was to resurface in dramatic fashion by the end of the decade. The second 
significant point in relation to the meeting was that:
Ibid. p. 135. 
Ibid.
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‘Steele [believed] that the experiences and discussions of that day and the meeting 
at Cheyne Walk increased Adams’ recognition of the limitations of ‘armed 
struggle’ and the need for the IRA to have a parallel political policy if it was ever 
to get anywhere.’ '^*
In 1974 the British government de-proscribed Sinn Fein in order to provide the means by 
which the authorities were able to maintain contact with the republican movement at the 
same time as ‘[avoiding] the impression that direct negotiations were taking place with 
the IRA’.^  ^The main reason for legalising the political front, however, lay ‘in the hope 
that this might promote the IRA’s political activity at the expense of its military effort’. 
This, according to one PSNI Special Branch source, was a pivotal moment and a serious 
miscalculation.^^ What the British government didn’t realise was that Sinn Fein would 
not become an alternative to the armed straggle but that it would be a sub-unit of the 
organisation. State response in this regard, and it has arguably persisted in facilitating the 
use of the political front in this way to this day, has been crucial in enabling the 
republican movement to use Sinn Fein as a tactical device and an extra weapon in the 
IRA’s ‘war’ against the British. This was soon to become apparent through the so-called 
Long War strategy.
Ibid. p. 144
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 272
Ibid.57 Special Branch source, interview.
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By 1974 it looked as though the tide seemed to be turning against the insurgents. The 
introduction of Diplock courts^  ^in 1972 and security force successes in 1973-4 (between 
April 1973 and April 1974 1,292 people were charged with terrorist offences)^^ had put 
the IRA on the back foot.*’*'
The ‘disastrous’ truce had made matters worse.Through secret negotiations the British 
government had hinted that it might consider ‘withdrawal’ if the IRA ended its campaign. 
The government, however, had no intention of letting go of Northern Ireland but the 
effect of the truce was debilitating -  to those in prison like Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuinness it looked as though ‘the IRA [was] being run down’. In early 1976 there 
were even thoughts of calling off the campaign through ‘[shortage] of money, [shortage] 
of arms and [through] men getting aixested.’*^^  The IRA had been taken in by the British 
who had ‘pretended they might withdraw’.*^'*
The problem for Gerry Adams was that if the military struggle came to a halt then so did 
the whole struggle and the trace, which they had entered into, ‘isolated from the rest of 
the body politic in Ireland’*’^ , had nearly defeated republicanism. The state’s ceasefire 
tactic, with the belief that the longer the truce lasted the less likely the IRA would want 
to, or be able to, return to ‘war’, had shown the republican leadership that the battle
Juryless courts resided over by judges (to avoid the problem of juror intimidation). See The ‘Diplock’ 
Report: ‘Report o f the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to deal with Tenorist Activities in 
Northern Ireland’, Cmnd. 5185, published in London by. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1972, SEN 10 
151850 1, Cain website: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/.
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 242 
^  For arrests see also op. cit. Taylor, Provos pp. 152-3.
Monison D., quoted in op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 275.
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 197
McKee, B. (IRA member) quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 199.
McKitti'ick , D., interview.
Op. cit. Taylor, Provos p. 199.
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henceforth had to be fought on other fronts as well, and this promised a greater role for 
Sinn Fein, though not as a sign of moderation, but as the means to expand the straggle 
beyond the purely militaristic approach.
The success of the security forces had forced young IRA leaders to rethink their strategy 
from prison. No longer was victory just around the comer. The realisation that the British 
government had no intention of leaving the province and the state’s increasingly 
successful use of informers were key factors behind the movement’s ‘Long War’ 
strategy. Another legacy of the 1975 trace was the establishment of Sinn Fein ‘incident 
centres’ that were to monitor the IRA ceasefire -  it was a significant step for the future of 
the political front. As Taylor noted above ‘they were a watershed in the public perception 
of Sinn Fein, giving it a political standing in the nationalist community and, more 
importantly, a physical presence.’^ *’
There is little doubt that the security force successes from 1972 onwards against the 
republican movement, coupled with the debilitating trace, were key factors behind Gerry 
Adams’ Long War strategy that entailed an enhanced role for Sinn Fein. The response 
had restiicted the group militarily while the government’s reaction convinced the 
insurgents that they were not about to leave the province in a hurry. State response had 
therefore not only convinced the emerging Northem leadership that the ‘war’ had to be 
fought on other fronts as well as the military but that it was going to be a far longer 
struggle than republicans had anticipated. Sinn Fein’s role was henceforth not going to be 
restricted to being the propaganda mouthpiece for a strategy of violence.
*6 Ibid. p. 186.
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Ill the meantime the state’s pressure was kept up. Secretary of States Merlyn Rees and 
then Roy Mason introduced the policy of Ulsterization, criminalisation and nonnalisation 
-  a process involving the restoration of police primacy (taking the army out of the front 
line) and the removal of special category s ta tus .As  Mark Urban argues, soldiers do 
battle, police do police work. Having the army on the streets was potentially going to lead 
to gieater alienation of the minority community - ‘over-reaction to taunts can produce 
incidents which play into the hands of the IRA, feeding the nationalists’ stereotype of the 
British Army as a brutal occupying f o r c e . T h e  new policy was designed to eliminate 
this possibility.
The security force response in the late 1970s did, however, have its problems. Apart from 
the emergence of Northem Command under Martin McGuinness as the new centre of 
power in the republican movement, intense rivalry between the different security 
agencies hampered an effective response. Nevertheless, through the new policy, and 
under Kenneth Newman, the intelligence performance had ‘greatly improved’ by early 
1 9 7 7  69 reorganisation of police work that enhanced the force’s inteiTogation ability 
and new legislation that allowed teiTorist suspects to be held for up to seven days 
produced results.Indeed, ‘between 1976 and 1979 about 3,000 people were charged 
with terrorist offences, most of them on the basis of confessions obtained under
Special category status had been conceded by William Wliitelaw in 1972 after a hunger strike by inmate 
Billy McKee and included privileges such as prisoners wearing their own clothing and not having to do 
prison work.
Urban, M., Big Bovs’ Rules. The Secret Struggle Against The IRA. Faber and Faber, London, 1992, p. 
69.
See ibid. p. 29 
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inteiTogation’7' As Wichert notes the 1970s was a period in which the government
succeeded in curbing the violence of the tenorists without actually eradicating it 72
It was the removal of special category status, however, that was to set off a chain of 
events over the next five years that was to have the most significant impact on IRA 
strategy, and particularly with regard to the role of its political front. It was Margaret 
Thatcher’s refusal (after coming to power in 1979) to concede to the demands of 
republican prisoners over political status that ultimately led to the movement’s more 
political strategy and indeed in the end its engagement with the Good Friday Agreement. 
It all began with the ‘Dirty Protest’ which then evolved into a full blown hunger strike 
that lead to the deaths of ten prisoners.
Edward Moxon-Browne wrote in 1981 that ‘from the point of view of the state, the 
existence of PSF is important since it allows for some sort of communication with PIRA 
without too much political embarrassment.’^  ^ What wasn’t to the government’s liking, 
however, was the level of electoral support Sinn Fein managed to mobilise after Bobby 
Sands’ success in Fermanagh and South Tyrone. Republicans could argue with some 
justification that they weren’t just a band of extmmists with little support but that they did 
have a significant electoral mandate.
British government policy in the 1980s, underpinned by a commitment to keeping 
Northern Ireland within the union, sought to counter both the ‘bullet’ and ‘ballot box’
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 321. 
Op. cit. Wichert p. 171.
Moxon-Browne, E., ‘The Water and the Fish: Public Opinion and the Provisional IRA in Northern 
Ireland’, Wilkinson, P. (ed.), British Perspectives On Terrorism. Allen and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 51,
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parts of republican strategy. The success of Sinn Fein after the hunger strikes was of 
serious concern to the Conservative administration, who feared that the party might 
actually overtake the vote of the constitutional nationalist party, the Social and 
Democratic Labour Party (SDLP). '^* The former won 13.4% of the vote in the 1983 
Westminster election compared to the SDLP’s 17.9% and Geny Adams was elected MP 
for West Belfast.^  ^Something had to be given to constitutional nationalists to boost their 
support against the electoral advances of the republican movement. This came in the form 
of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985.
It should be noted that the Agreement was preceded by a period of rapprochement 
between the Irish and British governments and this was vitally important in improving 
cooperation against the threat of the IRA. The first Anglo-Irish summit in November 
1983 for two years (after a rift over the Falklands war) reflected Dublin’s concern over 
the electoral advances of Sinn Fein, and its fear that further increases in support for the 
IRA might lead to an attempt by the group to drag the South into the conflict.^^
The agreement originated from the New Ireland Forum, which included Fianna Fail, Fine 
Gael, and the Irish Labour Party from the Republic and the SDLP. In May 1984 they 
came up with three options; ‘a united thirty two county state, a federal arrangement, or 
joint authority within Northern Ireland by Dublin and London.Margaret  Thatcher 
immediately dismissed all three. Intergovernmental discussions continued in the
Sinn Fein won 13.4% of the vote in the 1983 Westminster election compared to the SDLP’s 17.9%.
Bew P. and Gillespie G., Northem Ireland. A Chronologv Of The Troubles 1968-1999. Gill and 
MacMillan, Dublin 1999, p. 172.
Fitzgerald, G., All in A Life. Garrett Fitzgerald. An Autobiographv. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1991, p. 
410.
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aftermath of the Forum report and the British government, under pressure from 
America^ ,^ and clearly interested in cross-border security cooperation, managed to 
negotiate the AIA. It was a watershed for Catholics in the province -  it recognised that 
there were two traditions in Northem Ireland and pledged to further ‘Cross-Border 
Cooperation on Security, Economic, Social and Cultural Matters’. A p a r t  from security 
cooperation, the object as far as Britain was concerned was to encourage those engaged 
in constitutional politics and to isolate extremists.
The AIA appeared to have the desired affect. In the 1987 election the SDLP stietched its 
lead over Sinn Fein to nearly 10%^** and Gerry Adams lost his seat. The state’s response 
through the AIA had put pressure on Adams’ political strategy from the militarists within 
the movement, especially when they were sitting on a stoclcpile of Libyan weapons. But 
there was no denying that Sinn Fein still had a level of core support which, although less 
than the post-Sands results, was nevertheless substantial enough to be of serious concern 
to constitutional politicians. The banning of Sinn Fein from television broadcasts in 
October 1988 was the last throw of a mindset that sought to marginalise militant 
republicanism rather than bringing it in from the cold and aclaiowledging that the party 
did have an electoral mandate.
One of the first indications that the British government’s approach was about to shift 
were the comments of Secretary of State for Northem Ireland Peter Brooke who, in 
November 1989, stated that the IRA could not be beaten and that the government could
See Wilson, A., Irish America and the Ulster Conflict. 1968-1995. Blackstaff Press, Belfast, 1995, p. 
287.
®^As quoted in Wichert op. cit. p. 194.
See Bew and Gillespie op. cit. p. 208.
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talk to the IRA after a ceasefire.^' The state’s new approach was about to impact directly 
on the role of the IRA’s political front and give it a prominence that had hitherto not been 
realised. In November 1990 Brooke famously declared that the British had no ‘strategic 
or economic interest’ in keeping the North within the UK.^  ^The government’s position 
was clearly changing fr om commitment to the union to a position of neutrality -  a shift 
that prompted Adams, after persuasion from the SDLP leader John Hume, to adopt a 
more realistic analysis: Northern Ireland was not under Westminster rule for Britain’s 
own ends but because the majority of the population in the North wanted to remain 
British.
Sinn Fein’s elevation in the 1980s, suggested McKitti'ick and Colin Brown, had prompted 
internal divisions and Brooke’s remarks might have been an attempt to stiengthen the 
hand of those republicans that wanted to develop the IRA’s political strategy further:
‘One possibility [behind Brooke’s remarks] is that Mr. Brooke is seeking to 
promote the internal debate which is suspected to have been going on within Sinn 
Fein and the IRA. There has been speculation that republican opinions differ on 
whether to concenti ate on violence or think more in temis of political activity.
On the face of it this analysis appears at odds with that of a Special Branch source -  that 
Sinn Fein is a tactical device to win as many concessions as possible, while weakening 
state security for a possible return to war. This thesis, will conclude, however, that
‘Offer of talks to Sinn Fein raises uproar’, Daily Telegraph. 4‘'* November 1989.
Op. cit. Bew and Gillespie p. 242.
McKitti'ick D., and Brown, C., ‘Brooke hints at talks with Sinn Fein if  violence ends’, The Independent.
4**’ November 1989.
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although it is still possible that the IRA might return to ‘war’, the current post September 
11^ '’ 2001 environment and the resilient peace process has meant that the political front 
has ultimately come to represent a more moderate approach towards the use of violence -  
‘ultimately’ because without the political part of the strategy in the 1980s and without the 
development of Sinn Fein in the 1990s, whether or not it represented moderation at the 
time, it did establish the means through which there could be a change of attitude if 
subsequent events dictated it, which, it is argued, they have done.
Whether or not Sinn Fein has come to represent moderation towards the use of violence, 
there is little doubt that the talks leading up to the Good Friday Agreement and the five 
years of negotiations since has greatly enhanced the utility of Sinn Fein. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that the threat of violence remains at the time of writing (June 2003). 
The three states’ response has allowed and indeed encouraged the political front of the 
IRA to negotiate while it has been backed up by the implied threat of violence that an 
intact military stmcture represents.
In the early 1990s it became increasingly clear to the republican movement that 
conditions were emerging that would necessitate a ceasefire. Not only is it believed that 
the group was losing the ‘intelligence war’ against the state but for the first time loyalists 
were killing more republicans than the latter were Idlling security forces. In short the 
IRA’s back was against the wall. If the organisation was being defeated militarily what 
were the alternatives? Sinn Fein had to be developed to pursue the struggle -  not in 
tandem with IRA violence, but supported by the threat o f violence. While the conclusion 
to this thesis argues that internal divisions have prevented the IRA from carrying out ‘acts
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of completion’, the strategic value of the continuing threat of violence has certainly not 
been lost on the republican leadership. As Aughey has argued republicans may not have 
won the ‘war’ but they are trying to win the argument and this is where Sinn Fein’s role 
has been of paramount importance.
In the early 1990s the British government had two choices. Notwithstanding the earlier 
shift in the government’s approach, it could have driven home the military advantage 
against the IRA. The Special Branch source believes that this could have been achieved. 
Or it could have negotiated with Sinn Fein to establish what would be required for 
republicans to engage in a peace process. Clearly, the fonner would have entailed risks 
when the IRA had a sizeable electoral mandate. The government pursued the less 
dogmatic approach of an all-inclusive peace process. Notably, after nearly a decade of 
negotiations and four and a half years since the GFA was signed, the IRA at the time of 
writing remains aimed. It is fair to say that whereas violence was used to achieve 
republican goals, as noted above, this has been substituted with the threat of violence. 
Many find it difficult to believe that the IRA will disappear as a force until a united 
Ireland has been achieved.
For it is a fact that from the early 1990s Westminster was not just concerned with 
satisfying the demands of the law abiding majority of Catholics, but was also keen to rein 
in the minority republican movement that so threatened not just the province but also 
London and the mainland with bombs. That is why opinion polls that actually suggested
Aughey, A., interview
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that most Catholics did not object to RUC symbols^  ^lose their relevance, and that is why 
Sinn Fein has had a disproportionately large influence on the peace negotiations. The 
legitimisation of extremism has meant that, at the time of writing, it is increasingly Sinn 
Fein and not the SDLP who the Catholic electorate look towards to play hardball when it 
comes to winning concessions for their community.
It is tempting at this point to compare the dilemma faced by the British government in the 
early 1990s with the situation faced by the Spanish authorities in the Basque region in 
2002. One should be wary, however, of comparisons with the Basque case and the 
lessons to be drawn ûom it. Firstly, the Basque region fonns part of mainland Spain 
whereas Northern Ireland is part of the island of Iieland and not part of the British 
mainland. Secondly, this has meant that there has been a much gi*eater emotional 
attachment between Madrid and the region -  evident in the mass marches in Madrid 
against ETA violence, something that has not happened in London over IRA and loyalist 
violence. Thirdly, Spain consists of a number of semi-autonomous regions -  if demands 
for independence were met in the Basque countiy then this could have a laiock on effect 
in the other regions, most notably Catalonia, and seriously threaten the national fabric of 
the rest of Spain. Fourthly, unlike ETA’s demands, the IRA has fought for Irish 
unification and not for Northern Irish independence. Its desire for ‘reunification’ with 
another state is not a cause that can be replicated in other parts of the United Kingdom 
and so is less likely to provoke a severe knock on effect vis a vis the independent 
nationalists of Scotland and Wales. Fifthly, fifteen per cent of ETA’s territorial claim 
actually includes part of France. Thus, any consideration of granting Basque
A Belfast Telegi'aph poll taken in April 2000 showed that 61% o f Catholics did not find the RUC name 
and symbols offensive, cited in ‘RUC backed by 61pc of Catholics’, Daily Telegraph. April 6'’* 2000.
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independence by the Spanish would presumably be bitterly opposed by the French who 
would be faced with a newly independent hostile state in its backyard with the aim of 
annexing a piece of French tenitory! Therefore, whereas the British felt able to declare its 
neuti'ality over the question of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status, for all the above 
reasons, the Spanish have unequivocally committed itself to national unity.
Despite these fundamental differences, it is nevertheless interesting to compare the 
situation in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s with that of Spain in 2002. In the 
fonner, having failed to marginalise Sinn Fein, Westminster engaged with republicans 
with the aim of drawing them into an overall inclusive settlement. This has had its risks 
with an enhanced and state assisted Sinn Fein mandate emerging at the same time as 
increasing loyalist disillusionment over the peace accord. For those who believed that the 
level of violence could not get worse than in the years of the ‘Troubles’, it did seem at 
times in 2002, with a growing Sinn Fein mandate and an increasingly marginalised 
loyalism, that such a possibility existed and that has been the gamble of the Good Friday 
Agreement. In the Spanish case Madrid, having offered everything it could reasonably 
have expected to for the reasons outlined above, has decided to outlaw Herri Batasuna, 
the political front of ETA and concentrate on a more draconian solution. This kind of 
harder line approach was available to the British but was turned down. Thus, it will be 
interesting to see what results the two very different types of response yield in the longer 
temi. Certainly the British approach has facilitated and even encouraged the greater 
utility of the IRA’s political fi'ont, whereas the latest Spanish response clearly has not.
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Another aspect of the state’s impact on the utility of a political front relates to the 
importance of adhering to the rule of law and democratic values when responding to 
teiTorism. Where the state has fallen down in this area provides the insurgents with a 
propaganda boost that is best utilised through its political front. State over-reaction and 
over-zealousness and any extra legal activity have at times been features of the British 
response to the IRA. The introduction of internment and Bloody Sunday served to 
enhance republican propaganda and their particular assessment of events. So too have 
alleged miscarriages of justice, most famously exemplified in the Guildford four and 
Birmingham six cases. Its role in this regard has also been reinforced by criticism of the 
British government from human rights organisations.^^
Wliat gives Sinn Fein a particular utility in its propaganda role, however, are the 
allegations of security force collusion with loyalist teiTorist groups in targeting republican 
activists and especially the activities of the Force Research Unit in this regard. Any truth 
in the allegations serves to sustain Sinn Fein’s perception that the security forces, 
specifically the RUC Special Branch and the British amiy, are ‘unionist death squads’. 
There have been numerous allegations of security documents that have somehow fallen 
into loyalist terrorist h an ds . Jo hn  Stevens, who was deputy Chief Constable of 
Cambridgeshire, found that members of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) had been 
involved in collusion with loyalist paramilitaries but that the passing of infonnation to
Such as the Norwegian Helsinki Committee (see Coulter C., ‘Britain violated human rights in NI -  
report’, The Irish Times. August 9**' 1989) and the United Nations Committee against Torture (Doyle, L. 
‘UN group condemns suspects’ treatment’, The Independent. November 16* 1991).
See, for example, McKittiick, D., ‘New leaks worsen Anglo-Irish relations’, The Independent. September 
23 1989, and Brown, C., and Reeves P., ‘Security leak puts credibility of RUC and Amiy at risk’. The 
Independent August 3 T' 1989. More recently see Mullin, J., ‘Loyalist gangs had security files’. Guardian 
newsunlimited, website: http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland , November 5* 1999.
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them was ‘neither widespread nor insitutionalised’. In his latest enquiry Stevens has 
concluded that collusion took place in the murders of Pat Finucane and Adam Lambert.^*
Such transgressions, perceived or otherwise, strengthen Sinn Fein’s propaganda role -  it 
has ‘tried to demonstrate that every security force action against them is carried out under 
a secret scheme of ‘state-sponsored tenorism’ or ‘official murder’. The rhetoric helps 
Sinn Fein cultivate support by portiaying the British army as some sort of death squad. It 
also helps to obscure the fact that the IRA kills far more people in the province than any 
other organisation’.^ ^
The propaganda function against the state is an important one but in the context of 
Northern Ireland it has even more significance. That is because circumstances have 
meant that the Catholic community to whom Sinn Fein are addressing in the domestic 
sphere are often willing listeners. Confidence in the security forces has often been low^ % 
largely because there has been such small representation amongst Catholics in the police 
force (barely exceeding 5%). Speaking of Bloody Sunday Professor Demiot Walsh of the 
University of Limerick stated that:
‘The failure of the law and justice system to punish those responsible and provide 
redress for those who had been injured and the families of the deceased dealt a 
shattering blow to nationalist confidence in the rule of law ... For the nationalist
Webster P., and Gonnan, E., ‘UDR leaked to teiTorists says Stevens’, The Times. May 18* 1990. 
Stevens Enquiry, Overview and Recommendations, April 17*' 2003, from website: 
http ://www .n uzho iind. c om .
Gorman, E., ‘Deadly years o f undercover shootings’. The Times. June 4* 1991.
See McKittiick, D., ‘Catholic confidence in Army’s fairness slumps’. The Independent, December 20* 
1991. See also Merritt, J., ‘Terror links dent UDR’s credibility’, Observer. May 29* 1988.
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community as a whole it confimied an established pattern of security force 
excesses going unpunished; a pattern which has continued from Bloody Sunday 
right up to the current peace process.
The sectarian divisions and tensions, particularly at ‘interface’ areas, in Northern Ireland 
are also something that republicans have been able to utilise as it seeks to deliver its 
message that the statelet is inherently unsustainable.
State tr ansgressions are not just utilised by Sinn Fein for domestic propaganda purposes 
but they also help to sustain another hugely important function of the political front -  its 
international dimension (see chapter 9). Irish-Americans have often been a willing 
audience when it comes to claims of state ‘oppression’ fr om Sinn Fein, and of course this 
international propaganda function is boosted through the claims of a security policy of 
‘shoot to kill’ in the 1980s,^  ^ through allegations of security force/loyalist collusion in 
Catholic murders, miscarriages of justice and European court victories against the British 
govemment.^"*
It is clear that the state’s response has been a fundamental factor in enhancing the utility 
of the IRA’s political fr ont, whether or not one believes that its use represents moderation 
towards the use of violence on the part of the movement. It has managed to secure a
Walsh, D., quoted in ‘Tribunal opens Its main hearings today’, Irish Times. March 27* 2000.
See, for example, Maguire, A., ‘Full inquiry urged on IRA deaths’. The Irish Times. June 4*'' 1991 and 
Adams J., Morgan, R., and Bambridge A., ‘Shoot to Kill?’, The Sunday Times. November 27* 1988. The 
‘Stalker inquiry’ was established in 1982 to investigate allegations of a shoot to kill policy but Stalker was 
taken off the case in 1986, leading to the perception amongst many Catholics o f a state cover up.
Such as the European Court’s ruling that the British government should pay compensation of 10,000 
pounds each to the families of ten IRA men killed by the security forces after it concluded that inquiries 
into these deaths had been inadequate (see Evans, M., ‘Payouts of £10,000 may ‘open the floodgates” . The 
Times. May 5* 2001).
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number of ‘concessions’ from the British government at the same time as weakening 
state structures. In other words while it has been alleged that the IRA has regrouped, 
retrained and rearmed in the course of the process the political front has managed to 
weaken the state’s ability to respond to any return to ‘war’. Even if there are no plans to 
return to violence the political front has arguably^  ^managed to dilute the ‘Britishness’ of 
the province. It is this role of weakening the state’s presence in Northern Ireland that has 
been one of the main functions of the political fr ont and it is the state response from 
Westminster, Dublin and Washington that has facilitated this important function through 
the Good Friday Agreement and the current peace process.
The IRA, through Sinn Fein, has secured the release of nearly all of its prisoners, it has 
managed to procure two executive positions in the Northern Ireland executive, it has 
taken up office space at Westminster and received office expenses (worth approximately 
100,000 pounds each for its four MPs), and it is cuiTently negotiating amnesty for those 
IRA fugitives ‘on the run’. It has also managed to demoralize the new Police Seiwice of 
Northern Ireland, through police reform (with numerous early retirements and siclmess 
absence)^ *^  that Sinn Fein is still not satisfied with. Indeed, it continues to try to 
undeimine the police by calling for the abolition of the Full Time Police Reserve and 
Special Branch. It has also demanded that the policing and judicial powers should be 
devolved to Stoimont. In addition, it has also been negotiating for former IRA teiTorists 
and prisoners to be allowed to sit on the new Distiict Policing Partnerships. This could 
potentially provide the IRA with a further intelligence gathering opportunity. Whether or
By, for example, insisting on the reduction o f British symbols and Union Jack flag flying from 
government buildings. Arguable, because it could be intimated that given that devolution exists for Wales 
and Scotland, and that the British-Irish Council brings together all three devolved governments. Northern 
Ireland’s status within the United Kingdom might be seen as just as secure as that of Wales and Scotland.
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not Sinn Fein represents moderation towards the use of violence (and this will be 
assessed in the conclusion) the political front’s utility has reached new heights and it is 
the state that has directly facilitated this.
The Loyalists
This chapter will assess the impact of the state’s response on the strategy of the loyalist 
groups vis a vis the use of political fronts. First and foremost, it has been the inability of 
Westminster and the unionist government in Stormont to resolve the conflict that 
prompted some loyalists to work out for themselves how some sort of accommodation 
could be reached, and this prompted the use of political fronts for this purpose (such as 
the NUPRG). Indeed, disillusionment with the state’s power sharing project in 1974 led 
to the UWC stiike which in turn gave loyalists a new found confidence. This, along with 
the British government’s traditional ‘arms length approach’ to the North and emotional 
detachment from the province, prompted the idea of ‘negotiated independence.’ 
Secondly, loyalist group strategy has often been a reaction to republican strategy (see 
Chapter 9) and so one could assume that the state’s response to the IRA would have an 
impact on tire approaches of the UDA and the UVF. The state’s response in the early 
1970s, for example, helped to polarize the conflict to such a degi'ee that there was no 
utility in having loyalist political fronts, particularly when these have generally 
represented a sign of moderation. Finally, the state sponsored peace process in tlie 1990s 
elevated the roles of the loyalist political fronts to an unprecedented degree because it
^  See Cusack, J., ‘Low morale in RUC sees top officers getting out’, Irish Times. February 13*, 2001.
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was vital that the UDA and UVF called ceasefires and equally important that they were 
sustained.
It was the Northern Ireland state that coiitiibuted to the fracturing of the monolithic 
nature of unionism, that ultimately led to the loyalist political ventures of the 1970s. 
Traditionally ‘the PWC [Protestant Working Class] [believed] that its livelihood rested 
upon its support for the Stoimont Governmentbut  as Sean McKee stated, ‘clearly the 
progressive steps by O’Neill did not seem at all palatable to the loyalist community and 
so the beginnings of a fracturing of the all-class alliance that was the unionist ‘family’ 
was set in motion.
But as the civil disturbances worsened the UK government became increasingly 
concerned. That meant that the unionist establishment had to look more and more over its 
shoulder. As David Boulton wrote of the UVF:
‘Wlien the UVF began to kill catholics in 1966 and Paisley’s and Bunting’s 
Volunteers attacked civil rights marchers in 1968, they were acting out the 
traditional role of the ascendancy class’s bully-boys. It was a natural reflex in 
times of trouble. But the Unionist leadership could no longer afford to approve or 
condone such reflexes since its survival had come to depend less on lumpen 
support at home than on approval from Westminster, So the UVF was proscribed
McAuley, J., ‘Cucluillain and an RPG-7: the ideology and politics o f the Ulster Defence Association’, in 
Hughes, E., Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland. Open University Press, Buckingham, 1991, p. 47.
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and Paisleyism denounced as fascism. The result was an unprecedented rift in the 
coalition of classes on which Unionist supremacy was dependent, with Paisley 
heading up a new working-class Unionism.
This fracturing of unionism was manifested in the creation of Paisley’s Democratic 
Unionist Party which was to be ‘on the right on constitutional issues and on the left on 
social issues.
‘Clearly the rift arose from tactical, not social differences: the protestant working 
class broke with O’Neill because he was soft on catholics, not because he left 
protestant workers in slum houses. But the social chemistry of the situation was 
such that, once a rift had opened up, the protestant working-class began to 
become aware of specific class issues. They began, slowly, to develop a class 
consciousness. And they began to feel their sti*ength as a class, distinctive and 
separate from middle-class Unionists.’
So this rupturing of what had been a monolith, which had its roots in the attempts by 
O’Neill to inti'oduce reforms, laid the conditions whereby working class loyalists could 
be used as the ‘muscle’ behind hardline but ‘respectable’ unionism, and it was ultimately 
the loyalists’ awareness that they were being ‘used’ by Paisley and others that prompted 
them to seek a political voice of their own through their political fr onts. It was the feeling
McKee, S., ‘The Real Voice o f Ulster Loyalism? The Progressive Unionist Party’, M Litt Dissertation, 
University of Ulster, 1995, p. 2.
Boulton, D., The UVF 1966-73. An Anatomy Of Lovalist Rebellion. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1973,
p. 186.
Op. cit. Bew and Gillespie p. 40. This is not to suggest that there were not other differences other than 
class within unionism such as those that revolved around religious, town and country issues.
Op. cit. Boulton p. 186.
278
that they could no longer rely on politicians to adequately represent them that 
undeipinned their ventures into politics.
If loyalist strategy has often been determined by IRA strategy which in turn has to some 
degree been determined by the state’s response, then it would follow that the state’s 
response to the IRA would have an indirect impact on UDA and UVF strategy. Its 
response was so counterproductive in the early 1970s, through the ‘Rape of the Falls’, 
internment without trial, and Bloody Sunday that it facilitated the emergence of the IRA 
as a force which in turn hardened attitudes on the loyalist side. Wlien one considers that 
the loyalist political fronts did generally represent moderation towards the use of 
violence, then the polarized environment of the early 1970s would certainly not have 
encouraged their use. Moreover, the loyalist perception that the government was not 
dealing adequately with the threat that the IRA posed and its fear that the UK was about 
to betray unionism through its secret negotiations with the giroup also militated against 
the use of loyalist political fronts in the early 1970s.
It was out of this mistrust for the security forces that the UDA emerged as an 
amalgamation of a number of ‘defence’ associations. In early 1972, as the crisis swelled 
out of control, William Craig’s Ulster Vanguard was formed to unify unionists of all hues 
under one umbrella to show the IRA that it meant business. Though on the surface the 
organisation was apparently ‘respectable’ Craig’s rousing and provocative speeches, 
talking of ‘[liquidating] the enemy’ like Paisley’s rhetoric, prompted many young 
loyalists to take up arms. This was the political leadership that members of the UDA and
Quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 98.
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the UVF paid homage to. To loyalists it was these senior ‘constitutional’ politicians that 
gave the two groups legitimacy for their activities.
The Irish Republic’s response to the crisis helped polarize the situation further. There was 
apparently ‘a plan by the Eire Government to put its tioops across the Ulster border and 
stage an ‘international incident’. They would then call upon the United Nations to 
inteiwene, and should loyalists permit this to happen, it would ultimately spell the end of 
the Northern Ireland state ... that such a plan existed was later confinned by Neil 
Blaney.’*^  ^According to Garland ‘this type of information was being spread throughout 
the Loyalist community and further inflamed f e a r s . A s  is so often the case in Northern 
Ireland perception became fact and these early rumours made their own contribution to 
an environment that again would not have been conducive to loyalist political fronts.
The pivotal point in loyalism’s recent history as far as the emergence of the loyalist 
political fronts is concerned was the 1974 Ulster Workers Council strike. It was this event 
that gave loyalists a new found confidence and prompted some of them to think 
politically for themselves. It was a response to the state’s Sunningdale initiative and it 
was the failure of the state to secure a political settlement that had, indirectly at least, 
brought about the new ‘political’ emphasis in loyalist thinking.
In the 1970s, however, it wasn’t just the unionists that tried to undermine the loyalist 
forays into politics by labelling them as communists. According to Bruce:
Belfast Telegraph, 3T ‘ May 1990 cited in Garland, R., Seeking a political Accommodation. The Ulster 
Volunteer Force: Negotiating History. Shankhill Community Publication, 1997, p. 8.
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The British aiiiiy’s black propaganda unit stiiTed the pot nicely by inventing the 
Ulster Citizens’ Amiy (UCA), supposedly a left-wing loyalist teiTor group and 
circulating statements, puiportedly from the UCA, accusing leading UVF and 
UDA men of various crimes against their own people. It even claimed HeiTon and 
another murdered UDA leader, Ernie ‘Duke’ Elliot, as UCA men by placing in 
memoriam notices in the Belfast Telegraph in the UCA’s name. The rural 
evangelical unionists, who see republicanism and communism as two wings of the 
Catholic Church’s long war against the tme gospel, previously responded to any 
progressive noises from the paramilitaries by accusing them of being unpatiiotic. 
It was even rumored (sic) that the UDA’s Common Sense had republican input. If 
loyalist spokesmen continue to impress the public we can expect a revival of that 
sort of attack [in the 1990s].’
It is quite ironic that this type of ‘black propaganda’ activity seemed to be going on at the 
same time as the British government tried to persuade the UVF to become more political 
by deproscribing the organisation in 1974.
An important state initiative that had more of a direct impact on the utility of loyalist 
political fronts was the Anglo-Irish Agreement. To unionists, like the dreaded Council of 
Ireland dimension of Sunningdale, it threatened the constitutional status of the province -  
the one issue that combined unionists of all hues -  and it led to the reversion to 
stereotypical roles. Indeed James McAuley argued that unionist hegemony is always
Ibid.
Bruce S., ‘Paramilitaries, Peace, and Politics: Ulster Loyalists and the 1994 Truce’ in Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism. Vol. 18, p. 200. Bruce does not outline the amiy’s reason for trying to portray loyalist
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likely to reconstruct itself ‘when a threat is perceived to the constitutional position.’ 
Thus, the underlying monolithic nature of unionism would come to the fore and squeeze 
out political initiatives or political involvement from the loyalist paramilitary groups. One 
reason for Common Sense not being taken seriously, and also why the UDLP failed to 
generate electoral support after 1985, was that ‘the violence in protests against the Anglo- 
Irish accord had undermined the UDA’s claims to be taken seriously as a constitutional 
political force.’ The UDA and UVF statements threatening to kill those who 
collaborated^®  ^represented attempts to make sure that they did have at least some role in 
opposing the AIA and that meant a reversion to what it did best - organising riots and 
violence.*®^
The situation was to change dramatically with the onset of the peace process and the 
Good Friday Agreement. The extent to which the US, the Irish Republic and the British 
government have enhanced the utility of Sinn Fein has been outlined above. The same 
was true of the loyalist gioups. John Major wrote that the exploratory dialogue from 
December 1994 also entailed finding ‘an acceptable basis for ... the two small loyalist 
parties, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), to 
join the constitutional talks on an equal basis as democratic and law-abiding 
participants.’ *^® After the end of the IRA ceasefire, and with the loyalist groups ‘straining
politicos as communist but just refers to it ‘[stimng] the pot nicely’, though the implication appears to be 
that unionist politicians had some influence over the ‘propaganda unit’.
Op. cit. McAuley p. 52.
Bruce, S., The Red Hand. Protestant Paramilitaries In Northern Ireland. Oxford University Press, 1992, 
p. 242.
See ibid. pp. 236-7.
Although in the short term the agreement undennined the prospects for the loyalist political fronts it is 
possible to contend that the opposite was the case in the longer temi. It could be argued that the rise in 
loyalist violence increased pressure on the IRA, which in turn contributed to the ceasefires that were to give 
the loyalist political fronts a greater role.
Major, J., John Major. The Autobio graph v. Harper Collins, London, 1999, p. 469.
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at the leash’, ‘it was essential to have their political representatives at the table if we were 
to keep them on-side and off terrorism’.*** The utility of their political fronts was boosted 
considerably, therefore, because they were the political representatives of the two loyalist 
terrorist groups, whose continued ceasefires were imperative to the peace process. From 
the two groups’ point of view they also provided the means through which they could 
have access to the very top of the British political hierarchy. Moreover, the Good Friday 
Agreement represented the type of accommodation that the PUP and the UDP (and the 
UPRG and UDLP before it) had been proposing since the 1970s. In short the state 
response to the conflict had given the loyalist political fronts a much greater role in the 
1990s.
In the post Good Friday Agreement period, however, loyalists have become disillusioned 
by what they have seen as ‘outside agreement’ deals between the British government and 
Sinn Fein.**  ^ The perception that Downing Stieet has pandered to republicans and that 
loyalists have been increasingly sidelined from the process has placed enonnous pressure 
on the utility of the two groups’ political fronts. Indeed, the UDA’s apparent 
disillusionment with the peace process led to the dissolving of the UDP in November 
2001 while the PUP has also come under severe strain. David Eiwine has stated that he’s 
no longer sure that the UVF shares his pro peace process political analysis.**^
I l l Ibid. p. 490.
As argued by David Erviiie (interview).
Ervine, D., ‘Eivine warns of'crisis' in Northern peace process’, The Irish Times. May 10* 2002.
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The UDA
In order to fully understand UDA strategy it is important to assess government policy and 
security force response for its impact. There are two important factors that underpinned 
the strategy of the UDA. The first, (see chapter 9), is that it was very much a direct 
response to the violence of the IRA. The second is that it was also a reaction to the 
perception that British security forces were not doing enough to counter the republican 
threat. As the IRA murder campaign and sectarian riots escalated the loyalists 
increasingly felt that the security forces were failing to protect their communities. Indeed 
it was this that led to the formation of the original ‘Defence’ organisations in the first 
place.
It was also the rumours of secret negotiations and meetings with republicans that aroused 
the suspicion of loyalists and this, along with the ‘hands off’ approach that the 
government had taken towards the province, contributed to the evolving perception that 
the mainland did not care much for Northern Irish unionism and the Republic did not care 
much for Northern Catholics. The idea that Westminster was emotionally detached from 
the province, therefore, underpinned the UPRG and then the ULDP’s innovation of an 
Independent Ulster.
The government’s failed initiative of 1973-4 was to have an indirect impact on UDA
strategy. It was the failure of the state (aswell as constitutional unionism) to resolve the
conflict coupled with the new found confidence that the UDA managed to acquire from
the successful UWC stiike that led some of their leaders to think more politically. Thus
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the UDA’s political fronts, while they were attempts to represent the loyalist working 
class politically, were also the result of the failure of the state, as well as unionist 
politicians, to resolve the conflict or come up with a workable solution.
The new rapprochement between Margaret Thatcher and Charles Haughey in 1980 
marked the beginning of closer cooperation between Westminster and Leinster House 
that was ultimately to lead to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agieement. To much of 
unionism and loyalism the perception was that if London and Dublin became closer that 
meant a united Ireland was on its way.**'* Despite protestations from Ian Paisley, the 
relationship was consolidated between Thatcher and GaiTet Fitzgerald and when the 
Agieement was eventually signed the monolith of unionism reemerged in all out 
opposition that left little room for UDA ‘politics’.
As noted above, the peace process gave the UDP a whole new profile. Through its 
articulate leaders, Gary McMichael and Davey Adams, the party enjoyed a degree of 
electoral success and an elevated profile as the political voice of the UDA, whose 
ceasefire was crucial to the success of the peace process. This role was to be shortlived, 
however, although the state’s policy can only be partly responsible for this. While 
loyalists may have felt sidelined by the political process in the post GFA period the 
support of the UDA for this process was always going to depend on how much the 
decentialised and fragmented structure of its organisation could be kept in tow.
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 172.
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The change in the leadership of the Ulster Political Research Group* after the expulsion 
of Adair from the organisation, and the UDA’s new ceasefire, appear to have brought the 
organisation back into the peace process fold. This time, however, the political front may 
have been used as a tactic to take attention away from the criminal exploits of the gi'oup. 
Adair had brought so much media attention to himself and the organisation’s activities 
that the UDA’s apparent resurgent political bona fides may simply be an attempt to 
deflect attention away from these nefarious activities, particularly when the government’s 
Assets Recovery Agency has just (February 2003) begun its work. Thus, despite the pro­
state nature of the loyalist groups, one shouldn’t discount the possibility that their 
political fronts too can be used as tactical devices and as propaganda outlets. In this case 
political pronouncements from the UDA’s political front and an apparent interest in a 
political settlement may just be a cover to disguise and protect the illegal criminal 
empires that it has established (echoing the 1980s when it was argued that the group’s 
political announcements were only a cover for such activities), while the UPRG has also 
been used to deny UDA involvement in sectarian attacks.**®
The UVF
The year 1974 was an important one as far as the state’s impact on the utility of political 
fronts was concerned. Garland states that ‘Francis Pym, the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland invited the UVF [and Sinn Fein] to ‘come in fi'om the cold’ on 16 
February 1974. His statement was seen in both Loyalist and Republican circles as making
The UPRG was actually formed by John White, an ally of Adair, but when Adair and White were 
thrown out o f the UDA the UPRG’s leadership changed hands.
See ‘UDA ceasefire ‘is not broken” , Belfast Telegraph. March 13* 2003.
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it possible for the UVF [and Sinn Fein] to take part in political negotiations for the 
future. ’ * By legalising Sinn Fein and the UVF the hope was that this would encourage 
the republican and loyalist teiTorists to think more politically. The object was to:
‘[allow] both organizations to participate in the political process ... Nevertheless, 
while welcoming the decision and recognizing that there was a need to develop a 
political party of its own, the UVF maintained that it had to remain an armed 
force ... A few days later, it dipped its toe in the political water by announcing 
that it would cause widespread disturbance unless bus fares in Belfast were 
reduced’.**^
Arthur Aughey stated that much of the political inspiration amongst loyalist gi'oups was 
government sponsored to encourage loyalists to think politically, but this was a very 
superficial activity -  ‘the crust on top of the violent volcano was very thin.’**® This 
seemed to be evident in the honific Dublin and Monaghan bombs that the UVF planted 
in May 1974.
The Ulster Workers Council stiike, according to Ervine, prompted the government to 
further persuade the UVF to become politically involved:
Op. cit. Garland p. 25.
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 124.
119 Aughey, A., interview.
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‘The Government saw further merit and urgency in encouraging political 
development after the U.W.C, strike, which had brought home how much political 
power could be wielded by non-conventional Protestant gioups.’*^®
Although it was the defeat of the Sunningdale agreement by the UWC stiike that 
provided the impetus for subsequent loyalist political fronts (because it was a 
breakthrough for loyalist working class consciousness), these government overtures also 
encouraged the UVF to think more politically.
There were, however, obstacles to overcome. Unionist politicians were alarmed by the 
new confidence of the loyalist working class and were only too willing to smear their 
political thinking as communism.*^* But, paradoxically, while the government tried to 
bring the UVF into politics to some in the British establishment it seemed that if this 
meant anything to do with socialism then it had to be undermined. Roy Garland noted:
‘In the [Sunday News 19.1.75] ... reference was made to the discovery of a 
‘restricted Ministry of Defence document’ which ‘showed clearly that the army 
regard its operations in Ireland as counter-revolutionary aimed at rooting out the 
Communist menace.’ This lends support to the view of Wallace, Foot, Holroyd 
and otliers that elements in the security forces were fighting their own war and 
fighting it within [this] ideological fianiework ... The UVF had been one of its 
victims’.
Ervine, D., quoted in op. cit. McKee p. 5
See Garland, R., Seeking a political Accommodation. The Ulster Volunteer Force: Negotiating Historv. 
Shankhill Community Publication, 1997, pp. 27-8.
Ibid. p. 35.
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This seiwed as a reminder that in the big scheme of things communism was the gi'eat 
‘evil’ of the day and any group that was remotely associated with class sti'uggle would 
have difficulty getting accepted. The UVF was not communist, however, although it 
suited unionist politicians to have people think otherwise.
The dismal failure of the VPP prompted the UVF to disregard political involvement for 
the time being. In the meantime, the IRA truce of 1975 rejuvenated fears of a government 
sellout and so loyalists intensified their level of violence in an effort to provoke the IRA 
to break its ceasefire. The tit for tat bombings that followed were hardly the sort of 
environment in which loyalist political fronts could develop. This was especially the case 
when the notorious ‘Shanldiill butchers’ under Lenny Miuphy emerged from within the 
UVF to commit the most blatantly sectarian and gruesome murders of the Troubles.
The PUP was also swallowed up in the broad unionist solidarity against the Anglo-Irish 
Agieement, although the episode seiwed to confirm to the paity that once again the UVF 
was being used by mainstieam politicians:
‘We cannot allow our position to go by default as happened in 1985. We must 
give direction and leadership and we have an opportunity to develop an equitable, 
pluralist society. ’
As with the UDP the peace process elevated the role of the PUP to an unprecedented 
level. Unlike the UDP, however, the party has suiwived despite the perception that
Progressive Unionist Party website quoted in McAuley J.,and Hisiop, S., ‘ ‘Many roads forward’: 
Politics and Ideology within the Progiessive Unionist Party’, Etudes Irlandaises. Spring 2000.
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loyalists have been sidelined from the peace process, primarily because the UVF is a 
more disciplined and centialised group than the UDA and because it does have two seats 
in the Legislative Assembly. It is vital, however, that loyalists are included in the political 
process if the role of the PUP is to be sustained or strengthened.
Conclusion
It was the constitutional instability of the province that derived from the ‘state’ in 
Northern Ireland, with two states laying claim to the same territoiy, along with 
Westminster’s traditional ‘detachment’ from the province, that provided a boost to 
would-be extremists on both sides. Nevertheless, the value of Anglo-Irish cooperation 
was evident through internment without trial on both sides of the border in the 1956-62 
campaign. The states’ security response had defeated the IRA prompting the group to 
reevaluate its str ategy with the aim of recouping lost support. Although this did entail an 
expanded role for Sinn Fein it was no longer to be a ‘front’ but was part of the leftward 
drift of Goulding’s IRA.
The state’s response was very different in the early 1970s. The ‘rape of the falls’, 
internment without trial and Bloody Sunday all served to polarize the conflict and 
militated against the use of political fronts. So too did the Irish Republic’s response 
which also helped to stir up loyalist emotions and republican aspirations of Dublin 
intervention.
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The deproscription of Sinn Fein in 1974 was designed to encourage the ‘politicians’ in 
the republican movement at the expense of the militarists but it enabled the IRA to use its 
political front as an extia weapon in its stiuggle to rid the British from the island in the 
decades ahead. The failure of the tiTice of 1975 and the government’s ‘deception’ by 
apparently pretending to withdraw from the province confirmed the IRA’s scepticism of 
the political sphere. This did not, however, mean that the role of Sinn Fein was therefore 
restricted. In fact the opposite was the case as Adams sought to expand the struggle to all 
fronts as well as the military one. The confirmation that the British state was not 
intending to leave the province and the republican view that the IRA came closest to 
defeat at this time had forced the movement to think more in the longer term and this 
entailed an expanded role for the political front. The truce did, however, lead to the 
establishment of Sinn Fein incident centies that would subsequently be utilised for the 
new strategy.
The removal of special category status for terrorist prisoners through the policy of 
Ulsterisation, nomialisation and criminalisation led to a series of events that were to have 
a profound effect on IRA strategy. It was the issue that prompted republican prisoners to 
launch a ‘dirty’ protest and then the hunger stiikes of 1981 which in turn led to Sands’ 
successful by-election. It was this pivotal event that persuaded the IRA to go to the polls.
So concerned was the British government at the success of Sinn Fein that they sought to
marginalise extr emism and bolster the centre ground of Northern Irish politics through
the Anglo-Irish Agreement. This was perhaps somewhat ironic given the fact that a
decade earlier Sinn Fein was legalised in an effort to strengthen the hand of the
‘politicos’ in the movement. Now the government tried to curtail the political front’s
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success and therefore its utility to the Army Council. Although the AIA failed to make a 
serious dent in the electorate of the party the government persisted in trying to halt Sinn 
Fein’s progress by imposing a media ban on the voices of teiTorist groups.
Peter Brooke’s remarks, however, declaring that the United Kingdom had no ‘selfish or 
strategic’ interest in Northern Ireland represented a shift in the government’s policy that 
was to ultimately bring mainstream republicanism into an all-inclusive peace process and 
this was to give the political front an unprecedented role, whether or not it represented 
moderation towards the use of violence. The legitimisation of Sinn Fein and indeed the 
republican stmggle through the peace process (by the UK, the Irish Republic and the US) 
has, it is argued, been the main factor behind the party’s electoral success. This 
legitimisation has enabled the party to negotiate as the ‘tough lawyer’ for the Catholic 
community and thereby gain support at the expense of the moderate SDLP. It has also 
enabled the political front to be used as the means to gain a number of concessions for the 
IRA while, at the time of writing, the threat of violence remains.
The British state has at times also facilitated Sinn Fein’s domestic and international 
propaganda function through its own fransgressions in response to the terrorist threat -  
whether it be through episodes like Bloody Sunday or the internment of the early 1970s, 
miscaiTiages of justice such as the Guildford Four and Binningham Six cases, shoot to 
kill allegations, or perhaps most serious of all the real and perceived collusion between 
the security forces and loyalist paramilitary groups. Added to this is the fact that the 
Catholic population as a whole have had little confidence in the security forces and so it 
has at times constituted a willing audience receptive to republican propaganda.
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Thus, the state has certainly facilitated the gi eater utilisation of the political front of the 
IRA -  through Sinn Fein’s legalisation in 1974, the establishment of Sinn Fein incident 
centres in 1975 and, after trying to marginalise the party during the 1980s, through 
enticing the republican movement into an all-inclusive settlement to the conflict. The 
British government (along with the Irish and American administrations) have directly 
encouraged the greater use of the IRA’s political front, whether or not this has ultimately 
come to represent moderation towards the use of violence.
As far as the loyalist gi'oups are concerned the roots of their political fr onts can be traced 
to the break-up of the monolith of unionism when O’Neill tried to introduce reforms. 
Henceforth the unionist ‘right’ were to provide the political voice of working class 
loyalism. To some within the loyalist groups, however, it became increasingly clear that 
loyalist workers were being ‘manipulated’ by politicians like Paisley and Craig. This, and 
the failure of the state to resolve the conflict, prompted some loyalists to think more 
politically, particularly after the UWC strike of 1974, with the aim of somehow reaching 
accommodation with the ‘enemy’. These impulses, such as the the UDA’s notion of 
‘negotiated independence’, were underpinned by Westminster’s traditional and 
continuing emotional detachment fr om the province.
The violence of the two loyalist groups, however, has been reactionary and has often 
been determined by the perceived inadequacy of the British government’s response to 
republicans, or fears of a secret deal between the two, as well as the level of IRA 
violence. The 1975 IRA trnce, for example, prompted the UVF (who feared a secret deal) 
to try to draw the IRA back into conflict. Their political frnnts therefore, which partly
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represented attempts to seek accommodation with their enemies, were prey to the 
imperatives of reactionary loyalist violence that would undermine their attempts to 
achieve political ‘respectability’ in the midst of a ‘law abiding’ community.
The AIA of 1985 was to have a negative impact on the loyalist political fronts as the 
Agr eement was so universally opposed by unionists that it had the effect of temporarily 
resunecting the monolith of unionism. This left the loyalist groups with no other role 
than their tr aditional one. Such was the str ength of political opposition to the AIA the 
only option left to the groups if they were to have any relevance at all was to oppose the 
accord with violence or the threat of violence.
The response of the state in the 1990s, however, was to have a direct impact on the utility 
of the loyalist political fr onts. As with Sinn Fein, it was vital that the PUP and the UDP 
should remain fully engaged with the peace process if the ceasefires of their respective 
organisations were to hold. As such the profiles and utility of these fronts reached 
unprecedented levels. The new political dispensation, however, did not include any UDP 
representation in the Assembly and this was a factor in the eventual demise of the party, 
although the UDA’s decentralised and fragmented structure of illegal fiefdoms (see 
chapter 4) had more to do with this. The unionist and loyalist perception that since the 
Good Friday Agreement was signed the state has been drip-feeding concessions to Sinn 
Fein and the IRA has led to a loss of faith in the peace process within the UVF and this, 
corTespondingly, has put pressure on the Progressive Unionist Party, whose 
spokesperson, David Erwine, continually warns of disillusionment within the group.
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Chapter 9 - The External Environment -  Other 
Factors
The previous two chapters have sought to assess the impact of state response and popular 
support on the strategies of the IRA, UDA and UVF vis a vis their use of a political front. 
This chapter seeks to broaden the external environment by briefly assessing the impact of 
the international environment (the US and Libya)* and other factors in the domestic 
environment. In the case of the IRA ‘other factors’ includes the loyalist response in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, the giowth of the SDLP, the hunger strikes of 1981 and Sinn 
Fein’s potential electorate and changes to it. It will be argued that Bobby Sands’ by 
election victory and President Clinton’s engagement with Sinn Fein have both been 
hugely significant in bringing about the gieater utility of the political fi'ont. It is the 
domestic external environment that has had the most significant impact on the utility of 
the loyalist political fronts. The problem of being pro-state, the law abiding nature of 
unionism, the division of labour ethos within unionism, and the actions of and loyalist 
response to the IRA, have all been powerful obstacles to the development of loyalist 
political fronts. Yet, it was the perceived changing nature of the relationship between 
working class loyalism and ‘respectable’ unionism that spawned them.
' This is not to argue that there were not other factors in the international environment that might have an 
impact on the utility of political flouts (such as the end o f the Cold W ar- see note 81) but the US’ role, it is 
argued, has been enonnously significant in bringing about the greater utility o f Sinn Fein (and indeed the 
loyalist fronts), and the Libyan relationship with the IRA has also directly affected the latter’s stiategy.
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It is worth noting some aspects of the social histoiy of the two communities that may also 
have had some bearing on the role and utility of political fronts on both the loyalist and 
republican sides. History, religion, culture and economic development had all combined 
‘to produce two distinct communities’^  or as Lyons puts it, a ‘clash of cultures’.^  James 
Dingley, a sociologist at the University of Ulster, has highlighted the enormous cultural 
difference between unionism and nationalism.'* Most significant is the notion that the 
majority community in Northern Ireland is peimeated by an individualistic ethos that 
champions hard work and individual achievement.^ This was borne out in the industiial 
revolution in the North and the giowth of large manufacturing industries such as Harland 
and Wolff.*^  Amongst the loyalist working classes there has been an emphasis on 
communalism as opposed to communism. While they may have hated their unionist 
employers they would have no truck with Catholics. Thus, Dingley conti'asts the 
‘scientific’ socialism of loyalists to the ‘romantic’ socialism of nationalists.^
In short the ‘community’ ethos prevalent in the minority community in the North would 
lend itself to a gi'eater role for a political fi-ont, whereas the individualistic ethos in 
unionism generally would not. As Aughey noted that when referring to the type of 
relationship between the UDA and the UVF and their political fronts, it is more about a 
bunch of individuals rather than any institutionalised cross membership. By contrast Sinn 
Fein is part of a social movement with a stiong notion of community. This is miiTored by 
Dingley’s obseiwation that there are few Catholics in the engineering and natural science
 ^Bucldand, P., A History o f Northern Ireland. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1981, p. 6.
 ^Lyons, F., Culture and Anarchy in Ireland. 1890-1939, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, p. 24.
Dingley, J., interview.
 ^See ‘Ulster; the Roots o f Difference’ (chapter 5) in op. cit. Lyons.
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fields but there are more who are affiliated to the arts. The converse is generally the case 
for Protestants.
The IRA
The Loyalist Response
The first factor that is well worth considering for its impact on the utility of an IRA 
political fi'ont is the loyalist response to the civil rights marches of the late 1960s and how 
the perceived imminence of pogi'oms against Catholic areas pushed any idea of politics to 
the background. This, it is contended, would even have limited the use of a political front 
as a tactical device as some of the subsequent tactical roles of Sinn Fein would not have 
helped to address, and indeed might have drawn time and effort away fiom, the perceived 
impending crisis. The loyalist response therefore, whipped up by Paisley and Craig,  ^
helped to polarize the brewing conflict between the two communities in Northern Ireland 
and this militated against the gieater utilisation of Sinn Fein.
It would be incomplete to refer to this seemingly unreasonable loyalist attitude without 
making reference to the unionist ‘seige mentality’ and the insecurity of the unionist
® See op. cit. Bucldand p. 5.
’ Dingley, J., interview.
® Paul Arthur ponders the degree to which ‘Northern Ireland was a relatively mild and insulated form of 
‘paranocracy’ (Arthur, P., ‘The Heath government and Northern Ireland’, in Ball, S., and Seldon, A., The 
Heath Government 1970-74. Longman, London, p. 256.) ‘in which the basis o f power was the successful 
appeal to paranoid fears in the Protestant electorate about the political, social, philosophical and military 
potential o f their Catholic neighbours’ (Heskin, K., Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis. Dublin, 
1981, pp. 100-2.)
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population in general. The Protestant community’s underlying anxiety is borne of a 
centuries old fear of fonning a minority within the island of Ireland against the traditional 
adversarial Catholic ‘menace’. It is the fear of being oveiwhelmed by Catholicism and its 
‘naiTOw’ practices that underpins unionist opposition to a united Ireland. This is 
exacerbated by suspicions that the British government might abandon the province and 
leave them at the mercy of Dublin and ‘Rome rule’.
No better is this siege mentality exemplified than during the Parades season and 
particularly in the tense stand-offs at Drumcree. The founder of the ‘Spirit of Drunicree’ 
gi'oup explained:
‘In many ways it’s not about 800 Orangemen marching down a road. It’s about 
the suiwival of a culture, of an identity, of a way of life ... The Ulster people have 
their backs against the wall.’^
Lennon confinns that the experience of the Protestant community over the last 200 years 
has been one of the loss of power and influence with a fear of the South, of Catholics and 
of an IRA re-emergence.*** Coupled with this insecurity is the view that, as Rose points 
out, Protestants may view discrimination is less about the fact but about what is fair* * - if 
nationalists and republicans are out to destroy Northern Ireland then why should they 
expect equal rights fiom the constitution they are seeking to repudiate?
® Patton, J., quoted in Taylor, P., Loyalists. Bloomsbury, London, 1999, p. 239.
Lennon, B., After the Ceasefires. Catholics and the Future of Northern Ireland. Colombia Press, Dublin, 
1995, p. 20.
“ Rose, R., Governing Without Consensus. An Irish Perspective, Faber and Faber, London, 1971, p. 273.
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One could argue that it was the loyalist response to the civil rights movement that was the 
single most important factor that ignited the spark that led to the re emergence of the IRA 
as a significant force in the early 1970s. Paisley’s rhetoric, lambasting NICRA as a cover 
for the IRA and advertising it as a surreptitious route to a united Ireland, and the loyalists 
who responded helped to enable republicans to transform a conflict that arose over civil 
rights within the United Kingdom into a violent clash between separatism and unionism. 
Very few Catholics were countenancing an end to partition before the situation became 
so polarized. As Rose points out the civil rights marchers were doing the opposite of what 
Sinn Fein was trying to do -they were attempting to claim full rights as UK citizens.*^
NICRA was concerned with equality for Catholics. It is true that there were IRA 
members in NICRA but they certainly did not dominate the organisation.*^ It is also true 
that the People’s Democracy’s ultimate goal was the replacement of both the Stormont 
and Dublin regimes with an Irish Workers’ Republic*'* but nor did this organisation by 
any means represent the mainstream of the civil rights movement. Thus, it would be no 
exaggeration to suggest that the loyalist response not only helped the IRA come into 
being as a revitalised organisation once more but also created another chapter of real and 
perceived injustice against the Catholic population that republicans could draw upon and 
use as propaganda to support Sinn Fein’s role in this regard.
Not only did the brutal response to the civil rights movement increase support for the 
IRA but so too did Paisley’s denigration of the one party that might have taken support
Ibid. p. 156.
See Bishop, P., and Mallie, E., The Provisional IRA. London: Corgi, 1992, pp. 72-3.
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away from militant republicanism -  tire SDLP. Labelling the party ‘republican’ he 
rejected out of hand Faulloier’s attempts in 1971 to bring the moderate nationalist party 
into Northern Ireland’s government through the creation of three new committees, two of 
which were to be chaired by the SDLP.*  ^ Paisley’s reaction to even this meagre 
concession to the SDLP was bound to be counterproductive. Hardline unionist 
politicians’ inability to be reasonable with the constitutional Catholic party was bound to 
discredit the party within its own community, deeming them perhaps irTelevant and 
leaving the IRA further strengthened. There is no doubt that such intransigence helped 
create the conditions for the IRA to reap enough popular support for a strategy of 
violence alone and one that militated against any political enterprise.
Paddy Devlin explained that ‘in 1970 you weren’t relevant in Ardoyne or up the Falls 
unless you were giving up flame-throwers’*^ . To give some indication of how polarized 
the situation was becoming, ‘while republicanism was still split and bereft of anything 
resembling political organisation’, even members of the ‘moderate’ SDLP were joining 
Citizens’ Defence Committees:*^
‘The times did not favour the organisation of traditional political parties: the huge 
movement of people displaced by initirnidation and the burnings of 1969 went on 
shiftirrg, settling and resettling throughout much of the seventies ... In 1974 a 
Community Relations Commission Report said that firm evidence existed of
Op. cit. Rose p. 159.
Kelley, K., The Loneest War. Northern Ireland and the IRA. Zed Press, London, 1982, p. 152.
Devlin, P., quoted in O’Connor, P., In Search Of A State. Catholics In Northern Ireland. Blackstaff Press, 
Belfast, 1995, p. 64.
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8,180 families forced to evacuate their homes in the greater Belfast area between 
August 1969 and February 1973, 80 per cent of which they estimated to be 
Catholic.’*^
In these circumstances there was less room for political activity. Wliile memories of 
Goulding’s discredited ‘political approach’ were also still fresh in the mind violence 
seemed to be the order of the day where politics was seen as a sign of wealaiess. Also 
strategies that entailed utilisation of a political front take time to develop and the 
imminence of violence against Catholics meant a preoccupation with defence and attack 
against those that threatened the perceived elimination of the minority community. In 
short, the domestic external environment in the early 1970s facilitated a violence alone 
strategy and not greater utilisation of it’s political front beyond its propaganda and 
vigilante functions.
The SDLP
The second ‘other factor’ was the fomiation of the Social and Democratic Labour Party 
and its emergence as the main political representative (until 2001) of the Catholic 
population. The party was launched in August 1970 under the leadership of Geny Fitt 
and was an amalgamation of the old Republican Labour, Northern Ireland Labour and 
Nationalist parties as well as Independents. It promoted left of centre policies and called 
for Irish reunification but with majority consent. Rejecting the use of violence, it saw
Op. cit. O’Connor p. 64. 
Ibid.
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itself as an alternative to stieet politics and the physical force tradition of republicanism 
and sought to bring politics back to parliament.
The emergence of the SDLP is important because its existence and fortunes have had a 
direct impact on republican considerations over the utility of the ballot box and therefore 
gr eater utilisation of its political front. Ever since the imposition of partition the IRA has 
long claimed to represent the Catholic population, especially after their ‘defensive’ role 
in the early 1970s. As noted above, this has meant that they had everything to lose by 
putting this assertion to the test, particularly when the reality was that it would be 
disproved by the SDLP, and not much to gain because they had in any case already 
claimed to represent the minority community. A longstanding reason, therefore, for the 
IRA’s refusal to adopt an electoral strategy has been fear of failure.
As noted above, ‘it took the unwelcome initiative of the prisoners in starting a hunger 
strike for political status to force a reluctant leadership into electoral politics.’*^ Sands’ 
success conquered the IRA’s fear of losing at the ballot box and the organisation now 
believed that they could credibly claim to represent a substantial constituency, a claim 
that they would have found difficult to substantiate in the past. Thus while republicans 
did not in fact poll as well as the SDLP they were able to command a sizeable part of the 
nationalist electorate and so exorcised their fear of the ballot box.
After the imposition of Direct Rule Bishop and Mallie argue that the attr action of the post 
Stormont SDLP was a contributory factor in the IRA losing popular support by the
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Spring of 1972. Indeed, as the Siinningdale project^* was getting off the ground Ruairi 
O’Bradaigh, President of Sinn Fein, was vexed by ‘the support that the power sharing 
agreement was generating for the SDLP’^  ^ and divisions arose as to how best to counter 
it. Many republicans believed that the SDLP had won concessions and votes on the back 
of the IRA and were resentful for this.^  ^ This frustration led to considerations for some 
kind of electoral engagement to fend off the SDLP from would be Sinn Fein supporters. 
The fear of being exposed as not after all representing the Catholic population and the 
belief that it would divert people from the real source of IRA legitimacy -  the British 
presence in Ireland -  meant that the electoral option, and thus a greater role for Sinn Fein, 
was rejected.
It was a dilemma that was to resurface in 1981 but this time the IRA took its chances at 
the polls. Henceforth the gioup’s performance at the ballot box would affect the degiee to 
which mainstream republicans would have faith in the electoral project, and therefore 
Sinn Fein’s expanded role. The performance and tactics of the SDLP were therefore of 
direct relevance as a factor in the domestic external environment. Most notably pressure 
was put on Sinn Fein with the emergence of the SDLP-inspired New Ireland Forum 
which then led to the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The objective of the 
AIA was to sti engthen moderate nationalism in the North which meant undermining the 
bullet and ballot box strategy of the IRA and Sinn Fein. This in turn put pressure on the
Op. cit. Patterson p. 193.
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 221
Siinningdale was where the failed power sharing experiment o f 1974 was hatched. 
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 265.
See op. cit. O’Connor p. 19.
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utility of Sinn Fein’s electoral role and strengthened the hand of those republicans who 
were suspicious of having to ‘refine’ their actions in keeping with Sinn Fein priorities, 
especially when Libyan shipments of weapons put the armed campaign on as sound a 
footing as it had ever been.
Perhaps one of the failings of the SDLP, and this has helped to sustain Adams’ political 
strategy, has been that it has never really appealed to the working classes, but has been 
more associated with ‘Castle Catholics’ and the middle class. The failure to tackle social 
deprivation in places like West Belfast has left the door open for Sinn Fein to utilise a 
natural constituency of Catholic working class voters. A confidential SDLP survey was 
apparently earned out in West Belfast that found that white collar workers were three 
times more likely to have voted for the SDLP than for Sinn Fein and that the unemployed 
and those ‘at subsistence levels’ were twice as likely to have voted Sinn Fein.^  ^ Sinn 
Fein attracts few political idealogues but appeal to any group that bears economic 
grievance or feels socially excluded.^*^  Father Denis Faul stated that the Church must 
speak for Catholics ‘at the shaip end of injustice and sectarianism’ -  or lose souls to ‘the 
Pro vos’ by allowing Sinn Fein to consolidate an underclass vote.’^ ^
The attitude of the Catholic Church and its alignment more with the SDLP than 
republicans might have been another factor that has militated against the utility of Sinn
After démocratisation in Spain in 1974 the Spanish group ETA were also concerned by the number of 
votes that were being cast for the moderate nationalist party, the PNV, by voters who might otherwise have 
voted for the group.
See op. cit. O’ Connor pp. 68 and 71. This is notwithstanding that some of its founders were deeply 
rooted in working class communities in West Belfast, such as Geny Fitt and Paddy Devlin.
^ fÜ d .p. 61.
Quoted in op. cit. O’Connor p. 298.
304
Fein as an electoral tool in a religions society. In her siii*vey of Catholic attitudes O’ 
Connor states that ‘the perception that the Church’s ‘political point of view’ includes an 
unwillingness to offend the state -  as well as closeness to the SDLP -  is widely shared’^® 
and the ‘repeated denunciation (by the Church) of the use of violence, and of apologists 
for violence, has made clear what the officially approved attitude is to Sinn Fein. 
Constant praise for the moderation and morality of the advocates of constitutional 
nationalism indicates where the Church’s blessing lies.’^ ^
It should also be noted that the SDLP has influenced republican thinking in other ways. 
During the New Ireland Forum discussions O’Connor detected a ‘new language’ from 
republicans where the period of transition to a united Ireland started to be defined in 
generations. While this change in attitude might have signalled the potential for some 
kind of peace process, it also seemed to entail a greater role for Sinn Fein. John Hume’s 
role as persuader (ft'om the late 1980s^ **) to Adams’ that there was no merit in continuing 
the aimed sti'uggle was also a factor that would assist the development of Sinn Fein.^ * 
Hume was pivotal in bringing Adams around to understanding ‘that progress could only 
be made by persuading the unionist community, who were the real opponents of Irish 
unity, of the need for c h a n g e . I n  fact it could be argued that, as the leader of the 
respectable and constitutional party of nationalism, it was Hume himself who first
Op. cit. O’Connor p. 282. 
Ibid. p. 291.
30 In what became laiown as the Hume-Adams dialogue.
See, for example, Bowcott, O., ‘Catholic parties rule out new deal’, The Guardian. April 25*'' 1993. 
Farren, S., ‘Surviving turmoil and threat to play a pivotal role’, Irish Times. August 20*'* 2000.
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publicly confeiTcd legitimacy on the IRA and Sinn Fein by pursuing his lengthy dialogue
with Adams.^^
Sinn Fein’s potential electorate
Another factor that has had a direct impact on the electoral performance of the IRA’s 
political front, and therefore its utility as an electoral tool, has been the size of Sinn 
Fein’s potential electorate. What is particularly interesting is that much of Sinn Fein’s 
core support appears to come from voters who might have had any type of grievance?^ 
The party has been able to harness support from people who have had grievances that 
may be socially or economically related rather than politically motivated.
This would tend to suggest that social and economic deprivation has enhanced the 
electoral perfoniiance of the IRA’s political front. Richard Rose, however, refutes the 
suggestion that such deprivation is related to the constitutional issue in the Northern 
Ireland context. Loss of economic being, he argued in Governing Without Consensus, 
hadn’t meant a challenge to the London regime in the past.^  ^ He continued: ‘the 
politician’s theory that Catholic allegiance can be bought with economic benefits is 
refuted by the evidence.Cavanaugh also argues that political violence in N. Ireland has
See, for example, Pyle, P., ‘Why critics have sought to link SDLP and IRA’, Irish Times. February 2T ‘, 
1989.
See, for example, op. cit. O’Connor p. 61.
Op. cit. Rose p. 71.
Ibid. p. 300.
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not been related to economic deprivation, thus dismissing ‘deprivation theory’ or ‘equity 
theory’?  ^The conflict, she argued, has been waged on nationalist not class divisions.
Wichert nevertheless argued that there is a clear link between high unemployment and 
social deprivation and communal violence or clashes with state forces in areas such as 
West Belfast.^  ^Moxon-Browne has stated that ‘in essence PIRA represents the ‘cutting 
edge’ of a movement which finds roots in the fmstration of relative deprivation 
experienced by a section of the Catholic community in N. Ireland.Coupled with this is 
the reputation that Sinn Fein has managed to establish for itself as the hardest working 
party ‘on the ground’ not only in terms of canvassing votes but also through its 
engagement with community politics and its resolution of local issues and giievances. 
Thus Sinn Fein’s activity in this area, coupled with the SDLP’s apparent lack of interest 
in deprived areas, has meant that the IRA’s political front has found natural allies and 
supporters through the unemployed, those with poor housing, those poorly educated, and 
those who feel marginalised by a society they feel is unjust, and this has therefore 
increased its utility as an electoral tool. None of these attributes necessarily mean these 
people vote for Sinn Fein to secure a united Ireland.'*** Lennon makes the additional point 
that the deprived are unemployed and bored and are more likely to commit crime hence it 
is not suiprising that there is a conflict between deprived people and the police.'** This 
provides another reason for these people to become the natural allies of Sinn Fein (who
Cavanaugh, K., ‘Interpretations Of Political Violence In Ethnically Divided Societies’, Terrorism And 
Political Violence, Vol. 9, Autumn 1997, No. 3, p. 40.
Wichert, S., Northern Ireland Since 1945. Longman, London and New York, 1991, pp. 184-5. 
Moxon-Browne, E., ‘The Water and the Fish: Public Opinion and the Provisional IRA in Northern 
Ireland’, Wilkinson, P. (ed.), British Perspectives On Terrorism. Allen and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 69. 
See, for example, op. cit. O’Connor p. 70.
Op. cit. Lennon p. 137.
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have withheld support from the ‘illegitimate’ police force), especially if the police are 
often perceived as protecting the better off/^
Thus, while it may not necessarily be the case that economic benefits enhance the 
political allegiance of Catholics to the state (Rose pointed out that the state could not buy 
allegiance with such benefits) they might well moderate the expression of this lack of 
allegiance and thus enhance the vote of the moderate nationalist party at the expense of 
Sinn Fein. In other words while antipathy to the state may remain, and Rose makes the 
point that there was no consistent tendency for upward or downwardly mobile Catholics 
to have their views toward the Constitution altered by mobility,'*  ^the methods of showing 
it will have been moderated.
The significance of all this is that if Sinn Fein was aware that much of its electorate 
consisted of all types of disaffected groups then its calls in recent years and under the 
new political dispensation to regenerate socially and economically deprived areas would 
appear to have risked losing these people their cause of disaffection and possibly 
therefore their votes. The chances of upward mobility would have been enhanced and 
thus more SDLP supporting Castle Catholics would have been created. Thus, would these 
calls to address such deprivation in socially disadvantaged Catholic districts not have 
reduced the utility of the political fr ont as an electoral tool?
Ibid.
Op. cit. Rose p. 342.
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Wliether or not this has or would have been the case the issue has been superceded by a 
more significant factor. The legitimisation of the IRA and Sinn Fein by the governments 
of the UK, Irish Republic and the US and the resulting reputation that the party has 
gained as the ‘tough lawyer’'*'* for Catholics (as opposed to the ‘weak lawyer’, the SDLP) 
has seen the party’s fortunes improve considerably and its potential electorate expand 
through the peace process.
Thus, the type of state response has increased the appeal of Sinn Fein, expanded its 
support base and has therefore increased the utility of the political fiont as an electoral 
tool and as a result it has now managed to eat into the SDLP’s constituency with its so- 
called ‘non-territorial nationalism.’ State response has therefore helped to create new 
opportunities as far as the potential electorate for the IRA’s political front is concerned 
and therefore given it greater utility.
The Hunger Strikes
Wlienever one attempts to generate hypotheses or contribute to theory fonnulation one 
shouldn’t underestimate the impact of unforeseen events. This is particularly tme of the 
IRA case in this thesis. One such event that could not be anticipated was ‘the fluke of 
Independent (Unity) MP Frank Maguire’s deaüi during the surge of nationalist sympathy 
for the prison hunger stiikers of 1981.’'*^ Not only did this provide an opening for Sands 
but it was at a time when the Catholic population appeared to be radicalised by the
A term used by Aughey, A., (interview) to describe Sinn Fein’s stance in the peace process negotiations. 
Op. cit. O’Connor p. 76.
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strikes. Thus, if there was one episode that was fundamental with regard to the greater 
utilisation of Sinn Fein as a political front then it was the hunger strikes and Bobby 
Sands’ election victory. The events of 1981 more than anything conquered the fear 
amongst republicans of using the ballot box and represented a turning point as far as Sinn 
Fein’s role was concerned.
The crucial thing to understand is that while in the longer tenn this greater utilisation of 
Sinn Fein may indeed have ultimately represented moderation on the part of the 
movement, at the time its expanded role was to go hand in hand with the aimed struggle. 
It was still clearly not a substitute or an alternative to a sti’ategy of violence, but rather an 
adjunct to it. Sands’ success was seen by the IRA as a mandate for the armed stmggle and 
a confidence booster to not just continue with the ‘war’ but to pursue it with even more 
deteimination.'**’ Not only did it reinforce the justification for violence and attract droves 
of new recruits to the cause but it also galvanised and motivated republicans to expand 
the so called ‘Long war’ strategy that Adams had advocated in the late 1970s. Sinn Fein’s 
policy also became harder line in the light of the hunger strikes. Wichert notes that up to 
1980 Sinn Fein demanded phased withdrawal of the British, but changed this to 
immediate withdrawal.'*^
Noraid was said to have doubled its income from contributors during the hunger strikes. (Ball, I., ‘IRA 
Cash fiom U.S. Doubled’, Daily Telegraph. October 13“‘ 1981).
47 Op. cit Wichert p. 186.
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The International Environment
The United States
As the world has become more globalised internal conflict and sub-state insurgencies 
rarely come without an international dimension. Washington’s interest in the Northern 
Ireland conflict is borne of a burgeoning Irish-American diaspora that emanated from the 
two gieat emigration drives after the Irish famine and the defeat of the anti-tieatyites after 
the Irish Civil War, and so Irish-Americans have, like the South of Ireland, a historical 
sympathy with the cause of Irish republicanism. This has given Sinn Fein great utility as 
a propaganda machine because North America has been seen by the party as ‘a key 
battlegi'ound in the propaganda war with Britain’'*^ and it has therefore organised 
numerous ‘propaganda tours’ there.
Sinn Fein’s role as the political voice of the IRA has also been transmitted through the 
media. A good example of this has been the ‘Geny Adams column’ in the Irish Voice, an 
Irish-America paper, through which the Sinn Fein leader has been able to channel the 
IRA’s view of events, criticizing the ‘imperialist’ British, and lauding republican 
‘martyi's’.^ * The column was particularly useful for republicans as a way of explaining to 
the American audience the reasons, for example, behind the breakdown of the IRA’s
Doyle, L., ‘Sinn Fein pins hopes on Noraid for new blood’. The Independent. January 23“* 1989.
Also see Doyle, L., ‘Words, not weapons, are the war strategy in the U S’, The hidependent. September 
11**' 1989.
*^* See, for example. Bishop, P., ‘Propaganda tour plan by Sinn Fein’, The Observer. October 24**' 1982.
*^ These articles were subsequently serialised in a book (Adams, G., An Irish Voice. The Guest for Peace. 
Mount Eagle, Dingle, County Derry, 1997). See, for example, pp. 141, 148, 160.
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ceasefire in February 1996 and how (alleged) British government obduracy and stalling 
caused it^ ,^ and how the ‘international media gathered to see Sinn Fein [subsequently] 
being refused entry to the ‘all-party talks” in June^ ,^ and how ‘being stopped at British- 
staffed checkpoints [was] a fact of life for Nationalists in Northern Ireland’^ '*
The United States has been a potent source of funds and aims with which to sustain the 
sti'uggle at home. Such assistance, allegedly through groups like Noraid (Northern Irish 
Aid), has helped to keep the IRA aimed^  ^and mobilised and therefore helped to militate 
against the use of a political front as a sign of moderation. Gun running operations have 
also been a common feature of Irish-American support for the aimed struggle.^ ** Indeed, 
according to Bishop and Mallie, ‘by 1981, forty-seven per cent of the weapons recovered 
by the police and Army since the troubles started were of American manufacture.’^^  Thus 
‘Irish-American republicans made an extiemely important contribution to the IRA’.^  ^
Such support, both in teims of funding and arms, helped the IRA pursue its armed 
struggle and would have lessened the likelihood that its political front would have been 
used as a sign of moderation.
Sinn Fein’s propaganda function both at home and in the US and the support that this has 
helped to generate for the Irish republican cause has meant that the political front has also 
been a useful fundraising tool. Although there are a plethora of republican fundraising
Ibid. p. 201.
55 Ibid. p. 218.
5“ Ibid. p. 240.
55 Nicholson-Lord, D,, ‘Noraid men implicated in $5m arms deals’, The Times. February 23“" 1982.
5* See Wilson, A., Irish America and the Ulster Conflict 1968-1995. Blackstaff, Belfast 1995, pp. 290-1. 
52 Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 301.
5® See op. cit. Wilson p. 292.
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organisations one shouldn’t forget the utility of Sinn Fein in this regard. It has been 
argued in this thesis that Sinn Fein’s primary role has been to develop popular support for 
the struggle and one positive offshoot of this has been greater income from fundraising at 
home and abroad, and particularly the United States. Sinn Fein spokesmen have 
addressed republican support gioups in the US with the aim of raising money for the 
IRA.^ ** Beyond these ‘propaganda tours’ the political front has also been engaged in
organising collections at functions in pubs and clubs 60
Apart from its important propaganda role in mobilising greater domestic and international 
support, the role of the political front as the fundraiser for IRA resources and activities 
should not be overstated. The IRA have used a variety of other effective means of raising 
funds, including protection rackets, illegal taxi fiiiiis, building site frauds, illegal drinking 
clubs, kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies, smuggling and counterfeiting. It has also 
benefited from Noraid’s fundraising activities.
Sinn Fein has, however, been able to raise substantial sums for its own party finances. 
Initially, in the 1980s, there was a certain degi ee of resentment that IRA funds should go 
towards Adams’ political strategy.*’^  Since then Sinn Fein has become self-sustaining 
through its fundiaising activity and in fact has become the richest party in Northern
5** See, for example, ‘Sinn Fein activist to be deported from U S’, The Independent, November 16*'* 1989.
See Horgan, J., and Taylor, M., ‘Playing the ‘Green Card’ -  Financing the Provisional IRA: Part 1’, 
Terrorism and Political Violence. Summer 1999, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 35 (footnote 36).
See two excellent articles on IRA fundraising: Horgan and Taylor’s ‘Playing the ‘Green Card’ -  
Financing the Provisional IRA: Part 1’ (ibid.) and James Adams’ ‘The Financing o f Terror’ (op. cit.). See 
also ‘Rackets and business keep millions coming in’, The Sunday Times, August 7**' 1988, and Cusack, J., 
and Keogh, E., ‘Gang used Garda unifoims in cigarettes raid’, The Irish Times. December 5**' 2001.
See, for example, Clarke, L., Broadening the Battlefield. The H Blocks and the Rise of Sinn Fein. Gill 
and Macmillan, Dublin, 1987, p. 230.
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Ireland. This financial footing on its own has increased the utility of the political front as 
an electoral and propaganda machine. In the United States ‘Friends of Sinn Fein’ has 
been funding the party since 1995 and by the end of 2002 it was said to have raised 
nearly 5.5 million dollars^  ^with Adams able to draw a thousand guests at $500 dollar a 
head fundraising dinners*^ '*. Friends of Sinn Fein apparently ‘agreed to a deal with the 
Department of Justice in Washington, which meant that every dollar raised and spent in 
Ireland had to be accounted for and the books audited by an accountant nominated by the 
federal governm entw hich in turn meant that none of the money raised would be 
allowed to fund the IRA. The party also currently receives the highest amount of money 
in donations in comparison with any other political party on the island of Ireland.**^
It is not clear how much, if any, of this money has contributed to the sustenance of the 
IRA but the very fact that Sinn Fein is the richest party on the island of Ireland has 
enhanced its utility as a fighting electoral machine considerably. As such, in this respect 
the popular support and international environment variables have been particularly 
important in increasing the utility of Sinn Fein as an electoral tool.
The US was to have a very different kind of impact on the utility of Sinn Fein when, 
much to the ire of the British government, in 1994 President Clinton granted Geny 
Adams a 48 hour visa. In fact, leading US politicians had made an impact since the early
55 Ray O’Hanloii, ‘Adams to meet Haass, fundraise’, The Irish Echo online, Newshound, website: 
http://www.nuzhound.com , November 6-12 2002.
Breen, S., ‘Victim’s mother to picket SF fimd-raiser in N Y ’, Irish Times. November 4*'* 2000.
**5 Moloney, E., A Secret Histoiv o f the IRA. Penguin, London, 2002, p. 460.
Parties in the Irish Republic are not required to register donations under 4000 pounds but those over that 
amount give a total Sinn Fein figure o f approximately 300,000 pounds in 2001 (from an overall total
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1970s. In 1971, for example, Senator Edward Kennedy had called for the immediate 
withdrawal of British troops from the province, and was therefore accused of giving 
encouragement to the IRA.^  ^ Though he later moderated his position in support of 
constitutional nationalism, the so-called ‘Four Horsemen’ of Irish-American politics (of 
which he was a member were to have a significant bearing on US policy on Northern 
Ireland. Although they denounced IRA violence they also criticised British government 
policy. In 1979 they succeeded in getting the State Department to suspend the sale of 
handguns to the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary)^**, much to the ire of the British 
government. The group then foiiiied Friends of Ireland which ‘contained some of the 
most powerful politicians in America’.^** The ‘Friends’ supported the New Ireland Forum 
and were instrumental behind the US pressure that helped to bring a more conciliatory 
Margaret Thatcher in the negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Irish Agreement.^'
Those in the US that lobbied for a visa to be granted to Adams argued that it ‘would 
strengthen moderates within the republican movement’ and ‘that further gains could be 
achieved if violence was ended .S ubsequen t US persuasion was one of the factors 
behind the IRA’s ceasefire in August 1994 and this was followed in September by the 
gianting of an unrestricted visa to Adams, further steps that enhanced the utility of the
donated to all parties o f approximately 750,000) compared to approximately 185,000 in 2000 (see ‘Sinn 
Fein oiitscores FF in donation league’, The Irish Times. April 17**' 2002).
*^2 Op. cit. Wilson p. 286.
The other three members were Senator Daniel Moynihan, the Speaker Tip O’Neill and Hugh Carey 
(Governor of New York).
See Bew, P., and Gillespie, G., Northern Ireland. A Chronology Of The Troubles, Gill and Macmillan, 
Dublin, 1999, p. 136.
2° Op. cit. Wilson p. 287.
2* Ibid. p. 287. This is not to ignore the fact in this paragraph that the US government was ‘generally 
responsive to British requests for action against the Irish-American republican network’ through 
undermining Noraid funding, breaking up gunnmniiig operations and maintaining (up to the 1990s) a 
‘highly restrictive’ visa policy against Sinn Fein (op. cit. Wilson p. 292.).
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IRA’s political front. Ever since the Sinn Fein leader has been seen as something of a 
world statesman by many Irish-Americans. This and the party’s access to the very top of 
the hierarchy of the world’s only supexpower were to raise the profile of Sinn Fein to new 
heights. Indeed, the sponsorship of Sinn Fein by the United States, the Irish Republic and 
the UK has meant that republican aspirations, and even the means it used, have been 
given a degree of legitimacy. In fact, to reiterate, the legitimisation of extremism has 
meant that, at the time of writing, it is increasingly Sinn Fein and not the SDLP who the 
Catholic electorate look to play hardball when it comes to winning concessions for the 
nationalist community as well as Catholics as a whole, and this has greatly enhanced Sinn 
Fein’s role as an electoral tool.
Libya And International Support
This thesis has suggested that a continued belief in the utility of violence alone as a 
strategy militates against the greater utilisation of a political front as a sign of 
moderation. There are a number of components to the perceived success in the use of 
violence. One of these is a ready supply of arms. The IRA is Icnown to have had a number 
of international links that have helped it to procure arms.^  ^ The inteinational strategic 
environment of the 1980s -  specifically the hostile relations between the UK and Libya^ '* 
-  led to Gadaffi supplying substantial aims shipments to the IRA.
22 Ibid. p. 295.
25 See, for example, ‘Provo arms links with Palestine guenillas’, Sundav Times. February 12**’ 1978. There 
have even been reports o f an IRA training camp on the edge of the Sahara Desert (see Linscott, G., ‘Sahara 
base for IRA -  Banks’, The Guardian. March 25**’ 1977).
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Following the Second World War Libya was gi'anted independence after a long history of 
colonial rule. Strong ‘Western’ influence, however, remained as the British, Americans 
and French ‘maintained large military bases to protect their political and economic 
interests in the region, especially vast oil fields’.W h ile  the ruling Idris family reaped 
the rewards of the oil wealth there was very little benefit for the many that lived in 
poverty. Frustration over this and the wave of Arab nationalism that was sweeping across 
North Africa and the Middle East at the time prompted Sadi Gadaffi to overthrow the 
Idris family.^ *^
Like the IRA, therefore, Gadaffi had a hatied for the ‘colonialist’ British and ‘he let it be 
known that it [Libya] was ready and able to assist revolutionary movements willing to 
foment trouble for the old imperial powers that had once ruled the Arab Middle East’ 
After making contact with the regime, the IRA managed to secure agreement from 
Tripoli to supply it with arms, after which shipments were successfully despatched in the 
early 1970s.'^  ^By the mid 1970s, however, the Libyan leader, having been impressed by 
the loyalist Ulster Workers’ Council strike, had become ‘apprised of the complexities of 
the Ulster situation’ and had lost interest.
2'* Not least due to the murder o f PC Yvonne Fletcher by a gunman firing fi om the Libyan Embassy in 
London.
Moloney, E., A Secret History o f the IRA. Penguin, 2002, p. 8. 
Ibid.
75
76
22 Ibid. p. 9. It wasn’t just the Middle East that viewed the former colonists in this way. The Japanese Red 
Army terrorist group was also referred to as the Ant-Imperialist International Brigade.
2® Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 305. It was fiom this time that IRA members received training exercises in 
Libya (see, for example, McDonald, H., ‘IRA’s top army agent slips out of Ulster’, 
hitp:/Avww.newsunlimited.co.ulc/nireland , May 11**' 2003, and Jacinto, L., ‘Peddling Tenor’, 
htt~p‘.//mQre.abcnews.go.com/sections/wortd/CioodMormngAmerica/ireland03081 l.h tm l, August 11th 
2003).
2** Ibid. p. 306.
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Relations between the United Kingdom and Libya were to deteriorate further in the 
1980s. This culminated in the murder of PC Yvonne Fletcher by a gunman firing from 
the Libyan Embassy in London, after which Libyan diplomats were expelled from the 
country. The Libyan ‘Voice of the Arab Homeland’ stated that
‘the People’s committees will form an alliance with the secret IRA in view of the 
fact that it champions the cause of liberating Ireland and liberating the Irish nation 
from the tyranny of British colonialism ... if Britain tries to use any means to 
pressurize and oppress Libyan Arabs the revolutionary committees will enable the 
IRA to do whatever it wishes in Britain and to retaliate twice as strongly’
Gadaffi himself apparently refened to the IRA leaders as ‘noble stingglers’.^  ^
Subsequently, two more shipment of aims made it through in 1985 and a further two 
were successfully dispatched after the retaliatory bombing by the United States, Britain’s
Cited in O’Brien, B., The Long War. The IRA And Sinn Fein. O’Brien Press, Dublin, 1995, p. 138.
Ibid. It could be argued that the end of the Cold War is another factor in the international environment 
that has had an impact not just on the ‘Troubles’ but also on the utility of political fronts. By taking the 
wind out of revolutionary movements it has arguably made possible the emergence o f a number of peace 
processes and therefore the gr eater utility o f political fronts (that therefore represented moderation towards 
the use of violence) as negotiating vehicles. Michael Cox, for example, argued that the end o f the Cold War 
‘made it far more difficult for the IRA to continue with its military campaign ... because in the post-cold 
era its campaign of violence could no longer be so readily justified.’ He cited Sinn Fein’s Mitchel 
McLaughlin who said that ‘the end of the Cold War and its effects on the strategic and the regional interests 
of the West made it possible for a number o f peace processes [including the one in Ireland] to emerge. ’ Cox 
suggested that ‘as radicalism around the world began to ebb in the 1990s, this had a marked influence on a 
number o f key figures in the Republican movement’ and they ‘started to lose their various points of 
ideological and political reference around the world.’ Cox, M., ‘Northern Ireland: The War that came in 
fr om the Cold’, Irish Studies In International Affairs. Vol. 9, 1998, pp. 73-84. The point has also been 
made that Clinton’s decision to grant Adams a visa against British wishes reflected the dimunition of the 
value of the ‘special relationship’ between the two countiies in the post Cold War environment. (Wilson,
A., Irish America and the Ulster Conflict 1968-1995. Blackstaff, Belfast 1995, pp. 293-4).
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closest ally, of Tripoli in April 1986.^  ^ One shipment that did not make it through, 
however, was the Eksiind which was seized off the French coast with 150 tons of arms 
and ammunition on board. Despite this success the failure to detect the other shipments 
represented a serious intelligence failure. In all approximately 150 tons were 
successfully delivered off the Wicklow coast.^  ^ At this time, therefore, it appeared that 
the IRA was perfectly adequately equipped to continue the ‘war’ against the British state 
and according to some ‘led the Army Council to believe that the IRA could score a 
significant military brealcthrough’.®'^  This would have militated against the use of a 
political front as a sign of moderation or even as part of dual-track strategy as the 
tensions within the republican movement over Enniskillen, for example, were to show.
The Loyalists
This thesis argues that, in the cases of the loyalist groups, it is the domestic external 
environment that has had the most fundamental impact of all the variables assessed. 
Unionist culture and traditions, the notion of the division of labour within unionism, and 
the fact that the UDA and the UVF are pro-state groups have all placed inhibitions on the
The attack on Tripoli was said to be the result o f the Reagan administration’s belief that Libya was 
behind the bombing o f a Berlin disco that killed two US servicemen in 1986 (see website: 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/52487Q.asp ).
Holland, J., Hope Against History. The Ulster Conflict. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1999, p. 194. 
For a catalogue o f those shipments o f aims intercepted by the authorities see ‘Weapons that were 
intercepted’, Irish Times. June 27^’ 2000.
Holland, J., Hope Against History. The Ulster Conflict. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1999, p. 195.
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strategies of these organisations, that have in turn militated against the utility of their 
political fronts.
The Collectivist Unionist Culture
Unionism has traditionally been seen as a monolithic en tity .I ts  collectivist tiadition 
finds its roots in the process of industrialisation and a common bond against the Catholic 
South and Irish nationalists in the province. Bastions of the North’s manufacturing 
industry, such as the Harland and Wolff shipyards, have comprised almost exclusively of 
Protestant unionists. Ever since the foimation of the province of Northern Ireland in 1922 
the notion of the ‘Protestant ascendancy’ bonded all those of that religion together and 
unionism spoke with one voice (in theory at least). The spokesmen were Unionist 
politicians while their position and that of unionism were protected by the state’s largely 
Protestant security forces - the RUC and the B Specials. It was a unionist state for the 
Protestant people and therefore it was Protestant unionist law that had to be obeyed. This 
meant that the Northern Irish administiation was inherently sectarian in nature against the 
minority Catholic population that it did not trust and that it felt would undemiine the state 
if given the chance. It therefore followed that the obligation to obey the law and to 
uphold the state was itself sectarian practice - thus the continuing unionist reference to 
‘the majority of law abiding citizens’ as a euphemism for the Protestant population as 
opposed to those that sought to undermine the state.
Dingley, J., interview.
320
The sectarian nature of ‘Protestant law’ was perhaps unwittingly revealed by a recent 
comment by David Burnside (Ulster Unionist Party MP for South Antiim) in relation to 
the expense of the Bloody Sunday inquiry: ‘Public inquiries don’t make people any 
better. Bloody Sunday has just wound up the republican population, made the lawyers 
rich, and the law-abiding people in NorÜiem Ireland are just disgusted with all this 
money being spen t.(ita lics added) The false, and perhaps sectarian, assumption here is 
that the only law abiding people in Northern Ireland are Protestants (or othei-wise that law 
abiding Catholics do not support the inquiry which is also clearly not true).
It was this inherent respect for (unionist) law and order that meant that ‘respectable’ 
politicians and the ‘law abiding majority’ were sure to keep their distance from the 
Protestant paramilitaries when they emerged in the 1960s and 70s, and this meant that 
any potential support for their political fronts was always going to be minimal. With a 
history of at best latent antagonism against Stomiont and the British state the relationship 
of most Catholics with the IRA was by contrast more ambivalent, exemplified at the 
ballot box with some impressive showings for Sinn Fein, particularly since the hunger 
strikes of 1981. In summary, the law abiding nature of the unionist population, even if it 
was to uphold a partial state, meant that it was always going to find it more difficult to 
support any political front that might be linked to an illegal teiTorist group.
Robins, J., ‘Lawyers in the line of fire’, The Independent, 30 July 2002.
321
The Division of Labour
Wlien the UVF and the UDA did emerge, however, some unionist politicians saw the 
value in using loyalist muscle for political leverage. Even when the Protestant working 
classes became aware of this, and some spokesmen sought to give them representation 
through the PUP and the UDP, the ‘law abiding’ Protestant population, working classes 
included, instinctively believed that politicians did the politics while the paramilitaries 
role was ‘military’. In other words a natural extension of the ‘law abiding’ nature of 
unionism was that, if there had to be loyalist paramilitaries, then there should at least be a 
division of labour. If loyalist terrorists were an unfortunate necessity in responding to 
violent republicanism they certainly were not going to be allowed to contaminate 
established political unionism.
Wliile the law abiding nature of unionist culture meant that there was no place for 
paramilitaries engaging in political projects, it also inevitably meant that the political 
endeavours that were embarked upon would be undermined by loyalist violence. For 
example when Tommy HeiTon, leader of the UDA in East Belfast and vice chainnan, 
‘stood as a Vanguard unionist for the 1973 Assembly he got fewer votes than the UDA 
had members in the area.’^^  Malachi O’Doherty, a Belfast journalist, stated that ‘those 
who support loyalist organisations mostly give their votes to other parties which have a 
limited tolerance of old gunmen and offer no promotion to them.’^  ^There has, then, been 
an in-built problem for the loyalist gi'oups to achieve respectability. Arthur Aughey
Bmce, S., ‘Paramilitaries, Peace, and Politics: Ulster Loyalists and the 1994 Truce’ in Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism. Vol. 18, p. 199.
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suggested that John McMichael looked upon his involvement with the anti Anglo-Irish 
agieement Ulster Clubs as a way of countering this problem by attaching himself and the 
UDA to a popular cause alongside ‘respectable’ politicians.^^
Pro-State Terrorism
As loyalism is pro-state, there have been plenty of political alternatives to loyalist 
political fronts, through the plethora of unionist parties. As a Special Branch source put 
it:
‘As pro-state teiTorists the loyalists have always struggled to attract individuals 
with serious political potential. Such talent would always inevitably realise its 
potential with the mainstream unionist parties
As a result, ‘while the Republican Movement atti-acts talent the loyalist movement is led 
by men with muscle-bound vocal chords.
Not only have loyalists faced the problem of lack of political talent in a competitive field 
but being pro-state has reduced the utility of political fronts in other ways. Wliile Sinn 
Fein was used as a propaganda tool to justify their cause and highlight flaws in 
government policy, loyalists had no need of this because unionists were the state and
O’ Doherty, M., ‘Man on a mission but future is not so bright’, Belfast Telegraph. 30*^ ' July 2002. 
Aughey, A., interview. It was, argues Aughey, an attempt by McMichael to push his own ambitions and 
UDA policy beyond Belfast. The Ulster Clubs were to be the front for the extension o f loyalist politics. 
Special Branch source, interview.
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even after the imposition of Direct Rule there were still a plethora of unionist parties to 
choose from. Perhaps most significantly, whereas there was no radical nationalist 
alternative to Sinn Fein, the DUF has certainly represented hardline unionism and so the 
political space was simply not there for loyalist political fronts. Bruce argued in 1992;
‘The logic ... is  that there was and is no obvious political opening for the loyalist 
paramilitaries. Precisely because they are loyalists there is no possibility of 
acquiring a position analogous to that of Sinn Fein. When one is fighting to 
preserve the state from those who would destroy it and to maintain the status quo, 
one can complain about this or that element of the British government’s policies, 
but one cannot present a radical alternative.’^ ^
It was precisely because of this lack of political space, and the desire to free themselves 
fiom the division of labour ethos, that the loyalist political fr onts had to be innovative. 
They had to be different to try and appeal to the electorate by presenting fr'esh ideas 
compared to the ‘stick in the mud’ policies of unionist parties that had ‘let them down’. 
These new ideas manifested themselves in attempts to bring new approaches to somehow 
ultimately ending the conflict and so this thesis argues that unlike republicans, the loyalist 
political fr onts did generally represent a sign of moderation towards the use of violence. 
There was neither the level of sophistication to utilise political fronts as tactical devices 
(except when they have been used to detract attention away from criminal exploits), nor 
was it practicable because, while Sinn Fein was used from the late 1970s to establish
O’ Doherty, M., ‘Man on a mission but future is not so bright’, Belfast Telegiaph. 30"' July 2002.
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alternative social structures to those of the state, loyalist gi'oups supported those that 
already existed. This provides a clear example of how the utility of loyalist political 
fronts (especially as a tactic) is limited compared with their anti-state counteiparts.
These ‘innovative’ ideas were, however, an affront to traditional unionism. Speaking of 
Baix’s proposals for an independent Northern Ireland Bruce noted:
‘ ... that it was an innovation at all meant that it was suspect. The whole credo of 
unionism is a journey from Eden to hell. Things were once very good when all of 
Ireland was British. Then they were good because Ulster was British. Any future 
is hardly likely to be better than the past and is almost certain to be worse. The 
most successful unionist politicians are those whose manner and style, as well as 
politics, are most obviously tied to the past. Even when it is presented as the last 
chance to hold on to the present, innovation is suspect because it is an admission 
that something must be given up.’^ ^
Thus, there has always been something of a dilemma for the loyalist gioups and their 
political prospects. In an attempt to break into the unionist electorate they had to present 
an alternative to tlie stale old unionism yet anything innovative was treated with 
suspicion as a further potential dilution of the Britishness of the province. As Bruce noted 
worldng class Protestants who are not evangelicals grow up in a world of late 17* century 
symbols, such as the Orange Order, the Apprentice Boys of Deny and the Battle of the
Bmce, S., The Red Hand. Protestant Paramilitaries In Northern Ireland. Oxford University Press, 1992, 
pp. 243-4.
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Boyne, stating that ‘ideas and images that do not draw on that tradition will have an 
uphill struggle to acceptance,
The ironies of being a pro-state terrorist were not lost on Gusty Spence as he addressed a 
republican:
“ Listen,’ I said, ‘you have to understand -  you entered into this situation and you 
Imew what you were on about, you laiew exactly what you wanted to achieve; I 
didn’t. I hadn’t got a clue and yet I had all these qualifications: I was a Prod, a 
member of the British army, I was in the Orange and the Black, and I voted 
Unionist and I did all these things. Whenever you people are put in here it’s a 
‘foreign’ government puts you in here. But my government put me in here.’^ ^
One of the objectives of IRA violence was to bomb their way to the negotiating table. 
Spence stated that ‘violence had worked for the IRA who were engaged in talks with 
govermnent agents as part of the political process. The UVF took a conscious decision to 
give the British Government a message that if Republican violence could get them to the 
conference table, then the UVF could commit more violence than the IRA.’ But, as 
Spence was well aware, the pro-state group had its limitations -  if loyalists tried to bomb 
their way to the negotiating table what could talks with the British government achieve? 
Talks to keep things as they were? In any case unionism had so many representatives to
”  Ibid. p. 243. 
Ibid. p. 235.
95 Spence, G., quoted in Garland, R., Seeldng a political Accommodation. The Ulster Volunteer Force: 
Negotiating History. Shanldnll Community Publication, 1997, p. 14.
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do this, who incidentally would use the threat of loyalist turmoil as a bargaining tool 
themselves. So what was the point of ‘political’ representatives of the UVF and the 
UDA? The very fact that unionist politicians were able to use loyalist disenchantment 
undermined the potential utility of loyalist political fronts as a means for the British
government to communicate with the UDA or the UVF without having to deal with the I
!
stigma of talking to teiTorists.
This leads on to another fundamental problem for the two loyalist gioups in the domestic 
external environment. Their violence to a large extent has been a response to republican 
teiTorism.^  ^ As Aughey and Mcllheny argued ‘what distinguished militant Protestant 
activity was its negative and reactive character. In ‘military’ terms tit-for-tat killings 
followed the level of IRA violence.Therefore loyalist strategy has largely been 
detennined by IRA strategy. If the IRA stepped up its campaign then so would the UDA 
and UVF. This in turn would have militated against the use of a political front (whereas it 
may not have done on the republican side who could use Sinn Fein as a tactical device) 
because the ‘law abiding’ nature of unionism would have meant that the utility of 
paramilitaries engaging in politics would have been even more limited. Thus, because the 
loyalist political fronts represented moderation and ‘accommodation’, if the IRA stepped 
up its campaign of violence then any loyalist response would automatically undermine 
the role of these fr onts. The utility of the loyalist political fr onts have therefore often been 
dependent on republican stiategy. This was borne out in May 2002 when David Eiwine
Ibid.
This was aclaiowledged by the UDA (Bowcott, O., ‘Presbyterians hold meeting with UDA’, The 
Guardian. March 2"" 1992).
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warned that continuing IRA activity meant that ‘the options for [his] party [were] 
seriously naiTowed’.^ ^
Garland summed up the problems for the loyalist gioups:
‘The reality ... was that the Unionist political establishment -  coupled with the 
Provisional IRA’s total disregard for the increasing polarisation its relentless 
onslaught was engendering -  had succeeded in neutralising progressive thinldng 
within Loyalist ranks, and for most of the 1980s any ‘new thinking’ was forced to 
remain behind the scenes, until another opportunity might arise when the two 
communities in Northern Ireland could again be urged to seek an honest 
accommodation with each other.
Feuding between loyalist groups has also put pressure on the utility of their political 
fronts. Less centralised and disciplined than the IRA, the UDA and the LVF, in 
particular, have been prone to feuding. The LVF’s potential to draw the UVF back to 
violence in a feud in 2000 that killed seven threatened to undermine the role of the 
Progressive Unionist Party.
98 Aughey and Mcllheny, ‘The Ulster Defence Association: Paramilitaries and Politics’, in Wilkinson, P. 
(ed.). Terrorism: British Perspectives. Dartmouth Publishing, Aldershot, 1993, p.35.
Ervine, D., ‘Provos made the crap’, Newshound, website: httD://www.nuzhound.co.ul(, May 2002. 
Garland, R., Seeldng a political Accommodation. The Ulster Volunteer Force: Negotiating History. 
Shankhill Community Publication, 1997 p. 37.
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The UVF and the UDA
Despite all of these fundamental problems for any political initiative from the UDA and 
the UVF, the polarisation of the early 1970s in any case meant that there was no call for a 
political front. The sense of impending crisis and potential republican insunection meant 
that on the loyalist side, too, politics was off the agenda. From August 1969 ‘both 
communities were in the giip of a mounting paranoia about the other’s intentions. 
Catholics were convinced that they were about to become the victims of a Protestant 
pogrom; Protestants that they were on the eve of a republican insuiTection.’’'^ ^
An additional reason for this was that loyalism already appeared to have a political voice. 
To some degiee they saw themselves as being represented by hardline unionists. Men like 
Ian Paisley and William Craig were perceived as giving the political representation to the 
‘courageous defence’ of loyalists on the ground. In the first instance, then, the origins of 
the loyalist political fronts can be found in the change of the relationship between 
loyalism and ‘respectable’ unionism. It was the awareness amongst members of the 
loyalist community that they were being used or ignored whenever it suited unionism that 
prompted some to seek adequate political representation for working class loyalism. 
Writing of 1974 the Shanldnll Bulletin stated:
See McAuley, J., and Hislop, S., ‘ ‘Many roads forward’: Politics and Ideology within the Progressive 
Unionist Party’. Etudes Irlandaises. Spring 2000, pp. 187-8.
Op. cit. Bishop and Mallie p. 103.
329
‘the loyalist community has been brainwashed for years. We are supposed to be
the privileged class yet we live in atrocious conditions, houses with no baths, run­
down estates, high imemployment, few social amenities and whole communities 
which are dying because of the planners and government policies. Yet for years 
people have continued to vote for politicians who created and allowed these 
conditions to exist.
So deeply ingrained, however, was the division of labour within unionist culture that
even members of the UDA and UVF voted for the ‘respectable’ political parties and this
has been a constant disincentive against the establishment of political fronts. Thus while 
loyalists were thinking twice about being used as the ‘muscle’ for politicians, as they had 
been in the 1974 UWC strike, they continued to vote for them. This was evident in the 
electoral failures of the UDA’s NUPRG^ ®"^  and meant that future such projects were 
going to be less likely. Moreover, again on the UDA, Bruce noted that these ‘are the very 
people with the worst record of turning out to vote, especially when it is an absolute 
ceitainty that someone dressed in a Union Jack is going to win.’^^  ^ All of these factors 
may have played a part in John McMichael’s disastrous poll result in a February 1982 by- 
election in which he polled just 576 votes.
As if there wasn’t enough that hindered loyalist exploits into politics, mainstream 
unionists labeled the would be politicians of the UVF as communists. As Garland wrote
McAuley, J., ‘Cuchullain and an RPG-7: the ideology and politics of the Ulster Defence Association’, in 
Hughes, E., Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland. Open University Press, Buckingham, 1991, p. 52.
Op. cit. Bruce, The Red Hand p. 240.
Ibid. p. 241.
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‘in the early 1970s unionist politicians regularly accused UVF and UDA spokesmen of 
being com m unists.T his was undeipinned by an apparent dirty tricks campaign from 
the British amiy (see chapter 8).
THE UDA
As far as both the loyalist gioups are concerned it was the domestic external environment 
that was the most crucial factor undeipinning the use (or not) of political fronts. In the 
case of the UDA the turning point in the relationship with unionist politicians which in 
turn led to the fomiation of the NUPRG was the failure of the 1977 strike that Paisley had 
called for. As McAuley stated:
‘The Ulster Defence Association came into being as an expression of the mistrust 
of Ulster working people with Unionist politics. The UDA is a working people’s 
organisation, the only one of its kind in Ulster. While its main concern has been 
for the maintenance of an aimed body of citizens, the UDA has found itself in the 
position of exploring its political potential, because of the increasingly obvious 
weakness of Unionist politics ...under this momentum the UDA entered the field 
of constitutional politics.’
Bruce, S., ‘Paramilitaries, Peace, and Politics: Ulster Loyalists and the 1994 Truce’ in Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism. Vol. 18, p. 200.
Ulster quoted in op. cit. McAuley pp. 54-5.
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Peter Taylor also emphasises the significance of the failure of the stiike, arguing that it 
heralded the break between Paisley and the UDA who apparently ‘were no longer 
prepared ... to be used by him’ Andy Tyrie and John McMichael ‘set up a political 
think tank -  the New Ulster Political Research Group -  to work out the organization’s 
own policy as its members no longer had any faith in mainstieam loyalist politicians.’ 
The remit of Glen Barr, Harry Chicken, Bill Snoddy and Tucker Lyttle ‘was to produce a 
coherent political direction for the UDA.’^
Events in the domestic external environment had provided a catalyst for the change in the 
nature of this relationship. The success of the UDA in the Ulster Workers Council stiike 
that brought down the Sunningdale project had led some loyalists to believe that the UDA 
could play a more political role. Bruce remarked that ‘some of the impetus [for 
McMichael’s Common Sense document] undoubtedly came from a belief that, as in 
1974, the apparent impotence of the major parties left a vacuum in which the UDA could 
again find an important role itself.’^Certainly, a view was developing that loyalists 
could think more politically for themselves instead of depending on unionist politicians to 
do this for them.
The document was always going to face stiff resistance from the ‘law abiding’ 
community. However innovative or refreshing, the fact that it came from a paramilitary 
group was enough for it to be dismissed. Moreover, if proposals were going to be any
Taylor, P., Loyalists. Bloomsbury, London, 1999, p. 162. 
Ibid.
Op. cit. Bruce, The Red Hand p. 231.
Ibid.p.239.
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different from the ideas of the plethora of other unionist political representatives then 
they had to show more innovation. This manifested itself in the attempt by Barr and 
others to promote the idea of independence. Yet being innovative, as Bruce stated, was in 
itself dubious to the vast bulk of the unionist population. As Aughey argued above (in 
chapter 4), how can one equate independence with loyalty?
Andrew White remarked that ‘the rejection of Common Sense (by unionists), therefore, 
was seen by the UDA as a signal for them to continue to do what they did best, and let 
others woiTy about p o l i t i c s . A n d  Combat stated that: ‘If the UDA fails now after 
playing their big card, the loyalist paramilitaries have only one card left -  the UFF, who 
will then be unrestrained by any considerations for their political wing.’ '^^  The electoral 
failures meant that future such projects were going to be even less likely.
The failure of the UDP to win any seats in the Assembly and therefore its failure to win a 
stake in the new political dispensation was enough to undermine its credibility as the 
spokesperson for the UDA, which was sidelined from the peace process.’*"^ Perhaps its 
ultimate disbandment was inevitable.
White, A., ‘The Development o f Working-Class Loyalist Conflict (1985-95) and the Rise o f the PUP 
and the UDP’, MA dissertation. Queen’s University, Belfast, 1995, p. 54.
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The UVF
The creation of the Ulster Loyalist Front in the Autumn of 1973, was, according to 
Garland a reflection of the knowledge of ‘the weakness of right-wing Unionism’ and that 
they ‘were developing confidence in their own phi losophy . As  noted above, the ULF’s 
declared aim was to
‘express the views and opinions of grassroots Loyalists’ and to ‘act as a ginger 
group ... Its policies included a ‘return to democracy’ and increased use of 
referenda, workers’ partnership schemes, and although in favour of private 
enteiprise it wanted to curb ‘international monopoly capitalism’. Better seiwices 
for the old, the very young, the sick and disabled were called for, as well as 
changes in housing allocation and in educational structures.
The UVF was also becoming more aware that not only were the ‘politicians’ ignoring the 
welfare of working class loyalists but they were also devoid of any ideas as to how to 
bring the conflict to an end, and it was loyalists who were paying the price for this with 
their lives. As such the group’s subsequent forays into politics were undeipinned by two 
factors: firstly, the perception that the loyalist worldng classes were in need of political 
representation, rather than further exploitation, and secondly, the genuine desire to find
Combat quoted in op. cit. White p. 54.
See O’Halloran, M., ‘Fear about paramilitaries in wake of UDP’s defeat’, Irish Times. June 29"' 1998. 
Op. cit. Garland p. 23.
Ibid.
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imaginative and novel ways through which the violence could ultimately be brought to an 
end. Billy Mitchell, a senior UVF member at the time, recalled:
‘.... We Icnew there had to be a different way, that we couldn’t go on sending 
people out to blow up pubs or to go out and shoot people -  and at the same time 
to see our pubs and our shops being blown up and our people shot. It didn’t look 
as if the politicians were going to resolve it politically so we needed space. We 
felt if we called a ceasefire and stopped the hostilities, perhaps we could engage 
politically and maybe even ourselves come up with some political thoughts. We 
just felt that continued acts of violence weren’t taking us anywhere.
At the time Mitchell, masked and dressed in black, stated the UVF’s position:
‘Wliilst we were fighting the IRA, we were leaving the constitutional and the 
political crisis to the politicians. We woke up and realized that we’d been fighting 
a war for four years yet our countiy’s been sold down the river by the politicians. 
We’d been leaving the political war to the politicians whereas in actual fact the 
politicians had been losing that war. So we called a ceasefire and went to the 
politicians and told them we weren’t going to fight the Provos for ever.’ *
The UVF, however, was still bereft of a political strategy of its own. As noted in chapter 
8, the gi'oup, ‘while welcoming the decision (to legalise it) and recognizing that there was
Mitchell, ‘Billy’, quoted in op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 122
335
a need to develop a political party of its own, ... maintained that it had to remain an 
aimed force’. * Th i s  would be a dual-tiack sti'ategy of sorts but a very different one to 
that pursued by the IRA in the 1980s. The UVF would carry on with its ‘war’ while the 
political front would not be a tactical device to help defeat republicans but rather it would 
develop a political strategy that might facilitate an end to the violence. The front in this 
case would represent a sign of moderation towards the use of violence on the part of the 
UVF brought about by the domestic external environment - namely the loss of faith in 
unionist politicians to secure a settlement.
Wliile this loss of faith was materialising the UWC strike had given loyalists a new found 
confidence in the political arena. Nelson stated that:
‘The sti'ike heightened their optimism; it seemed to show that ordinary working 
people could achieve change without the pemiission of politicians. Setting up 
their own independent political movement now seemed neither so frightening nor 
so fraught with risk of failure ... by the summer of 1974 there were many signs 
for the launching of a conciliatory, anti sectarian political wing in the UVF.’*^**
With the political vacuum left after the collapse of the executive, the organisation decided 
to form the Volunteer Political Party. The object was to ‘get some political dialogue
“ U bid.p. 123
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 124.
120 Nelson, S., Ulster’s Uncertain Defenders. Belfast, 1984, p. 174, cited in McKee, S., ‘The Real Voice of 
Ulster Loyalism? The Progi'essive Unionist Party’, M Litt Dissertation, University of Ulster, 1995, p. 5.
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going’ because ‘people had become disenchanted with the political leadership they had 
been getting which was leading us nowhere.’
Yet for the reasons cited above, and after the UVF’s ceasefire had ended, Ken Gibson of 
the VPP was humiliated at the general election of 1974. The group, in an attempt to 
prevent further embaiTassment stated that ‘the general public does not support the 
political involvement of the UVF’ and it was therefore ‘fruitless to promote the Volunteer 
Party as a party political machine.’ The failure of the VPP seiwed as a reminder of the 
preference of unionists and loyalists for constitutional politicians when it came to the 
ballot box*“^  and it ‘set back the drive for a working-class loyalist party for a number of 
years, indeed it was not for several years that a new political initiative was launched.’*^"*
A recurring theme in PUP ideology has also been the ‘criticism of the established 
Unionist leadership.’ It has, nevertheless, failed to break the stranglehold of the nature 
of unionist culture and tiaditions that have so militated against the utility of the loyalist 
political fronts. Moreover, in the current peace process the PUP has found its utility to be 
detennined by the actions of republicans. Ervine declared in May 2002;
‘There were times when I was prepared to defend Sinn Fein’s right to be within
the process and by implication, the Executive. No more! So, if I won’t attempt to
Op. cit. Taylor, Loyalists p. 138.
Quoted in Cusack, J., and McDonald, H., UVF. Poolbeg, Dublin, 1997, p. 150.
The party had also been smeared by unionist politicians who had accused it o f supporting a Marxist 
agenda, arousing suspicion in working class loyalist communities (op. cit. McAuley and Hislop p. 177). 
Op. cit. McKee p. 8.
Op. cit. McAuley and Hislop p. 178.
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exclude, and feel strongly enough to refuse to justify the presence of Sinn Fein, 
then the options for our party are seriously narrowed.’*^*’
Conclusion
Chapters 7 and 8 have assessed the impact of popular support and state response on the 
utility of political fronts in Northern Ireland. This chapter has broadened the external 
environment to include other factors that the writer believes have also had an impact. It 
has argued that the community ethos that prevails in the Catholic community lends itself 
more to the development of a political front whereas the individualistic ethos of 
Protestantism in the province is more likely to militate against the effective use of such 
fronts. That is because the former ethos is more likely to lend itself to ideas of a common 
goal and unity of puipose whereas the individualism of Protestantism in the province is 
more likely to lead to differences and fragmentation. As Aughey has stated, loyalism is 
really about a bunch of individuals and this has lessened the chance that the two loyalists 
gi'oups’ political fronts could be utilised effectively.
The loyalist response to NICRA is also worthy of particular mention as a factor that 
affected the potential utility of the IRA’s political fr'ont. Whipped up by men like Paisley, 
its ruthless and violent reaction to the civil rights marches was fundamental in creating a 
polarized environment that left little room for politics, tactical or otherwise, that would 
have entailed a greater role for Sinn Fein. Coupled with this was the fact that loyalist
Ervine, D., ‘Proves made the crap’, newsliound.com, website: http://www.nuzhQund.com , May 2002
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politicians could not even give the new SDLP the time of day and this helped to hand the 
initiative to the IRA and thereby polarize the crisis further.
Despite this, the emergence of the SDLP was to have a direct impact on the decision 
whether or not to give a greater role to Sinn Fein, particularly as an electoral machine. It 
was the fear of defeat against the constitutional nationalist party, when the IRA had 
always claimed to represent the Catholic population, that helped prevent Sinn Fein from 
going to the ballot box until 1981. It was also the SDLP-inspired New Ireland Forum that 
led to the Anglo-Irish Agieement which was designed to marginalise Sinn Fein and 
therefore reduce its utility as an electoral tool. Conversely, John Hume’s dialogue with 
GeiTy Adams at the end of the 1980s was an attempt by the former to bring an end to IRA 
violence, and this would entail a gieater role for Sinn Fein both at the ballot box (North 
and South) and through the peace process and all the hard bargaining it has entailed.
Another factor facilitating the utility of Sinn Fein as an electoral tool has been the hard 
work ‘on the ground’ by the party’s activists. It has also managed to attiact the votes of 
those with any grievance, not just those who disagi'ee with partition, and perhaps the 
SDLP have assisted them in this by not paying enough attention to deprived areas. The 
key event, however, that really put Sinn Fein on the map as an electoral force, and that 
many see as the beginning of the current peace process, was Bobby Sands’ by-election 
victory. It was his performance that prompted the IRA to utilise Sinn Fein at the ballot 
box as another weapon in the ‘war’ against the British.
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There is no doubt that the United States has had an enomious impact on the role of Sinn 
Fein. The huge Irish-American diaspora has meant that the US has been a key 
battleground in the propaganda war and this has been one of the political front’s key 
functions. The US has also been the source of resources and arms and this has helped 
militate against the use of Sinn Fein as a sign of moderation towards the use of violence. 
The 1990s, however, witnessed a policy from Washington and Clinton that was to give 
Sinn Fein its greatest utility yet. The granting of a visa to Adams in 1994 heralded the 
beginning of a process by which the US sought to persuade the British government to 
bring republicans in fr om the cold. It also represented a propaganda boost for republicans 
and subsequently Sinn Fein leaders have been portrayed as international statesmen to a 
global audience. The sponsorship and impetus that Clinton gave to the beginnings of the 
peace process and the subsequent Good Friday Agi'eement have been fundamental in 
bringing about an unprecedented role for the IRA’s political front, whether or not it has 
come to represent moderation towards the use of violence.
The role of Libya has also impacted on the utility of Sinn Fein. It is important to 
appreciate that as Adams was trying to develop the political part of the struggle in the 
1980s the amis shipments that were making their way through from Gadaffi only 
strengthened the argument of those that were sceptical of any politics. Thus, not only did 
these amis lessen the likelihood that Sinn Fein would represent moderation towards the 
use of violence but they also bolstered the views of those that were opposed to the 
increasing engagement with British structures, even if tliis was tactical.
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In the cases of the loyalist groups ‘other factors’ in the domestic external environment 
have had the most significant impact on the utility of their political fronts of all the 
variables assessed in this thesis. Wliile their pro-state ideology has been an inhibiting 
factor, more specifically, because the unionist population has tiaditionally been so ‘law 
abiding’, this has meant that any political endeavour by teiTorist groups (‘loyal’ or not) 
was going to sh'uggle to gain acceptance. Therefore, while no doubt unionist politicians 
used the thieat of loyalist upheaval if the constitutional status of Northern Ireland was 
under tlueat, they were careful enough not to become too intimate with the loyalist 
groups, and so the division of labour ethos was maintained.
Nevertheless, the perception that the loyalist working classes were being manipulated by 
unionist politicians prompted the groups to attempt to give them more ‘honest’ political 
representation. This entailed not just speaking for this potential constituency of support 
but also represented attempts at providing an ultimate solution to the conflict that the 
‘politicians’ had failed to achieve. With the former aim the law abiding nature of 
unionism and the division of labour ethos in unionist culture proved too much of an 
obstacle and so the groups were unable to convert this perceived constituency of support 
into votes at die ballot box. With the latter any ultimate solution would require 
imagination and innovation and would therefore inevitably entail some dilution of the 
Britishness of the province that would struggle to gain acceptance, such as the UDA’s 
notion of negotiated independence. Besides these obstacles, being pro-state has meant 
that there have been a number of political alternatives to the loyalist political fronts and
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those with serious political talent were more likely to realise it in the larger pro-union 
parties.
Finally, prospects for the loyalist political fronts, which have sought to find ultimate 
accommodation with their enemies and therefore have generally represented moderation 
towards the use of violence, have been undermined by the violence perpetrated by the 
two groups. When this loyalist violence has so often been a reaction to IRA violence, or 
to the perceived inadequacy of the British response to the IRA, then the loyalist fronts 
have also been at the mercy of the strategies of other agencies or groups in the domestic 
external environment.
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Chapter 10 - Conclusion
This thesis will conclude by dispelling any notion that political fronts represent the 
moderate half of a movement or that they are somehow ideologically different or 
separate from their terrorist organisations. Secondly, it will summarise the impact of 
the selected variables on the utility of political fronts in the chosen case studies. 
Tliirdly, it will address the reseaich questions posed in the introduction -  to what 
extent has the perceived failure in the use of violence alone facilitated the gi eater use 
of political fi'onts and does the use of or the gieater use of a political fi ont represent a 
sign of moderation towards the use of violence on the part of the groups? Focusing on 
the republican movement, this thesis will conclude that the IRA's political front has 
been used as a tactical device but that it has ultimately come to represent moderation, 
even though it still uses the threat of violence at the time of writing. Finally, the 
conclusion will consider the possibilities for broadening the scope of this study. Wliat 
impact, for example, have the same ‘variables’ had on the utility of political fironts in 
other cases? Do other political fronts have similar functions? What lessons can be 
leaiiit firom the Northern hroland context that could help bring about a transfonnation 
firom a situation where the political firont is very much part of the tenrorist machinery 
to one where it represents a sign of moderation towards the use of violence? 
Conversely, if Simi Fein does not after all represent a sign of moderation towards the 
use of violence then we will have seen the use of a political firont as a tactical device 
to unprecedented levels, and an awareness of this will also be of use to govermiients 
in dealing with other cases where the true intentions of a tenrorist group might be 
cloaked in an apparent commitment to democracy.
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The idea tliat terrorist political fronts represent the moderate half of a movement is 
misleading. An assessment of the dynamics of the relationsliip between tenrorist 
organisations and their political fronts shows that the former are very much in control 
of the latter and that any deviation from this would be unwelcome to the tenrorist 
gi'oup. This has been true of the IRA and the loyalist giroups. It was evident, for 
example, when the UDA ‘blimtly’ warned the UDP to ‘cool it’ in 1995 as far as 
engagement with the peace process was concerned.^ Although at times it has appealed 
that the loyalist political fronts have a greater degiroe of autonomy than their 
republican coimterpart their raison d’etre is to speak for the UDA and UVF. The UDP 
was dissolved in 2001 precisely because it no longer represented the views of the 
UDA/
The control of political frronts is achieved thirough dual membersliip, particularly at 
leadership level. Although, again, this is less clear in the cases of the loyalist groups 
the relationship still exists albeit based on less foimal interactions between individuals 
at the apex of the groups and their frronts, compared with the more formal dual 
membership in the case of the IRA and Sinn Fein. Political fronts airo therefore very 
much part of the tenrorist machinery and have a number of important functions that 
may have little or nothing to do with a more moderate approach towards the use of 
violence. Despite the differences between the roles of the anti-state and pro-state 
cases political fronts crucially provide tenrorist groups with a political voice and a 
propaganda outlet. Sum Fein has been utilised to gieat effect in this regard both at the 
national and international levels. The ‘political voice’ has also been important for the 
loyalist giroups. The Progressive Unionist Paity, for example, has let it be Icnown
' Campbell, J., ‘Loyalist Bosses Warn on Fast Paced Peace Process’, Simdav World. Januaiy S'*' 1995. 
 ^See Rowan, B., ‘Loyalist party ‘left with little option” , BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uJc/news , 
November 28th, 2001.
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when the UVF is losing faith in the peace process, wliile the cuiTent Ulster Political 
Research Group has endeavoiued to convince the public that the UDA is ‘cleaning up 
its act’, after the internal feuding that led to the expulsion of Adair and his supporters.
Wliile political fronts do not represent the moderate half of a movement this does not 
mean to say that the fronts themselves could not be utilised to represent moderation 
towards the use of violence on the part of tlie groups. Indeed, this thesis has argued 
that the loyalist political fronts have generally represented such moderation. It is also 
argued that Simi Fein too has ultimately represented a softening of attitudes towards 
the use of violence. The point is that, whether or not this is the case, and whatever the 
roles of the political front are, the controlling influence has come from the tenrorist 
organisations.
Wliile political frronts are used as political voices and propaganda outlets by both the 
IRA and the loyalist groups it is clear that the anti-state Sinn Fein has had greater 
utility than the pro-state frronts. Its functions have also included vigilantism and 
‘community policing’, organised confrontation and destabilising function, the 
development of ‘alternative structures’ (from the 1970s), its international role, its role 
as an electoral tool and its responsibility for maximizing the benefits of the peace 
process. In the loyalist cases, the utilities of their political frronts have also included 
their functions as electoral tools, as would-be political representatives of working 
class loyalism, and, like Sinn Fein, as the means tlnrough which to gain benefits firom 
the peace process.
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By comparison with Sinn Fein, the utility of the loyalist political fronts has been 
limited by the fact that they could not be used to create alternative stmctures because 
they supported the ones that already existed and their propaganda roles (both at home 
and abroad) were always going to be restricted by the fact that they have supported 
the status quo, and have not therefore been able to diaw upon state transgi*essions, real 
or otherwise, that Simi Fein has been able to both domestically and internationally. 
Being pro-state has also meant that any electoral ambitions from the loyalist groups 
have been thwar ted by the number of other pro-imion entities in the political market 
place. The ideology of a group, therefore, in tliis case whether it be pro-state or anti- 
state, is likely to have a direct impact on the usefulness or utility of political fronts.
Another problem that emanates from the loyalist groups’ pro-state ideology as far as 
the utility of their political fronts is concerned is the Taw abiding’ nature of 
Protestantism in Northern Ireland and, by extension, the division of labour' ethos that 
exists within the Protestant culture - politics was for the politicians and if vigilante 
violence was necessary it could certainly not be allowed a political outlet to challenge 
the ‘respectable’ political parties. It was therefore ideology and the domestic external 
environment, tlnough Protestant and unionist cultiue, that represented the most 
significant obstacles to the use of loyalist political fr onts, especially when that use, 
usually as a sign of moderation, meant engagement with the electoral process.
Paradoxically, it was the changing natrue of the relationship with unionism that 
prompted the loyalist groups to utilise political fronts in the first place. Frustration 
with being ‘manipulated’ by hardline politicians, who would use the muscle of the 
loyalist paramilitaries when it suited them and then drop them like a hot potato when
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it didn’t,^  prompted the UDA and the UVF, especially after the UWC strike, to think 
more politically for themselves and they sought to give the loyalist worldng class 
‘honest’ representation. These exploits, for the ideological and cultural reasons above, 
were destined to fail.
The ideology of the IRA has been something of a double-edged sword as far as the 
utility of its political front is concerned. Historically, it’s powerful dogma has been 
accompanied by an uncompromising physical force tradition and a belief that politics 
was the ‘domain of the unprincipled’. Traditionally, abstention firom the Westminster, 
Dublin and Stormont administrations has gone hand in hand with an apparent 
indifference to the opinion of the public, which had been ‘led astray’. These strong 
cunronts in republican tradition would have militated against any political involvement 
or engagement with British political structiues and therefore limited the utility of Sinn 
Fein in this regard.
Yet, before going on to argue that the IRA has in fact been more pragmatic than its 
dogma suggests, its powerful and imcornpromising ideology has, paradoxically, also 
helped bring about the more effective use of its political firont. It has facilitated a 
disciplined and highly centralised organisational stmctiue, ensiuing that any political 
firont would be under the tight control of the Army Council. This has been achieved 
tlirrough dual membership between the two, especially at leadership level, and it has 
meant that, rather than as an alternative to the armed struggle, for most of its life Sinn 
Fein has been a sub-unit of the IRA and an extra weapon in its struggle to rid the 
British firorn the island.
 ^Using what David Ervine called deniable plausibility, interview.
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The IRA has indeed shown a degree of pragmatism despite its imcompromising 
dogma. This is partly due to that other component of its ideology -  republican 
socialism - which entailed gi'eater identification with the working classes and political 
exploits that reflected this, such as Peader O’Donnell’s Saor Eire and Republican 
Congi'ess projects in the 1930s. The traditional faultline in Irish republicanism, 
therefore, was between those that wanted to take a more Marxist, political path and 
those militaiists who had no time for politics. It should not be forgotten, however, that 
those who may have had little interest in republican socialism often saw opportunities 
tlnrough it for mobilising support for the national cause -  for ultimately, and this is a 
central argument of this thesis, it was the desire to generate popular support that lay 
behind first Üie adoption of, and then the greater utilisation of Simi Fein, despite the 
IRA’s apparent traditional indifference to public opinion. Indeed, Gerry Adams’ 
political strategy and his strenuous efforts to mobilise political support both in the 
North and South has led to a new faultline witliin the movement between his 
supporters and those that are opposed to the increasing engagement with British 
stmctures that the peace process has entailed. Thus, IRA ideology, the group’s 
pragmatism and dilution of this ideology, and the faultlines within the organisation 
have all had implications for the utility of Simi Fein.
The stmctures and leadership of the groups, it is argued, which have at least been 
partly deteimined by their ideology, have also had a bearing on the utility of their 
political fronts. As noted above, the much more centralised and disciplined natiue of 
the IRA meant that the political firont could be kept under the tight control of the 
Aimy Coimcil and so Simi Fein could be utilised with a clear sfrategy in mind that
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would be accepted by the organisation as a whole. In this respect the same could be 
said for the UVF which has been more centralised than the UDA. The fragmented and 
decenfralised natine of the latter, however, has meant that its political fronts have 
often not been able to represent the views of the whole organisation, leading to 
disagi'eements over their utility (which, for example, eventually led to the dissolution 
oftheUDPin2001.)
Of fundamental importance in the ‘internal enviromnent’ was the change in IRA 
leadership in the mid 1970s that brought Adams and McGuimiess to the apex of the 
group. It was Adams who was instrumental in bringing about the ‘Long War’ strategy 
that entailed the gieater utility of the IRA’s political front, it was he that emphasised 
the importance of the political strategy in the 1980s and it is he that has been at the 
forefront of the political negotiations that continue to meet more and more of the 
demands of republicans. Wliether or not Simi Fein has ultimately come to represent 
moderation in the use of violence on the part of the IRA, without Adams at the helm it 
is unlikely that its political fr ont would have been utilised to this degiroe.
Beyond the ideology, stmctiuro and leadership of the case studies the second ‘internal’ 
variable assessed for its impact on the utility of political frronts was the notion that 
violence had or has become a habit. Chapter 6 argued that, while there may be a 
number of sti*ategic or ideological reasons for the persistence of violence, the idea that 
violence can become habitual, both at the individual and organisational levels, should 
not be overlooked. Certainly, at the individual level it appears that the use of violence 
to some has become habitual through the shaip rise in pimislmient beatings in the 
post-ceasefrre period. In the case of the IRA such activity appears to some extent to
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satisfy individual needs while at the same time it has been pennitted in order to keep 
the organisation imited. While in one sense this may have increased the utility of its 
political front by providing former terrorists with traditional Simi Fein activities 
(punisliment beatings and street violence) as a substitute, it has done little to enliance 
the electoral prospects of the party at the national level. Thus, as Simi Fein bids to 
become an all-Ireland electoral force ‘violence as a habit’ has had a detrimental 
impact on its prospects.
In the cases of the loyalist gioups violence as a habit has certainly had a negative 
impact on the utility of their political fronts. In the face of a law-abiding Protestant 
community, and when their political fronts have depended on the support of the wider 
unionist population, their organised criminal empires, punishment beatings and 
murders of imiocent Catliolics have militated against their utility both as electoral 
forces and as the soince of ideas.
The state response has been fimdamental in its impact on the choices that the tenrorist 
giroups have made vis a vis the use of political frronts. The long tradition of the aims 
length approach of the British government to the province led to the perception 
amongst some loyalists that Westminster was emotionally detached from Northern 
Ireland, and it was this that provided the backdrop to the independent Ulster idea and 
therefore the utility of the UDA’s political fronts to sell the notion tlnrough Common 
Sense and Beyond the Religious Divide. It also doubtless helped to sustain the 
republican view that the British state’s presence in the province was illegitimate 
which in turn provided the ideological undeipimiing to its ‘community policing’ role.
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The British and Irish response to the Border Campaign, however, with the 
simultaneous introduction of inteiimient witliout tiial on both sides of the border, 
defeated the IRA and forced the group to reevaluate its strategy. The state’s response 
in the eai'ly 1970s, though, thirough the ‘rape of the falls’, internment and Bloody 
Sunday, helped to polarize the crisis that militated against political endeavours, 
tactically or otheiwise, firom any of the cases studied here. So too did Dublin’s 
response to the brewing crisis when it stirred up loyalist emotions and republican 
aspirations by warning that it ‘could not stand idly by’.
In 1974 the deproscription of Siim Fein enabled the IRA to use its political firont as an 
exti'a weapon in its stmggle to rid the British firom the island. Indeed, after the failure 
of the 1975 truce and the government’s ‘deception’ in pretending that it might 
withdraw firom the province, Simi Fein was to have an elevated role as Adams sought 
to expand the stmggle on to all fironts thirough the so-called ‘Long War’ stiategy. 
Security force successes and the debilitating truce of 1975, therefore, forced a 
reappraisal firom the IRA leadership which entailed a more substantial role for Simi 
Fein.
It was perhaps Thatcher’s policy towaids tenrorist prisoners that indirectly and 
inadvertently led to the watershed as fai' as Sinn Fein’s political role was concerned. 
Her refusal to grant special category status helped set in motion a series of events that 
was to ultimately lead to Bobby Sands’ by-election victory and henceforth Sinn Fein’s 
electoral role. The political firont’s subsequent success at the polls was of serious 
concern to Westminster and Dublin too, who feairod that should Sinn Fein have 
become the majority nationalist party it might have prompted the IRA to raise the
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tluroshold of violence that in turn might have risked civil wai' and led the group to 
attempt to draw the Republic into the conflict."^
The British and Irish governments therefore fried to curtail the utility of Sinn Fein as 
an electoral tool tlnrough the Anglo-Irish Agreement, but they failed to make a long 
teim impact on the political front’s mandate. The media ban on the voices of terrorist 
giroups was the last tlnrow of a mindset that sought to marginalise the republican 
movement.
It was the change in attitude firom the British state firom the early 1990s that was to 
herald a much giroater profile for Simi Fein as it tried to draw republicans into an all- 
inclusive peace process. The legitiniisation of the front that this has entailed has 
enabled it to present itself as the ‘tough lawyer’ for the Catholic community and 
thereby increase its support at the expense of the more moderate SDLP. The 
legitimacy that has been accorded to the movement thirough the peace process has 
therefore been fundamental hi bringing about the front’s success at the polls and 
therefore its greater utility as an electoral force to the Aiiiiy Council. With an 
increased mandate, and while the tlneat of violence remains, the political firont has 
also managed to negotiate a raft of concessions (such as executive positions in 
government, expenses and office space at Westminster, the early release of prisoners, 
and aimiesty for on the run prisoners^) while IRA activity continues. Indeed, Simi 
Fein’s engagement with the peace process and the subsequent Good Friday 
Agreement has seen the girowing prominence of the firont to a point where it has,
See Fitzgerald, G., All in a Life. An Autobiography. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1991, p. 410. 
This last concession is still being negotiated.
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ai'guably, superceded the aimed struggle (and therefore the IRA itself) in teims of its 
role and influence within the movement.
As far as the loyalist groups are concerned one could perhaps trace the roots of their 
political fironts to the break-up of the monolith of rmionism after O’Neill’s attempts to 
introduce reforms in the 1960s. It was this that led to the emergence of the unionist 
‘right’ that the loyalists giroups were to become disillusioned with as their means of 
political representation. This and the failure of tlie state and unionist politicians to 
resolve the conflict prompted the two groups to engage in political endeavours of their 
own. Fears of a secret deal between tlie IRA and the government, however, meant that 
these political exploits, which represented attempts to achieve political respectability 
within the ‘law abiding’ Protestant community, were often at the mercy of reactionary 
loyalist violence.
Although the Anglo-Irish Agreement led to the temporary restoration of the monolith 
of unionism and therefore left little space for loyalist political fironts, the state’s 
response in the 1990s through the peace process, as with Sinn Fein, raised the profile 
and utility of the loyalist political fronts whose roles as political spokespersons for the 
UDA and the UVF were vital if the loyalist ceasefires were to hold. The perception 
amongst miionists and loyalists, however, that the government continues to drip-feed 
concessions to republicans has led to a loss of faith in the peace process on the part of 
the loyalists and especially the UVF^, whose political firont has come under pressure 
as a result.
® As noted earlier it is questionable how political the UDA actually is and therefore how relevant the 
peace process is to it when its whole raison d’etre appears to have more to do with maintaining illegal 
fiefdoms.
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It is not only the British and Msh governments that have had an impact on the utility 
of the gi'oups’ political fronts. The conflict in Northern Ireland has, since the Great 
Famine of the 1840s, always had an international dimension. Wliile in the course of 
the Troubles elements of the frish-American population helped, allegedly tlnough 
organisations such as Noraid, to sustain the IRA’s armed struggle which therefore 
helped militate against the use of a political fr ont as a sign of moderation, the Clinton 
administration’s role in ‘bringing republicans in from the cold’ was of fundamental 
importance. It was Washington’s gianting of a visa to Adams in 1994, followed by its 
persuasion of the British government to engage with republicans, and its subsequent 
support^ for the negotiations, that was vital in sustaining the peace process that not 
only gave Simi Fein giroater utility, but also the PUP and UDP.
Thus, a willing incumbent in the Wliite House was instmmental in facilitating Simi 
Fein’s endeavour to internationalise the conflict. Tliis in turn enhanced its propaganda 
utility by providing it with greater opportunities to internationalise perceived British 
injustice and oppression.
There is no accounting for events and there have certainly been unforeseen episodes 
that have undoubtedly had a major impact on the utility of the political fr onts studied 
in this thesis. The Ulster Workers Council strike was a watershed as it raised an 
awareness that working class loyalism was being ‘manipulated’ and some in the 
loyalist groups thereafter sought to give more adequate representation to tliis 
constituency. In the case of the IRA the one episode that has been described as the 
watershed when it comes to the utility of Simi Fein (as an electoral tool) was the
’ Thiough, for example, the appointment o f Senator George Mitchell to chair the talks leading up to the 
GFA.
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hunger strikes of 1981 and the subsequent election of Bobby Sands as MP for 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone. It prompted the IRA to pursue an electoral sti*ategy that 
fonned the bedrock to Sinn Fein’s unprecedented role in the current peace process.
This thesis has also highlighted other factors of significance in the external 
enviromnent that have impacted on the utility of Sinn Fein. It suggests that the 
coimmmity ethos that exists within the Catholic population lends itself to the more 
effective use of a political fr ont, with a common goal and unity of purpose, whereas 
the individualistic culture of Northern Msh Protestantism would not. It has also noted 
the impact of the loyalist response to NICRA as a major factor behind the polarization 
of the crisis in the early 1970s which militated against the use of political fronts. The 
SDLP has also been a factor that the IRA has had to talce accoimt of when considering 
any electoral engagement, especially when the latter already claimed to represent the 
Catholic population.
The variable that has, it is argued, had the most impact on the greater utilisation of 
Siim Fein, however, has been the desire to mobilise a wider following or to tap 
perceived existing popular support. Sands’ by-election victory was only significant if 
the IRA were concerned about generating giroater support from within the Catholic 
conmiunity. It was the recognition that the IRA needed popular support that lay 
behind the adoption of Sinn Fein as its political front in the first place. It was the 
admission that the lack of support led to the failmro of the Border Campaign that 
prompted a réévaluation of strategy to address tliis. It was the acloiowledgement by 
Adams in the mid 1970s that the IRA had lost touch with the populace that was the 
main motivation for the Long War strategy and it is the electoral drive, both North
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and South, that reflects Adams’ view that the destiny of the republican struggle lies in 
its ability, through Shin Fein, to secine giroater support at the ballot box in both 
jiuisdictions. McGuimiess himself said, in an about turn from traditional republican 
dogma, that ‘republicanism always worked on the basis that it would never be 
successful unless it had the support of the people.’^  Leadership, ideology, structure, 
state response, and events were all to varying degrees important factors that led to the 
giroater utilisation of the IRA’s political firont. Ultimately, however, and despite its 
claim that it needs no other legitimacy other than the presence of the British in ‘their 
country’, the IRA has always been concerned with generating a wider following, even 
if, until 1981, it was hesitant to become electorally involved for fear of defeat.
The loyalist political fronts were created to represent working class loyalists so rather 
than mobilising support they represented attempts to attract a perceived constituency 
of support, particularly after the UWC strike of 1974, but as stated in chapter 7 the 
irony is that they have by and large failed to convert this perceived demand into 
electoral success (for the reasons outlined above and in chapter 9). Thus, as noted in 
chapter 7, while the ‘popular support’ variable was important in bringing about the 
perceived utility of the loyalist political fironts the evident lack of support at the polls 
militated against their use.
To what extent has the perceived failure in the use of violence alone led to the giroater 
utilisation of a political firont, either as a tactical device or as a sign of moderation? 
Certainly, the defeat of the IRA in the Border Campaign led to a reassessment of IRA 
strategy that entailed a shift towards politics of a Mai*xist natmro. But Goulding was
McGuiimess, M., quoted in Jackson, G., ‘Blair visit may be worse than useless -  McGuiimess’, The 
Irish Times, Maich S'*' 2001.
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trying to take the whole organisation away from national unity as the main objective 
and into class struggle and so Simi Fein’s role as a ‘front’ had to be redefined. As 
Patterson noted, most of the educational work was being carried out inside the IRA 
and the whole movement was becoming politicised.^
A clearer example was the decision by Adams to launch a new strategy in the mid 
1970s. It had been prompted by the failmro of the IRA to achieve a military victory in 
the short teim and it was this perceived failure in the use of violence that led to a more 
substantial role for Sinn Fein, though not as a sign of moderation. The hunger strikes 
gave a critical boost to the development of Adams’ political strategy that he had 
launched with limited success in the 1970s.
It has been argued that a cmcial factor behind the ceasefires of 1994, and thus behind 
Sinn Fein’s higher profile, was that the IRA was up against it militaiily.^  ^Not only 
was it losing the intelligence war but loyalists were outkilling republicans for the first 
time. The IRA realised that a military victory was not possible and therefore the 
perceived failmro of violence, even as pait of a dual-track strategy, prompted the 
ceasefire which in turn led to a giroater role for the political front both electorally and 
tlnrough the negotiations that led up to the GFA and after.
To what extent has the use or the giroater utilisation of political frronts represented a 
sign of moderation towaids the use of violence, if at all? Certainly in the case of the 
loyalist groups one could argue that they did represent a sign of moderation. Even if 
violence continued while these fironts were operating the VPP, the PUP, the NUPRG,
 ^Patterson, H., The Politics O f Illusion, A  Political History O f The IRA. Serif, London, 1997, p. 106.
See Holland, J., Hope Against History. The Ulster Conflict. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1999, 
Chapter 7, and Taylor, P., Provos, Bloomsbury, London, 1997 p. 311.
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the ULDP and the UDP all represented, at least in pai*t, attempts to ultimately find a 
solution to the conflict which their political masters in ‘respectable’ unionism had 
clearly failed to do. Therefore not only did the loyalist groups feel that the loyalist 
worldng classes had been misrepresented by imionist politicians but they also realised 
that for as long the latter failed to achieve a solution to the conflict it was they that 
were making the ultimate sacrifice. Wliy should they fight and die for the politicians 
whose job it was to sort the mess out? So the loyalist political fronts generally 
represented genuine attempts to view the conflict in a different way and so facilitate 
the emergence of some Idnd of solution. A possible exception to this is the current 
UPRG, which may be being used as the means to detract attention away from the 
organised criminal exploits of the UDA.’^
In the case of the IRA, despite the elevated role for Simi Fein through the ‘Long War’, 
the new approach did not represent a more moderate stance, either in the use of 
violence or in policy. In fact, the opposite was the case as the IRA’s militaiy stincture 
was reorganised to combat informers and pressme was put on the movement’s Eire 
Nua policy of 1972^  ^in favour of a miitary Irish state -  ‘ a fai' more imcompromising 
Republican position.’ Nor did the ‘bullet and ballot box’ strategy of the 1980s 
equate to a softening of attitudes. Again, the opposite seemed to be the case - ‘Sinn 
Fein was pursuing an electoral strategy but not at the expense of the IRA ... the 
‘armed stmggle’ was to remain the cutting edge of the Republican Movement whose
** Although the UPRG has stressed that it represents an attempt ‘to steer the UDA away from 
paramilitarism’ and it claims that it has disbanded its youth whig (See ‘Political path for loyalists?’, 
UTV, website: http://www.u.t\7newsroom/indepth, Febraary 23^  ^2003 and ‘Disband plan confirmed’, 
The Sunday Life. March 23'^ '* 2003).
Eire Nua proposed a federal Ireland that would giye unionists a regional power base.
O’Brien, C. C., States O f Ireland. Anchor Press, London, 1972, p. 111.
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centrality was never in doubt’ This was especially the case after the perceived 
moral mandate of Sands’ victory. As far as policy was concerned abstentionism was 
still finnly in place and phased withdrawal was replaced with the more hardline 
demand for the immediate British removal from the province.
It was as tliis electoral stiategy developed, however, tliat one could detect the first 
signs of tension within the movement when Adams called for the ‘refinement’ of IRA 
violence in order to enhance Siim Fein’s electoral prospects. In the sense that the Siim 
Fein leader placed giroater emphasis on avoiding civilian casualties and on the more 
careful timing of attacks (to tie m with electoral considerations) the political front did 
represent moderation of a sort towards the use of violence. But this should not be 
overstated because the use of violence was to remain at the heart of the struggle. Just 
because Adams was worried about the electoral repercussions of untimely bomb 
explosions it did not mean that the armed struggle was going to be diluted in favour of 
politics. After all, if the movement was going to have an electoral strategy, it seemed 
only sensible to try and maximise the success of the ballot box part of its approach 
without suggesting in any way that the aimed sfruggle was less central to the cause. 
Indeed, to facilitate the bullet and ballot box strategy IRA violence was to become 
‘sharper’ in what was temied by McGuinness as the ‘Tactical use of the Armed 
Stmggle’ (TUAS) that was to allow Simi Fein to campaign unliindered by ‘disasters’ 
like Eimiskillen.
Despite the signing of the Good Friday Agiroement the peace process has been dogged 
by the painfully slow progress of IRA decommissioning and more lately by
Taylor, P., Provos. The IRA And Sinn Fein. Bloomsbury, London, 1997, pp. 283-4. 
Wicheit, S., Northern Ireland Since 1945. Longman, London and New York, 1991, p. 186.
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continuing IRA activity. It is still not clear whether or not the republican movement 
has forsaken the use of violence for good, and therefore whether or not Siim Fein has 
ultimately come to represent moderation towards the use of violence on the part of the 
movement. The following will consider the arguments.
Sinn Fein as a sign of moderation?
If the ERA’S two acts of ‘putting weapons beyond use’ were tactical it would certainly 
be more ideologically palatable for tlie group. But there are three factors that might 
suggest that the organisation has at last committed itself to disaiiii and that Simi Fein 
has come to represent moderation on the part of the movement. The Colombian 
episode was certainly important for two reasons. Firstly, Americans were furious that 
the ERA was allegedly training members of FARC, the largest of the dmg trafficking 
organisations that Washington was countering with its 1.6 billion dollar ‘Plan 
Colombia’ operation. Ruddock quotes the special American envoy to Northern 
Ireland, Richard Haass, as saying to Geny Adams: ‘If any American, seiwice 
personnel or civilian, is Idlled in Colombia by the teclmology the ERA supplied then 
you can fuck off
Secondly, it was a debacle that was appairontly organised by the hardline Brian 
Keenan. It is claimed that his influence on the Aimy Council suffered an 
embarassing setback and changed the internal dynamics of the body, with a shift 
towards key Siim Fein figures who favom ed putting weapons beyond use.
Hass, R., quoted in: Ruddock,, A., ‘How America held the IRA over a baiTeP, Guardian 
newsunlimited, website: htto://www.uewsunlimited.co.uk/uireland . October 28* 2001.
See Ruddock, A., ‘How America held the IRA over a barrel’. Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
htt|o://www.newsiinlimited.co.uk/mreland . October 28* 2001 and Clarke, L., ‘IRA ‘given drug cash’ to 
bain guenillas’. The Times. October 7*, 2001.
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The second factor, the September i f ’ 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and 
the Pentagon, also seemed to be important in the apparent shift of the internal balance 
of the IRA Aiiny Council. Haass, in a more restrained tone, stated that:
‘Wliat September 11^ ’’ did was bring about a sea-change in American thinlcing. 
There is simply zero tolerance in this countiy for tenrorism of any sort 
anywhere. Wlien the leaders of Sinn Fein and the IRA saw this, and saw their 
tiaditional somces of support in the US would very likely be af fec tedI  thinlc 
that, in turn, caused them to reconsider their own long standing policy.’
Certainly the American and British administrations could hardly declare a ‘war on 
teiTorism’ if they were seen to be equivocating over Simi Fein’s right to be in 
govenunent while the IRA retained its illegal weapons and terrorist infrastmcture. 
The Colombian episode and September l l ‘^’ were cleai'ly fundamental in forcing a 
move from the IRA in the short teim.
The third factor that has not been as widely aclaiowledged has been the process of 
receding American tolerance for the IRA, which began when Bill Clinton left office. 
The indications were that President Bush was not going to become as involved in the 
peace process as his predecessor, and when he called on the IRA to disarm^° the 
republican movement must have loiown that it had got all that it was going to get firom
Including millions o f  dollars ‘from rich Conservative Irish-Americans’ (Ruddock, A., ‘How America 
held the IRA over a barrel’, Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
httD://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland. October 28* 2001)
Haass, R., quoted in Breen, S., ‘Mitchell says Trimble tactics worked’, Irish Times. October 29* 
2001 .
See Macintyre, B., ‘IRA must disarm, make no mistake, says Bush on eve o f  visit’, The Times. July 
18*2001.
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Washington. Any review or renegotiation of the Good Friday Agi'eement was at best 
going to bring back what was already on offer or more likely was going to give 
republicans a worse deal. In short, as far as White House patronage was concerned, 
Sinn Fein and the IRA had had its heyday with the depaiture of President Clinton.
It was this last factor that may have helped to prompt the IRA to at least agi*ee a 
method of putting weapons beyond use after the Weston Park talks in July 2001, 
along with Dublin’s increasing exasperation at republican intransigence and the 
feeling that the negotiations had got to a ‘take it or leave it’ stage. Ultimately, 
however, it was the international stiategic environment, after Colombia and 
September 11^\ that detemiined the timing of the move on aims. These events appear 
to have prompted a shift in the internal dynamics of the IRA Army Council and this 
brought about a change in strategy which lay behind the group’s decision to ‘save the 
peace process’ and finally confirm that Simi Fein represented moderation towards the 
use of violence on the part of the group.
Or Sinn Fein Continuing as a Tactic?
At the time of writing the IRA, it is safe to assume, still has a substantial amount of 
explosives and weapons in its aimoury. Moreover, the argument remains that 
‘whatever moves are made in regard to satisfying the two inspectors and General de 
Chastelain, it is clear the IRA is not intending to disaim f u l l y . A  Belfast academic 
also wrote in October 2001 ‘does anyone believe, or pretend, that the IRA would 
decommission all its weapons and disband before it had achieved the end of British
Cusack, J., TRA clearly not going to disarm fully’, Irish Times. 7* August 2001.
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rule in Northern h e l a n d ? I t  is also yet possible that the organisation has only 
disposed of easily traceable or dated weapomy while it acquires more modern arms. 
As the Florida smuggling operation came to light some reports suggested that ‘the 
IRA leadership was intent on re-arming with new weapons from the US before 
decoimnissioning some of its old gims.’^ "^
Perhaps more ominous are the words of Brian Keenan in Febmary 2001 - ‘those who 
say the war is over, I don’t Imow what they’re talking about. The revolution can never 
be over imtil we have British imperialism where it belongs, in the dustbin of 
h i s to ry .Perhaps  Keenan saw his role as interlocutor with the hidependent 
International Decoimnissioning Body as the means of making sure that putting 
weapons out of use didn’t ‘get out of hand’. Sean O’Callaglian has argued that 
Keenan would split from Adams and McGuimiess if decommissioning ever 
happened^^ - so what is keeping him on board? Perhaps the wai* is not yet over after 
all. The newly elected Simi Fein MP Michelle Gildernew could not bring herself to 
say so^ ,^ and nor has the movement explicitly amioimced a permanent end to the use 
of violence.
In its statements the IRA has said that it would put its weapons beyond use in the right 
context - upon the ‘removal of the causes of conflict’. David Eiwine of the PUP
Kennedy, D., ‘Any symbolic move by IRA w ill be worthless’, Irish Times. October 17* 2001.22
In fact Adams has gone to some length to explain the enomioiis difficulties the republican movement 
has faced over just the single act o f putting weapons beyond use. See ‘Sinn Fein chiefs took 
‘dangerous’ gamble on aim s’. The Times. September 29* 2001.
McDonald, H., ‘IRA men offliook as guncase collapses’. Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
httD://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland . January 16* 2000. See also ‘IRA accused o f  smuggling 
arms while talking peace’, Sundav Times. February 20* 2000.
Keenan, B., quoted in Cowan, R., ‘IRA chief warns o f return to war if  talks fail’. Guardian 
newsunlimited, httn://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireIand . February 27* 2001.
O’Callaghan, S., ‘A fanatic with the instincts o f a hungry jackal’. The Dailv Telegraph. February 10*
2000.
27 See Browne, V., ‘Meetings o f minds still a long way o f f ,  Irish Times. August 15 2001.
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continually pushed Simi Fein during the summer of 2001 to explain what these causes 
were/^ To find the answer loyalists need have looked no further than Sinn Fein’s 
website which explicitly states in bold format that ‘Sinn Fein seeks an end to 
partition which is the cause of conflict, injustice and division in Ireland.
A Special Branch source with a number of years experience argued that there has 
been no shift in the role of Simi Fein, stating that the
‘IRA leadership is still in control of the apparatus. The Colombian episode 
would have had to be cleairod by the Army Council -  the IRA is such a 
disciplined organisation that it is inconceivable that it did not.
This is supported by reports that Padiaig Wilson, said to be a high ranldng IRA 
member and a close friend of Adams, has also made at least one recent trip to 
Colombia.^* One is reminded of Geny Adams’ telephone call to the White House 
prior to the Canary Wliarf bombing in February 1996 when ‘he said he was hearing 
some very distiubing news and he would call us back’.^  ^Presiunably, he was at the 
meeting that sanctioned the bombing.
Finally, there is little doubt that IRA activity has continued since Colombia. At the 
time of writing (Jmie 2003) mainstream republicans are the main line of inquiry 
behind the theft of sensitive security documents from the Castlereagh police complex
See Kite M., and Walker, C., Loyalist paramilitaries reject peace agreement’, The Times. July 11*
2001.
Siim Fein website: http://www.sinnfein.ie 
Special Branch source, interview.
See Garraty, S., TRA ‘trained Fare teiTorists’, Irish Independent. May 15* 2002.
Bew, P., and Gillespie, G., Northern Ireland. A Chronology O f The Troubles. Gill and Macmillan, 
Dublin, 1999, p. 321.
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while the Stormont spying scandal led to the suspension of the political institutions in 
October 2002. The IRA are also believed by secmity forces to have orchestrated 
nationalist riots in Belfast in the smnmer of 2002. A leaked worldng paper from the 
Dublin administration in December 2002 aclaiowledged that IRA activity was 
continuing^^, while a recently discovered IRA aims cache was said to be ready for 
use.^ "^  All of this has led to fears tliat once the point arrives where the ERA feels that it 
can prociue no fruther political concessions tlnrough its political front then it may 
return to war.^^
A Shade of Grey
If Simi Fein does not in any way represent moderation on the part of the IRA’s 
attitude to the use of violence then we will have witnessed the use of a political front 
as a tactical device to an imprecedented level - to dilute the ‘Britishness’ of the 
province, to midemiine British stmctures and wealcen state security, at the same time 
as rearming and strengthening its own military organisation. The tentative suggestion 
(because it is difficult to know for siuro), however, is that, even if the Colombian, 
Castlereagh and Stoimont episodes were sanctioned by the Aimy Council, while it 
would still have giave implications for the peace process if it were known, it could 
still have represented part of the effort of Adams and the republican leadership to 
keep the mainstream movement imited, by appeasing and keeping hold of those that 
wanted action, or well paid employment, or those that wanted to prepare for war if the 
peace process failed to deliver a miited Ireland. For, while it is the case that the
See Doherty, J., ‘Trimble walkout liits talks’. The Scotsman. September 20* 2002.
See Lister, D., ‘IRA cache contained arms ‘ready for action” . The Times. March 25* 2003.
See Cusack, J., ‘Castlereagh worries grow after reports o f IRA activity’, Irish Times. April 6* 2002.
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republican movement is a disciplined organisation and sldlled in presenting a united 
front, it is reasonable to assume that some serious debating has gone on within that 
has required all the undoubted skill of the leadership to hold things together. It is 
probably unwise to see all IRA activity as a manifestation of a well thought out 
strategy but rather as evidence of keeping certain people and factions placated in the 
effort to keep the organisation imited.
The notion that there has been a rift in the IRA over Adams’ approach therefore 
deserves some attention. In the 1980s there was clearly friction within the IRA over 
its electoral strategy. As early as 1983 tensions existed over the amount of resources 
going to the political project while ‘operations had fallen’. A d a m s  was apparently 
furious when the IRA bombed a police station near a residential airoa the night before 
the general election of that year.^  ^Damiy Morrison said in April 1983: ‘we would like 
to thinlc that the IRA would appreciate when to take an expedient holiday for a 
week’.^  ^ hi 1985 internal friction led to the expulsion of four IRA members who 
criticised ‘the low level of IRA activity in Belfast, the exclusion of tried members like 
themselves from the imier circle and the diversion of fimds into political work.’^  ^O’ 
Bradaigh claimed that the 1986 ending of abstention from the Dail was a ‘sell out of 
republican principles’. Thus, while it could be argued that these internal tensions were 
to some extent due to the calls for the ‘refinement’ of ‘activity’, they also arose over 
resoiuces and sacred republican principles. It is quite possible that internal frictions 
may have existed simply because there were those within the IRA who opposed any 
kind of involvement with the ‘comipt and miprincipled’ political domain even if it did
See Clarke, L., Broadening the Battlefield. The H Blocks and tlie Rise o f  Sinii Fein. Gill and 
Macmillan, Dublin, 1987, p. 218.
Ibid. p. 227.
Monison, D., quoted in Bishop, P., ‘A Gimman Cleans Up His Act’, The Observer. April 17* 1983. 
Op. cit. Clarke p. 230.
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not represent moderation towards the use of violence. For, to reiterate, the aimed 
stmggle was to remain central to the cause.
The very fact tliat Adams had to continue to call upon the IRA to avoid civilian 
casualties suggests that the rift over his electoral strategy persisted"^ ®, underlined by 
one report in 1990 that by the end of the year there had been ‘recmiing suggestions 
that Sinn Fein and the IRA [were] in the grip of an internal debate’. I n  Sharrock and 
Devenport’s Man o f War, Man o f Peace the authors argue that there ‘is clearly a range 
of views’ in the IRA and they noted a senior policeman’s view that ‘I’d be more 
concerned if he (Adams) wasn’t on the Army C o u n c i l . T h e  implication is that 
Adams has been a restiaining influence on the IRA and that the political strategy (and 
therefore Simi Fein) has in fact come to represent moderation on the part of the group. 
John Major also noted the organisation’s internal divisions in liis autobiogiaphy. 
Referring to the period prior to the end of the IRA’s first ceasefire he stated that ‘we 
knew the hai*d men were getting restive’ and that ‘one IRA giroup was not going to 
wait even till then [all party t a lks ]Moreover ,  ‘intelligence from all sources, overt 
and covert, had shown that much of the Provisional movement dissented firom 
Adams’ ‘unaiiiied’ strategy, and saw the ceasefire as no more than a tactic.
Perhaps this shouldn’t be siuprising if one holds to Ed Moloney’s analysis that the 
ceasefire was only sold to the IRA on the basis that it would not be peimanent."^  ^ It
See, for example, Goodwin, S., ‘Killing o f civilians alienates voters, Adams warns IRA’, The 
Independent. January 30* 1989.
Millar, P., ‘IRA’s pointless killing o f a gentle man’, The Irish Times. August 14* 1990.
Sharrock, D., and Devenport M., Man o f War. Man o f Peace. The Unauthorised Biographv o f Gerrv 
Adams. Macmillan, 1998, p. 474.
Major, Jolm, Jolm Major. The Autobiographv. Haiper Collins, London, 1999, pp. 485-6,
Ibid. p. 488.
Moloney, E., A Secret Historv o f the IRA. Penguin, 2002, p. 469.
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was also, he argues, tolerated providing there would be no decommissioning/^^ Like 
many other commentators'^^ Moloney notes the opposition of glass roots members to 
the Good Friday Agieement and to the demands the peace process has been maldng of 
republicans/^ He also wrote that as far as the IRA was concerned the renewed 
ceasefire ‘would not be comprehensive and all-embracing’ but ‘operations’ could be 
mounted ‘if necessary’ and so ‘there would be enough leeway to calm anxious nerves 
in the ranlc and file.’'^  ^ In addition he describes how serious rifts developed between 
the Aimy Council and the IRA executive over consultation and policy/^
It is in this context that one should assess continuing IRA activity and the recent find 
of IRA amis ‘ready for action’. To reiterate, such activity should be seen as a 
manifestation of different views within the group and it has presumably, to some 
extent, been tolerated by the leadership in order to keep the organisation united. For 
there is a fear that the IRA will split and that defectors will join dissident groups.^’ 
Quite apart fi'om the split of 1997, defections have already taken place since the 
signing of the agi'eement.^^ It is also in this context that one should view Keenan’s 
provocative words -  as an attempt to keep hardliners on b o a r d . T h e  recent
Ibid. p. 488.
Such as McDonald, H., ‘Grassroots IRA resist arms m ove’. Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireIand, December T* 2002 and Shan'ock, D., ‘IRA volunteers place 
faith in the Amialite ... not Adams’, The Daily Teleeraph. February 3"^  ^2000. Peter Taylor argues that 
Adams’ and McGuinness’ ‘great, and often umecognized, achievement is tliat they have brought the 
republican movement so far and presided over the abandonment o f so many o f  its cardinal principles 
without tearing it apart.’
Op. cit. Moloney p. 481.
Ibid. p. 469.
See ibid. pp. 468-9. This point was also made by the Irish Times (‘Violence blamed on tension in 
Provisionals’, Irish Times. March 16*^ ‘ 2000.)
See ‘IRA stance governed by fear o f defections’. The Irish Times. February 2000.
See McDonald, H., ‘Defections to rebels shake IRA’, Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
http://WWW .newsimlimited.co.uk/nirelaiid, December 5^ ' 1999.
His audience was a republican one and it was a time when Sinn Fein and the IRA sought to prevent 
defections to dissident republicans (see Keenan, B., quoted in Cowan, R., ‘IRA chief warns o f return to 
war if talks fail’, http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/nireland , February 27*'' 2001).
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introduction of a hardliner to the Army Council, for example, was designed to keep 
him from defecting to dissident republicans/'^
McKittrick stated that:
‘[one] view is that the continued existence of the IRA has not only been 
inevitable but in some respects valuable in ensuring that republicanism did 
not degenerate into dozens of violent shards. This was voiced by the former 
chief constable, Sir Romiie Flanagan, who said: ‘If we are going to have a 
peace delivered, then we can’t have people fragmenting all over the place and 
engaging imilaterally in violence. They remain intact. They continue to tTain, 
recruit and cany out intelligence gathering, which in some people’s eyes 
presents the greatest opportunities for the delivery of tme, enduring, 
disciplined and lasting peace.’ Alongside this line of thought exists, among 
many sections of opinion, the belief that it is unrealistic to thinic that all IRA 
activity can suddenly be switched off.’^ ^
Thus, it would appear that some elements see the organisation’s ceasefire as 
peimanent, while others might see a return to war as an option if the process does not 
lead to their ultimate goal. Others still might disagree with the process but are staying 
loyal to Adams and McGuinness. According to Patterson, Keenan believed that IRA 
violence had stopped too soon.^^ So the suggestion here is that it is unlielpful to look 
at IRA intentions and activity as a single well thought out sti*ategy, but rather they
Special Branch source, intei*view.
McKittrick, D, ‘Documents tliat prove the IRA is still active dissolved’. The Independent. 20‘'' April
2002.
Patterson, H., interview.
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should be viewed as representing the different strands of opinion within the 
mainsti'eam republican movement, although the Aimy Coimcil itself appears to have 
supported the Good Friday Agieement.
There may also be another organisational factor behind continuing IRA activity. It is 
unfortunately the case that the use of violence and the tlireat of violence is the only 
thing that has given the paramilitaries any relevance in Northem Ireland. If the IRA 
was to declare a cessation of activity what of the tensions between it and rival 
organisations in ‘the commimity’ such as the INLA.^^ Would the ‘community 
policing’ role be ceded to others in the republican heartlands? How would it control 
its illegal protection rackets without recourse to violence?^^ How also would it 
maintain its ‘social control’ of communities, or deal with dissidents who criticise its 
strategy, or potential defectors? It has to date used violence and the tlireat of violence 
to keep potential defectors on board.
These questions tlirow up an uncomfortable paradox. If violence has been the only 
thing that has given these gr oups any relevance, particularly at the local level, and the 
IRA was to cease all ‘activity’, then it risks becoming irrelevant, with the possibility 
that it would lose support to dissidents. Aughey stated that having failed to win the 
war, the IRA and Sinn Fein are now trying to win the ar*gument.^° Not only are they 
trying to prevail in this argument against the British government, but also against the 
dissident republican groups who hold firm to the ideology and traditions of Irish
See McGuigan, C., Tensions mount in IRA/INLA turf war’, The Simdav Life. December 8* 2003. 
The Real IRA’s Joe O’Comior was shot apparently because he attempted to move in on the IRA’s 
lucrative cigarette smuggling trade (Cusack, J., ‘New ferocity o f gang ‘wars’ outside Dublin’, Irish 
Times. June iT^ 200 n  
See O’Kane, M., ‘IRA dissidents arm to fight’, Guardian newsunlimited, website: 
http://www.newsimlimited.co.uk/uireland , February 1999.
^  Aughey, A., interview.
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republicanism. For tliis reason it would seem essential that the IRA remains intact. 
Any act of disbandment would be viewed by many of its own members as an act of 
surrender, and result in defections to the Real or Continuity IRA. In the case of the 
IRA, organisational survival has not come about despite the conditions of the 
‘external environment’ (ie. the peace process) but because of them (ie. the existence 
of dissident groups waiting to attract defectors). So wlhle mainstream republicans, 
who believe that they have been right along (with not a little encouragement from the 
British state -  see Chapter 8), are trying to get the message of a republican triumph 
across, disbanding their ‘legitimate army’ of a united Ireland would seriously 
undermine their pitch. It is therefore strategically vital for the long term republican 
project that the group is not dissolved in a huriy. As Aughey maintains ‘the effective 
leadership of the IRA is not in the process of disbanding the organisation but are 
winding it down to such a degree as to make it compatible with Sinn Fein 
progr-essing’.^ ^
Due to these organisational factors, then, it is possible to explain continuing IRA 
activity at the same time as argumg that the IRA leadership is committed to the peace 
process. The contention here is that Adams’ political strategy tlrrough Sinn Fein has 
ultimately come to represent moderation towards the use of violence -  for the post- 
September l/^’ 2001 environment and the importance of the Irish American diaspora 
to the IRA and Sinn Fein has meant that a return to ‘war’ is unlikely. Wlhle the 
gr eater utilisation of Sinn Fein may not have represented moderation in the 1970s and 
‘80s the conditions in the environment have since determined that it now does so.
Ibid.
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This would not have been possible, however, without the earlier development of the 
political front, even if this was geared to undermining the state in every possible way.
This does not mean to say that the strategic value of an intact IRA has been lost on 
republicans -  far from it. The tlneat of violence that this represents has continued to 
give Sinn Fein extra leverage in negotiations for further concessions. In a sense rather 
than the TUAS, it could be argued that republican strategy has become the ‘tactical 
use of the tln*eat of violence’. Nor should one unquestioningly assiune that the failure 
of the IRA to produce an unambiguous statement revealing its intentions in April 
2003 was entirely due to internal divisions. Sti'ategic considerations may well have 
played a part in preventing the group from ‘showing its hand’ too early -  ie. just 
before an election that might have delivered a very different negotiating adversary 
(the Democratic Unionist Party).*^  ^ A return to ‘war’, however, is imlikely for the 
reasons outlined above and the primacy of politics has meant that Sinn Fein has 
ultimately come to represent moderation towards the use of violence.
This thesis has primarily set out to do two things. Firstly, it has assessed a number of 
selected variables in the internal and external environments for their impact on the 
utility of political fr'onts. In the course of this it has, secondly, outlined the different 
utilities and roles of these fronts. As stated in the inti'oduction, by gaining a better 
understanding of this sphere of teiTorist gioup strategy it is hoped that opportunities 
for conflict resolution between governments and terrorist groups will ultimately be 
enlianced. Likewise, the importance of recognising the fact that political fr'onts can
The DUP was expected to seriously challenge the UUP’s position as the majority party o f  unionism  
but the Assembly election (originally scheduled for May 2003, and then May 29th) has been 
postponed until such time die British and Irish governments manage to broker a deal tliat resurrects the 
political institutions.
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have important utilities and functions that may have nothing to do with a more 
moderate attitude towards the use of violence should also be of interest to the 
policymaking community. For it should not be forgotten, and this thesis has set out to 
make this point in the case of the ERA in particular, that political fronts are very much 
part of the teiTorist machinery. They have been important tools for the dissemination 
of propaganda, for internationalising perceived grievances, for generating sympathy 
and support and providing the political voices of terrorist groups.
As stated at the outset tlris project has sought to make its own modest contribution to 
theory building. To reiterate, whilst it does not set out to construct an over-arching 
general theory, its conclusions can contribute to hypothesis building through 
subsequent analysis of further case studies. By assessing the impact of the selected 
variables and by identifying the various utilities of political fr onts in the Northem 
Ireland context it might then be possible to draw comparisons with other cases. One 
of the most important fruictions of The National Liberation Front of Kurdistan 
(ERNK), the political front for the Kiu'distan Workers’ Party (PKK)*"^ , for example, 
was to appeal to the Kurdish diaspora at all levels -  politically, socially and 
culturally.The desire to mobilise popular support and the international enviromnent 
were therefore fundamental factors behind the gi*eater utility of the ERNK, and so too, 
therefore, was its role as an important propaganda tool. It was particularly concerned 
with drawing the attention of the international community to alleged attacks by the
Which has now changed its name to Congiess for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (HADEK) 
see ‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’, GlobalSecurity.org, website; 
littp://www.globalsecuritv.ora/militarv/wor]d/üara/pkk.htm .
See KIC, Kurdistan Infomiatie Gentium, website: 
http://www.xs4aU.ul/~kicadam/t>ers/2000/I/05dQ30Q.htnil.
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Turkish authorities on Kurdish people and institutions/^ Therefore, as with Sinn Fein, 
the ERNK, has been engaged with highlighting alleged human rights abuses by the 
state authorities/^
The Basque separatist group ETA, too, has been concerned with mobilising popular 
support, evident in Herri Batasuna’s role as an electoral tool. It has also seiwed as a 
fundi'aising organisation for the group. One of the reasons that it was banned by the 
Spanish government was that its ‘113 ‘People’s Taverns’ raised money for ETA’s 
teiTorist activities’.^  ^ These same taverns apparently acted ‘as recruitment centres for 
young people’ highlighting another role for the political front in this case.^  ^Batasuna 
has also been heavily involved in the orchestration of sti*eet violence. In July 2002 it 
was fined the equivalent of eleven million pounds ‘for damage caused by its youth 
group’s campaign of street violence’ as part of a strategy ‘to destabilise the Basque 
region’. T h e  similarities with Simi Fein’s strategy and role are strildng and perhaps 
not surprising given the history of contacts between the IRA and ETA.^°
As this thesis has concluded that Sinn Fein has ultimately come to represent 
moderation on the part of the IRA towards the use of violence, what lessons can be 
learnt that can be applied to other cases? Of particular value to the policy making 
community would be the identification of the factors that facilitate the ti'ansfoimation
See ‘ERNK Statement about Ninova Refiigess and CHP Apologies’, MED Broadcasting Ltd., 
website: http : //w w w . ib.be/med/ww w /020398ninova.htm .
See website: littp://diiectorv.google.con'i/Ton/Societv/Etluiici(v/Kiirdish/Organi'zatiQns/ .
Judge Baltasar Garzon, quoted in SliaiTOck, D., ‘Basque political wing banned over Eta bloodshed’. 
The Times. August 27*'' 2002.
Ibid.
‘Eta must pay £ 11m for damage’. The Times. July 4**' 2002.
Batasmia representatives attended Simi Fein’s party conference o f 2002. Also members o f Herri 
Batasima attended every Sinn Fein annual conference from 1981-5, while Siim Fein members have 
been regular visitors to the Basque region o f Spain (see Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 
Background Brief, ‘The Provisional IRA: International Contacts Outside the United States’, January 
1988).
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of a political front from being part of the teiTorist group’s machinery (as its political 
voice, propaganda tool, street agitator, electoral tool and so on) to representing 
moderation towards the use of violence where it serves as the negotiator for the 
teiTorist group in a peace process. Certainly, the right leadership is vital. The IRA 
case has shown the importance of a leader capable enough to both bring the gioup 
into a peace process at the same time as keeping it relatively imited. The international 
environment has also been pivotal in bringing about moderation towards the use of 
violence. There can be little doubt that a third party is boimd to have more influence 
on an insurgent gioup than the traditional adversary of the state in which it operates. 
By developing its linlcs with Washington the republican movement managed to gain 
the attention of a powerful third party that was going to have more sympathy with its 
cause than the British government and so could be perceived (in republican eyes) as 
more of a neutral arbiter in the conflict. It is worth noting that ETA has recently 
launched a magazine called Zutabe with the intention of courting sympathy abroad.
It will be interesting to see whether ETA’s attempts to internationalise its struggle will 
be puisued through its political front (and how difficult this will be when it has been 
banned) as the IRA did so successfully with Sinn Fein.
Nevertheless the ‘home’ state’s response is also pivotal in facilitating such a 
transformation. Firstly, the security response in the 1990s put enough pressiue on the 
IRA to force it to admit that a military victory was not achievable. To complement 
this the British government attempted to diaw the IRA’s political front into an all- 
inclusive peace process. Spain has adopted a very different policy against ETA and 
HB. Chapter 8 outlines a number of fimdamental differences between the Northern
See Tremlett, G., ‘Basque Tenorists wage war o f words’, The Guardian. October 18**' 2002.
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Ireland and Basque situations that make any comparison questionable/^ The 
proscription of Herri Batasuna, however, not only disenfr anchises approximately 10% 
of the Basque electorate but also removes the possibility that the political front might 
ultimately provide a democratic outlet -  for, finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
chance events have played a fundamental role in moderating the stance of the IRA 
towards the use of violence. September 11^ '’ 2001 has created an environment where 
teiTorism is no longer tolerated, particularly in the United States. It is possible that, as 
in the case of the IRA, allowing a terrorist political front to develop might ultimately 
provide the political outlet for a terrorist group should the environmental conditions 
determine that a more moderate approach towards the use of violence be taken.
It is difficult to envisage, for example, the Spanish govermnent declaring its neutrality on the 
constitutional status o f the region, when it forms part o f mainland Spain (and when other regions in a 
very decentialised system might demand the same), and thus destabilise the national fabric o f the 
country. It is therefore not easy to imagine how the Spanish goveiiiment could offer more than regional 
autonomy.
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